Add identity trust administration surfaces
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@@ -9,13 +9,29 @@ authentication-assurance evidence, and auditable key-access trust decisions.
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It deliberately does not own login sessions, resource authorization, private
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keys, encryption, or plaintext.
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The headless module exposes `identity_trust.directory` and
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The backend exposes `identity_trust.directory` and
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`identity_trust.assurance`. Access or Policy must approve resource access
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first; Identity Trust then verifies the acting account, active public device
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key, current subject epoch, and assurance evidence. Encryption providers may
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consume that decision to rewrap a key, but no key material is returned by this
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module.
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The WebUI contributes two optional surfaces:
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- **Settings > Device trust** lets an account inspect active/revoked public
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device keys, revoke a current key with its expected revision, and inspect
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assurance level, provider, device binding, expiry, and provenance.
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- **Administration > Identity trust** lets an authorized security officer use
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an Access-backed account selector when Access is available, inspect the same
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bounded projections, rotate subject epochs with an upstream Access decision,
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and review immutable key-access decisions. Explicit account references remain
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usable when the optional Access directory is absent.
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Revocation and rotation are not retroactive: neither can recall plaintext,
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exports, or key material already obtained by an endpoint. Stale revisions fail
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closed and must be reloaded. The API and UI expose public JWK metadata only;
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private JWK parameters are rejected by the capability contract.
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Focused verification:
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```bash
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