[Task] S/MIME/OpenPGP signing/encryption with no-silent-downgrade policy #2

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opened 2026-07-06 11:37:00 +02:00 by zemion · 2 comments
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Imported from the consolidated GovOPlaN product backlog.

  • Source: /mnt/DATA/Nextcloud/ADD ideas UG/Products/govoplan/backlog.md
  • Line: 209
  • Section: Milestones > Milestone 12 - Later Integrations And Mail Capabilities
  • Source status: DEFERRED.

Imported backlog item:

- [ ] S/MIME/OpenPGP signing/encryption with no-silent-downgrade policy.
<!-- codex-backlog-fingerprint:e78ff97420600872632ad7b3 --> Imported from the consolidated GovOPlaN product backlog. - Source: `/mnt/DATA/Nextcloud/ADD ideas UG/Products/govoplan/backlog.md` - Line: `209` - Section: `Milestones > Milestone 12 - Later Integrations And Mail Capabilities` - Source status: `DEFERRED.` Imported backlog item: ```markdown - [ ] S/MIME/OpenPGP signing/encryption with no-silent-downgrade policy. ```
zemion added this to the Milestone 12 - Later Integrations And Mail Capabilities milestone 2026-07-06 13:24:36 +02:00
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Owner

Evaluation: intentionally not implemented as a local Mail toggle.

The existing govoplan-encryption repository is a boundary scaffold, not a cryptographic runtime. Safe S/MIME/OpenPGP delivery requires decisions and interoperability fixtures for: supported profiles/algorithms; user/organization signing identity and key custody (local vault, KMS/HSM, or external provider); recipient certificate/key discovery and trust/revocation; signing identity selection; and explicit failure/fallback semantics.

Invariant recommendation: required signing/encryption must fail closed, and no path may silently downgrade. Keep this issue open and link it to the future Encryption/Identity Trust provider rather than storing private keys or ad-hoc crypto in Mail.

Evaluation: intentionally not implemented as a local Mail toggle. The existing `govoplan-encryption` repository is a boundary scaffold, not a cryptographic runtime. Safe S/MIME/OpenPGP delivery requires decisions and interoperability fixtures for: supported profiles/algorithms; user/organization signing identity and key custody (local vault, KMS/HSM, or external provider); recipient certificate/key discovery and trust/revocation; signing identity selection; and explicit failure/fallback semantics. Invariant recommendation: required signing/encryption must fail closed, and no path may silently downgrade. Keep this issue open and link it to the future Encryption/Identity Trust provider rather than storing private keys or ad-hoc crypto in Mail.
zemion added
status
needs-info
and removed
status
triage
labels 2026-07-31 22:54:52 +02:00
Author
Owner

Codex State: ready

Summary

  • Product/security profile approved on 2026-08-04: implement S/MIME as the first institutional profile and OpenPGP as an additional explicit profile.
  • Private-key custody belongs to Encryption/KMS and never to Mail. Recipient certificates/keys initially come from administered directory or LDAP sources; opportunistic internet discovery is deferred.
  • Required signing or encryption fails closed on missing, expired, revoked, unverifiable, or provider-unavailable material. Plaintext fallback is permitted only by an explicit audited policy and is never silent.
  • Signing identity, trust/revocation evidence, algorithm suite, key version, and downgrade decision remain pinned in delivery evidence.

Next / Blocked

  • The decision blocker is resolved; implementation should begin with provider-neutral S/MIME custody and interoperability fixtures.

Suggested status label: status/ready

## Codex State: ready ### Summary - Product/security profile approved on 2026-08-04: implement S/MIME as the first institutional profile and OpenPGP as an additional explicit profile. - Private-key custody belongs to Encryption/KMS and never to Mail. Recipient certificates/keys initially come from administered directory or LDAP sources; opportunistic internet discovery is deferred. - Required signing or encryption fails closed on missing, expired, revoked, unverifiable, or provider-unavailable material. Plaintext fallback is permitted only by an explicit audited policy and is never silent. - Signing identity, trust/revocation evidence, algorithm suite, key version, and downgrade decision remain pinned in delivery evidence. ### Next / Blocked - The decision blocker is resolved; implementation should begin with provider-neutral S/MIME custody and interoperability fixtures. Suggested status label: `status/ready`
zemion added
status
ready
and removed
status
needs-info
codex/needs-human
labels 2026-08-04 13:18:31 +02:00
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Reference: GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail#2