Record governed encryption lifecycle defaults
This commit is contained in:
@@ -18,6 +18,37 @@ certification claim. Stronger claims require a named protection profile whose
|
|||||||
provider, clients, algorithms, backup procedure, and failure tests have passed
|
provider, clients, algorithms, backup procedure, and failure tests have passed
|
||||||
the profile's conformance and security review.
|
the profile's conformance and security review.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Approved Product Baseline
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The product decision recorded on 2026-08-04 separates module activation from
|
||||||
|
content protection. Enabling Encryption makes its capabilities and
|
||||||
|
administration available but never encrypts existing or new content by itself.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- System definitions are reusable profile templates. Tenants explicitly
|
||||||
|
activate profiles for an owner-module collection or individual object.
|
||||||
|
Accounts and groups remain policy subjects rather than cryptographic scopes.
|
||||||
|
- New objects inherit protection only inside an explicitly activated scope.
|
||||||
|
Existing objects move through an explicit, checkpointed, copy-on-write
|
||||||
|
migration with verified cutover.
|
||||||
|
- The first production profile is managed server-envelope encryption backed by
|
||||||
|
a KMS/HSM provider. The bundled local provider remains a bounded reference
|
||||||
|
implementation. Tenant-held and client E2EE profiles require separate
|
||||||
|
provider approval and conformance evidence.
|
||||||
|
- Recovery defaults to a high-assurance, distinct-custodian 2-of-3 quorum with
|
||||||
|
requester separation. Ordinary platform administration does not bypass the
|
||||||
|
ceremony.
|
||||||
|
- Horizontally scaled nodes may receive only short-lived, in-memory unwrap
|
||||||
|
grants. They do not persist usable key material on node-local storage.
|
||||||
|
- Disable remains blocked until every protected object is verifiably decrypted,
|
||||||
|
migrated, exported, or destroyed. Externally opaque ciphertext must be
|
||||||
|
resolved through its provider before the owning profile can be removed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
After a migration has retired plaintext, reversal is another governed
|
||||||
|
migration rather than retention of an undisclosed plaintext rollback copy.
|
||||||
|
True E2EE is deliberately not part of the first production profile because it
|
||||||
|
changes search, server-side processing, inspection, reporting, legal-hold
|
||||||
|
export, and recovery guarantees.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Ownership Boundary
|
## Ownership Boundary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Encryption owns:
|
Encryption owns:
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user