# govoplan-files **Repository type:** module (domain). GovOPlaN Files is the managed file module. It bundles backend storage APIs and the Files WebUI package so file features can be installed as one module. ## Ownership This repository owns: - backend module manifest `files` - file permissions such as `files:file:read`, `files:file:upload`, `files:file:download`, `files:file:organize`, and `files:file:delete` - file-space, file metadata, share, upload, download, pattern matching, and transfer APIs - SQLAlchemy file models and module migration registration - WebUI package `@govoplan/files-webui` - `/files` route and IconRail navigation contribution Core owns auth, tenants, RBAC evaluation, database/session primitives, CSRF/API helpers, and shell layout. ## Development Install through the core environment: ```bash cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-core ./.venv/bin/python -m pip install -r requirements-dev.txt ``` Run the WebUI from the core host: ```bash cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-core/webui PATH=/home/zemion/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.3/bin:$PATH /home/zemion/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.3/bin/npm run dev ``` ## Module integration Backend entry point: ```toml [project.entry-points."govoplan.modules"] files = "govoplan_files.backend.manifest:get_manifest" ``` Frontend package: ```text @govoplan/files-webui ``` The campaign module can integrate with files when both modules are installed, for example for managed attachment selection and campaign file sharing. Files does not import campaign internals; campaign share/existence checks use the core `campaigns.access` capability registered by the campaign module. Files also publishes the optional `privacy.dsar.files` capability. The Core data-subject workflow can use it to collect bounded, tenant-scoped file, version, share, folder, evidence, and non-secret configuration metadata for a direct membership subject. The provider may revoke a subject-targeted share or detach mutable actor references idempotently, but it never exports credential material or raw bytes and never bypasses Files retention, legal hold, evidence, purge approval, audit, or recovery controls. See the handbook's data-subject request coverage section for the review and erasure boundary. Platform RBAC and governance rules are documented in `govoplan-core/docs/`. Managed files can carry source provenance for connector and import workflows. Upload callers may provide `source_provenance_json` and `source_revision`; the module stores those values under file metadata, returns normalized `source_provenance` and `source_revision` fields in file responses, and carries them into managed campaign attachment matches for frozen execution evidence. Connector policy preflight is available through `POST /api/v1/files/connector-policy/evaluate`, and provenance-bearing uploads can pass `connector_policy_json` to enforce the same policy before file content is read. Policy payloads contain ordered `sources`; each source has `scope_type`, optional `scope_id`, optional `label`, and a `policy` object. The policy object supports `allow`/`allowlist`/`whitelist` and `deny`/`denylist`/`blacklist` rules for `connectors`, `providers`, `external_ids`, `external_paths`, and `external_urls`. Deny rules win across the hierarchy; allow rules narrow access at each source that defines them. Connector endpoint settings are exposed through governed connector profiles. Profiles can be supplied as JSON through `GOVOPLAN_FILES_CONNECTOR_PROFILES_JSON`, or from a JSON file path through `GOVOPLAN_FILES_CONNECTOR_PROFILES_FILE`. Each profile has an `id`, `provider`, `endpoint_url`, governance `scope_type`/`scope_id`, optional `capabilities`, and deployment-owned credential references such as `password_env`, `token_env`, or `secret_ref`. Environment references require an exact name in the deployment-wide `GOVOPLAN_CONNECTOR_SECRET_ENV_ALLOWLIST`; API-managed profiles cannot select process environment variables and may use only Files-owned encrypted password or token values. API-created `secret_ref` values fail closed until Files has an ownership contract that can confirm provider-side deletion. Legacy external references are treated as non-owned: deleting a profile or credential detaches and audits the reference but never passes it to an arbitrary secret provider. Profile and credential deletion immediately clears encrypted values, credential identities, deployment references, and private metadata in the same transaction as the non-secret audit record; an audit failure rolls the deletion back. `GET /api/v1/files/connectors/profiles` returns only profiles visible to the current principal (system, tenant, user, group, or accessible campaign scope) and redacts secret values and environment variable names. Use the returned `policy_sources` with connector policy preflight before importing files. `GET /api/v1/files/connectors/providers` exposes provider descriptors for Seafile, Nextcloud, WebDAV, SMB, NFS, and local filesystem connectors. The descriptor declares implementation status, optional dependencies, permission mapping, sync/index strategy, conflict handling, preview behavior, and audit events so provider coverage remains visible without forcing every optional protocol dependency to be installed. `GET /api/v1/files/connectors/profiles/{profile_id}/browse` provides read-only connector browsing. Browse entries use a shared `library`/`folder`/`file` shape, run profile policy with the `browse` operation, and support Seafile, WebDAV/Nextcloud, and SMB when the optional `smb` extra is installed. Seafile profiles browse libraries and directories via Seafile's read-only API; profiles can still opt into WebDAV browsing by setting `metadata.webdav_endpoint_url` or `metadata.browse_protocol` to `webdav`. S3-compatible profiles support bucket and prefix browsing when the optional `s3` extra is installed. `POST /api/v1/files/connectors/profiles/{profile_id}/import` imports a Seafile or WebDAV/Nextcloud/SMB file into managed storage through the same governance, conflict handling, source provenance, and connector audit path as direct uploads. The Seafile provider uses account-token auth and the native file download-link API; Nextcloud and generic WebDAV profiles use authenticated `GET` requests against the configured WebDAV endpoint. SMB profiles use `smb://server[:port]/share[/path]` endpoints and deployment-owned or encrypted stored credentials through `smbprotocol`. Files installs a pinned transport for every initial session, reconnect, alias, and DFS referral target. The deployment private-network policy is re-evaluated immediately before each socket opens. S3 connector browse/import binds botocore HTTP and HTTPS pools to the same pinned socket policy. Retries, redirects, endpoint discovery, bucket aliases, and new connections are therefore revalidated while TLS keeps the configured hostname for SNI and certificate checks. Connector clients do not use outbound proxies or ambient AWS credential discovery; configure credentials on the governed profile, or explicitly use an anonymous profile for public objects. Keep connector spaces read-only unless a remote write is explicitly needed. An S3 profile with the `write` capability can back a two-way connector space. `POST /api/v1/files/connector-spaces/{space_id}/write-back` then conditionally creates or replaces one remote object from a managed file, records durable recovery intent before the provider effect, and verifies request/content markers afterward. Automatic remote delete, rename, move, and ACL propagation remain disabled; other connector providers remain read-only. An incompatible SDK upgrade fails closed before a usable client/session is returned. Durable platform storage has a separate deployment boundary: installer-owned Garage is accepted only at its exact generated endpoint, while an operator-selected external backend requires a clean HTTPS origin and `FILE_STORAGE_S3_ENDPOINT_TRUSTED=true`. That flag is deployment configuration, cannot be supplied through a Files connector profile, and does not replace operator responsibility for DNS, certificates, egress, bucket policy, versioning, and recovery. The actual local/S3 backend implementation is owned by Core so Files, Campaign, and workers resolve the same object namespace. Files owns file metadata and key layout. Node-local storage is supported only for `local` or one-host `host-shared` profiles; multi-host `shared` deployments require S3. Destructive Files-module retirement applies the same credential lifecycle before dropping tables. Every remaining Files-owned encrypted connector secret is scrubbed and audited first, while legacy non-owned external references are detached and identified as such in the audit record. Retirement does not claim or attempt provider-side deletion for references Files cannot prove it owns. Local connector development assets live in `dev/connectors/`. The compose stack boots Nextcloud, Seafile, WebDAV, and SMB endpoints for provider development and manual interoperability testing. Connector and collaboration ownership boundaries are documented in `docs/CONNECTOR_BOUNDARY.md` and `docs/DOCUMENT_COLLABORATION_BOUNDARY.md`. The role-adaptive user, administration, integration, and operator guide is the [Files handbook](docs/FILES_HANDBOOK.md). The Files route, connector surfaces, consequence classes, and pattern-language verification are recorded in [Files interface pattern migration](docs/INTERFACE_PATTERN_MIGRATION.md). Archive imports use a two-phase preview and confirmation flow for ZIP, TAR, TAR.GZ, TAR.BZ2, and TAR.XZ. Requests are spooled to bounded temporary files; the server validates paths, entry count, expanded size, and expansion ratio, then returns a 30-minute tenant/user-bound preview token. Confirmation reuploads the original archive and stores only the selected members. Password-protected ZIP passwords remain request-only and are never included in the preview token. Managed blob writes and applied orphan cleanup use Core's durable recovery ledger. On PostgreSQL, intent, request digests, recovery mode, and a distributed lease are committed before physical storage effects; the Files session commit verifies database and streamed object evidence, while rollback compensates only a newly reserved unreferenced key. Development SQLite records blob intent in the caller transaction to avoid its second-writer deadlock, then verifies on commit or reconstructs compensation evidence after handled rollback. Because a hard loss before that commit can leave an unrecorded object, SQLite requires a complete integrity scan after a crash and is not a production recovery profile. New object keys are opaque and do not retain the uploaded filename. Uncertain or mismatched effects remain visible through Ops. Operators with `files:file:admin` can run bounded, resumable integrity scans in Administration. Scan batches and finding actions carry monotonic revisions; stale resume, recheck, or cleanup requests fail before touching object storage. Orphan cleanup always requires a dry-run preview followed by separate confirmation and records recovery-ledger evidence. Bulk rename and transfer APIs are owner-scoped: callers must provide the active user or group file space with `owner_type` and `owner_id`. The storage layer keeps a named legacy file-only helper for historical callers that lack owner context, and regression tests cover its write-access checks. Optional producer modules can persist generated output through the provider- neutral `files.artifact_store` capability. Files remains responsible for upload authorization, ownership, path normalization, versioning, and blob storage; producers receive stable file/version references without importing Files internals. See [Generated Artifact Store](docs/GENERATED_ARTIFACT_STORE.md). ## Release packaging The repository root includes a `package.json` for git-based WebUI installs. It exports the package `@govoplan/files-webui` from `webui/src` so release builds can depend on tagged git refs instead of local `file:` paths.