Add governed encryption administration
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@@ -36,6 +36,27 @@ an ownership transfer does not transfer cryptographic custody.
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No capability in this module accepts or returns plaintext key material.
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## Administration Surface
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Tenant encryption custodians can inspect bounded vault, envelope, migration,
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recovery, and disable-preflight summaries. These read models deliberately omit
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provider key references, wrapped-key references, ciphertext locations, and
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cryptographic material. They are tenant-scoped and bounded to prevent the
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operator interface from becoming an unrestricted metadata export.
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Vault lifecycle actions require optimistic revision, policy-decision, recent
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assurance, reason, and idempotency evidence. Rotation does not silently migrate
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old envelopes. Revocation and scheduled destruction explain that prior
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plaintext cannot be recalled and that content may become unavailable. A
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migration request only authorizes the operation: the feature module that owns
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the content must durably apply it and record evidence before success. Provider
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outcome reconciliation never converts an unknown outcome into success without
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that evidence.
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Recovery requests show quorum, distinct-custodian, expiry, and requester
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separation requirements. Approval authorizes a later provider-specific action;
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it does not return keys, change resource ownership, or prove execution.
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## Assets and Threat Actors
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Protected assets include content plaintext, data-encryption keys, wrapping keys,
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