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fix(assessment): harden capability evidence trust

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This commit is contained in:
Albrecht Degering
2026-07-22 19:21:06 +02:00
parent 1dc9148ec3
commit 19c4b63ade
8 changed files with 1928 additions and 153 deletions
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71
docs/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md
View File

@@ -360,7 +360,11 @@ windows. Only `active` and `next` entries are trusted; unknown statuses,
duplicate key IDs and malformed structured keyrings fail closed, while revoked,
disabled and retired entries are ignored. Do not establish this trust file by
downloading it in the same rerun. Public JSON responses are bounded to 16 MiB.
Use `--json` or `--output PATH` for automation.
Use `--json` or `--output PATH` for automation. Evidence and report files are
written through a bounded same-directory atomic replacement, with mode `0600`
and file and directory `fsync`. All parent directories must already exist, no
parent component may be a symlink, and an existing symlink or non-regular output
target is rejected.
Exit status `0` means the assessed release metadata is current, `2` means
explicit review is required, and `1` means the schema or trust checks are
@@ -385,7 +389,7 @@ that observation to the assessment and signed catalog:
--output /var/tmp/govoplan-fit-review.json
```
The collector follows the strict
The collector follows the strict version `0.2.0`
[`installed-composition-evidence.schema.json`](installed-composition-evidence.schema.json)
contract. It enumerates all installed distributions whose normalized name starts
with `govoplan-`, compares the enabled assessed package and module-manifest
@@ -395,11 +399,18 @@ entries and evidence-backed conclusions.
For each distribution, the collector also:
- verifies every supported SHA-256 entry in installed wheel `RECORD` metadata,
- verifies every supported SHA-256 immutable wheel-payload entry in installed
`RECORD` metadata,
within fixed limits of 256 GovOPlaN distributions, 10,000 files and 512 MiB
hashed per distribution, 50,000 files and 2 GiB hashed for one collection,
and 64 MiB for any single file;
- distinguishes immutable VCS commits and archive hashes from editable installs,
- accepts package-owned data-file targets below the installation prefix and
declared `console_scripts`, while rejecting other traversal, undeclared
scripts, paths outside the prefix and leaf symlinks before opening a file;
- reports pip-generated, unhashed `__pycache__/*.pyc` entries separately only
when their derived source is a hashed payload entry, including generated
files below a confined package-owned runtime-data prefix;
- distinguishes coherent PEP 610 Git commits and archive hashes from editable installs,
local directories, package-index/unknown origins and malformed metadata;
- compares a non-editable VCS commit with the assessment commit and, when one is
present, the signed catalog `selected_units` commit;
@@ -407,16 +418,29 @@ For each distribution, the collector also:
and stable error codes. It never writes direct URLs, paths, hostnames,
usernames, exception text or file contents.
`RECORD` agreement proves that the files agree with their installed metadata; it
does not make self-consistent metadata a trusted release origin. Similarly, a
version string is not artifact integrity. Editable and directory-backed installs
`RECORD` `verified` means complete matching coverage of the immutable wheel
payload, not every runtime byte. The proof scope exposes the aggregate count of
generated unhashed bytecode; runtime activation remains unchecked. `RECORD`
agreement proves that payload files agree with installed metadata, but does not
make self-consistent metadata a trusted release origin. Similarly, a version
string is not artifact integrity. PEP 610 VCS evidence is accepted only for
`vcs: git`, a full 40–64 hexadecimal commit, one mutually exclusive provenance
form and a coherent bounded URL shape. Editable and directory-backed installs
remain mutable even when their small editable-install `RECORD` is valid. Archive
or index artifacts without a hash anchored by the assessed release remain
unanchored. These conditions cause review rather than being promoted to
immutable installed-release proof.
Use `--installed-evidence PATH` to review evidence collected in a separate
environment. Evidence input and output are bounded to 4 MiB. Collection loads
Only evidence produced in-process by `--collect-installed-evidence` is a local
observation, and it must be no more than five minutes old (with at most 30
seconds of future clock skew) at the selected verification time. Use
`--installed-evidence PATH` to compare evidence collected in a separate
environment. Imported JSON is unsigned and therefore always carries a blocker:
it can identify differences but cannot establish checked or valid installed
proof. A future signed collector-attestation format is required to cross that
boundary. The proof scope records observation mode, collection/evaluation time,
freshness, and whether evaluation used current time or an explicit historical
override. Evidence input and output are bounded to 4 MiB. Collection loads
the `govoplan.modules` entry-point factories in order to read module IDs and
manifest versions; that executes installed GovOPlaN manifest code. Run it only
inside the installation being assessed and with the same isolation expected for
@@ -453,16 +477,35 @@ the tool's deterministic canonicalization.
--trusted-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/catalog-keyring.json \
--installed-evidence /srv/govoplan/evidence/installed.json \
--boundary-evidence /srv/govoplan/evidence/target-proof.json \
--boundary-authority-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/proof-authorities.json
--boundary-authority-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/proof-authorities.json \
--expected-external-provider-subject provider-production
```
With `--installed-evidence`, this command performs comparison and proof-binding
diagnostics only: the imported installed document is unsigned, so neither it nor
the boundary claim becomes accepted proof. An accepted boundary review requires
a trusted orchestrator to retain the direct in-process observation, obtain the
external signature over its digest, and call the review library within the
five-minute observation window. A future signed collector-attestation format
should make that exchange durable across processes.
Target-environment and production-approval claims must use the assessment's
`deployment_profile.id` as `subject_id`. External-provider claims require the
operator to supply a bounded opaque expected subject with
`--expected-external-provider-subject`; without it, such a claim remains
unchecked and blocks. Expected and observed IDs are retained in proof scope.
The authority keyring is a governance trust root. Do not download or generate it
from the proof bundle being checked, and do not reuse catalog signing authority
as implicit production authority. A target operator or approver must validate
from the proof bundle being checked. The checker rejects proof-authority public
keys reused by either the published or independently trusted catalog keyring,
and rejects the same proof public-key material assigned to multiple authority
IDs. Authority `not_after` is exclusive. A target operator or approver must validate
the referenced drill/result artifacts before signing. The rerun verifies the
attestation and its bindings; it does not fetch or reinterpret those artifacts.
`--verification-time` exists for reproducible historical review. Live admission
must use the actual current time.
`--verification-time` exists only for reproducible historical review. Supplying
it always marks the machine and human report as a **HISTORICAL override**; callers
cannot relabel it as current. Live admission must omit it and use the actual
current time.
No boundary bundle or production authority has been supplied for this current
assessment. Target environment, provider and production proof therefore remain

54
docs/installed-composition-evidence.schema.json
View File

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
"format": "uri-reference"
},
"schema_version": {
"const": "0.1.0"
"const": "0.2.0"
},
"evidence_kind": {
"const": "govoplan.installed-composition"
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
"required": ["kind", "commit"],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": ["vcs-commit", "editable-vcs"]
"const": "vcs-commit"
},
"commit": {
"type": "string",
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
"status",
"hashed_file_count",
"permitted_unhashed_file_count",
"generated_unhashed_file_count",
"unverifiable_file_count",
"missing_file_count",
"mismatched_file_count"
@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@
"permitted_unhashed_file_count": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/count"
},
"generated_unhashed_file_count": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/count"
},
"unverifiable_file_count": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/count"
},
@@ -199,7 +203,51 @@
"mismatched_file_count": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/count"
}
}
},
"allOf": [
{
"if": { "properties": { "status": { "const": "verified" } } },
"then": {
"properties": {
"hashed_file_count": { "minimum": 1 },
"permitted_unhashed_file_count": { "minimum": 1 },
"unverifiable_file_count": { "const": 0 },
"missing_file_count": { "const": 0 },
"mismatched_file_count": { "const": 0 }
}
}
},
{
"if": { "properties": { "status": { "const": "partial" } } },
"then": {
"properties": {
"hashed_file_count": { "minimum": 1 },
"unverifiable_file_count": { "minimum": 1 },
"missing_file_count": { "const": 0 },
"mismatched_file_count": { "const": 0 }
}
}
},
{
"if": { "properties": { "status": { "const": "mismatch" } } },
"then": {
"anyOf": [
{ "properties": { "missing_file_count": { "minimum": 1 } } },
{ "properties": { "mismatched_file_count": { "minimum": 1 } } }
]
}
},
{
"if": { "properties": { "status": { "const": "unavailable" } } },
"then": {
"properties": {
"hashed_file_count": { "const": 0 },
"missing_file_count": { "const": 0 },
"mismatched_file_count": { "const": 0 }
}
}
}
]
},
"collection_issue": {
"type": "object",

190
tests/test_capability_fit_atomic_io.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import stat
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest import mock
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "assessments"
RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
if str(tools_root) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
from govoplan_assessment.atomic_io import ( # noqa: E402
AtomicJsonWriteError,
atomic_write_json,
)
class CapabilityFitAtomicIOTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_writes_private_json_with_expected_content(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
target = Path(temporary_directory) / "evidence.json"
payload = {"z": [1, 2], "message": "Grüße"}
created_in: list[Path] = []
original_mkstemp = tempfile.mkstemp
def observed_mkstemp(*args, **kwargs):
created_in.append(Path(kwargs["dir"]))
return original_mkstemp(*args, **kwargs)
with (
mock.patch(
"govoplan_assessment.atomic_io.tempfile.mkstemp",
side_effect=observed_mkstemp,
),
mock.patch(
"govoplan_assessment.atomic_io.os.fsync",
wraps=os.fsync,
) as fsync,
):
atomic_write_json(target, payload, max_bytes=1024)
self.assertEqual(payload, json.loads(target.read_text(encoding="utf-8")))
self.assertTrue(target.read_bytes().endswith(b"\n"))
self.assertEqual(0o600, stat.S_IMODE(target.stat().st_mode))
self.assertEqual([target.parent], created_in)
self.assertEqual(2, fsync.call_count)
def test_replaces_existing_regular_file_and_secures_mode(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
target = Path(temporary_directory) / "report.json"
target.write_text('{"old": true}\n', encoding="utf-8")
target.chmod(0o644)
old_handle = target.open("rb")
self.addCleanup(old_handle.close)
atomic_write_json(target, {"new": True}, max_bytes=1024)
self.assertEqual(b'{"old": true}\n', old_handle.read())
self.assertEqual({"new": True}, json.loads(target.read_text("utf-8")))
self.assertEqual(0o600, stat.S_IMODE(target.stat().st_mode))
def test_size_bound_leaves_existing_target_unchanged(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
directory = Path(temporary_directory)
target = directory / "evidence.json"
original = b'{"original": true}\n'
target.write_bytes(original)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(AtomicJsonWriteError, "size limit"):
atomic_write_json(target, {"large": "x" * 100}, max_bytes=32)
self.assertEqual(original, target.read_bytes())
self.assertEqual([], list(directory.glob(".govoplan-json-*.tmp")))
@unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os, "symlink"), "symbolic links are unavailable")
def test_rejects_symlink_without_modifying_link_or_referent(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
directory = Path(temporary_directory)
referent = directory / "outside.json"
referent.write_bytes(b'{"keep": true}\n')
target = directory / "evidence.json"
target.symlink_to(referent.name)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(AtomicJsonWriteError, "symbolic link"):
atomic_write_json(target, {"replace": True}, max_bytes=1024)
self.assertTrue(target.is_symlink())
self.assertEqual(b'{"keep": true}\n', referent.read_bytes())
self.assertEqual([], list(directory.glob(".govoplan-json-*.tmp")))
@unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os, "symlink"), "symbolic links are unavailable")
def test_rejects_symlinked_parent_component(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
directory = Path(temporary_directory)
real_parent = directory / "real-parent"
real_parent.mkdir()
linked_parent = directory / "linked-parent"
linked_parent.symlink_to(real_parent, target_is_directory=True)
target = linked_parent / "new" / "evidence.json"
with self.assertRaisesRegex(AtomicJsonWriteError, "parent path"):
atomic_write_json(target, {"unsafe": True}, max_bytes=1024)
self.assertFalse((real_parent / "new").exists())
def test_requires_existing_parent_without_creating_directories(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
directory = Path(temporary_directory)
missing_parent = directory / "missing" / "nested"
target = missing_parent / "evidence.json"
with self.assertRaisesRegex(AtomicJsonWriteError, "already exist"):
atomic_write_json(target, {"safe": True}, max_bytes=1024)
self.assertFalse(missing_parent.exists())
def test_rejects_post_replace_mode_or_identity_change(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
directory = Path(temporary_directory)
target = directory / "evidence.json"
original_replace = os.replace
def insecure_replace(source, destination):
original_replace(source, destination)
Path(destination).chmod(0o644)
with mock.patch(
"govoplan_assessment.atomic_io.os.replace",
side_effect=insecure_replace,
):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(
AtomicJsonWriteError,
"permissions changed and were restored",
):
atomic_write_json(target, {"safe": True}, max_bytes=1024)
self.assertEqual(0o600, stat.S_IMODE(target.stat().st_mode))
self.assertEqual({"safe": True}, json.loads(target.read_text("utf-8")))
def test_does_not_unlink_unknown_post_replace_inode(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
directory = Path(temporary_directory)
target = directory / "evidence.json"
original_replace = os.replace
def replaced_again(source, destination):
original_replace(source, destination)
Path(destination).unlink()
Path(destination).write_bytes(b"unknown replacement\n")
with mock.patch(
"govoplan_assessment.atomic_io.os.replace",
side_effect=replaced_again,
):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(
AtomicJsonWriteError,
"did not preserve",
):
atomic_write_json(target, {"secret": True}, max_bytes=1024)
self.assertEqual(b"unknown replacement\n", target.read_bytes())
def test_replace_failure_removes_private_temporary_file(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary_directory:
directory = Path(temporary_directory)
target = directory / "evidence.json"
with mock.patch(
"govoplan_assessment.atomic_io.os.replace",
side_effect=OSError("simulated replacement failure"),
):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(
AtomicJsonWriteError, "could not be written atomically"
):
atomic_write_json(target, {"safe": True}, max_bytes=1024)
self.assertFalse(target.exists())
self.assertEqual([], list(directory.glob(".govoplan-json-*.tmp")))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()

641
tests/test_capability_fit_evidence.py
View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import hashlib
from importlib import metadata
import json
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
from types import SimpleNamespace
@@ -24,8 +25,12 @@ for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
if str(tools_root) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
from govoplan_assessment.capability_fit import review_capability_fit # noqa: E402
from govoplan_assessment.capability_fit import ( # noqa: E402
render_review,
review_capability_fit,
)
from govoplan_assessment.evidence import ( # noqa: E402
_bounded_file_sha256,
canonical_bytes,
canonical_sha256,
collect_installed_composition,
@@ -205,6 +210,8 @@ class CapabilityFitEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
selected_commits={},
evidence=evidence,
schema=self.installed_schema,
observation_mode="direct_local",
verification_time=datetime(2026, 7, 23, 12, tzinfo=UTC),
)
codes = {item.code for item in result.findings}
@@ -213,6 +220,86 @@ class CapabilityFitEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertTrue(result.proof_scope["installed_artifacts"]["checked"])
self.assertFalse(result.proof_scope["installed_artifacts"]["valid"])
def test_imported_unsigned_installed_evidence_is_comparison_only(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
evidence = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=evidence,
installed_evidence_mode="imported_unsigned",
)
installed = report["proof_scope"]["installed_artifacts"]
self.assertEqual("blocked", report["status"])
self.assertFalse(installed["checked"])
self.assertIsNone(installed["valid"])
self.assertTrue(installed["comparison_valid"])
self.assertEqual(
"unsigned_import",
report["proof_scope"]["installed_evidence_observation"]["freshness"],
)
self.assertIn(
"installed_evidence_unsigned_import",
{item["code"] for item in report["findings"]},
)
def test_direct_installed_evidence_must_be_fresh_and_not_from_future(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
cases = (
("2026-07-23T11:54:59Z", "installed_evidence_stale", "stale"),
("2026-07-23T12:00:31Z", "installed_evidence_from_future", "future"),
)
for collected_at, expected_code, expected_freshness in cases:
with self.subTest(collected_at=collected_at):
evidence = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
evidence["collected_at"] = collected_at
report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=evidence,
)
self.assertEqual("blocked", report["status"])
self.assertFalse(
report["proof_scope"]["installed_artifacts"]["checked"]
)
self.assertIn(
expected_code,
{item["code"] for item in report["findings"]},
)
self.assertEqual(
expected_freshness,
report["proof_scope"]["installed_evidence_observation"][
"freshness"
],
)
def test_forged_verified_record_counters_fail_semantic_validation(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
evidence = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
evidence["artifacts"][0]["record_integrity"].update(
hashed_file_count=0,
mismatched_file_count=1,
)
relaxed_schema = deepcopy(self.installed_schema)
relaxed_schema["$defs"]["record_integrity"].pop("allOf")
report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=evidence,
installed_schema=relaxed_schema,
)
self.assertEqual("review_required", report["status"])
self.assertIn(
"installed_record_integrity_invalid",
{item["code"] for item in report["findings"]},
)
self.assertFalse(report["proof_scope"]["installed_record_integrity"]["valid"])
def test_collector_verifies_record_and_redacts_direct_url(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
root = Path(temp_dir)
@@ -251,6 +338,225 @@ class CapabilityFitEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
tampered["artifacts"][0]["record_integrity"]["mismatched_file_count"],
)
def test_collector_accepts_real_core_wheel_payload_scripts_data_and_pyc(
self,
) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
root = Path(temp_dir)
wheels = root / "wheels"
prefix = root / "prefix"
wheels.mkdir()
build_python = (
Path(sys.base_prefix)
/ "bin"
/ (f"python{sys.version_info.major}.{sys.version_info.minor}")
)
subprocess.run(
(
str(build_python),
"-m",
"pip",
"wheel",
"--no-deps",
"--no-build-isolation",
"--wheel-dir",
str(wheels),
str(META_ROOT.parent / "govoplan-core"),
),
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
wheel = next(wheels.glob("govoplan_core-*.whl"))
subprocess.run(
(
str(build_python),
"-m",
"pip",
"install",
"--no-deps",
"--ignore-installed",
"--prefix",
str(prefix),
str(wheel),
),
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
site_packages = next(prefix.glob("lib/python*/site-packages"))
dist_info = next(site_packages.glob("govoplan_core-*.dist-info"))
distribution = metadata.PathDistribution(dist_info)
record_paths = {str(item) for item in distribution.files or ()}
self.assertTrue(
any(
path.startswith("../../../govoplan_core_runtime/")
for path in record_paths
)
)
self.assertTrue(
any(path.startswith("../../../bin/govoplan-") for path in record_paths)
)
with (
mock.patch.object(sys, "path", [str(site_packages), *sys.path]),
mock.patch.object(sys, "prefix", str(prefix)),
):
evidence = collect_installed_composition(
assessment=self.assessment,
collected_at=datetime(2026, 7, 23, 11, 58, tzinfo=UTC),
distributions=[distribution],
)
record = evidence["artifacts"][0]["record_integrity"]
self.assertEqual("verified", record["status"])
self.assertGreater(record["hashed_file_count"], 0)
self.assertGreater(record["permitted_unhashed_file_count"], 0)
self.assertGreater(record["generated_unhashed_file_count"], 0)
self.assertEqual(0, record["unverifiable_file_count"])
self.assertEqual(
(), validate_payload(payload=evidence, schema=self.installed_schema)
)
def test_record_traversal_and_leaf_symlinks_are_never_hashed(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
prefix = Path(temp_dir) / "prefix"
site_packages = prefix / "lib" / "python-test" / "site-packages"
site_packages.mkdir(parents=True)
traversal = create_traversal_distribution(prefix, site_packages)
normal, payload = create_distribution(site_packages)
outside = Path(temp_dir) / "outside.py"
outside.write_text(payload.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), encoding="utf-8")
payload.unlink()
payload.symlink_to(outside)
with (
mock.patch.object(sys, "path", [str(site_packages), *sys.path]),
mock.patch.object(sys, "prefix", str(prefix)),
):
evidence = collect_installed_composition(
assessment=self.assessment,
collected_at=datetime(2026, 7, 23, 11, 58, tzinfo=UTC),
distributions=[traversal, normal],
)
records = {
item["package_name"]: item["record_integrity"]
for item in evidence["artifacts"]
}
self.assertEqual("partial", records["govoplan-traversal"]["status"])
self.assertGreaterEqual(
records["govoplan-traversal"]["unverifiable_file_count"], 2
)
self.assertEqual("partial", records["govoplan-demo"]["status"])
self.assertGreater(records["govoplan-demo"]["unverifiable_file_count"], 0)
def test_bounded_hash_stops_at_opened_file_snapshot(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
path = Path(temp_dir) / "growing.bin"
path.write_bytes(b"0123456789")
actual_stat = path.stat()
initial_stat = SimpleNamespace(st_mode=actual_stat.st_mode, st_size=4)
final_stat = SimpleNamespace(st_mode=actual_stat.st_mode, st_size=10)
with mock.patch(
"govoplan_assessment.evidence.os.fstat",
side_effect=(initial_stat, final_stat),
):
_, hashed_bytes, exceeded = _bounded_file_sha256(path, max_bytes=8)
self.assertEqual(4, hashed_bytes)
self.assertTrue(exceeded)
def test_collector_rejects_unbounded_or_secret_shaped_metadata(self) -> None:
distributions = [
FakeDistribution(
name="govoplan-secret-user@private-host/path",
entry_points=[],
),
FakeDistribution(
version="1.0.0/private-user@host",
entry_points=[],
),
FakeDistribution(
entry_points=[
FakeEntryPoint(
name="safe-module",
manifest_id="secret-user@private-host/path",
)
],
),
]
evidence = collect_installed_composition(
assessment=self.assessment,
collected_at=datetime(2026, 7, 23, 11, 58, tzinfo=UTC),
distributions=distributions,
)
encoded = json.dumps(evidence, sort_keys=True)
self.assertNotIn("secret-user", encoded)
self.assertNotIn("private-host", encoded)
self.assertNotIn("private-user", encoded)
self.assertTrue(
any(
item["code"]
in {
"distribution-metadata-invalid",
"module-entry-point-invalid",
}
for item in evidence["collection_issues"]
)
)
def test_pep610_git_provenance_requires_one_coherent_git_form(self) -> None:
valid_commit = "a" * 40
cases = (
(
"valid",
{
"url": "https://example.invalid/govoplan-many.git",
"vcs_info": {"vcs": "git", "commit_id": valid_commit},
},
"vcs-commit",
),
(
"svn",
{
"url": "https://example.invalid/govoplan-many.git",
"vcs_info": {"vcs": "svn", "commit_id": valid_commit},
},
"malformed-direct-url",
),
(
"missing-vcs",
{
"url": "https://example.invalid/govoplan-many.git",
"vcs_info": {"commit_id": valid_commit},
},
"malformed-direct-url",
),
(
"ambiguous",
{
"url": "file:///govoplan-many",
"vcs_info": {"vcs": "git", "commit_id": valid_commit},
"dir_info": {"editable": True},
},
"malformed-direct-url",
),
)
for label, direct_url, expected_kind in cases:
with self.subTest(label=label):
evidence = collect_installed_composition(
assessment=self.assessment,
collected_at=datetime(2026, 7, 23, 11, 58, tzinfo=UTC),
distributions=[
FakeDistribution(entry_points=[], direct_url=direct_url)
],
)
self.assertEqual(
expected_kind,
evidence["artifacts"][0]["source_provenance"]["kind"],
)
def test_entry_point_limit_is_explicit_instead_of_silent_truncation(self) -> None:
distribution = FakeDistribution(
entry_points=[FakeEntryPoint(name=f"module-{index}") for index in range(17)]
@@ -320,6 +626,248 @@ class CapabilityFitEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertTrue(report["proof_scope"]["target_environment"]["valid"])
self.assertFalse(report["proof_scope"]["external_providers"]["checked"])
self.assertFalse(report["proof_scope"]["production_approval"]["checked"])
self.assertEqual(
self.assessment["deployment_profile"]["id"],
report["proof_scope"]["target_environment"]["expected_subject_id"],
)
self.assertEqual(
self.assessment["deployment_profile"]["id"],
report["proof_scope"]["target_environment"]["observed_subject_id"],
)
def test_external_provider_claim_requires_explicit_matching_subject(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
installed = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
proof, authority = signed_boundary_evidence(
assessment=self.assessment,
installed=installed,
claims=[boundary_claim("external_providers", "passed")],
allowed_scopes=["external_providers"],
)
unconfigured = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
boundary_evidence=proof,
authority_keyring=authority,
)
accepted = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
boundary_evidence=proof,
authority_keyring=authority,
expected_external_provider_subject="provider:test",
)
self.assertEqual("blocked", unconfigured["status"])
self.assertIn(
"boundary_provider_subject_unconfigured",
{item["code"] for item in unconfigured["findings"]},
)
self.assertEqual("current", accepted["status"])
provider_scope = accepted["proof_scope"]["external_providers"]
self.assertEqual("provider:test", provider_scope["expected_subject_id"])
self.assertEqual("provider:test", provider_scope["observed_subject_id"])
def test_boundary_subject_mismatch_blocks_without_echoing_invalid_config(
self,
) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
installed = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
proof, authority = signed_boundary_evidence(
assessment=self.assessment,
installed=installed,
claims=[
boundary_claim(
"target_environment",
"passed",
subject_id="another-deployment",
)
],
allowed_scopes=["target_environment"],
)
mismatch = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
boundary_evidence=proof,
authority_keyring=authority,
)
invalid_config = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
expected_external_provider_subject="https://private.invalid/secret",
)
self.assertIn(
"boundary_claim_subject_mismatch",
{item["code"] for item in mismatch["findings"]},
)
encoded = json.dumps(invalid_config, sort_keys=True)
self.assertIn("boundary_provider_subject_invalid", encoded)
self.assertNotIn("private.invalid", encoded)
self.assertNotIn("secret", encoded)
def test_authorized_negative_claim_creates_scope_specific_review_target(
self,
) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
installed = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
proof, authority = signed_boundary_evidence(
assessment=self.assessment,
installed=installed,
claims=[
boundary_claim("target_environment", "failed"),
boundary_claim("production_approval", "rejected"),
],
allowed_scopes=["target_environment", "production_approval"],
)
report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
boundary_evidence=proof,
authority_keyring=authority,
)
targets = {item["id"] for item in report["review_targets"]}
self.assertIn(
"boundary.target_environment.production-like-dev",
targets,
)
self.assertIn(
"boundary.production_approval.production-like-dev",
targets,
)
def test_proof_authorities_must_be_independent_and_key_ids_unambiguous(
self,
) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
installed = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
proof, authority = signed_boundary_evidence(
assessment=self.assessment,
installed=installed,
claims=[boundary_claim("target_environment", "passed")],
allowed_scopes=["target_environment"],
)
release_public_key = keyring["keys"][0]["public_key"]
reused = deepcopy(authority)
reused["keys"][0]["public_key"] = release_public_key
duplicate = deepcopy(authority)
duplicate["keys"].append(
{
**deepcopy(duplicate["keys"][0]),
"key_id": "authority:duplicate-material",
"allowed_scopes": ["production_approval"],
}
)
reused_report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
boundary_evidence=proof,
authority_keyring=reused,
)
duplicate_report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
boundary_evidence=proof,
authority_keyring=duplicate,
)
self.assertIn(
"boundary_authority_reuses_release_key",
{item["code"] for item in reused_report["findings"]},
)
self.assertIn(
"boundary_authority_public_key_duplicate",
{item["code"] for item in duplicate_report["findings"]},
)
self.assertFalse(
duplicate_report["proof_scope"]["target_environment"]["checked"]
)
def test_authority_not_after_is_exclusive(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
installed = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
proof, authority = signed_boundary_evidence(
assessment=self.assessment,
installed=installed,
claims=[boundary_claim("target_environment", "passed")],
allowed_scopes=["target_environment"],
)
authority["keys"][0]["not_after"] = "2026-07-23T12:00:00Z"
report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
boundary_evidence=proof,
authority_keyring=authority,
)
self.assertIn(
"boundary_authority_untrusted",
{item["code"] for item in report["findings"]},
)
def test_historical_verification_and_generated_runtime_gap_are_visible(
self,
) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
evidence = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
evidence["artifacts"][0]["record_integrity"][
"generated_unhashed_file_count"
] = 3
report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=evidence,
)
observation = report["proof_scope"]["installed_evidence_observation"]
self.assertEqual("historical_override", observation["verification_mode"])
self.assertEqual(
3,
report["proof_scope"]["installed_record_integrity"][
"generated_unhashed_file_count"
],
)
self.assertIn("HISTORICAL override", render_review(report))
def test_invalid_internal_verification_mode_is_bounded_and_blocking(self) -> None:
evidence = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
result = review_installed_composition(
assessment=self.assessment,
catalog_entries={},
selected_versions={},
selected_commits={},
evidence=evidence,
schema=self.installed_schema,
observation_mode="direct_local",
verification_time=datetime(2026, 7, 23, 12, tzinfo=UTC),
verification_mode="https://private.invalid/secret",
)
encoded = json.dumps(result.proof_scope, sort_keys=True)
self.assertIn(
"installed_evidence_verification_mode",
{item.code for item in result.findings},
)
self.assertEqual(
"invalid",
result.proof_scope["installed_evidence_observation"]["verification_mode"],
)
self.assertFalse(result.proof_scope["installed_artifacts"]["checked"])
self.assertNotIn("private.invalid", encoded)
def test_unauthorized_production_claim_keeps_every_claim_unchecked(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
@@ -401,6 +949,10 @@ class CapabilityFitEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
installed_evidence: dict[str, object] | None = None,
boundary_evidence: dict[str, object] | None = None,
authority_keyring: dict[str, object] | None = None,
installed_evidence_mode: str = "direct_local",
installed_schema: dict[str, object] | None = None,
expected_external_provider_subject: str | None = None,
verification_time: datetime | None = datetime(2026, 7, 23, 12, tzinfo=UTC),
) -> dict[str, object]:
return review_capability_fit(
assessment=deepcopy(self.assessment),
@@ -409,7 +961,7 @@ class CapabilityFitEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
published_keyring=keyring,
trusted_keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed_evidence,
installed_evidence_schema=self.installed_schema
installed_evidence_schema=(installed_schema or self.installed_schema)
if installed_evidence is not None
else None,
boundary_evidence=boundary_evidence,
@@ -420,18 +972,20 @@ class CapabilityFitEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
boundary_authority_keyring_schema=self.authority_schema
if boundary_evidence is not None
else None,
verification_time=datetime(2026, 7, 23, 12, tzinfo=UTC),
verification_time=verification_time,
installed_evidence_mode=installed_evidence_mode,
expected_external_provider_subject=expected_external_provider_subject,
)
def matching_installed_evidence(assessment: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
return {
"$schema": "./installed-composition-evidence.schema.json",
"schema_version": "0.1.0",
"schema_version": "0.2.0",
"evidence_kind": "govoplan.installed-composition",
"assessment_id": assessment["assessment_id"],
"assessment_release": assessment["release"]["ref"],
"collected_at": "2026-07-22T12:00:00Z",
"collected_at": "2026-07-23T11:58:00Z",
"scope": "current-python-environment.govoplan-distributions",
"artifacts": [
artifact(
@@ -461,6 +1015,7 @@ def artifact(
"status": "verified",
"hashed_file_count": 1,
"permitted_unhashed_file_count": 1,
"generated_unhashed_file_count": 0,
"unverifiable_file_count": 0,
"missing_file_count": 0,
"mismatched_file_count": 0,
@@ -468,11 +1023,19 @@ def artifact(
}
def boundary_claim(scope: str, result: str) -> dict[str, object]:
def boundary_claim(
scope: str,
result: str,
*,
subject_id: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
default_subject = (
"provider:test" if scope == "external_providers" else "production-like-dev"
)
return {
"scope": scope,
"result": result,
"subject_id": f"subject:{scope}",
"subject_id": subject_id or default_subject,
"control_ids": [f"control:{scope}"],
"artifacts": [
{
@@ -579,19 +1142,72 @@ def create_distribution(
return metadata.PathDistribution(dist_info), payload_file
def create_traversal_distribution(
prefix: Path,
site_packages: Path,
) -> metadata.PathDistribution:
dist_info = site_packages / "govoplan_traversal-1.0.0.dist-info"
dist_info.mkdir()
metadata_file = dist_info / "METADATA"
metadata_file.write_text(
"Metadata-Version: 2.1\nName: govoplan-traversal\nVersion: 1.0.0\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
unowned_file = prefix / "unowned_runtime" / "private.py"
unowned_file.parent.mkdir()
unowned_file.write_text("private = True\n", encoding="utf-8")
undeclared_script = prefix / "bin" / "govoplan-not-declared"
undeclared_script.parent.mkdir()
undeclared_script.write_text("#!/bin/sh\n", encoding="utf-8")
metadata_path = metadata_file.relative_to(site_packages).as_posix()
unowned_path = "../../../unowned_runtime/private.py"
record_path = (dist_info / "RECORD").relative_to(site_packages).as_posix()
(dist_info / "RECORD").write_text(
"\n".join(
(
record_row(metadata_path, metadata_file.read_bytes()),
record_row(unowned_path, unowned_file.read_bytes()),
record_row(
"../../../bin/govoplan-not-declared",
undeclared_script.read_bytes(),
),
f"{record_path},,",
)
)
+ "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
return metadata.PathDistribution(dist_info)
def record_row(path: str, content: bytes) -> str:
digest = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hashlib.sha256(content).digest()).decode("ascii")
return f"{path},sha256={digest.rstrip('=')},{len(content)}"
class FakeEntryPoint:
group = "govoplan.modules"
value = "fixture:get_manifest"
def __init__(self, *, name: str) -> None:
def __init__(
self,
*,
name: str,
manifest_id: str | None = None,
manifest_version: str = "1.0.0",
) -> None:
self.name = name
self.manifest_id = manifest_id or name
self.manifest_version = manifest_version
def load(self):
return lambda: SimpleNamespace(id=self.name, version="1.0.0")
return lambda: SimpleNamespace(
id=self.manifest_id,
version=self.manifest_version,
)
class FakeDistribution:
version = "1.0.0"
files = ()
def __init__(
@@ -599,8 +1215,11 @@ class FakeDistribution:
*,
entry_points: list[FakeEntryPoint],
direct_url: dict[str, object] | None = None,
name: str = "govoplan-many",
version: str = "1.0.0",
) -> None:
self.metadata = {"Name": "govoplan-many"}
self.metadata = {"Name": name}
self.version = version
self.entry_points = entry_points
self.direct_url = direct_url

66
tools/assessments/capability-fit.py
View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import argparse
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import re
import sys
@@ -22,6 +23,10 @@ from govoplan_assessment import ( # noqa: E402
render_review,
review_capability_fit,
)
from govoplan_assessment.atomic_io import ( # noqa: E402
AtomicJsonWriteError,
atomic_write_json,
)
from govoplan_assessment.evidence import validate_payload # noqa: E402
from govoplan_release.catalog import DEFAULT_PUBLIC_BASE_URL, fetch_json # noqa: E402
@@ -29,6 +34,8 @@ from govoplan_release.catalog import DEFAULT_PUBLIC_BASE_URL, fetch_json # noqa
TRUSTED_KEYRING_FILE_ENV = "GOVOPLAN_MODULE_PACKAGE_CATALOG_TRUSTED_KEYS_FILE"
MAX_ASSESSMENT_INPUT_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
MAX_EVIDENCE_INPUT_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
MAX_REPORT_OUTPUT_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
OPAQUE_ID_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,159}$")
def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
@@ -130,6 +137,13 @@ def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
"--verification-time",
help="Optional ISO-8601 time for reproducible boundary-proof verification.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--expected-external-provider-subject",
help=(
"Opaque provider-environment ID that external-provider proof must match; "
"never supply a URL, credential, or endpoint identifier."
),
)
parser.add_argument(
"--json", action="store_true", help="Print the machine-readable review report."
)
@@ -157,6 +171,13 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
raise SystemExit(
"--boundary-evidence requires --installed-evidence or --collect-installed-evidence"
)
if (
args.expected_external_provider_subject is not None
and OPAQUE_ID_PATTERN.fullmatch(args.expected_external_provider_subject) is None
):
raise SystemExit(
"--expected-external-provider-subject must be a bounded opaque ID"
)
if (
args.collect_installed_evidence is not None
and args.output is not None
@@ -232,7 +253,12 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
raise SystemExit(
"Collected installed evidence did not satisfy its bounded schema"
)
write_object(args.collect_installed_evidence, installed_evidence)
write_object(
args.collect_installed_evidence,
installed_evidence,
max_bytes=MAX_EVIDENCE_INPUT_BYTES,
label="installed evidence",
)
boundary_evidence = None
boundary_evidence_schema = None
@@ -260,6 +286,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
max_bytes=MAX_EVIDENCE_INPUT_BYTES,
)
verification_time = parse_datetime(args.verification_time)
report = review_capability_fit(
assessment=assessment,
schema=schema,
@@ -275,12 +302,22 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
boundary_evidence_schema=boundary_evidence_schema,
boundary_authority_keyring=boundary_authority_keyring,
boundary_authority_keyring_schema=boundary_authority_keyring_schema,
verification_time=parse_datetime(args.verification_time),
verification_time=verification_time,
installed_evidence_mode=(
"direct_local"
if args.collect_installed_evidence is not None
else "imported_unsigned"
),
expected_external_provider_subject=args.expected_external_provider_subject,
)
encoded = json.dumps(report, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
if args.output is not None:
args.output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
args.output.write_text(encoded, encoding="utf-8")
write_object(
args.output,
report,
max_bytes=MAX_REPORT_OUTPUT_BYTES,
label="review report",
)
sys.stdout.write(encoded if args.json else render_review(report))
return {"current": 0, "blocked": 1, "review_required": 2}[report["status"]]
@@ -307,16 +344,19 @@ def read_object(path: Path | None, *, label: str, max_bytes: int) -> dict[str, o
return payload
def write_object(path: Path | None, payload: dict[str, object]) -> None:
def write_object(
path: Path | None,
payload: dict[str, object],
*,
max_bytes: int,
label: str,
) -> None:
if path is None:
raise SystemExit("Missing installed evidence output path")
encoded = json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
if len(encoded.encode("utf-8")) > MAX_EVIDENCE_INPUT_BYTES:
raise SystemExit(
"Collected installed evidence exceeds the bounded output limit"
)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(encoded, encoding="utf-8")
raise SystemExit(f"Missing {label} output path")
try:
atomic_write_json(path, payload, max_bytes=max_bytes)
except AtomicJsonWriteError as exc:
raise SystemExit(f"Could not securely write {label}") from exc
def parse_datetime(value: str | None):

230
tools/assessments/govoplan_assessment/atomic_io.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
"""Bounded, private, atomic JSON output for assessment evidence."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import stat
import tempfile
from typing import Any
class AtomicJsonWriteError(RuntimeError):
"""Raised when JSON output cannot be written with the required guarantees."""
def atomic_write_json(
path: str | os.PathLike[str],
payload: Any,
*,
max_bytes: int,
) -> None:
"""Write bounded JSON through a private same-directory temporary file.
A successful return means the file contents and the containing directory
entry have both been flushed. If flushing the directory fails after the
atomic replacement, the replacement may be visible but its crash
durability is unknown, so the function reports failure. Every parent must
already exist as a real directory; symbolic-link components are rejected.
"""
if isinstance(max_bytes, bool) or not isinstance(max_bytes, int) or max_bytes <= 0:
raise ValueError("max_bytes must be a positive integer")
encoded = _encode_bounded_json(payload, max_bytes=max_bytes)
target = Path(os.path.abspath(os.fspath(path)))
parent = target.parent
descriptor = -1
verification_descriptor = -1
temporary_path: Path | None = None
temporary_identity: tuple[int, int] | None = None
try:
_assert_real_parent(parent)
_assert_replaceable_target(target)
try:
descriptor, temporary_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
dir=parent,
prefix=".govoplan-json-",
suffix=".tmp",
)
temporary_path = Path(temporary_name)
os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
metadata = os.fstat(descriptor)
if (
not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode)
or stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) != 0o600
):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"Atomic JSON temporary file could not be secured."
)
temporary_identity = (metadata.st_dev, metadata.st_ino)
verification_descriptor = os.dup(descriptor)
handle = os.fdopen(descriptor, "wb")
descriptor = -1
with handle:
handle.write(encoded)
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
# Recheck after creating and flushing the temporary file so an
# unsafe target discovered before replacement is never followed.
_assert_real_parent(parent)
_assert_replaceable_target(target)
os.replace(temporary_path, target)
temporary_path = None
_assert_installed_target(
target,
expected_identity=temporary_identity,
recovery_descriptor=verification_descriptor,
)
_fsync_directory(parent)
finally:
try:
if descriptor >= 0:
os.close(descriptor)
finally:
try:
if verification_descriptor >= 0:
os.close(verification_descriptor)
finally:
if temporary_path is not None:
try:
temporary_path.unlink()
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
except AtomicJsonWriteError:
raise
except OSError as exc:
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"JSON output could not be written atomically."
) from exc
def _encode_bounded_json(payload: Any, *, max_bytes: int) -> bytes:
encoder = json.JSONEncoder(
allow_nan=False,
ensure_ascii=False,
indent=2,
sort_keys=True,
)
chunks: list[bytes] = []
encoded_size = 1 # The document always ends with one newline.
for chunk in encoder.iterencode(payload):
encoded_chunk = chunk.encode("utf-8")
encoded_size += len(encoded_chunk)
if encoded_size > max_bytes:
raise AtomicJsonWriteError("JSON output exceeds its size limit.")
chunks.append(encoded_chunk)
return b"".join(chunks) + b"\n"
def _assert_replaceable_target(path: Path) -> None:
try:
metadata = path.lstat()
except FileNotFoundError:
return
except OSError as exc:
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"JSON output target could not be inspected safely."
) from exc
if stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError("JSON output target must not be a symbolic link.")
if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError("JSON output target must be a regular file.")
def _assert_real_parent(path: Path) -> None:
current = Path(path.anchor)
for part in path.parts[1:]:
current /= part
try:
metadata = current.lstat()
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"JSON output parent directory must already exist."
) from exc
except OSError as exc:
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"JSON output parent directory could not be inspected safely."
) from exc
if stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"JSON output parent path must not contain symbolic links."
)
if not stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"JSON output parent path must contain only directories."
)
def _assert_installed_target(
path: Path,
*,
expected_identity: tuple[int, int] | None,
recovery_descriptor: int,
) -> None:
try:
metadata = path.lstat()
except OSError as exc:
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"Atomic JSON replacement could not be verified."
) from exc
observed_identity = (metadata.st_dev, metadata.st_ino)
if (
expected_identity is None
or observed_identity != expected_identity
or not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode)
):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"Atomic JSON replacement did not preserve the secured regular file."
)
if stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) == 0o600:
return
try:
recovery_metadata = os.fstat(recovery_descriptor)
if (
not stat.S_ISREG(recovery_metadata.st_mode)
or (recovery_metadata.st_dev, recovery_metadata.st_ino) != expected_identity
):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"Atomic JSON replacement recovery descriptor is invalid."
)
os.fchmod(recovery_descriptor, 0o600)
os.fsync(recovery_descriptor)
recovered_metadata = os.fstat(recovery_descriptor)
installed_metadata = path.lstat()
except OSError as exc:
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"Atomic JSON replacement permissions could not be restored."
) from exc
if (
stat.S_IMODE(recovered_metadata.st_mode) != 0o600
or (installed_metadata.st_dev, installed_metadata.st_ino) != expected_identity
or not stat.S_ISREG(installed_metadata.st_mode)
or stat.S_IMODE(installed_metadata.st_mode) != 0o600
):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"Atomic JSON replacement permissions could not be restored."
)
_fsync_directory(path.parent)
raise AtomicJsonWriteError(
"Atomic JSON replacement permissions changed and were restored."
)
def _fsync_directory(path: Path) -> None:
flags = os.O_RDONLY
if hasattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY"):
flags |= os.O_DIRECTORY
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
descriptor = os.open(path, flags)
try:
if not stat.S_ISDIR(os.fstat(descriptor).st_mode):
raise AtomicJsonWriteError("JSON output parent path must be a directory.")
os.fsync(descriptor)
finally:
os.close(descriptor)

50
tools/assessments/govoplan_assessment/capability_fit.py
View File

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ from govoplan_release.version_alignment import candidate_catalog_version_issues
from .evidence import (
BoundaryEvidenceReview,
InstalledEvidenceReview,
public_key_material_from_keyrings,
review_boundary_evidence,
review_installed_composition,
)
@@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ def review_capability_fit(
boundary_authority_keyring: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
boundary_authority_keyring_schema: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
verification_time: datetime | None = None,
installed_evidence_mode: str = "imported_unsigned",
expected_external_provider_subject: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return a secret-free release-drift report for one fit assessment."""
@@ -356,6 +359,10 @@ def review_capability_fit(
)
)
evidence_verification_time = verification_time or datetime.now(tz=UTC)
evidence_verification_mode = (
"historical_override" if verification_time is not None else "current"
)
installed_review = review_installed_composition(
assessment=assessment,
catalog_entries=catalog_entries,
@@ -363,6 +370,9 @@ def review_capability_fit(
selected_commits=source_selection.selected_commits,
evidence=installed_evidence,
schema=installed_evidence_schema,
observation_mode=installed_evidence_mode,
verification_time=evidence_verification_time,
verification_mode=evidence_verification_mode,
)
findings.extend(
Finding(item.severity, item.code, item.message, item.assessment_ids)
@@ -378,7 +388,13 @@ def review_capability_fit(
evidence_schema=boundary_evidence_schema,
authority_keyring=boundary_authority_keyring,
authority_keyring_schema=boundary_authority_keyring_schema,
verification_time=verification_time,
verification_time=evidence_verification_time,
verification_mode=evidence_verification_mode,
expected_external_provider_subject=expected_external_provider_subject,
forbidden_authority_public_keys=public_key_material_from_keyrings(
published_keyring,
trusted_keyring,
),
)
findings.extend(
Finding(item.severity, item.code, item.message, item.assessment_ids)
@@ -396,6 +412,7 @@ def review_capability_fit(
assessment=assessment,
installed_review=installed_review,
),
boundary_review.review_targets,
)
return build_report(
assessment=assessment,
@@ -908,7 +925,7 @@ def build_report(
**boundary_scope,
}
return {
"report_version": "0.2.0",
"report_version": "0.3.0",
"status": status,
"assessment_id": assessment.get("assessment_id"),
"assessment_release": assessment.get("release", {}).get("ref")
@@ -930,9 +947,11 @@ def build_report(
def render_review(report: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
installed_checked = (
report.get("proof_scope", {}).get("installed_artifacts", {}).get("checked")
is True
proof_scope = report.get("proof_scope", {})
installed_scope = proof_scope.get("installed_artifacts", {})
installed_checked = installed_scope.get("checked") is True
installed_supplied = bool(installed_scope.get("evidence_sha256")) or (
"installed_evidence_observation" in proof_scope
)
lines = [
f"Capability fit rerun: {report['status']}",
@@ -941,12 +960,29 @@ def render_review(report: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
(
"Scope: schema, signed release metadata, optional local tag provenance, "
+ (
"and supplied installed-composition evidence."
"and locally observed installed-composition evidence."
if installed_checked
else "and no installed-composition evidence."
else (
"and supplied installed-composition evidence that did not establish local proof."
if installed_supplied
else "and no installed-composition evidence."
)
)
),
]
verification = proof_scope.get("boundary_evidence_verification") or proof_scope.get(
"installed_evidence_observation"
)
if isinstance(verification, dict) and verification.get("evaluated_at"):
mode = verification.get("verification_mode")
mode_label = (
"HISTORICAL override"
if mode == "historical_override"
else "current-time evaluation"
)
lines.append(
f"Evidence verification: {mode_label} at {verification['evaluated_at']}."
)
findings = report.get("findings") or []
if findings:
lines.append("Findings:")

779
tools/assessments/govoplan_assessment/evidence.py
View File

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