docs(core): refine function-bound postbox encryption
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@@ -57,6 +57,11 @@ The trust layer should provide:
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- key rotation and epoch tracking
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- recovery policy hooks
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Recovery must be organizationally governed. A server-held universal plaintext
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key would defeat the E2EE claim; any escrow, threshold recovery, or emergency
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grant needs an explicit assurance profile, authority/quorum, audit trail, and
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user-visible consequence.
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## Role And Function Postboxes
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Role-bound access needs special handling. A postbox can be bound to an
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@@ -75,6 +80,30 @@ rewrapping service:
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Key epochs are required when role membership changes. Older messages may remain
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readable according to policy, but new access must use the current epoch.
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The function-bound container exists independently of membership. It may remain
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vacant and continue to receive ciphertext without falling back to an unrelated
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personal mailbox. Zero, one, or several incumbents are valid states. Each
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incumbent receives an independently auditable, device-bound wrapped-key path;
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the postbox is never copied into their account ownership.
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A new assignment or hand-over rotates the function/postbox key epoch. Envelope
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encryption permits the normal rotation path to rewrap per-message data keys
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rather than rewrite large ciphertext objects; a security policy may require
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full content re-encryption for selected compromise or cryptographic-profile
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events. The history available to a new incumbent must be selected policy (all
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retained history, a bounded historical window, or assignment-time content) and
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recorded with the grant.
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Delegation is a time-bounded represented-function grant, not a copy or
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substitution of the postbox. Expiry or withdrawal stops future key release and
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actions. It cannot revoke plaintext already decrypted, printed, exported, or
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captured outside the platform. Multiple simultaneous incumbents and delegates
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remain distinguishable in key-fetch and action evidence.
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Postbox content and signed manifests are immutable. Correction or replacement
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creates a linked new object/version; it never silently substitutes ciphertext
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or evidence that another actor may already have inspected.
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## External Recipients
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External recipients may need one-time or time-limited access without a full
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