security(connectors): reject tunneled metadata addresses

tests/test_http_fetch.py

@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ class HttpFetchTests(unittest.TestCase):
             "255.255.255.255",
             "::",
             "::ffff:255.255.255.255",
+            "64:ff9b::169.254.169.254",
+            "64:ff9b::255.255.255.255",
+            "fd00:ec2::254",
             "fe80::1",
             "ff02::1",
         ):
@@ -95,6 +98,21 @@ class HttpFetchTests(unittest.TestCase):
             ), self.assertRaisesRegex(OutboundHttpBlocked, "forbidden special-purpose network"):
                 validate_outbound_http_url("https://connector.example.test/path", policy=policy)
 
+    def test_public_policy_rejects_reserved_and_ipv4_embedded_ipv6_addresses(self) -> None:
+        policy = outbound_http_policy({"APP_ENV": "production"})
+        for address in (
+            "fec0::1",
+            "::127.0.0.1",
+            "64:ff9b::8.8.8.8",
+            "64:ff9b::127.0.0.1",
+            "2002:7f00:1::",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(address=address), patch(
+                "govoplan_core.security.outbound_http.socket.getaddrinfo",
+                return_value=[(10, 1, 6, "", (address, 443, 0, 0))],
+            ), self.assertRaises(OutboundHttpBlocked):
+                validate_outbound_http_url("https://connector.example.test/path", policy=policy)
+
     def test_outbound_policy_rejects_mixed_public_and_private_dns_answers(self) -> None:
         policy = outbound_http_policy({"APP_ENV": "production"})
         with patch(