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# GovOPlaN Capability and IT-Infrastructure Fit Assessment
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> Generated from [`capability-fit-current.json`](../../capability-fit-current.json).
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> Edit and validate the machine-readable assessment, then regenerate this file;
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> do not maintain conclusions independently in Markdown.
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This is an evidence-based fit assessment, not a production approval or
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security certification. Repository or manifest existence alone never counts
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as an implemented capability. Unknown target requirements remain explicitly
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`not_assessed`.
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## Assessment record
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| Field | Value |
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| --- | --- |
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| Assessment ID | `campaign-reference-2026-07-22` |
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| Schema version | `govoplan.fit-assessment/0.2.0` |
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| Assessed on | 2026-07-22 |
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| Scope | Campaign-centric internal pilot and small-production candidate |
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| Release | `stable-catalog-202607220843` (tagged_release) |
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| Meta commit | `5447299289a1` |
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| Deployment profile | `production-like-dev` · `partial` |
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| Configuration packages | `none: environment-profile basis only` |
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| Canonical input SHA-256 | `5a23f17c5289c5a89d2e92445f2c8b2eef54e3753f1392ebf300aff5508f0bfe` |
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## Controlled status vocabulary
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| Status | Meaning |
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| --- | --- |
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| `verified` | Implemented and directly exercised by evidence appropriate to the stated scope. |
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| `available_unconfigured` | Implemented with supporting evidence, but not configured and exercised in the target. |
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| `partial` | A useful subset exists, but a material part of the requirement is missing or unproved. |
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| `scaffold` | Contracts or structure exist, but the end-to-end capability is not usable. |
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| `external_system` | The deployment or another system must supply the capability. |
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| `planned` | Only a concept, backlog item, or design direction exists. |
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| `not_fit` | Evidence shows that the assessed composition cannot meet the requirement. |
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| `not_assessed` | The requirement or target environment is not sufficiently known. |
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## Scope and reference journeys
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Reference journeys:
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- Internal operator authors, validates, builds, queues, sends and reconciles an email Campaign with managed attachments
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- Operator inspects delivery and audit evidence
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Explicitly postponed:
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- Workflow and workflow-driven user stories
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## Facts
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- The assessment is pinned to signed stable catalog sequence 202607220843 and the exact module commits listed below.
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- The Campaign authoring, validation, build, mock-delivery, managed-file, local-access, and local-audit paths have direct test or contract evidence.
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- The production-like development profile runs PostgreSQL and Redis in containers while application processes use editable source trees.
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- No installed-target, external-provider, reference-readiness, recovery, or production-approval evidence bundle is attached to this assessment.
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## Decisions
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- Use Campaign as the first reference journey and flagship pilot scenario.
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- Keep Workflow and workflow-driven user stories planned and explicitly postponed for this assessment.
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- Use local GovOPlaN accounts for the bounded pilot; do not claim federated identity support.
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- Do not approve small production until installed-artifact, target mail, monitoring, backup/restore, and recovery proof checks pass.
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## Assumptions
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- The pilot can use local accounts and one internal tenant or office.
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- A dedicated non-production SMTP/IMAP account and safe recipients are available.
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- Pilot load fits one API and one worker until measured otherwise.
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- Durable local storage is acceptable for the pilot.
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## Unresolved decisions
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- What are the target organization's data classes, legal bases, retention and external-disclosure rules?
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- Which identity, mail, file, address and monitoring systems are mandatory?
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- What are Campaign volume, concurrency, growth, availability, RPO and RTO?
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- Who owns each external runtime component and operational control?
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- Which accessibility, security, support and procurement constraints are mandatory?
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## Pinned release and composition
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Release reproducible: **yes**.
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Release notes:
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- The live stable catalog has a valid Ed25519 signature trusted through release-key-1.
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- Core v0.1.13 and Campaign v0.1.10 are tagged and package-integrated; this is not target-environment or production approval.
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- The absence of a configuration package is pinned explicitly as an environment-profile-only basis; this remains a promotion gap.
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| Module | Repository and commit | Manifest version | Enabled | Role |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `core` | `govoplan-core` @ `d487726f4d2c` | `0.1.13` | yes | API, registry, migrations, sessions, kernel contracts and shared WebUI |
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| `tenancy` | `govoplan-tenancy` @ `efbec827616b` | `0.1.8` | yes | Tenant context and lifecycle |
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| `organizations` | `govoplan-organizations` @ `39c081c4fb8f` | `0.1.8` | yes | Organization model |
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| `identity` | `govoplan-identity` @ `7a1710af896f` | `0.1.8` | yes | Normalized internal identity directory |
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| `access` | `govoplan-access` @ `f1d64d247e12` | `0.1.11` | yes | Local authentication, sessions, API keys and RBAC |
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| `admin` | `govoplan-admin` @ `11ecf362a36d` | `0.1.8` | yes | Administration surfaces |
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| `dashboard` | `govoplan-dashboard` @ `4b960ad37f0d` | `0.1.8` | yes | Module-aware home surface |
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| `policy` | `govoplan-policy` @ `1063622d311a` | `0.1.9` | yes | Policy explanation and configuration boundary |
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| `audit` | `govoplan-audit` @ `d3d2c60d7dc1` | `0.1.8` | yes | Database audit records and retrying audit outbox |
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| `campaigns` | `govoplan-campaign` @ `735e874bd03c` | `0.1.10` | yes | Campaign authoring, build, delivery control and reporting |
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| `files` | `govoplan-files` @ `2b34f6e30578` | `0.1.9` | yes | Managed files and Campaign attachments |
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| `mail` | `govoplan-mail` @ `3e2302909022` | `0.1.10` | yes | SMTP and IMAP profiles and transports |
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| `calendar` | `govoplan-calendar` @ `9bcf41bb1fbb` | `0.1.8` | yes | Optional calendar outside the Campaign pilot minimum |
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| `docs` | `govoplan-docs` @ `be52b716caed` | `0.1.10` | yes | Configured-system documentation |
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| `ops` | `govoplan-ops` @ `341773a4ff8a` | `0.1.8` | yes | Readiness and deployment-profile visibility |
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| `addresses` | `govoplan-addresses` @ `93dddbb8c52a` | `0.1.9` | no | Optional reusable recipient sources and CardDAV |
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## Deployment profile
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Status: `partial`
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PostgreSQL and Redis run in containers while API, WebUI, worker and scheduler run from editable source trees.
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Evidence:
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- configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/dev/production-like/docker-compose.yml
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- documentation/documented_model: govoplan/dev/production-like/README.md
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## Recommended scenarios
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### Controlled Campaign pilot
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Status: `partial`
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Proceed with a bounded internal pilot after its provider, privacy, workload, and recovery proof checks are assigned and passed.
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Composition: `core`, `tenancy`, `organizations`, `identity`, `access`, `admin`, `dashboard`, `policy`, `audit`, `campaigns`, `files`, `mail`, `docs`, `ops`.
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Topology:
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- One supervised GovOPlaN API process and one immutable built WebUI behind deployment-owned TLS termination
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- One PostgreSQL database and a durable single-node or shared managed-file path
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- One persistent private Redis broker and one supervised Celery worker when asynchronous delivery is enabled
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- One dedicated non-production SMTP/IMAP account with a restricted safe-recipient policy
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- External health checks, centralized logs, protected secret injection, and coordinated backup storage
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Conditions:
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- Use one internal tenant or office and controlled operators.
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- Keep recipient volume non-critical until measured.
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- Enable Addresses only when reusable recipient lists or CardDAV are explicitly in scope.
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- Do not enable or claim Workflow from this assessment.
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### Small-production candidate
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Status: `partial`
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Do not approve production until every listed operational gate has target evidence and the residual risks have named owners.
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Composition: `core`, `tenancy`, `organizations`, `identity`, `access`, `admin`, `dashboard`, `policy`, `audit`, `campaigns`, `files`, `mail`, `docs`, `ops`.
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Topology:
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- Immutable separately supervised WebUI, API, and worker artifacts behind monitored reverse-proxy TLS
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- Dedicated or managed PostgreSQL with measured coordinated backup and isolated restore
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- Persistent authenticated Redis with queue-age, queue-depth, and worker-health alerts
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- Durable shared or S3-compatible object storage with versioning, lifecycle, and restore evidence
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- Target-native secret management, centralized monitoring/logging/audit export, and an exercised incident and disaster-recovery procedure
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Conditions:
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- Pin and promote a configuration package instead of relying on an environment-only basis.
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- Pass installed-release, target SMTP/IMAP, accessibility, privacy, security, operations, and recovery evidence gates.
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- Agree availability, RPO, RTO, retention, support, and procurement requirements.
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- Run only one scheduler unless distributed leadership or locking is proved.
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## Functional matrix context
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### Required modules
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- core
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- tenancy
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- organizations
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- identity
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- access
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- admin
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- dashboard
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- policy
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- audit
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- campaigns
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- files
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- mail
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- docs
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- ops
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### Optional modules
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- addresses
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### External systems and connectors
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- Deployment-owned reverse proxy and TLS certificate lifecycle
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- Target SMTP/IMAP service and its DNS, certificate, throttling, bounce, and reply policies
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- Target-native secret store, monitoring/logging platform, backup storage, and incident-response process
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### Missing contracts
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- End-to-end federated identity provider and lifecycle contract
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- Target monitoring, alert delivery, and central audit/SIEM acceptance contract
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- Production configuration-package promotion and approval evidence
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### Policy decisions
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- Recipient allow-list, permitted sender, attachment, retention, and external-disclosure policy
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- Identity, MFA, break-glass, service-account, and joiner/mover/leaver policy
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- Availability, RPO, RTO, support, procurement, and residual-risk ownership
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### Manual workarounds
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- Use controlled local accounts while federation remains outside the verified slice
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- Use one supervised scheduler where periodic work is unavoidable
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- Keep provider reconciliation and production promotion under explicit operator review
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### Blockers
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- No promoted configuration package is pinned
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- No installed-target or target SMTP/IMAP proof is attached
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- No coherent target backup/restore or disaster-recovery drill with measured RPO/RTO is attached
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- No target privacy, security, accessibility, operations, or production-approval evidence is attached
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## Assessment questionnaire
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Every required area remains visible even when its target answer is unknown.
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| Area | Question | State | Answer | Evidence |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Scope Outcomes | Which journey is assessed? | `answered` | An internal operator authors, validates, builds, queues, sends and reconciles a Campaign with managed attachments. | — |
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| Scope Outcomes | Is Workflow in scope? | `answered` | No; Workflow is planned and explicitly postponed. | — |
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| Scope Outcomes | Which users, roles, tenants, organization units, and delegated functions participate? | `assumed` | One internal tenant or office with controlled Campaign operators; detailed organization and delegation shape remains target-specific. | — |
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| Scope Outcomes | What constitutes pilot success and production acceptance? | `answered` | Pilot success requires the bounded Campaign journey and proof checks; production additionally requires installed-artifact, provider, privacy, security, operations, recovery, and approval evidence. | — |
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| Data Policy | Which data classes and legal bases apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Data Policy | What retention, deletion, archive and legal-hold rules apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Data Policy | Which privacy, security, residency, minimization, access, and external-disclosure constraints apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Identity Integrations | May the pilot use local GovOPlaN accounts? | `assumed` | Yes; federation is outside the verified composition. | — |
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| Identity Integrations | Which target SMTP/IMAP service and policy apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Identity Integrations | Which identity protocols, MFA, joiner/mover/leaver, service-account, and break-glass rules are mandatory? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Identity Integrations | Which connector protocols, versions, directions, authentication, certificate, rate-limit, egress, and degraded-mode requirements apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Workload Growth | What are Campaign frequency, recipients per Campaign, send window, import size and attachment volume? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Workload Growth | What are tenant, named-user, active-user, concurrent-user, and peak-request assumptions? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Workload Growth | What are tenant, user, concurrency, file, database, queue and audit growth assumptions? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Workload Growth | What connector traffic, scheduled-job, batch, queue-depth, queue-age, and external-rate-limit peaks apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Availability Operations | What availability, RPO and RTO are required? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Availability Operations | Who operates database, queue, storage, TLS, secrets, monitoring, backup and incident response? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Availability Operations | Which hosting, network-zone, egress, proxy, DNS, NTP, certificate-authority, residency, or disconnected-operation constraints apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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| Procurement Decisions | Which licensing, accessibility, security, certification, support and procurement conditions are mandatory? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
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## Functional capability matrix
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| Requirement | Status | Evidence | Conditions and gaps | Recommendation and proof |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| **platform.composition**<br>Compose enabled backend and WebUI modules without hard optional-module dependencies. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_module_system.py; contract/current_workspace: govoplan/tools/checks/check-contracts.py (43 modules, 33 providers, 19 requirements, no issues) | Condition: Package integration is verified; repeat checks on the installed target composition.; Gap: No target deployment acceptance is recorded.; Risk: A reproducible module graph can still be installed or configured incorrectly. | Use the signed stable catalog and verify the minimal Campaign composition after installation.<br>**Proof:** Run contract, migration, API and WebUI module-permutation gates on the installed release. |
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| **access.local**<br>Provide tenant-scoped local accounts, sessions, API keys and RBAC. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-access/tests/test_auth_dependencies.py; test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#cookie-session-csrf | Condition: Pilot accepts local accounts.; Gap: MFA and federated lifecycle are not part of this conclusion.; Risk: Manual account lifecycle may not satisfy production identity policy. | Use controlled local pilot accounts and define break-glass/bootstrap rules.<br>**Proof:** Exercise joiner, role change, suspension and protected-owner recovery. |
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| **campaign.journey**<br>Author, validate, build, queue, send, reconcile and report a Campaign with frozen execution evidence. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#campaign-create-validate-build-mock-send; test/committed_source: govoplan-campaign/tests (Campaign v0.1.10 is exactly the catalog-selected tagged source); configuration/committed_source: https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/catalogs/v1/channels/stable.json#sequence-202607220843 (Core v0.1.13 and Campaign v0.1.10 have matching catalogued Python and WebUI refs) | Condition: This verifies implementation paths, not target-provider delivery.; Gap: Usability and target-provider acceptance remain separate.; Risk: Package integration does not prove provider behavior or production operations. | Use the catalogued Campaign release for usability and target-provider acceptance.<br>**Proof:** Run the complete journey with safe data and the target-like mail service. |
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| **files.managed_attachments**<br>Store and resolve managed Campaign attachments on durable storage. | `verified` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-files/tests (14 tests passed); test/current_workspace: govoplan-campaign/tests/test_attachment_building.py | Condition: Deployment provides a durable storage root.; Gap: Target backup and restore are not verified.; Risk: Node-local storage prevents safe independent API scaling. | Use durable local storage for the pilot and assess object/shared storage before scaling.<br>**Proof:** Back up and restore files together with database references. |
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| **mail.smtp_imap**<br>Send Campaign mail through SMTP and optionally append sent messages through IMAP. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-mail/tests (22 tests passed); documentation/documented_model: govoplan-campaign/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md | Condition: Use a dedicated non-production service account and safe recipients.; Gap: No target provider, TLS chain, throttling or bounce/reply process was exercised.; Risk: Ambiguous provider outcomes can cause duplicate-send risk if reconciled incorrectly. | Run target-like interoperability and failure drills before production use.<br>**Proof:** Prove SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, throttling and outcome reconciliation. |
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| **addresses.recipient_sources**<br>Select reusable address lists as Campaign recipient sources. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-addresses/tests (14 tests passed) | Condition: Enable the Addresses module explicitly.; Gap: Addresses is disabled in the pinned root profile.; Risk: Recipient governance may differ between source data and frozen Campaign evidence. | Enable only when reusable lists are a pilot requirement.<br>**Proof:** Build a Campaign from a source list and verify immutable recipient provenance. |
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| **audit.local**<br>Retain tenant/system audit evidence and retry governed audit events. | `verified` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-audit/tests (5 tests passed) | Condition: Conclusion covers local database evidence only.; Gap: No central sink, retention enforcement or tamper-evident archive is verified.; Risk: Local audit evidence may not satisfy organizational records or SIEM requirements. | Define retention and export requirements before production approval.<br>**Proof:** Exercise privileged-event review, retention and any required external export. |
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| **identity.federation**<br>Integrate external LDAP/AD, OIDC/SAML or SCIM identity infrastructure. | `scaffold` | documentation/documented_model: govoplan-idm/README.md | Gap: No end-to-end provider connector or federated login is verified.; Risk: Federation-dependent organizations cannot use the current pilot composition without extra implementation. | Use local pilot accounts or assess and implement the selected provider path.<br>**Proof:** Run provider metadata, login/provisioning, deprovisioning and failure tests. |
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| **compliance.export_control**<br>Screen persons and organizations against embargo/sanctions lists with review evidence. | `planned` | issue/documented_model: https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/12 | Gap: No provider, list provenance, match policy, review flow or legal evidence exists.; Risk: The current composition must not be represented as performing export-control screening. | Keep outside pilot claims until the user story is implemented and legally validated.<br>**Proof:** Validate list ingestion, versioning, matching, false-positive review and audit evidence. |
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| **workflow**<br>Orchestrate the journey through Workflow. | `planned` | observation/documented_model: Assessment scope (Explicitly postponed) | Gap: Workflow is outside this assessment.; Risk: Including it would overstate the assessed composition. | Do not enable or claim Workflow for this reference pilot.<br>**Proof:** Reassess in a later Workflow-focused composition. |
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## Infrastructure matrix
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| Requirement | Status | Evidence | Conditions and gaps | Recommendation and proof |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| **runtime.web_api**<br>Serve matching WebUI and API artifacts with health endpoints. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_module_system.py; route/committed_source: govoplan-core/src/govoplan_core/server/fastapi.py#/health | Condition: Materialize the matching catalogued artifacts in the target.; Gap: No production image or service bundle is supplied by the profile.; Risk: Editable source processes are unsuitable as a production artifact. | Install matching catalogued WebUI/API refs and supervise them as immutable artifacts.<br>**Proof:** Deploy the built artifacts and run health/module-route checks. |
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| **runtime.worker**<br>Run durable asynchronous Campaign jobs. | `available_unconfigured` | configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/tools/launch/launch-production-like-dev.sh | Condition: Redis and a supervised worker are required when Celery is enabled.; Gap: Target heartbeat, restart and queue-age alerting are not proved.; Risk: Queued work can stall silently without monitoring. | Start one worker for the pilot and split queues only after measurement.<br>**Proof:** Interrupt and restart a worker while preserving job/reconciliation safety. |
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| **runtime.scheduler**<br>Run periodic recovery and cleanup safely. | `partial` | test/committed_source: govoplan-calendar/tests/test_outbox.py (Committed and pushed after the catalogued Calendar v0.1.8 tag) | Condition: Calendar outbox and recovery work is remote-integrated source but not stable-package-integrated.; Gap: No distributed leader election or target supervision is established.; Risk: Multiple schedulers can duplicate periodic dispatch without locking. | Omit from the Campaign-only pilot or run one supervised instance.<br>**Proof:** Prove missed-schedule recovery and single-leader behavior. |
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| **data.postgresql**<br>Persist application state in PostgreSQL with explicit migrations. | `verified` | configuration/committed_source: govoplan/dev/postgres; test/committed_source: govoplan/tools/checks/postgres-integration-check.py | Condition: Target database remains deployment-owned.; Gap: HA, patching, WAL policy and capacity are not assessed.; Risk: A single unprotected database is a system-wide failure point. | Use managed or dedicated PostgreSQL with explicit migration and backup controls.<br>**Proof:** Run migrations and restore a target-like database. |
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| **queue.redis**<br>Provide the Celery broker and queue persistence. | `available_unconfigured` | configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/dev/production-like/docker-compose.yml#redis | Gap: Authentication, TLS, eviction, HA and queue-loss policy are not assessed.; Risk: Broker loss or eviction can delay work even when database business state survives. | Configure private persistent Redis and monitor queue age/depth.<br>**Proof:** Exercise broker interruption and worker recovery. |
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| **storage.local**<br>Persist managed files on a durable single-node/shared path. | `verified` | contract/committed_source: govoplan-files/src/govoplan_files/backend/storage/backends.py | Condition: Path is durable, private, writable and backed up.; Gap: Node-local storage cannot support independent API replicas.; Risk: Files can be lost or become inconsistent with database state. | Use for a bounded pilot only with coordinated backup.<br>**Proof:** Restore files and verify all database references. |
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| **storage.object**<br>Use S3-compatible storage for independently scalable file persistence. | `partial` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-files/tests/test_connector_providers.py | Gap: No chosen target service or storage-backend interoperability drill.; Risk: Provider semantics, CA or lifecycle mismatch can break file access/retention. | Select and exercise the target object store before horizontal scaling.<br>**Proof:** Upload, retrieve, version, back up and restore representative objects. |
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| **edge.proxy_tls**<br>Terminate HTTPS and enforce proxy/security policy. | `external_system` | route/committed_source: govoplan-ops/src/govoplan_ops/backend/api/v1/routes.py#deployment-security | Gap: No proxy, certificates, renewal, header or request-limit configuration is shipped here.; Risk: Incorrect proxy/cookie/CORS configuration can expose sessions or block legitimate use. | Supply and monitor the edge through the target platform.<br>**Proof:** Run external TLS/header/cookie/CORS and upload-limit tests. |
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| **security.secret_store**<br>Inject and rotate master, database, mail and connector secrets. | `external_system` | configuration/committed_source: govoplan/.env.example | Gap: No target secret manager or rotation drill is selected.; Risk: Loss of the master key makes encrypted credentials unavailable; leakage compromises connectors. | Use target-native secret injection and document rotation/recovery.<br>**Proof:** Rotate a non-production credential and recover from a protected backup. |
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| **identity.access**<br>Authenticate users and enforce tenant-scoped authorization through the selected identity mode. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-access/tests/test_auth_dependencies.py; test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#cookie-session-csrf | Condition: The bounded pilot accepts local GovOPlaN accounts.; Gap: Target MFA, federation, provisioning, and joiner/mover/leaver requirements are not assessed.; Risk: A local-only identity topology may not satisfy institutional production policy. | Use controlled local pilot accounts and assess the mandatory production identity topology separately.<br>**Proof:** Exercise login, role change, account suspension, protected bootstrap, and break-glass recovery in the target. |
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| **connectors.mail**<br>Reach the selected SMTP/IMAP and other external connector endpoints under explicit network and provider policy. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-mail/tests (Protocol adapters have direct tests; no target provider was exercised); documentation/documented_model: govoplan-campaign/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md | Condition: The deployment supplies DNS, egress, proxy, CA trust, scoped service accounts, and provider limits.; Gap: No target endpoint, TLS chain, throttling, sender policy, bounce/reply path, or disclosure agreement is assessed.; Risk: Provider rejection, delay, or ambiguous outcomes can affect delivery and evidence completeness. | Use a dedicated safe provider account for the pilot and require target interoperability evidence before production.<br>**Proof:** Exercise target-like SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, throttling, outage, retry, and reconciliation through the approved network path. |
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| **operations.monitoring**<br>Detect API, database, worker, queue, storage and delivery degradation. | `partial` | route/committed_source: govoplan-ops/src/govoplan_ops/backend/api/v1/routes.py#/ops/readiness; contract/committed_source: govoplan-core/src/govoplan_core/server/fastapi.py#slow-request-logging | Gap: No metrics exporter, log collector, dashboards, alert routes or SLO is verified.; Risk: Failures and queue backlog can remain unnoticed. | Integrate external monitoring before small production.<br>**Proof:** Trigger each readiness/delivery failure and verify an actionable alert. |
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| **operations.audit**<br>Retain, monitor, review, and where required export security and business audit evidence. | `partial` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-audit/tests (Local audit persistence and retry behavior are exercised) | Condition: Local database audit evidence is part of coordinated backup and access review.; Gap: Target retention enforcement, tamper-evident export, SIEM integration, alerting, and privileged review are not verified.; Risk: Local evidence alone may not meet institutional security, records, or incident-response requirements. | Define the target audit retention, export, monitoring, and review controls before production approval.<br>**Proof:** Exercise privileged-event review, retention, export failure/retry, and target SIEM or archive ingestion. |
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| **operations.backup_restore**<br>Back up and restore database, files, configuration and keys as a coherent service. | `partial` | documentation/documented_model: govoplan-core/docs/DEPLOYMENT_OPERATOR_GUIDE.md; issue/documented_model: https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/29 | Gap: No target full-service restore drill or measured RPO/RTO exists.; Risk: Partial restore can produce missing files, unusable secrets or inconsistent evidence. | Treat Core #29 and a target restore drill as a production gate.<br>**Proof:** Restore the whole service into an isolated environment and measure it. |
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| **operations.disaster_recovery**<br>Recover the service after site or dependency loss within agreed RPO/RTO. | `not_assessed` | absence/current_workspace: No target DR plan or exercise evidence supplied | Gap: RPO/RTO, off-site copies, recovery order, failover, communications and exercise schedule are unknown.; Risk: Service and evidence may be unrecoverable after a major incident. | Define and exercise DR before any availability commitment.<br>**Proof:** Run a documented end-to-end recovery exercise. |
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## Data flows and trust boundaries
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| Flow | From → to | Data | Trust boundary | Controls |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `browser.api` | User browser → Reverse proxy and GovOPlaN WebUI/API | Session and CSRF cookies; Campaign content; Recipient personal data; Managed files | Client/public to application | HTTPS; Exact CORS origins; Secure cookies; Tenant and RBAC enforcement; Request limits |
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| `api.database` | GovOPlaN API and workers → PostgreSQL | Tenant and identity records; Campaign drafts, snapshots and jobs; Connector metadata; Audit evidence | Application to primary state store | Dedicated database identity; Private or encrypted transport; Migrations; Backup and retention |
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| `api.queue.worker` | GovOPlaN API → Redis and Celery worker | Job identifiers; Queue routing and retry metadata | Request plane to asynchronous processing plane | Private authenticated broker; Bounded payloads; Idempotent claims; Queue monitoring |
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| `worker.mail` | GovOPlaN Campaign worker → External SMTP and IMAP services | Recipient addresses; Message bodies; Attachments; Sent-message copy | GovOPlaN to external communication provider | Scoped service account; TLS and CA policy; Sender and recipient policy; Rate limits; Outcome reconciliation |
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| `worker.connectors` | GovOPlaN connector worker → External address, file, object or calendar service | Addresses; Files and provenance; Calendar resources | GovOPlaN to organizational/external content systems | Explicit sync direction; Scoped credentials; Endpoint allow-list; Provenance; Conflict and reconciliation policy |
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## Risks and residual risks
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| Risk | Impact | Treatment | Owner | Residual risk |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| **risk.reproducibility**<br>The signed package selection is reproducible but has not been accepted as an installed target composition. | Installation or configuration drift can still produce uncertain deployed behavior. | Materialize the signed catalog in an isolated target and run installed-artifact acceptance gates. | unassigned | Module and environment differences still require release-environment verification. |
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| **risk.delivery_provider**<br>Target SMTP/IMAP behavior and failure modes are unproved. | Failed, delayed or duplicate communication and incomplete evidence. | Run target-like interoperability, throttling and uncertainty drills. | unassigned | External provider outages and ambiguous outcomes remain operational risks. |
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| **risk.recovery**<br>Backup/restore and disaster recovery are not demonstrated across all state and keys. | Irrecoverable or inconsistent service after loss. | Complete Core #29 and an isolated full-service restore/DR exercise. | unassigned | Recovery time and data loss remain bounded by the selected external infrastructure. |
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## Recommendations
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- Proceed only with a controlled internal Campaign pilot after the bounded proof checks pass.
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- Use the minimal composition and enable Addresses only for an explicit reusable-recipient journey.
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- Do not claim Workflow, export-control screening, identity federation or production DR as implemented.
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- Treat installed-release acceptance, target mail proof, monitoring and a coherent restore drill as production gates.
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## Proof-of-concept and promotion checks
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1. Materialize the signed catalog into an isolated installation and rerun contract, migration and module-permutation gates against the installed artifacts.
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2. Collect the isolated installation with the bounded installed-composition evidence contract; require exact enabled package/module versions, complete RECORD verification and immutable provenance anchored to this assessment.
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3. Run a safe target-like Campaign through SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, reporting and audit.
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4. Drill worker, Redis and ambiguous-delivery failures without duplicate sends.
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5. Restore PostgreSQL, managed files, configuration and encrypted credentials and measure RPO/RTO.
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6. Validate proxy/TLS, cookies/CORS, account bootstrap, secret redaction, monitoring and alert delivery.
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7. Measure representative Campaign/file/queue/database load and external throttling.
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8. Require separately issued, expiring and independently scope-authorized evidence before marking target environment, external provider or production approval proof as checked.
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## Generation contract
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This report is deterministic output from the schema-validated JSON companion.
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The generator rejects duplicate JSON keys, schema drift, secret-bearing field
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names, stale checked-in output, and oversized inputs. A new assessment or
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release changes the canonical input hash and requires review of the affected
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evidence and conclusions through the release-aware reassessment tool.
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