Establish certifiable Voting provider boundary

docs/CERTIFIABLE_VOTING_PROGRAM.md

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# Native certifiable Voting program
+
+## Objective and non-claim
+
+GovOPlaN may develop a native end-to-end verifiable Voting provider, but the
+current platform and bundled `local_confidential` provider are not certified
+voting products. Certification cannot be obtained by adding a label, tests, or
+general platform security controls. It applies to a precisely bounded Target
+of Evaluation (TOE), version, evaluated configuration, lifecycle, and evidence
+set assessed by an independent laboratory and certification authority.
+
+The native provider must therefore be an isolated assurance component behind
+`voting.provider.<id>`, not an implicit claim over all of GovOPlaN. Voting owns
+the governed ballot lifecycle and evidence projection; the TOE owns ballot
+secrecy, cryptographic casting, verification, tallying, and the evaluated
+ceremony. Policy, Access, Identity Trust, Encryption, Forms Runtime, Workflow
+Engine, Committee, Decisions, Audit, Records, and Reporting may support the
+journey without being silently pulled into the TOE.
+
+## Program stages
+
+### 1. Protection profile and legal target
+
+- identify election classes, jurisdictions, attack potential, voting
+  principles, accessibility duties, and retention obligations;
+- select the applicable BSI Protection Profile/TR and Common Criteria target;
+- engage a recognized evaluation facility before fixing the architecture;
+- write the Security Target, assumptions, threats, organizational policies,
+  security objectives, and evaluated configuration.
+
+### 2. TOE and trust boundaries
+
+- specify client, election server, bulletin board, verifier, tally component,
+  key ceremony, build/release chain, time source, and operator boundaries;
+- define electorate preparation and archival as explicit supporting processes
+  when they are outside the TOE;
+- prohibit node-local authoritative state and undeclared side channels;
+- define compromise, suspension, challenge, annulment, recovery, and evidence
+  export before implementation.
+
+### 3. Protocol and independent review
+
+- select a published, independently reviewed end-to-end verifiable protocol;
+- use reviewed cryptographic libraries and parameter suites rather than
+  designing new cryptography;
+- provide individual and universal verification without exposing vote choice;
+- define coercion-resistance claims truthfully, including what is not solved;
+- commission independent cryptographic and privacy review before production.
+
+### 4. Conformance implementation
+
+- implement canonical ballot/electorate/result/evidence encodings;
+- bind every cast and tally artifact to the frozen definition and electorate;
+- provide deterministic conformance fixtures, malformed-input suites,
+  property tests, fault injection, and cross-implementation verification;
+- preserve receipt privacy and prevent credentials, raw votes, or private keys
+  from entering GovOPlaN evidence projections;
+- expose certification state through `VotingProviderAssuranceDeclaration`.
+
+### 5. Controlled lifecycle
+
+- reproducible, signed builds and reviewed dependencies;
+- role-separated source, release, election, key-custody, and audit authority;
+- vulnerability handling, maintenance impact analysis, SBOM, provenance, and
+  controlled update path for in-progress elections;
+- production ceremonies, backup/restore, disaster recovery, secure deletion,
+  monitoring, incident response, and independently witnessed evidence.
+
+### 6. Evaluation and operation
+
+- laboratory pre-evaluation and gap remediation;
+- formal Common Criteria evaluation/certification of an exact TOE version;
+- target-specific deployment acceptance against the evaluated configuration;
+- certificate and maintenance-report monitoring;
+- fail-closed retirement or profile downgrade when validity expires or the
+  evaluated configuration changes.
+
+## Work-product gates
+
+Native implementation can proceed through fixtures and research profiles, but
+the `external_certified` runtime profile remains unavailable until all of these
+are independently evidenced:
+
+- approved Security Target and TOE boundary;
+- independent protocol/cryptographic review;
+- conformance and adverse-condition evidence;
+- controlled build and release provenance;
+- operational ceremony and recovery evidence;
+- valid product/version/configuration-specific certificate.
+
+Research, evaluation, and certified states are separate. A provider in
+evaluation may support a bounded test profile, but cannot become certified by
+configuration or administrator override.
+

docs/POLYAS_PROVIDER_PROFILE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# POLYAS provider profile
+
+## Current integration position
+
+POLYAS is the first external provider selected for high-assurance GovOPlaN
+Voting. This is an integration decision, not a certification claim. Until a
+contracted machine interface, sandbox, exact product/version binding, and
+current certificate evidence are available, the integration remains
+operator-assisted and must not advertise the `external_certified` assurance
+profile.
+
+The public POLYAS material documents the Online Voting Manager, spreadsheet
+electoral-roll import, PDF/Excel result export, an election control portal,
+verification tools, SecureLink, and an electoral-board interface. It does not
+document a stable public API that is sufficient for an unattended GovOPlaN
+provider. The initial integration therefore uses the existing external
+provider contract as its target and keeps manual handoffs explicit:
+
+1. GovOPlaN freezes the ballot definition and electorate hashes.
+2. An authorized election officer creates and seals the corresponding POLYAS
+   election using a reviewed export.
+3. GovOPlaN records the POLYAS project reference, exact product/profile, and
+   handoff evidence without storing voter credentials.
+4. Voters enter the provider through its controlled launch or invitation path.
+5. An authorized officer imports signed result and protocol artifacts.
+6. GovOPlaN verifies the frozen binding, records aggregate results and evidence,
+   and retains certification, challenge, and annulment as separate actions.
+
+Operator-assisted imports must be labelled as such. Browser automation or
+screen scraping is not an acceptable production API.
+
+## Provider information required
+
+Before implementing unattended preparation, launch, status, or result
+acquisition, obtain from POLYAS:
+
+- the contracted API/protocol specification and versioning policy;
+- sandbox credentials and representative test-election fixtures;
+- supported ballot methods, weighting, voter groups, replacement, quorum, and
+  threshold semantics;
+- idempotency, revision, sealing, cancellation, outcome-unknown, and retry
+  behavior;
+- invitation and voter-authentication boundaries;
+- signed result, archive, audit, and verification artifact formats;
+- retention, deletion, subprocessor, location, incident, and DPA terms;
+- product/version-specific Security Target, certificate, maintenance reports,
+  validity period, and evaluated configuration;
+- recovery and continuity evidence for an election in progress.
+
+Credentials belong in governed credential envelopes. Raw selections, voter
+credentials, recovery codes, and private provider keys must never cross the
+Voting provider boundary.
+
+## Certification gate
+
+The BSI certificate `BSI-DSZ-CC-0862-V2-2021` for POLYAS CORE 2.5.0, including
+maintained versions described by its maintenance reports, was valid through
+2026-06-24. As of 2026-08-04, that validity date has passed. A new election must
+not be labelled `external_certified` from this historical certificate alone.
+
+The adapter must expose a `VotingProviderAssuranceDeclaration`. The runtime
+accepts `external_certified` only when the declaration pins:
+
+- the exact provider and implementation contract;
+- supported assurance profile and protocol version;
+- certification authority and reference;
+- an independently retrievable evidence reference;
+- a current validity window.
+
+The declaration is frozen with the ballot and revalidated before cast and
+finalization. Expiry, revocation, provider replacement, protocol change, or
+certificate substitution fails closed and requires explicit reconciliation.
+
+Authoritative references:
+
+- [BSI certificate record](https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Zertifikate_CC/CC/Sonstiges/0862_0862V2.html)
+- [BSI TR-03169](https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03169/BSI-TR-03169.pdf)
+- [POLYAS security overview](https://support.polyas.com/en/faqs/security/ensure-secure-voting/)
+- [POLYAS election control portal](https://support.polyas.com/en/online-voting-manager/features/authentication/election-control-portal/)
+

docs/VOTING_DOMAIN.md

@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ credentials inside its own assurance boundary and returns aggregate counts,
 weighted counts, a result hash, and evidence. GovOPlaN does not claim that a
 provider or deployment satisfies legal or certification requirements merely
 because the adapter contract is implemented.
+Each provider declares supported assurance profiles, protocol and
+implementation identity, and certification state. Voting pins that declaration
+when opening and revalidates it before provider casting and finalization.
+`external_certified` requires a current authority, certificate reference,
+evidence reference, and validity window; a changed, expired, or revoked claim
+fails closed.
 Core bounds provider evidence to JSON, 64 items and 64 KiB and rejects fields
 that can carry credentials, private key material, plaintext, or raw
 selections before Voting or Committee can persist the projection.
@@ -57,6 +63,14 @@ external certification. It therefore cannot be selected for `secret` or
 the ballot opens; externally hosted providers may continue to require a
 pre-existing reference.
 
+POLYAS is the selected first external provider, initially through an explicit
+operator-assisted handoff until a contracted API and sandbox are available.
+The historical POLYAS CORE 2.5 Common Criteria certificate expired on
+2026-06-24, so its reference alone cannot enable `external_certified`. See
+[the POLYAS provider profile](POLYAS_PROVIDER_PROFILE.md). Native certifiable
+development is governed by the separate
+[certifiable Voting program](CERTIFIABLE_VOTING_PROGRAM.md).
+
 ## Lifecycle and concurrency
 
 Ballots move through `draft -> open -> closed -> certified`. A closed or
@@ -109,4 +123,7 @@ node-local filesystem.
 - raw selections are never returned by list, detail, result, or history APIs
 - provider result keys must exactly match frozen options
 - external results require evidence and cannot exceed the frozen electorate
+- external providers must match the assurance declaration frozen at opening
+- externally certified providers must remain currently certified through
+  provider casting and finalization
 - certification and annulment use separate permissions