Release govoplan-access v0.1.25: harden authentication and repair identity mappings

2026-09-08 01:32:20 +02:00
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+# Authentication cache boundary hardening
+
+The authentication cache is an optimization, never an additional authentication
+method or permission source. The September 2026 review found and reproduced
+three violations of that boundary in isolated SQLite tests.
+
+| Finding | Consequence | Resolution |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Service-account credentials passed through ordinary principal-summary refresh | A narrowed service-account ceiling could be replaced by backing membership roles; the service-account identifier and authentication method were lost. | Dedicated service-account resolution retains its provenance and checks the current ceiling/lifecycle on every request. It does not enter the interactive principal-summary cache. |
+| A warmed API-key summary accepted the same secret through a session cookie | The warm path accepted a cookie-authenticated mutation without the CSRF rule applied to real browser sessions; the cold path rejected the credential. | API keys require an explicit Bearer or X-API-Key header on both paths. Session cookies still require matching CSRF cookie/header/hash for mutations. |
+| Tenant-key intersection excluded only the historical `system:` spelling | Module-native system permissions and retained module wildcards could survive the tenant-only intersection. | Resolve wildcard grants to concrete registered tenant permissions and exclude system permissions by catalogue and compatibility aliases. |
+
+No existing secrets, sessions, assignments, or database schema are changed.
+Normal header-authenticated API keys and concrete tenant aliases remain
+compatible. Clients relying on API keys in browser cookies, implicit unknown
+wildcards, or accidental instance-level rights must correct their authentication
+method or permission configuration; these are not preserved as compatibility
+exceptions. Stored grants are not rewritten. Service-account access continues
+to narrow immediately when its ceiling is reduced or its lifecycle blocks use.
+
+Regression coverage is in `tests/test_auth_cache_security.py` and
+`tests/test_permission_catalog_contract.py`; the tests exercise the full
+credential resolver with principal caching enabled, not only the lower-level
+API-key lookup. They also verify that valid session CSRF and concrete legacy
+tenant aliases still work.
+
+## Remaining coordinated password-change workflow
+
+`Account.password_reset_required` is currently advisory metadata, not an
+enforced sign-in restriction. The administrator UI states this limitation,
+but the authentication-fields documentation previously claimed mandatory
+replacement; its English and German text now reflects the implementation.
+A generated password is disclosed once but is not a single-use login secret.
+
+A follow-up must deliver the password-change endpoint, current-password
+verification and replacement policy, CSRF and attempt limits, session
+revocation/rotation and cache invalidation, a restricted reset-required
+principal, and the corresponding accessible UI/recovery path together.
+Enabling only a rejection gate would lock affected accounts out without any
+supported way to finish the change. This review does not enable such a gate or
+change existing passwords.
+
+## Betriebshinweise
+
+API-Schlüssel werden ausschließlich über `Authorization: Bearer` oder
+`X-API-Key` gesendet, nicht über das Sitzungscookie. Ändernde Cookie-Anfragen
+benötigen weiterhin einen passenden CSRF-Header samt Cookie und serverseitigem
+Prüfwert. Dienstkonten behalten ihre eigene Herkunft und werden bei jeder
+Anfrage gegen den aktuellen Berechtigungsrahmen und Lebenszyklus geprüft.
+Mitgliedschaftsrollen oder zwischengespeicherte interaktive Rechte dürfen diesen
+Rahmen nicht ersetzen.
+
+Mandantenschlüssel erhalten keine instanzweiten Rechte, auch nicht unter
+modulbezogenen Berechtigungsnamen. Platzhalter werden in konkrete registrierte
+Mandantenrechte aufgelöst. Bestehende konkrete Mandantenrechte und ihre
+Kompatibilitätsnamen bleiben erhalten; gespeicherte Geheimnisse und
+Rollenzuweisungen werden nicht geändert.
+
+Das Kennzeichen `password_reset_required` erzwingt derzeit keinen
+Passwortwechsel. Ein einmal angezeigtes Anfangspasswort bleibt zur Anmeldung
+verwendbar. Die Nachfolgeumsetzung muss Passwortänderung, eng begrenzten
+Zwischenzugriff, Sitzungswechsel beziehungsweise Widerruf und eine bedienbare
+Wiederherstellung gemeinsam liefern; eine alleinige Zugriffssperre würde
+betroffene Konten ohne durchführbaren Passwortwechsel aussperren.