chore(release): document hardening and verify complete source package composition

docs/security/RUNTIME_IMAGE_AUDIT_2026-09-08.md

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+# Runtime image candidate audit — 8 September 2026
+
+Release coordination: [GovOPlaN #51](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/51).
+Canonical remediation: [GovOPlaN #52](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/52).
+This follow-up to the [source security/performance review](SECURITY_PERFORMANCE_REVIEW_2026-09-08.md)
+records registry-only scans of nine proposed runtime dependencies and two
+same-minor patch candidates. **Runtime publication is held:** patch-only updates
+do not resolve the baseline. Source/package publication is a separate outcome.
+No images were executed, rebuilt, selected for CI, or published by this audit.
+
+## Method and reproducible evidence
+
+Official Trivy **0.74.0** was installed only in a private local task directory,
+without sudo or Docker access. Its Linux-64bit release archive matched both the
+official checksums file and GitHub release asset metadata:
+
+- Archive SHA256: `2ae6fe3ee734b7fdf11335663e18c75ea12dccc76062f09f164a3b0f8be4371a`.
+- Checksums-file SHA256: `bc701c3c3ee8b9acbea2c23257e41381e3854888f51281616a6ba5dc96963821`.
+- Vulnerability database schema 2, updated `2026-09-07T19:06:01.154199452Z`,
+  downloaded from `mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-db:2`.
+- Scan flags: `--image-src remote --platform linux/amd64 --scanners vuln
+  --format json --no-progress --timeout 8m --max-image-size 2GB --exit-code 0`.
+  Findings were counted from validated JSON; exit zero did not mean clean.
+- Existing Docker credentials were not read; no private keys or secrets were
+  used. Checksums over official HTTPS metadata were verified, not independent
+  Sigstore signatures. See the [official release](https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/tag/v0.74.0)
+  and [registry-only scan documentation](https://trivy.dev/docs/latest/target/container_image/).
+
+Raw evidence is retained locally, not committed:
+`/home/zemion/.cache/govoplan-trivy-remote.yKZgjDOg/scan/`.
+It contains eleven `reports/*-amd64.json` reports/logs, scanner scripts,
+`patch-candidate-inspection.json`, exact successor registry indices, and
+`evidence-checksums.json`. Summary SHA256 values:
+
+- `summary.json`: `f2785a731d637452ab9c0b1f5399772c0f8828a63ca83d5fa7496abdad1c757a`.
+- `patch-summary.json`: `b3fc6273fcdad98864040ccdf3477ecf379afd46e9f94444b1f2910f48c1d85b`.
+
+All eleven executions succeeded without timeout/rate-limit failure. Initial
+summary fields distinguish `scan_execution_complete: true` from
+`coverage_complete: false`: Garage has no detectable package inventory.
+Checksums preserve evidence identity, not indefinite storage availability.
+
+## Exact requested pins and results
+
+All references below use `docker.io/`. Counts are package-vulnerability records,
+not distinct CVEs or confirmed exploitable application defects. A vulnerability
+can appear against several installed packages. Unfixed/unknown records remain.
+
+| Image tag | Exact index SHA256 | Critical / High / Medium / Low / Unknown | Fixable C/H |
+| --- | --- | --- | ---: |
+| `library/python:3.12-slim-bookworm` | `782412e85d0f0984994c290652577d4018aff08145c85b262bb63dc0c7522254` | 5 / 55 / 102 / 103 / 5 | 0 |
+| `library/postgres:16-alpine` | `cf78e76683b9ca8c5733cbbdce6c9262b45b6767934dd0a95e671f9a0fc20685` | 1 / 30 / 28 / 14 / 1 | 31 |
+| `library/redis:7-alpine` | `ff02b58f971e7d7d156a1267e283fcbbeee91773b6aa36c49dac28ecfe28eadf` | 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 | 0 |
+| `nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:1.29-alpine` | `0c79d56aee561a1d81c63f00eee5fb5fe29279560cdc55e91425133104c7fbe6` | 0 / 33 / 74 / 37 / 20 | 33 |
+| `library/haproxy:3.2.21-alpine` | `66e25cc9a8332635f4e897f7f4b1e5622c25f09f0ee23cddc6ce9bdb3a24772a` | 0 / 2 / 6 / 12 / 0 | 2 |
+| `library/caddy:2.10.2-alpine` | `4c6e91c6ed0e2fa03efd5b44747b625fec79bc9cd06ac5235a779726618e530d` | 7 / 75 / 67 / 37 / 4 | 82 |
+| `dxflrs/garage:v2.3.0` | `866bd13ed2038ba7e7190e840482bc27234c4afaf77be8cfa439ae088c1e4690` | **Unknown: no inventory** | — |
+| `greenmail/standalone:2.1.9` | `3ac5a83dd6727cf95e4d50e18907fb8ee7bbf5f67e8534714dee2fb1b5b2e1d4` | 0 / 0 / 116 / 35 / 0 | 0 |
+| `tonistiigi/binfmt:qemu-v10.2.3-68` | `400a4873b838d1b89194d982c45e5fb3cda4593fbfd7e08a02e76b03b21166f0` | 0 / 9 / 2 / 1 / 1 | 9 |
+
+## Patch-only options and limits
+
+Complete publisher tag listings were inspected for nginx 1.29, Caddy 2.10,
+HAProxy 3.2, GreenMail 2.1 and binfmt qemu10.2. Two newer candidates were
+scanned; their registry index bytes matched both registry and publisher digests,
+and contained amd64 and arm64 manifests:
+
+- `library/haproxy:3.2.23-alpine@sha256:6343ce34a132a5dceaa24767d739df2bd519f8f7c1079ae39e4821334e8eb42e`:
+  same Alpine 3.24.1, 24 detected OS packages, zero reported findings. This is
+  a useful candidate, not a completed compatibility test or application audit.
+- `greenmail/standalone:2.1.13@sha256:3df66b7edd01c8a301343ca5e3601d8674760d4708655573560c24745e624fb2`:
+  upstream changes Ubuntu 22.04 to Debian 13.6; **3 C / 80 H / 98 M / 85 L /
+  5 unknown**, 30 fixable C/H records. Not selected as a no-base-change update.
+- nginx's newest matching Alpine patch is already 1.29.8 at the scanned pin;
+  Caddy 2.10 remains 2.10.2; binfmt qemu10.2 remains 10.2.3-68. No newer matching
+  publisher images were found. The current [official Caddy image catalogue](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/docker-library/official-images/master/library/caddy)
+  uses 2.11.4; switching minor lines requires new scans and compatibility checks.
+
+Priority remediation: Caddy's own seven HIGH records require fixes through
+2.11.4, with additional bundled Go/library fixes that must be re-scanned;
+nginx's packages include curl/libcurl fixes through 8.22.0-r0, OpenSSL 3.5.8-r0,
+c-ares 1.34.8-r0, expat 2.8.1-r0 and libuuid 2.41.6-r1. PostgreSQL's OS records
+require OpenSSL 3.5.8-r0 and libuuid 2.42.3-r1; its CRITICAL plus 21 HIGH Go
+records concern the **gosu helper**, not PostgreSQL server code. binfmt's nine
+HIGH records concern its Go 1.26.4 build, with fixes through 1.26.6. Package
+presence does not establish vulnerable-symbol reachability. No unscanned tag
+is claimed to meet every fix requirement.
+
+## Python triage and coverage caveats
+
+Python image metadata identifies CPython 3.12.14, but Trivy inventories only
+Debian packages and pip, **not CPython/stdlib**. All 60 C/H records concern
+Debian packages: 21 CVEs, 50 `affected` records, 9 `fix_deferred`, 1
+`will_not_fix`, without a recorded fixed Bookworm version. Five util-linux CVEs
+repeat across eight binary packages. These remain installed; they are not all
+removed build dependencies. Pip 25.0.1 separately has five MEDIUM/one LOW
+records, with fixes through 26.2.0; it is install tooling, and the API image uses
+an offline `--no-index` wheelhouse rather than an arbitrary package index.
+
+Narrow triage examples, **not blanket exemptions**:
+
+- Debian states [CVE-2023-45853](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-45853)
+  does not affect the built Bookworm zlib binaries because vulnerable minizip
+  code is not included. Other bundled minizip implementations are separate.
+- [CVE-2026-8376](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-8376)
+  explicitly requires 32-bit Perl; this scan targets amd64.
+- [CVE-2025-7458](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-7458)
+  requires crafted arbitrary SQLite SQL; the managed runtime uses PostgreSQL,
+  but alternate SQLite use must be reviewed.
+- Perl's regex and Archive::Tar records need exact binary/module applicability
+  checks; vendor-deferred status alone is not a finding dismissal.
+
+Only amd64 was scanned. arm64, newly built GovOPlaN API/Web layers and optional
+dependency combinations remain unverified. Garage has no inventory; Redis,
+HAProxy and PostgreSQL source-built executables, CPython and QEMU static
+binaries need supplemental SBOM/source coverage. Zero detected OS findings is
+not zero application vulnerabilities. Trivy also lacks Alpine 3.24 EOL metadata
+and nginx CVE-2026-80256 detail; unknowns are retained. There were no runtime,
+exploitability, secret, misconfiguration, malware or signature-policy checks.
+
+Before lifting the runtime hold: approve and test maintained image-line changes
+where necessary, fix or narrowly disposition findings with evidence, close
+inventory gaps, scan both architectures and final runtime layers, then run
+deployment/ingress smoke checks. Do not silently change base OS, use unpinned
+`latest`, rebuild third-party images, or accept all HIGH/CRITICAL findings.

docs/security/SECURITY_PERFORMANCE_REVIEW_2026-09-08.md

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+# Security and performance review — 8 September 2026
+
+Coordinated status: [Core #296](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/296).
+This records a workspace-wide automated scan, targeted manual boundary review,
+and a verified implementation pass. It is not a penetration test, an exhaustive
+line-by-line review, or a security certification. The audit was completed on
+local, unpublished changes, preserving existing worktree changes. Subsequent
+release preparation/publication is tracked in
+[GovOPlaN #51](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/51) and the
+[0.1.45 release notes](../releases/0.1.45.md).
+
+## Implemented findings
+
+| Area | Finding and change | Evidence / ownership |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Authentication — high | Preserve service-account provenance and current scope ceilings instead of recalculating them as ordinary membership permissions. Tenant API keys cannot retain canonical system permissions or unsafe wildcard grants. | Previously failing isolated regressions; [Access #21](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access/issues/21). |
+| Authentication — medium | Warm-cache API keys must follow the same explicit-header credential rules as cold authentication. A session cookie cannot turn an API key into a session credential. | Regression covering source-dependent authentication. |
+| Browser authority/cache — medium | Clear reusable data on auth changes and write settlement; fence late 200/304 writes and obsolete 401 side effects. Honor server no-store/no-cache and explicit fresh-read requests. Interactive login/logout remove retained automation keys that could shadow cookie-session identity. | 23 real-client regressions. Unchanged settings keep their object identity, preventing profile-fetch loops. Core `docs/API_CLIENT_CACHE_CONTRACT.md`; owning Access EN/DE session/field documentation. |
+| Spreadsheet resource exhaustion | Validate actual XLSX coordinates before openpyxl traversal; ignore misleading declared dimensions; count blank row gaps toward the existing limits. | [Connectors #18](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-connectors/issues/18), 13 tests and 2 subtests. |
+| Template resource exhaustion | Enforce the existing 5 MiB output budget during substitution and item construction, including UTF-8, HTML escaping and separators. | [Templates #7](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-templates/issues/7), full 20 tests; independent 3,000-case valid-output comparison. |
+| Archive resource exhaustion | Inspect regular TAR member limits before traversing payloads. Limit archive paths to 4,096 UTF-8 bytes / 128 components and count derived directories against entry limits. | [Files #46](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files/issues/46), 55 archive and 15 documentation tests. Extension-header decoding still needs stronger isolation. |
+| Dataflow resource exhaustion | Reject LPAD/RPAD target lengths above the existing 1,000,000-byte preview budget before fill evaluation/allocation. Preserve final serialized-byte checks. | [Dataflow #22](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dataflow/issues/22), full 104 tests and 39 subtests; 7 new guard tests independently rerun. |
+| Docs performance / defense in depth | Batch revision reads per request, avoid loading pending draft bodies for readers, and validate tenant/entry/publication consistency while retaining owner/audience checks. | [Docs #22](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs/issues/22), full 39 tests. |
+| Notifications performance / defense in depth | Batch delivery-attempt loading while preserving recipient checks and rejecting inconsistent attempt references, including already-loaded relationships. | [Notifications #6](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-notifications/issues/6), full 23 tests. |
+| Session-list performance | Apply active/expiry predicates and the existing 100-row cap in SQL, before loading session history. | Query-shape regression in Access. |
+| Reporting correctness | Use structural bind-name suffixes for recursive calculated measures, preserving valid dotted/hyphenated public keys and parameter uniqueness. | [Reporting #10](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-reporting/issues/10), full 29 tests. |
+| Audit hygiene | Redact Gitleaks logs and machine reports on current, history and legacy scanner paths. | 13 audit-wrapper tests enforce the flag. |
+
+All changed module workflows/limits have owning EN/DE DocumentationTopic updates.
+Independent review found no concrete regression in the backend changes.
+
+## Measured performance changes
+
+These are SQL-query counts in isolated 40-item fixtures, not production latency
+or throughput claims. Authorization is still evaluated for each request.
+
+| Projection | Before | After |
+| --- | ---: | ---: |
+| Docs reader entries | 41 SELECTs | 2 SELECTs |
+| Docs editor entries | 81 SELECTs | 2 SELECTs |
+| Notification list with attempts | 41 SELECTs | 2 SELECTs |
+
+The Docs 401-entry batching regression uses 3 SELECTs. Resource guards reject
+oversized work before the formerly expensive allocation/traversal. This does
+not make every legitimate upload or campaign faster. Honoring no-cache can
+increase server validation requests; ETags still avoid retransmitting unchanged
+bodies. That authorization/freshness trade-off is deliberate.
+
+The original audit snapshot measured 517,380 initial JavaScript bytes and
+164,119 gzip bytes. Release preparation's pure-defaults split reduces this to
+516,730 initial bytes and 163,908 gzip bytes. Restoring the missing Tasks
+descriptor then measures 516,987 initial / 163,976 gzip bytes with all 46 module
+descriptors lazy, within the unchanged 524,288 / 164,128 caps. The gzip margin is still small; future
+startup work should reduce eager dependencies, not raise the cap automatically.
+The full 209-case browser suite passed before the split, followed by 13 focused
+browser checks after it. Radon recorded 238 rank-D-or-higher entries; complexity
+is a review-priority signal, not a performance measurement.
+
+## Dependency remediation
+
+Core's full npm audit went from 30 affected package entries to zero. Most initial
+entries were transitive effects of the same Tiptap advisory, not 30 independent
+application exploits. The website went from two affected entries to zero; both
+Mail lockfiles also report zero.
+
+- Tiptap packages are aligned at 3.31.3, with direct minimum ranges raised to
+  3.30.4 in both development and release manifests, with a parity regression.
+  Added an actual installed-library prototype-attribute regression for
+  the [maintainer's security advisory](https://github.com/ueberdosis/tiptap/security/advisories/GHSA-cp6q-959q-f8rh).
+- Core now resolves xmldom 0.9.12, browserslist 4.28.9 and nanoid 3.3.18.
+  The website's affected browserslist/nanoid dependencies are patched too.
+- Development/audit requirements now require pip >=26.2; the local development
+  environment uses 26.2.1. The installed audit originally flagged
+  [CVE-2026-13346](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qwm4-qh6w-59xr), requiring an
+  attacker-controlled package index. This is an installation-tool vulnerability,
+  not evidence of an exposed application endpoint.
+
+The final installed Python audit enumerated 188 distributions: 137 were
+auditable with zero known vulnerabilities, and 51 local distributions were not
+available in PyPI. Those skips are covered by source review, not by a claim of
+dependency-advisory coverage. Production images and every optional dependency
+combination were not independently resolved or scanned.
+
+## Scan coverage and limitations
+
+Evidence directory:
+`/mnt/DATA/tmp/govoplan-security-performance-20260908-gsk8jn/`.
+
+The final `final-quick/manifest.json` captures 79 repositories, tool versions,
+start/end repository fingerprints, report checksums, 168 report artifacts and
+163 validated JSON/SARIF reports. It records an unchanged workspace, complete
+coverage for its four required scanners, no execution errors and no missing
+reports. It ran in report-only mode: exit zero does **not** mean zero warnings.
+
+- Final production Bandit: 447,008 Python lines; 67 warnings (63 low, 4 medium),
+  no high findings. Ruff security rules: 54 warnings. SQL-construction warnings
+  were reviewed against identifier/operator validation and bound values in
+  DuckDB/Reporting; no injection fix was warranted there. XML import warnings
+  were checked: feed/BPMN input parsing uses defusedxml; stdlib imports support
+  types/output construction. Operator-owned fenced-run argv is not a public
+  arbitrary-command endpoint. Xrechnung output buffering remains a follow-up.
+  Assertions and error-swallowing markers remain review/maintenance warnings,
+  not proof that all such code is harmless.
+- Final local Semgrep rules: no findings. The broader OWASP-rule pass applied
+  272 rules to 4,169 tracked targets. Its seven warnings recommended weakening
+  owner-only 0700 permissions; they were rejected as false positives. One
+  Calendar rule timeout was rerun with a 60-second budget: zero findings/errors.
+  Bash and conformance TypeScript checks passed despite two scanner-specific
+  parser limitations. Ignored/dependency/generated paths are not a complete
+  line-by-line source audit.
+- Gitleaks: 79 Git histories plus 79 worktrees, 158 redacted reports, zero
+  detected secrets. This does not establish that deployed credentials are safe
+  or that formerly exposed credentials have been rotated.
+- Tool versions included Semgrep 1.176.1, Bandit 1.9.4, Ruff 0.15.21 and
+  Gitleaks 8.30.1. The downloaded Gitleaks binary archive matched the official
+  release SHA-256 before execution.
+- The containerized full-toolbox path could not access Docker's daemon. Its
+  full-mode Trivy/misconfiguration and additional OSV scans were **not** run.
+  A subsequent [registry-only runtime image audit](RUNTIME_IMAGE_AUDIT_2026-09-08.md)
+  successfully scanned nine pinned candidates and two same-minor successors
+  for amd64 without Docker. It found unresolved vulnerabilities and inventory
+  gaps; runtime publication is held. This does not complete full-toolbox,
+  arm64, final-runtime-image or deployment coverage.
+
+No live application probes, database changes, file operations, mail sends,
+IMAP appends, imports, notification delivery, deployments, commits or pushes
+were performed. Browser tests used isolated mocked fixtures. Package installs,
+builds and temporary audit-tool installation were local development operations.
+
+## Verification and remaining work
+
+- 209/209 browser conformance tests pass; production Core/website builds,
+  conformance TypeScript, 24 Core client/dependency regressions, 4 real-client
+  Files reload checks, and 72/72 manifest checks pass.
+- Access's full 91-test suite passed before the final documentation-only update;
+  the final documentation suite passed all 4 tests. Other module counts appear
+  above. The new authentication/resource tests include demonstrated pre-fix
+  failures rather than only structural assertions.
+- The original focused workspace run stopped at the institutional
+  governance/Portal fixture (`tests/test_institutional_governance_journey.py:223`,
+  `IndexError`). Release preparation fixes its mixed clocks using the existing
+  temporal context, retaining validity-boundary exclusions; 7 journey tests and
+  ambient-year checks pass. Tracked in
+  [Meta #50](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/50).
+- Campaign's apparent host-path issue was ruled out by existing tracked
+  API/build/snapshot guards and 11 passing tests under normal initialization.
+  Release preparation fixes the standalone import cycle through a deferred
+  resolver import without changing validation rules. Fresh-process coverage,
+  all 11 path tests and Campaign's full 611-test suite pass.
+
+Next coordinated work:
+
+1. [Hard resource isolation — Core #297](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/297):
+   regex CPU, aggregate allocation, TAR extension metadata, bounded workers and
+   cancellation, followed by production-like concurrent load tests.
+2. [Forced password change/recovery — Access #22](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access/issues/22):
+   the current flag is advisory only. Do not enable enforcement without a usable
+   local-password/recovery flow and external-provider rules.
+3. [Bound subprocess output — Xrechnung #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-xrechnung/issues/2):
+   enforce the existing 2 MiB limit while draining stdout/stderr, not afterwards.
+4. [Workflow revision batching/history projection — Workflow Engine #3](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow-engine/issues/3):
+   batch evidence lookups; separately define explicit history pagination and
+   authorized-total semantics. Docs/notification history volumes also remain.
+5. Resolve the [runtime image audit](RUNTIME_IMAGE_AUDIT_2026-09-08.md) findings
+   tracked in [Meta #52](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/52)
+   and coverage gaps before lifting its publication hold; complete deployment
+   audits, review exposed development credentials and worker quotas, and
+   benchmark realistic tenant sizes/concurrency. The sanctions
+   transport's fixed HTTPS/redirect allowlist is not a demonstrated arbitrary-URL
+   issue, but migration to Core's pinned egress transport remains desirable.
+
+Operational compatibility: tenant keys relying on accidental system/wildcard
+permissions must be corrected rather than weakening the guard. Extreme sparse
+spreadsheets, overly deep/long archive paths and oversized padding intermediates
+can now fail early with diagnostics. No stored documents or configurations were
+deleted or silently migrated.