feat: generate evidence-based fit assessments

2026-08-20 12:58:53 +02:00
parent 83ccb7f198
commit 5d4535f7b5
12 changed files with 1487 additions and 10 deletions
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ Pinned evidence is retained under `evidence/`; completed reviews and migration
 inventories are under `archive/`. They explain or prove a dated state and must
 not be read as current product status.
- [Campaign capability and infrastructure fit, 2026-07-22](evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
+- [Generated Campaign capability and infrastructure fit, 2026-07-22](evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md)
 - [Supporting narrative for the 2026-07-22 assessment](evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
 - [Interface surface inventory, 2026-08-03](evidence/snapshots/INTERFACE_SURFACE_INVENTORY.md)
 - [Strategic review, 2026-08-05](archive/2026-08/STRATEGIC_REVIEW_2026-08-05.md)
 - [Meta repository scan, 2026-07-13](archive/2026-07/META_REPO_SCAN.md)
@@ -93,6 +94,13 @@ evidence inputs, and project configuration. Their paths are intentionally
 stable because tools and published schema identifiers consume them; they are
 not additional reading-list entries.
 Regenerate and verify the human fit report from its JSON input with:
 ```sh
 ./.venv/bin/python tools/assessments/generate-capability-fit-report.py
 ./.venv/bin/python tools/assessments/generate-capability-fit-report.py --check
 ```
 ## Maintenance Rules
 1. Gitea issues are the only live source for work state, priority, and owner.
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Read this together with:
 - [Reference Journey Program](../strategy/REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md)
 - [Module Contracts and Install Boundaries](../operations/MODULE_CONTRACTS_AND_INSTALLS.md)
 - [Datasource and Definition Graph Architecture](DATASOURCE_AND_DEFINITION_GRAPH_ARCHITECTURE.md)
- [Capability and Infrastructure Fit](../evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
+- [Generated Capability and Infrastructure Fit](../evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md)
 - [Core Module Architecture](../../../govoplan-core/docs/MODULE_ARCHITECTURE.md)
 - [Core External References and Integration Maturity](../../../govoplan-core/docs/EXTERNAL_REFERENCES_AND_INTEGRATION_MATURITY.md)
 - [Core Action, Effect, and Automation Layer](../../../govoplan-core/docs/ACTION_EFFECT_AUTOMATION_LAYER.md)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
  "$schema": "./capability-fit.schema.json",
-  "schema_version": "0.1.0",
+  "schema_version": "0.2.0",
  "assessment_id": "campaign-reference-2026-07-22",
  "assessed_at": "2026-07-22",
  "scope": {
@@ -13,16 +13,30 @@
      "Workflow and workflow-driven user stories"
    ]
  },
  "facts": [
    "The assessment is pinned to signed stable catalog sequence 202607220843 and the exact module commits listed below.",
    "The Campaign authoring, validation, build, mock-delivery, managed-file, local-access, and local-audit paths have direct test or contract evidence.",
    "The production-like development profile runs PostgreSQL and Redis in containers while application processes use editable source trees.",
    "No installed-target, external-provider, reference-readiness, recovery, or production-approval evidence bundle is attached to this assessment."
  ],
  "decisions": [
    "Use Campaign as the first reference journey and flagship pilot scenario.",
    "Keep Workflow and workflow-driven user stories planned and explicitly postponed for this assessment.",
    "Use local GovOPlaN accounts for the bounded pilot; do not claim federated identity support.",
    "Do not approve small production until installed-artifact, target mail, monitoring, backup/restore, and recovery proof checks pass."
  ],
  "release": {
    "kind": "tagged_release",
    "ref": "stable-catalog-202607220843",
    "meta_commit": "5447299289a1",
    "reproducible": true,
-    "configuration_packages": [],
+    "configuration_packages": [
      "none: environment-profile basis only"
    ],
    "notes": [
      "The live stable catalog has a valid Ed25519 signature trusted through release-key-1.",
      "Core v0.1.13 and Campaign v0.1.10 are tagged and package-integrated; this is not target-environment or production approval.",
-      "No configuration revision or configuration package is pinned yet."
+      "The absence of a configuration package is pinned explicitly as an environment-profile-only basis; this remains a promotion gap."
    ]
  },
  "composition": [
@@ -188,6 +202,125 @@
      }
    ]
  },
  "scenarios": [
    {
      "id": "campaign-pilot",
      "label": "Controlled Campaign pilot",
      "status": "partial",
      "recommendation": "Proceed with a bounded internal pilot after its provider, privacy, workload, and recovery proof checks are assigned and passed.",
      "composition": [
        "core",
        "tenancy",
        "organizations",
        "identity",
        "access",
        "admin",
        "dashboard",
        "policy",
        "audit",
        "campaigns",
        "files",
        "mail",
        "docs",
        "ops"
      ],
      "topology": [
        "One supervised GovOPlaN API process and one immutable built WebUI behind deployment-owned TLS termination",
        "One PostgreSQL database and a durable single-node or shared managed-file path",
        "One persistent private Redis broker and one supervised Celery worker when asynchronous delivery is enabled",
        "One dedicated non-production SMTP/IMAP account with a restricted safe-recipient policy",
        "External health checks, centralized logs, protected secret injection, and coordinated backup storage"
      ],
      "conditions": [
        "Use one internal tenant or office and controlled operators.",
        "Keep recipient volume non-critical until measured.",
        "Enable Addresses only when reusable recipient lists or CardDAV are explicitly in scope.",
        "Do not enable or claim Workflow from this assessment."
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "small-production-candidate",
      "label": "Small-production candidate",
      "status": "partial",
      "recommendation": "Do not approve production until every listed operational gate has target evidence and the residual risks have named owners.",
      "composition": [
        "core",
        "tenancy",
        "organizations",
        "identity",
        "access",
        "admin",
        "dashboard",
        "policy",
        "audit",
        "campaigns",
        "files",
        "mail",
        "docs",
        "ops"
      ],
      "topology": [
        "Immutable separately supervised WebUI, API, and worker artifacts behind monitored reverse-proxy TLS",
        "Dedicated or managed PostgreSQL with measured coordinated backup and isolated restore",
        "Persistent authenticated Redis with queue-age, queue-depth, and worker-health alerts",
        "Durable shared or S3-compatible object storage with versioning, lifecycle, and restore evidence",
        "Target-native secret management, centralized monitoring/logging/audit export, and an exercised incident and disaster-recovery procedure"
      ],
      "conditions": [
        "Pin and promote a configuration package instead of relying on an environment-only basis.",
        "Pass installed-release, target SMTP/IMAP, accessibility, privacy, security, operations, and recovery evidence gates.",
        "Agree availability, RPO, RTO, retention, support, and procurement requirements.",
        "Run only one scheduler unless distributed leadership or locking is proved."
      ]
    }
  ],
  "functional_context": {
    "required_modules": [
      "core",
      "tenancy",
      "organizations",
      "identity",
      "access",
      "admin",
      "dashboard",
      "policy",
      "audit",
      "campaigns",
      "files",
      "mail",
      "docs",
      "ops"
    ],
    "optional_modules": [
      "addresses"
    ],
    "external_systems": [
      "Deployment-owned reverse proxy and TLS certificate lifecycle",
      "Target SMTP/IMAP service and its DNS, certificate, throttling, bounce, and reply policies",
      "Target-native secret store, monitoring/logging platform, backup storage, and incident-response process"
    ],
    "missing_contracts": [
      "End-to-end federated identity provider and lifecycle contract",
      "Target monitoring, alert delivery, and central audit/SIEM acceptance contract",
      "Production configuration-package promotion and approval evidence"
    ],
    "policy_decisions": [
      "Recipient allow-list, permitted sender, attachment, retention, and external-disclosure policy",
      "Identity, MFA, break-glass, service-account, and joiner/mover/leaver policy",
      "Availability, RPO, RTO, support, procurement, and residual-risk ownership"
    ],
    "manual_workarounds": [
      "Use controlled local accounts while federation remains outside the verified slice",
      "Use one supervised scheduler where periodic work is unavoidable",
      "Keep provider reconciliation and production promotion under explicit operator review"
    ],
    "blockers": [
      "No promoted configuration package is pinned",
      "No installed-target or target SMTP/IMAP proof is attached",
      "No coherent target backup/restore or disaster-recovery drill with measured RPO/RTO is attached",
      "No target privacy, security, accessibility, operations, or production-approval evidence is attached"
    ]
  },
  "questionnaire": {
    "scope_outcomes": [
      {
@@ -203,6 +336,20 @@
        "state": "answered",
        "answer": "No; Workflow is planned and explicitly postponed.",
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
        "id": "scope.users_tenants_organizations",
        "question": "Which users, roles, tenants, organization units, and delegated functions participate?",
        "state": "assumed",
        "answer": "One internal tenant or office with controlled Campaign operators; detailed organization and delegation shape remains target-specific.",
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
        "id": "outcome.acceptance",
        "question": "What constitutes pilot success and production acceptance?",
        "state": "answered",
        "answer": "Pilot success requires the bounded Campaign journey and proof checks; production additionally requires installed-artifact, provider, privacy, security, operations, recovery, and approval evidence.",
        "evidence": []
      }
    ],
    "data_policy": [
@@ -219,6 +366,13 @@
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
        "id": "data.privacy_security_disclosure",
        "question": "Which privacy, security, residency, minimization, access, and external-disclosure constraints apply?",
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      }
    ],
    "identity_integrations": [
@@ -235,22 +389,50 @@
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
        "id": "identity.protocols_lifecycle",
        "question": "Which identity protocols, MFA, joiner/mover/leaver, service-account, and break-glass rules are mandatory?",
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
        "id": "integration.protocols_network",
        "question": "Which connector protocols, versions, directions, authentication, certificate, rate-limit, egress, and degraded-mode requirements apply?",
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      }
    ],
    "workload_growth": [
      {
-        "id": "workload.campaign",
+        "id": "workload.campaign_volume_peaks",
        "question": "What are Campaign frequency, recipients per Campaign, send window, import size and attachment volume?",
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
-        "id": "workload.platform",
+        "id": "workload.tenants_users_concurrency",
        "question": "What are tenant, named-user, active-user, concurrent-user, and peak-request assumptions?",
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
        "id": "workload.files_jobs_audit_growth_retention",
        "question": "What are tenant, user, concurrency, file, database, queue and audit growth assumptions?",
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
        "id": "workload.connector_traffic_batches",
        "question": "What connector traffic, scheduled-job, batch, queue-depth, queue-age, and external-rate-limit peaks apply?",
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      }
    ],
    "availability_operations": [
@@ -267,6 +449,13 @@
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      },
      {
        "id": "hosting.network_constraints",
        "question": "Which hosting, network-zone, egress, proxy, DNS, NTP, certificate-authority, residency, or disconnected-operation constraints apply?",
        "state": "not_assessed",
        "answer": null,
        "evidence": []
      }
    ],
    "procurement_decisions": [
@@ -754,6 +943,63 @@
      "recommendation": "Use target-native secret injection and document rotation/recovery.",
      "proof_check": "Rotate a non-production credential and recover from a protected backup."
    },
    {
      "id": "identity.access",
      "requirement": "Authenticate users and enforce tenant-scoped authorization through the selected identity mode.",
      "status": "verified",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "kind": "test",
          "scope": "committed_source",
          "locator": "govoplan-access/tests/test_auth_dependencies.py"
        },
        {
          "kind": "test",
          "scope": "committed_source",
          "locator": "govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#cookie-session-csrf"
        }
      ],
      "conditions": [
        "The bounded pilot accepts local GovOPlaN accounts."
      ],
      "gaps": [
        "Target MFA, federation, provisioning, and joiner/mover/leaver requirements are not assessed."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "A local-only identity topology may not satisfy institutional production policy."
      ],
      "recommendation": "Use controlled local pilot accounts and assess the mandatory production identity topology separately.",
      "proof_check": "Exercise login, role change, account suspension, protected bootstrap, and break-glass recovery in the target."
    },
    {
      "id": "connectors.mail",
      "requirement": "Reach the selected SMTP/IMAP and other external connector endpoints under explicit network and provider policy.",
      "status": "available_unconfigured",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "kind": "test",
          "scope": "current_workspace",
          "locator": "govoplan-mail/tests",
          "note": "Protocol adapters have direct tests; no target provider was exercised"
        },
        {
          "kind": "documentation",
          "scope": "documented_model",
          "locator": "govoplan-campaign/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md"
        }
      ],
      "conditions": [
        "The deployment supplies DNS, egress, proxy, CA trust, scoped service accounts, and provider limits."
      ],
      "gaps": [
        "No target endpoint, TLS chain, throttling, sender policy, bounce/reply path, or disclosure agreement is assessed."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Provider rejection, delay, or ambiguous outcomes can affect delivery and evidence completeness."
      ],
      "recommendation": "Use a dedicated safe provider account for the pilot and require target interoperability evidence before production.",
      "proof_check": "Exercise target-like SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, throttling, outage, retry, and reconciliation through the approved network path."
    },
    {
      "id": "operations.monitoring",
      "requirement": "Detect API, database, worker, queue, storage and delivery degradation.",
@@ -780,6 +1026,30 @@
      "recommendation": "Integrate external monitoring before small production.",
      "proof_check": "Trigger each readiness/delivery failure and verify an actionable alert."
    },
    {
      "id": "operations.audit",
      "requirement": "Retain, monitor, review, and where required export security and business audit evidence.",
      "status": "partial",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "kind": "test",
          "scope": "current_workspace",
          "locator": "govoplan-audit/tests",
          "note": "Local audit persistence and retry behavior are exercised"
        }
      ],
      "conditions": [
        "Local database audit evidence is part of coordinated backup and access review."
      ],
      "gaps": [
        "Target retention enforcement, tamper-evident export, SIEM integration, alerting, and privileged review are not verified."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Local evidence alone may not meet institutional security, records, or incident-response requirements."
      ],
      "recommendation": "Define the target audit retention, export, monitoring, and review controls before production approval.",
      "proof_check": "Exercise privileged-event review, retention, export failure/retry, and target SIEM or archive ingestion."
    },
    {
      "id": "operations.backup_restore",
      "requirement": "Back up and restore database, files, configuration and keys as a coherent service.",
@@ -9,9 +9,13 @@
    "assessment_id",
    "assessed_at",
    "scope",
    "facts",
    "decisions",
    "release",
    "composition",
    "deployment_profile",
    "scenarios",
    "functional_context",
    "questionnaire",
    "capabilities",
    "infrastructure",
@@ -28,7 +32,7 @@
      "format": "uri-reference"
    },
    "schema_version": {
-      "const": "0.1.0"
+      "const": "0.2.0"
    },
    "assessment_id": {
      "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string"
@@ -54,6 +58,8 @@
        }
      }
    },
    "facts": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
    "decisions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
    "release": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
@@ -95,6 +101,33 @@
        }
      }
    },
    "scenarios": {
      "type": "array",
      "minItems": 2,
      "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/scenario" }
    },
    "functional_context": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "required_modules",
        "optional_modules",
        "external_systems",
        "missing_contracts",
        "policy_decisions",
        "manual_workarounds",
        "blockers"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "required_modules": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
        "optional_modules": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
        "external_systems": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
        "missing_contracts": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
        "policy_decisions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
        "manual_workarounds": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
        "blockers": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" }
      }
    },
    "questionnaire": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
@@ -239,6 +272,37 @@
        }
      }
    },
    "scenario": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
      "required": [
        "id",
        "label",
        "status",
        "recommendation",
        "composition",
        "topology",
        "conditions"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" },
        "label": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" },
        "status": { "$ref": "#/$defs/status" },
        "recommendation": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" },
        "composition": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "uniqueItems": true,
          "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" }
        },
        "topology": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" }
        },
        "conditions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" }
      }
    },
    "assessed_item": {
      "type": "object",
      "additionalProperties": false,
@@ -259,6 +323,7 @@
        "status": { "$ref": "#/$defs/status" },
        "evidence": {
          "type": "array",
          "minItems": 1,
          "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/evidence" }
        },
        "conditions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
 # GovOPlaN Capability and IT-Infrastructure Fit Assessment
 > Generated from [`capability-fit-current.json`](../../capability-fit-current.json).
 > Edit and validate the machine-readable assessment, then regenerate this file;
 > do not maintain conclusions independently in Markdown.
 This is an evidence-based fit assessment, not a production approval or
 security certification. Repository or manifest existence alone never counts
 as an implemented capability. Unknown target requirements remain explicitly
 `not_assessed`.
 ## Assessment record
 | Field | Value |
 | --- | --- |
 | Assessment ID | `campaign-reference-2026-07-22` |
 | Schema version | `govoplan.fit-assessment/0.2.0` |
 | Assessed on | 2026-07-22 |
 | Scope | Campaign-centric internal pilot and small-production candidate |
 | Release | `stable-catalog-202607220843` (tagged_release) |
 | Meta commit | `5447299289a1` |
 | Deployment profile | `production-like-dev` · `partial` |
 | Configuration packages | `none: environment-profile basis only` |
 | Canonical input SHA-256 | `5a23f17c5289c5a89d2e92445f2c8b2eef54e3753f1392ebf300aff5508f0bfe` |
 ## Controlled status vocabulary
 | Status | Meaning |
 | --- | --- |
 | `verified` | Implemented and directly exercised by evidence appropriate to the stated scope. |
 | `available_unconfigured` | Implemented with supporting evidence, but not configured and exercised in the target. |
 | `partial` | A useful subset exists, but a material part of the requirement is missing or unproved. |
 | `scaffold` | Contracts or structure exist, but the end-to-end capability is not usable. |
 | `external_system` | The deployment or another system must supply the capability. |
 | `planned` | Only a concept, backlog item, or design direction exists. |
 | `not_fit` | Evidence shows that the assessed composition cannot meet the requirement. |
 | `not_assessed` | The requirement or target environment is not sufficiently known. |
 ## Scope and reference journeys
 Reference journeys:
 - Internal operator authors, validates, builds, queues, sends and reconciles an email Campaign with managed attachments
 - Operator inspects delivery and audit evidence
 Explicitly postponed:
 - Workflow and workflow-driven user stories
 ## Facts
 - The assessment is pinned to signed stable catalog sequence 202607220843 and the exact module commits listed below.
 - The Campaign authoring, validation, build, mock-delivery, managed-file, local-access, and local-audit paths have direct test or contract evidence.
 - The production-like development profile runs PostgreSQL and Redis in containers while application processes use editable source trees.
 - No installed-target, external-provider, reference-readiness, recovery, or production-approval evidence bundle is attached to this assessment.
 ## Decisions
 - Use Campaign as the first reference journey and flagship pilot scenario.
 - Keep Workflow and workflow-driven user stories planned and explicitly postponed for this assessment.
 - Use local GovOPlaN accounts for the bounded pilot; do not claim federated identity support.
 - Do not approve small production until installed-artifact, target mail, monitoring, backup/restore, and recovery proof checks pass.
 ## Assumptions
 - The pilot can use local accounts and one internal tenant or office.
 - A dedicated non-production SMTP/IMAP account and safe recipients are available.
 - Pilot load fits one API and one worker until measured otherwise.
 - Durable local storage is acceptable for the pilot.
 ## Unresolved decisions
 - What are the target organization's data classes, legal bases, retention and external-disclosure rules?
 - Which identity, mail, file, address and monitoring systems are mandatory?
 - What are Campaign volume, concurrency, growth, availability, RPO and RTO?
 - Who owns each external runtime component and operational control?
 - Which accessibility, security, support and procurement constraints are mandatory?
 ## Pinned release and composition
 Release reproducible: **yes**.
 Release notes:
 - The live stable catalog has a valid Ed25519 signature trusted through release-key-1.
 - Core v0.1.13 and Campaign v0.1.10 are tagged and package-integrated; this is not target-environment or production approval.
 - The absence of a configuration package is pinned explicitly as an environment-profile-only basis; this remains a promotion gap.
 | Module | Repository and commit | Manifest version | Enabled | Role |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | `core` | `govoplan-core` @ `d487726f4d2c` | `0.1.13` | yes | API, registry, migrations, sessions, kernel contracts and shared WebUI |
 | `tenancy` | `govoplan-tenancy` @ `efbec827616b` | `0.1.8` | yes | Tenant context and lifecycle |
 | `organizations` | `govoplan-organizations` @ `39c081c4fb8f` | `0.1.8` | yes | Organization model |
 | `identity` | `govoplan-identity` @ `7a1710af896f` | `0.1.8` | yes | Normalized internal identity directory |
 | `access` | `govoplan-access` @ `f1d64d247e12` | `0.1.11` | yes | Local authentication, sessions, API keys and RBAC |
 | `admin` | `govoplan-admin` @ `11ecf362a36d` | `0.1.8` | yes | Administration surfaces |
 | `dashboard` | `govoplan-dashboard` @ `4b960ad37f0d` | `0.1.8` | yes | Module-aware home surface |
 | `policy` | `govoplan-policy` @ `1063622d311a` | `0.1.9` | yes | Policy explanation and configuration boundary |
 | `audit` | `govoplan-audit` @ `d3d2c60d7dc1` | `0.1.8` | yes | Database audit records and retrying audit outbox |
 | `campaigns` | `govoplan-campaign` @ `735e874bd03c` | `0.1.10` | yes | Campaign authoring, build, delivery control and reporting |
 | `files` | `govoplan-files` @ `2b34f6e30578` | `0.1.9` | yes | Managed files and Campaign attachments |
 | `mail` | `govoplan-mail` @ `3e2302909022` | `0.1.10` | yes | SMTP and IMAP profiles and transports |
 | `calendar` | `govoplan-calendar` @ `9bcf41bb1fbb` | `0.1.8` | yes | Optional calendar outside the Campaign pilot minimum |
 | `docs` | `govoplan-docs` @ `be52b716caed` | `0.1.10` | yes | Configured-system documentation |
 | `ops` | `govoplan-ops` @ `341773a4ff8a` | `0.1.8` | yes | Readiness and deployment-profile visibility |
 | `addresses` | `govoplan-addresses` @ `93dddbb8c52a` | `0.1.9` | no | Optional reusable recipient sources and CardDAV |
 ## Deployment profile
 Status: `partial`
 PostgreSQL and Redis run in containers while API, WebUI, worker and scheduler run from editable source trees.
 Evidence:
 - configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/dev/production-like/docker-compose.yml
 - documentation/documented_model: govoplan/dev/production-like/README.md
 ## Recommended scenarios
 ### Controlled Campaign pilot
 Status: `partial`
 Proceed with a bounded internal pilot after its provider, privacy, workload, and recovery proof checks are assigned and passed.
 Composition: `core`, `tenancy`, `organizations`, `identity`, `access`, `admin`, `dashboard`, `policy`, `audit`, `campaigns`, `files`, `mail`, `docs`, `ops`.
 Topology:
 - One supervised GovOPlaN API process and one immutable built WebUI behind deployment-owned TLS termination
 - One PostgreSQL database and a durable single-node or shared managed-file path
 - One persistent private Redis broker and one supervised Celery worker when asynchronous delivery is enabled
 - One dedicated non-production SMTP/IMAP account with a restricted safe-recipient policy
 - External health checks, centralized logs, protected secret injection, and coordinated backup storage
 Conditions:
 - Use one internal tenant or office and controlled operators.
 - Keep recipient volume non-critical until measured.
 - Enable Addresses only when reusable recipient lists or CardDAV are explicitly in scope.
 - Do not enable or claim Workflow from this assessment.
 ### Small-production candidate
 Status: `partial`
 Do not approve production until every listed operational gate has target evidence and the residual risks have named owners.
 Composition: `core`, `tenancy`, `organizations`, `identity`, `access`, `admin`, `dashboard`, `policy`, `audit`, `campaigns`, `files`, `mail`, `docs`, `ops`.
 Topology:
 - Immutable separately supervised WebUI, API, and worker artifacts behind monitored reverse-proxy TLS
 - Dedicated or managed PostgreSQL with measured coordinated backup and isolated restore
 - Persistent authenticated Redis with queue-age, queue-depth, and worker-health alerts
 - Durable shared or S3-compatible object storage with versioning, lifecycle, and restore evidence
 - Target-native secret management, centralized monitoring/logging/audit export, and an exercised incident and disaster-recovery procedure
 Conditions:
 - Pin and promote a configuration package instead of relying on an environment-only basis.
 - Pass installed-release, target SMTP/IMAP, accessibility, privacy, security, operations, and recovery evidence gates.
 - Agree availability, RPO, RTO, retention, support, and procurement requirements.
 - Run only one scheduler unless distributed leadership or locking is proved.
 ## Functional matrix context
 ### Required modules
 - core
 - tenancy
 - organizations
 - identity
 - access
 - admin
 - dashboard
 - policy
 - audit
 - campaigns
 - files
 - mail
 - docs
 - ops
 ### Optional modules
 - addresses
 ### External systems and connectors
 - Deployment-owned reverse proxy and TLS certificate lifecycle
 - Target SMTP/IMAP service and its DNS, certificate, throttling, bounce, and reply policies
 - Target-native secret store, monitoring/logging platform, backup storage, and incident-response process
 ### Missing contracts
 - End-to-end federated identity provider and lifecycle contract
 - Target monitoring, alert delivery, and central audit/SIEM acceptance contract
 - Production configuration-package promotion and approval evidence
 ### Policy decisions
 - Recipient allow-list, permitted sender, attachment, retention, and external-disclosure policy
 - Identity, MFA, break-glass, service-account, and joiner/mover/leaver policy
 - Availability, RPO, RTO, support, procurement, and residual-risk ownership
 ### Manual workarounds
 - Use controlled local accounts while federation remains outside the verified slice
 - Use one supervised scheduler where periodic work is unavoidable
 - Keep provider reconciliation and production promotion under explicit operator review
 ### Blockers
 - No promoted configuration package is pinned
 - No installed-target or target SMTP/IMAP proof is attached
 - No coherent target backup/restore or disaster-recovery drill with measured RPO/RTO is attached
 - No target privacy, security, accessibility, operations, or production-approval evidence is attached
 ## Assessment questionnaire
 Every required area remains visible even when its target answer is unknown.
 | Area | Question | State | Answer | Evidence |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | Scope Outcomes | Which journey is assessed? | `answered` | An internal operator authors, validates, builds, queues, sends and reconciles a Campaign with managed attachments. | — |
 | Scope Outcomes | Is Workflow in scope? | `answered` | No; Workflow is planned and explicitly postponed. | — |
 | Scope Outcomes | Which users, roles, tenants, organization units, and delegated functions participate? | `assumed` | One internal tenant or office with controlled Campaign operators; detailed organization and delegation shape remains target-specific. | — |
 | Scope Outcomes | What constitutes pilot success and production acceptance? | `answered` | Pilot success requires the bounded Campaign journey and proof checks; production additionally requires installed-artifact, provider, privacy, security, operations, recovery, and approval evidence. | — |
 | Data Policy | Which data classes and legal bases apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Data Policy | What retention, deletion, archive and legal-hold rules apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Data Policy | Which privacy, security, residency, minimization, access, and external-disclosure constraints apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Identity Integrations | May the pilot use local GovOPlaN accounts? | `assumed` | Yes; federation is outside the verified composition. | — |
 | Identity Integrations | Which target SMTP/IMAP service and policy apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Identity Integrations | Which identity protocols, MFA, joiner/mover/leaver, service-account, and break-glass rules are mandatory? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Identity Integrations | Which connector protocols, versions, directions, authentication, certificate, rate-limit, egress, and degraded-mode requirements apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Workload Growth | What are Campaign frequency, recipients per Campaign, send window, import size and attachment volume? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Workload Growth | What are tenant, named-user, active-user, concurrent-user, and peak-request assumptions? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Workload Growth | What are tenant, user, concurrency, file, database, queue and audit growth assumptions? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Workload Growth | What connector traffic, scheduled-job, batch, queue-depth, queue-age, and external-rate-limit peaks apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Availability Operations | What availability, RPO and RTO are required? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Availability Operations | Who operates database, queue, storage, TLS, secrets, monitoring, backup and incident response? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Availability Operations | Which hosting, network-zone, egress, proxy, DNS, NTP, certificate-authority, residency, or disconnected-operation constraints apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 | Procurement Decisions | Which licensing, accessibility, security, certification, support and procurement conditions are mandatory? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
 ## Functional capability matrix
 | Requirement | Status | Evidence | Conditions and gaps | Recommendation and proof |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | **platform.composition**<br>Compose enabled backend and WebUI modules without hard optional-module dependencies. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_module_system.py; contract/current_workspace: govoplan/tools/checks/check-contracts.py (43 modules, 33 providers, 19 requirements, no issues) | Condition: Package integration is verified; repeat checks on the installed target composition.; Gap: No target deployment acceptance is recorded.; Risk: A reproducible module graph can still be installed or configured incorrectly. | Use the signed stable catalog and verify the minimal Campaign composition after installation.<br>**Proof:** Run contract, migration, API and WebUI module-permutation gates on the installed release. |
 | **access.local**<br>Provide tenant-scoped local accounts, sessions, API keys and RBAC. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-access/tests/test_auth_dependencies.py; test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#cookie-session-csrf | Condition: Pilot accepts local accounts.; Gap: MFA and federated lifecycle are not part of this conclusion.; Risk: Manual account lifecycle may not satisfy production identity policy. | Use controlled local pilot accounts and define break-glass/bootstrap rules.<br>**Proof:** Exercise joiner, role change, suspension and protected-owner recovery. |
 | **campaign.journey**<br>Author, validate, build, queue, send, reconcile and report a Campaign with frozen execution evidence. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#campaign-create-validate-build-mock-send; test/committed_source: govoplan-campaign/tests (Campaign v0.1.10 is exactly the catalog-selected tagged source); configuration/committed_source: https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/catalogs/v1/channels/stable.json#sequence-202607220843 (Core v0.1.13 and Campaign v0.1.10 have matching catalogued Python and WebUI refs) | Condition: This verifies implementation paths, not target-provider delivery.; Gap: Usability and target-provider acceptance remain separate.; Risk: Package integration does not prove provider behavior or production operations. | Use the catalogued Campaign release for usability and target-provider acceptance.<br>**Proof:** Run the complete journey with safe data and the target-like mail service. |
 | **files.managed_attachments**<br>Store and resolve managed Campaign attachments on durable storage. | `verified` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-files/tests (14 tests passed); test/current_workspace: govoplan-campaign/tests/test_attachment_building.py | Condition: Deployment provides a durable storage root.; Gap: Target backup and restore are not verified.; Risk: Node-local storage prevents safe independent API scaling. | Use durable local storage for the pilot and assess object/shared storage before scaling.<br>**Proof:** Back up and restore files together with database references. |
 | **mail.smtp_imap**<br>Send Campaign mail through SMTP and optionally append sent messages through IMAP. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-mail/tests (22 tests passed); documentation/documented_model: govoplan-campaign/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md | Condition: Use a dedicated non-production service account and safe recipients.; Gap: No target provider, TLS chain, throttling or bounce/reply process was exercised.; Risk: Ambiguous provider outcomes can cause duplicate-send risk if reconciled incorrectly. | Run target-like interoperability and failure drills before production use.<br>**Proof:** Prove SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, throttling and outcome reconciliation. |
 | **addresses.recipient_sources**<br>Select reusable address lists as Campaign recipient sources. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-addresses/tests (14 tests passed) | Condition: Enable the Addresses module explicitly.; Gap: Addresses is disabled in the pinned root profile.; Risk: Recipient governance may differ between source data and frozen Campaign evidence. | Enable only when reusable lists are a pilot requirement.<br>**Proof:** Build a Campaign from a source list and verify immutable recipient provenance. |
 | **audit.local**<br>Retain tenant/system audit evidence and retry governed audit events. | `verified` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-audit/tests (5 tests passed) | Condition: Conclusion covers local database evidence only.; Gap: No central sink, retention enforcement or tamper-evident archive is verified.; Risk: Local audit evidence may not satisfy organizational records or SIEM requirements. | Define retention and export requirements before production approval.<br>**Proof:** Exercise privileged-event review, retention and any required external export. |
 | **identity.federation**<br>Integrate external LDAP/AD, OIDC/SAML or SCIM identity infrastructure. | `scaffold` | documentation/documented_model: govoplan-idm/README.md | Gap: No end-to-end provider connector or federated login is verified.; Risk: Federation-dependent organizations cannot use the current pilot composition without extra implementation. | Use local pilot accounts or assess and implement the selected provider path.<br>**Proof:** Run provider metadata, login/provisioning, deprovisioning and failure tests. |
 | **compliance.export_control**<br>Screen persons and organizations against embargo/sanctions lists with review evidence. | `planned` | issue/documented_model: https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/12 | Gap: No provider, list provenance, match policy, review flow or legal evidence exists.; Risk: The current composition must not be represented as performing export-control screening. | Keep outside pilot claims until the user story is implemented and legally validated.<br>**Proof:** Validate list ingestion, versioning, matching, false-positive review and audit evidence. |
 | **workflow**<br>Orchestrate the journey through Workflow. | `planned` | observation/documented_model: Assessment scope (Explicitly postponed) | Gap: Workflow is outside this assessment.; Risk: Including it would overstate the assessed composition. | Do not enable or claim Workflow for this reference pilot.<br>**Proof:** Reassess in a later Workflow-focused composition. |
 ## Infrastructure matrix
 | Requirement | Status | Evidence | Conditions and gaps | Recommendation and proof |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | **runtime.web_api**<br>Serve matching WebUI and API artifacts with health endpoints. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_module_system.py; route/committed_source: govoplan-core/src/govoplan_core/server/fastapi.py#/health | Condition: Materialize the matching catalogued artifacts in the target.; Gap: No production image or service bundle is supplied by the profile.; Risk: Editable source processes are unsuitable as a production artifact. | Install matching catalogued WebUI/API refs and supervise them as immutable artifacts.<br>**Proof:** Deploy the built artifacts and run health/module-route checks. |
 | **runtime.worker**<br>Run durable asynchronous Campaign jobs. | `available_unconfigured` | configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/tools/launch/launch-production-like-dev.sh | Condition: Redis and a supervised worker are required when Celery is enabled.; Gap: Target heartbeat, restart and queue-age alerting are not proved.; Risk: Queued work can stall silently without monitoring. | Start one worker for the pilot and split queues only after measurement.<br>**Proof:** Interrupt and restart a worker while preserving job/reconciliation safety. |
 | **runtime.scheduler**<br>Run periodic recovery and cleanup safely. | `partial` | test/committed_source: govoplan-calendar/tests/test_outbox.py (Committed and pushed after the catalogued Calendar v0.1.8 tag) | Condition: Calendar outbox and recovery work is remote-integrated source but not stable-package-integrated.; Gap: No distributed leader election or target supervision is established.; Risk: Multiple schedulers can duplicate periodic dispatch without locking. | Omit from the Campaign-only pilot or run one supervised instance.<br>**Proof:** Prove missed-schedule recovery and single-leader behavior. |
 | **data.postgresql**<br>Persist application state in PostgreSQL with explicit migrations. | `verified` | configuration/committed_source: govoplan/dev/postgres; test/committed_source: govoplan/tools/checks/postgres-integration-check.py | Condition: Target database remains deployment-owned.; Gap: HA, patching, WAL policy and capacity are not assessed.; Risk: A single unprotected database is a system-wide failure point. | Use managed or dedicated PostgreSQL with explicit migration and backup controls.<br>**Proof:** Run migrations and restore a target-like database. |
 | **queue.redis**<br>Provide the Celery broker and queue persistence. | `available_unconfigured` | configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/dev/production-like/docker-compose.yml#redis | Gap: Authentication, TLS, eviction, HA and queue-loss policy are not assessed.; Risk: Broker loss or eviction can delay work even when database business state survives. | Configure private persistent Redis and monitor queue age/depth.<br>**Proof:** Exercise broker interruption and worker recovery. |
 | **storage.local**<br>Persist managed files on a durable single-node/shared path. | `verified` | contract/committed_source: govoplan-files/src/govoplan_files/backend/storage/backends.py | Condition: Path is durable, private, writable and backed up.; Gap: Node-local storage cannot support independent API replicas.; Risk: Files can be lost or become inconsistent with database state. | Use for a bounded pilot only with coordinated backup.<br>**Proof:** Restore files and verify all database references. |
 | **storage.object**<br>Use S3-compatible storage for independently scalable file persistence. | `partial` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-files/tests/test_connector_providers.py | Gap: No chosen target service or storage-backend interoperability drill.; Risk: Provider semantics, CA or lifecycle mismatch can break file access/retention. | Select and exercise the target object store before horizontal scaling.<br>**Proof:** Upload, retrieve, version, back up and restore representative objects. |
 | **edge.proxy_tls**<br>Terminate HTTPS and enforce proxy/security policy. | `external_system` | route/committed_source: govoplan-ops/src/govoplan_ops/backend/api/v1/routes.py#deployment-security | Gap: No proxy, certificates, renewal, header or request-limit configuration is shipped here.; Risk: Incorrect proxy/cookie/CORS configuration can expose sessions or block legitimate use. | Supply and monitor the edge through the target platform.<br>**Proof:** Run external TLS/header/cookie/CORS and upload-limit tests. |
 | **security.secret_store**<br>Inject and rotate master, database, mail and connector secrets. | `external_system` | configuration/committed_source: govoplan/.env.example | Gap: No target secret manager or rotation drill is selected.; Risk: Loss of the master key makes encrypted credentials unavailable; leakage compromises connectors. | Use target-native secret injection and document rotation/recovery.<br>**Proof:** Rotate a non-production credential and recover from a protected backup. |
 | **identity.access**<br>Authenticate users and enforce tenant-scoped authorization through the selected identity mode. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-access/tests/test_auth_dependencies.py; test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#cookie-session-csrf | Condition: The bounded pilot accepts local GovOPlaN accounts.; Gap: Target MFA, federation, provisioning, and joiner/mover/leaver requirements are not assessed.; Risk: A local-only identity topology may not satisfy institutional production policy. | Use controlled local pilot accounts and assess the mandatory production identity topology separately.<br>**Proof:** Exercise login, role change, account suspension, protected bootstrap, and break-glass recovery in the target. |
 | **connectors.mail**<br>Reach the selected SMTP/IMAP and other external connector endpoints under explicit network and provider policy. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-mail/tests (Protocol adapters have direct tests; no target provider was exercised); documentation/documented_model: govoplan-campaign/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md | Condition: The deployment supplies DNS, egress, proxy, CA trust, scoped service accounts, and provider limits.; Gap: No target endpoint, TLS chain, throttling, sender policy, bounce/reply path, or disclosure agreement is assessed.; Risk: Provider rejection, delay, or ambiguous outcomes can affect delivery and evidence completeness. | Use a dedicated safe provider account for the pilot and require target interoperability evidence before production.<br>**Proof:** Exercise target-like SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, throttling, outage, retry, and reconciliation through the approved network path. |
 | **operations.monitoring**<br>Detect API, database, worker, queue, storage and delivery degradation. | `partial` | route/committed_source: govoplan-ops/src/govoplan_ops/backend/api/v1/routes.py#/ops/readiness; contract/committed_source: govoplan-core/src/govoplan_core/server/fastapi.py#slow-request-logging | Gap: No metrics exporter, log collector, dashboards, alert routes or SLO is verified.; Risk: Failures and queue backlog can remain unnoticed. | Integrate external monitoring before small production.<br>**Proof:** Trigger each readiness/delivery failure and verify an actionable alert. |
 | **operations.audit**<br>Retain, monitor, review, and where required export security and business audit evidence. | `partial` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-audit/tests (Local audit persistence and retry behavior are exercised) | Condition: Local database audit evidence is part of coordinated backup and access review.; Gap: Target retention enforcement, tamper-evident export, SIEM integration, alerting, and privileged review are not verified.; Risk: Local evidence alone may not meet institutional security, records, or incident-response requirements. | Define the target audit retention, export, monitoring, and review controls before production approval.<br>**Proof:** Exercise privileged-event review, retention, export failure/retry, and target SIEM or archive ingestion. |
 | **operations.backup_restore**<br>Back up and restore database, files, configuration and keys as a coherent service. | `partial` | documentation/documented_model: govoplan-core/docs/DEPLOYMENT_OPERATOR_GUIDE.md; issue/documented_model: https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/29 | Gap: No target full-service restore drill or measured RPO/RTO exists.; Risk: Partial restore can produce missing files, unusable secrets or inconsistent evidence. | Treat Core #29 and a target restore drill as a production gate.<br>**Proof:** Restore the whole service into an isolated environment and measure it. |
 | **operations.disaster_recovery**<br>Recover the service after site or dependency loss within agreed RPO/RTO. | `not_assessed` | absence/current_workspace: No target DR plan or exercise evidence supplied | Gap: RPO/RTO, off-site copies, recovery order, failover, communications and exercise schedule are unknown.; Risk: Service and evidence may be unrecoverable after a major incident. | Define and exercise DR before any availability commitment.<br>**Proof:** Run a documented end-to-end recovery exercise. |
 ## Data flows and trust boundaries
 | Flow | From → to | Data | Trust boundary | Controls |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | `browser.api` | User browser → Reverse proxy and GovOPlaN WebUI/API | Session and CSRF cookies; Campaign content; Recipient personal data; Managed files | Client/public to application | HTTPS; Exact CORS origins; Secure cookies; Tenant and RBAC enforcement; Request limits |
 | `api.database` | GovOPlaN API and workers → PostgreSQL | Tenant and identity records; Campaign drafts, snapshots and jobs; Connector metadata; Audit evidence | Application to primary state store | Dedicated database identity; Private or encrypted transport; Migrations; Backup and retention |
 | `api.queue.worker` | GovOPlaN API → Redis and Celery worker | Job identifiers; Queue routing and retry metadata | Request plane to asynchronous processing plane | Private authenticated broker; Bounded payloads; Idempotent claims; Queue monitoring |
 | `worker.mail` | GovOPlaN Campaign worker → External SMTP and IMAP services | Recipient addresses; Message bodies; Attachments; Sent-message copy | GovOPlaN to external communication provider | Scoped service account; TLS and CA policy; Sender and recipient policy; Rate limits; Outcome reconciliation |
 | `worker.connectors` | GovOPlaN connector worker → External address, file, object or calendar service | Addresses; Files and provenance; Calendar resources | GovOPlaN to organizational/external content systems | Explicit sync direction; Scoped credentials; Endpoint allow-list; Provenance; Conflict and reconciliation policy |
 ## Risks and residual risks
 | Risk | Impact | Treatment | Owner | Residual risk |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | **risk.reproducibility**<br>The signed package selection is reproducible but has not been accepted as an installed target composition. | Installation or configuration drift can still produce uncertain deployed behavior. | Materialize the signed catalog in an isolated target and run installed-artifact acceptance gates. | unassigned | Module and environment differences still require release-environment verification. |
 | **risk.delivery_provider**<br>Target SMTP/IMAP behavior and failure modes are unproved. | Failed, delayed or duplicate communication and incomplete evidence. | Run target-like interoperability, throttling and uncertainty drills. | unassigned | External provider outages and ambiguous outcomes remain operational risks. |
 | **risk.recovery**<br>Backup/restore and disaster recovery are not demonstrated across all state and keys. | Irrecoverable or inconsistent service after loss. | Complete Core #29 and an isolated full-service restore/DR exercise. | unassigned | Recovery time and data loss remain bounded by the selected external infrastructure. |
 ## Recommendations
 - Proceed only with a controlled internal Campaign pilot after the bounded proof checks pass.
 - Use the minimal composition and enable Addresses only for an explicit reusable-recipient journey.
 - Do not claim Workflow, export-control screening, identity federation or production DR as implemented.
 - Treat installed-release acceptance, target mail proof, monitoring and a coherent restore drill as production gates.
 ## Proof-of-concept and promotion checks
 1. Materialize the signed catalog into an isolated installation and rerun contract, migration and module-permutation gates against the installed artifacts.
 2. Collect the isolated installation with the bounded installed-composition evidence contract; require exact enabled package/module versions, complete RECORD verification and immutable provenance anchored to this assessment.
 3. Run a safe target-like Campaign through SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, reporting and audit.
 4. Drill worker, Redis and ambiguous-delivery failures without duplicate sends.
 5. Restore PostgreSQL, managed files, configuration and encrypted credentials and measure RPO/RTO.
 6. Validate proxy/TLS, cookies/CORS, account bootstrap, secret redaction, monitoring and alert delivery.
 7. Measure representative Campaign/file/queue/database load and external throttling.
 8. Require separately issued, expiring and independently scope-authorized evidence before marking target environment, external provider or production approval proof as checked.
 ## Generation contract
 This report is deterministic output from the schema-validated JSON companion.
 The generator rejects duplicate JSON keys, schema drift, secret-bearing field
 names, stale checked-in output, and oversized inputs. A new assessment or
 release changes the canonical input hash and requires review of the affected
 evidence and conclusions through the release-aware reassessment tool.
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-# GovOPlaN Capability and IT-Infrastructure Fit Assessment
+# Supporting Narrative: 2026-07-22 Capability and Infrastructure Assessment
 > **Canonical report:** The schema-validated human report is generated from the
 > machine-readable input at
 > [`CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md`](CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md).
 > This file retains the original hand-authored evidence narrative and operator
 > guidance; it is not maintained as a second set of conclusions.
 > **Pinned historical evidence:** This document assesses the exact 2026-07-22
 > Campaign composition below. It is intentionally not updated to describe later
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Read it together with:
 - the [institutional governance target architecture](../../architecture/INSTITUTIONAL_GOVERNANCE_TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md)
 - the [selected reference-journey program](../REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md)
 - the [current strategy status](../STRATEGY_STATUS.md)
- the [pinned Campaign capability and infrastructure fit assessment](../../evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
+- the [generated, pinned Campaign capability and infrastructure fit assessment](../../evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md)
 - the [interface pattern language](../../architecture/INTERFACE_PATTERN_LANGUAGE.md)
 - the [interface surface inventory](../../evidence/snapshots/INTERFACE_SURFACE_INVENTORY.md)
 - the [module contract and install model](../../operations/MODULE_CONTRACTS_AND_INSTALLS.md)
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 from copy import deepcopy
 import json
 from pathlib import Path
 import sys
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
 ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "assessments"
 RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
 for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
    if str(tools_root) not in sys.path:
        sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
 from govoplan_assessment.report_generator import (  # noqa: E402
    AssessmentGenerationError,
    load_bounded_json,
    render_assessment_markdown,
    validate_report_input,
 )
 class CapabilityFitGenerationTests(unittest.TestCase):
    @classmethod
    def setUpClass(cls) -> None:
        cls.assessment = json.loads(
            (META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit-current.json").read_text("utf-8")
        )
        cls.schema = json.loads(
            (META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit.schema.json").read_text("utf-8")
        )
    def test_current_assessment_renders_every_conclusion_from_one_input(self) -> None:
        validate_report_input(assessment=self.assessment, schema=self.schema)
        first = render_assessment_markdown(self.assessment)
        second = render_assessment_markdown(deepcopy(self.assessment))
        self.assertEqual(first, second)
        self.assertIn("## Facts", first)
        self.assertIn("## Decisions", first)
        self.assertIn("## Unresolved decisions", first)
        self.assertIn("## Risks and residual risks", first)
        self.assertIn("## Proof-of-concept and promotion checks", first)
        self.assertIn("### Controlled Campaign pilot", first)
        self.assertIn("### Small-production candidate", first)
        self.assertIn("## Functional matrix context", first)
        self.assertIn("### Manual workarounds", first)
        self.assertIn("### Blockers", first)
        self.assertIn("Workflow and workflow-driven user stories", first)
        for status in self.schema["$defs"]["status"]["enum"]:
            self.assertIn(f"`{status}`", first)
        for collection in ("capabilities", "infrastructure", "data_flows"):
            for item in self.assessment[collection]:
                self.assertIn(item["id"], first)
        infrastructure_ids = {
            item["id"] for item in self.assessment["infrastructure"]
        }
        self.assertTrue(
            {
                "runtime.web_api",
                "runtime.worker",
                "runtime.scheduler",
                "data.postgresql",
                "queue.redis",
                "storage.local",
                "storage.object",
                "edge.proxy_tls",
                "identity.access",
                "security.secret_store",
                "connectors.mail",
                "operations.monitoring",
                "operations.audit",
                "operations.backup_restore",
                "operations.disaster_recovery",
            }.issubset(infrastructure_ids)
        )
    def test_questionnaire_retains_all_required_fit_dimensions(self) -> None:
        ids = {
            item["id"]
            for answers in self.assessment["questionnaire"].values()
            for item in answers
        }
        self.assertTrue(
            {
                "outcome.reference_journey",
                "scope.users_tenants_organizations",
                "data.classification",
                "data.retention",
                "data.privacy_security_disclosure",
                "identity.protocols_lifecycle",
                "integration.protocols_network",
                "workload.tenants_users_concurrency",
                "workload.campaign_volume_peaks",
                "workload.files_jobs_audit_growth_retention",
                "workload.connector_traffic_batches",
                "availability.rto_rpo",
                "hosting.network_constraints",
                "operations.ownership",
                "procurement.constraints",
            }.issubset(ids)
        )
    def test_duplicate_keys_and_sensitive_fields_fail_closed(self) -> None:
        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
            duplicate = Path(directory) / "duplicate.json"
            duplicate.write_text('{"id": 1, "id": 2}', encoding="utf-8")
            with self.assertRaisesRegex(AssessmentGenerationError, "Duplicate JSON key"):
                load_bounded_json(duplicate, label="assessment")
        unsafe = deepcopy(self.assessment)
        unsafe["password"] = "must-not-render"
        permissive = deepcopy(self.schema)
        permissive["additionalProperties"] = True
        with self.assertRaisesRegex(AssessmentGenerationError, "sensitive field"):
            validate_report_input(assessment=unsafe, schema=permissive)
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Generate the human capability-fit report from its machine-readable input."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 import argparse
 import os
 from pathlib import Path
 import sys
 import tempfile
 META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
 ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "assessments"
 RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
 for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
    if str(tools_root) not in sys.path:
        sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
 from govoplan_assessment.report_generator import (  # noqa: E402
    AssessmentGenerationError,
    load_bounded_json,
    render_assessment_markdown,
    validate_report_input,
 )
 DEFAULT_ASSESSMENT = META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit-current.json"
 DEFAULT_SCHEMA = META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit.schema.json"
 DEFAULT_OUTPUT = (
    META_ROOT
    / "docs"
    / "evidence"
    / "snapshots"
    / "CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md"
 )
 MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
 def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="Render a deterministic human report from one capability-fit JSON input."
    )
    parser.add_argument("--assessment", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_ASSESSMENT)
    parser.add_argument("--schema", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_SCHEMA)
    parser.add_argument("--output", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_OUTPUT)
    parser.add_argument(
        "--check",
        action="store_true",
        help="Fail when the output is missing or differs instead of writing it.",
    )
    return parser.parse_args(argv)
 def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
    args = parse_args(argv)
    try:
        assessment = load_bounded_json(args.assessment, label="assessment")
        schema = load_bounded_json(args.schema, label="assessment schema")
        validate_report_input(assessment=assessment, schema=schema)
        rendered = render_assessment_markdown(assessment)
        encoded = rendered.encode("utf-8")
        if len(encoded) > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES:
            raise AssessmentGenerationError(
                f"Generated report exceeds the {MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES}-byte output limit"
            )
        if args.check:
            try:
                current = args.output.read_bytes()
            except OSError:
                current = None
            if current != encoded:
                print(
                    f"Capability-fit report is stale: {args.output}",
                    file=sys.stderr,
                )
                return 2
            print(f"Capability-fit report is current: {args.output}")
            return 0
        _atomic_write(args.output, encoded)
        print(f"Generated capability-fit report: {args.output}")
        return 0
    except AssessmentGenerationError as exc:
        print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr)
        return 1
 def _atomic_write(path: Path, content: bytes) -> None:
    if not path.parent.is_dir():
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(
            f"Output parent directory does not exist: {path.parent}"
        )
    if path.is_symlink():
        raise AssessmentGenerationError("Output path must not be a symbolic link")
    descriptor = -1
    temporary_name = ""
    try:
        descriptor, temporary_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
            prefix=".govoplan-fit-report-",
            suffix=".tmp",
            dir=path.parent,
        )
        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o644)
        with os.fdopen(descriptor, "wb", closefd=True) as handle:
            descriptor = -1
            handle.write(content)
            handle.flush()
            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
        os.replace(temporary_name, path)
        temporary_name = ""
    except OSError as exc:
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(
            f"Could not write generated report atomically: {exc}"
        ) from exc
    finally:
        if descriptor >= 0:
            os.close(descriptor)
        if temporary_name:
            try:
                os.unlink(temporary_name)
            except FileNotFoundError:
                pass
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
 """Deterministically render one validated capability-fit assessment as Markdown."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 import hashlib
 import json
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
 from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator, FormatChecker
 from jsonschema.exceptions import SchemaError
 MAX_ASSESSMENT_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
 STATUS_DEFINITIONS = (
    (
        "verified",
        "Implemented and directly exercised by evidence appropriate to the stated scope.",
    ),
    (
        "available_unconfigured",
        "Implemented with supporting evidence, but not configured and exercised in the target.",
    ),
    (
        "partial",
        "A useful subset exists, but a material part of the requirement is missing or unproved.",
    ),
    (
        "scaffold",
        "Contracts or structure exist, but the end-to-end capability is not usable.",
    ),
    (
        "external_system",
        "The deployment or another system must supply the capability.",
    ),
    (
        "planned",
        "Only a concept, backlog item, or design direction exists.",
    ),
    (
        "not_fit",
        "Evidence shows that the assessed composition cannot meet the requirement.",
    ),
    (
        "not_assessed",
        "The requirement or target environment is not sufficiently known.",
    ),
 )
 class AssessmentGenerationError(ValueError):
    """The assessment cannot be safely validated or rendered."""
 def load_bounded_json(path: Path, *, label: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
    try:
        size = path.stat().st_size
    except OSError as exc:
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"Could not inspect {label}: {exc}") from exc
    if size > MAX_ASSESSMENT_BYTES:
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(
            f"{label} exceeds the {MAX_ASSESSMENT_BYTES}-byte input limit"
        )
    try:
        payload = json.loads(
            path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
            object_pairs_hook=_unique_object,
        )
    except (OSError, UnicodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"Could not read {label}: {exc}") from exc
    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"{label} must contain one JSON object")
    return payload
 def validate_report_input(
    *,
    assessment: Mapping[str, Any],
    schema: Mapping[str, Any],
 ) -> None:
    try:
        Draft202012Validator.check_schema(schema)
    except SchemaError as exc:
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(
            f"Assessment schema is invalid: {exc.message}"
        ) from exc
    errors = sorted(
        Draft202012Validator(
            schema,
            format_checker=FormatChecker(),
        ).iter_errors(assessment),
        key=lambda item: tuple(str(part) for part in item.absolute_path),
    )
    if errors:
        details = "; ".join(
            f"{_json_path(error.absolute_path)}: {error.message}"
            for error in errors[:20]
        )
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"Assessment does not match schema: {details}")
    _validate_references(assessment)
    _reject_sensitive_keys(assessment)
 def render_assessment_markdown(assessment: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
    """Return stable Markdown derived only from a validated assessment object."""
    assessment_hash = hashlib.sha256(
        json.dumps(
            assessment,
            sort_keys=True,
            separators=(",", ":"),
            ensure_ascii=True,
        ).encode("utf-8")
    ).hexdigest()
    scope = _mapping(assessment["scope"])
    release = _mapping(assessment["release"])
    profile = _mapping(assessment["deployment_profile"])
    lines = [
        "# GovOPlaN Capability and IT-Infrastructure Fit Assessment",
        "",
        "> Generated from [`capability-fit-current.json`](../../capability-fit-current.json).",
        "> Edit and validate the machine-readable assessment, then regenerate this file;",
        "> do not maintain conclusions independently in Markdown.",
        "",
        "This is an evidence-based fit assessment, not a production approval or",
        "security certification. Repository or manifest existence alone never counts",
        "as an implemented capability. Unknown target requirements remain explicitly",
        "`not_assessed`.",
        "",
        "## Assessment record",
        "",
        "| Field | Value |",
        "| --- | --- |",
        f"| Assessment ID | `{_cell(assessment['assessment_id'])}` |",
        f"| Schema version | `govoplan.fit-assessment/{_cell(assessment['schema_version'])}` |",
        f"| Assessed on | {_cell(assessment['assessed_at'])} |",
        f"| Scope | {_cell(scope['title'])} |",
        f"| Release | `{_cell(release['ref'])}` ({_cell(release['kind'])}) |",
        f"| Meta commit | `{_cell(release['meta_commit'])}` |",
        f"| Deployment profile | `{_cell(profile['id'])}` · `{_cell(profile['status'])}` |",
        f"| Configuration packages | {_inline_list(release['configuration_packages'], code=True)} |",
        f"| Canonical input SHA-256 | `{assessment_hash}` |",
        "",
        "## Controlled status vocabulary",
        "",
        "| Status | Meaning |",
        "| --- | --- |",
    ]
    lines.extend(
        f"| `{status}` | {_cell(description)} |"
        for status, description in STATUS_DEFINITIONS
    )
    lines.extend(
        [
            "",
            "## Scope and reference journeys",
            "",
            "Reference journeys:",
            "",
            *_bullets(scope["reference_journeys"]),
            "",
            "Explicitly postponed:",
            "",
            *_bullets(scope["postponed"]),
            "",
            "## Facts",
            "",
            *_bullets(assessment["facts"]),
            "",
            "## Decisions",
            "",
            *_bullets(assessment["decisions"]),
            "",
            "## Assumptions",
            "",
            *_bullets(assessment["assumptions"]),
            "",
            "## Unresolved decisions",
            "",
            *_bullets(assessment["open_questions"]),
            "",
            "## Pinned release and composition",
            "",
            f"Release reproducible: **{'yes' if release['reproducible'] else 'no'}**.",
            "",
        ]
    )
    lines.extend(_notes(release.get("notes", [])))
    lines.extend(
        [
            "",
            "| Module | Repository and commit | Manifest version | Enabled | Role |",
            "| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
        ]
    )
    for module_value in assessment["composition"]:
        module = _mapping(module_value)
        lines.append(
            "| `{}` | `{}` @ `{}` | `{}` | {} | {} |".format(
                _cell(module["module_id"]),
                _cell(module["repository"]),
                _cell(module["commit"]),
                _cell(module["manifest_version"]),
                "yes" if module["enabled"] else "no",
                _cell(module["role"]),
            )
        )
    lines.extend(
        [
            "",
            "## Deployment profile",
            "",
            f"Status: `{_cell(profile['status'])}`",
            "",
            _text(profile["description"]),
            "",
            "Evidence:",
            "",
            *_bullets(_evidence_labels(profile["evidence"])),
            "",
            "## Recommended scenarios",
            "",
        ]
    )
    for scenario_value in assessment["scenarios"]:
        scenario = _mapping(scenario_value)
        lines.extend(
            [
                f"### {_text(scenario['label'])}",
                "",
                f"Status: `{_cell(scenario['status'])}`",
                "",
                _text(scenario["recommendation"]),
                "",
                f"Composition: {_inline_list(scenario['composition'], code=True)}.",
                "",
                "Topology:",
                "",
                *_bullets(scenario["topology"]),
                "",
                "Conditions:",
                "",
                *_bullets(scenario["conditions"]),
                "",
            ]
        )
    functional_context = _mapping(assessment["functional_context"])
    lines.extend(
        [
            "## Functional matrix context",
            "",
            "### Required modules",
            "",
            *_bullets(functional_context["required_modules"]),
            "",
            "### Optional modules",
            "",
            *_bullets(functional_context["optional_modules"]),
            "",
            "### External systems and connectors",
            "",
            *_bullets(functional_context["external_systems"]),
            "",
            "### Missing contracts",
            "",
            *_bullets(functional_context["missing_contracts"]),
            "",
            "### Policy decisions",
            "",
            *_bullets(functional_context["policy_decisions"]),
            "",
            "### Manual workarounds",
            "",
            *_bullets(functional_context["manual_workarounds"]),
            "",
            "### Blockers",
            "",
            *_bullets(functional_context["blockers"]),
            "",
        ]
    )
    lines.extend(
        [
            "## Assessment questionnaire",
            "",
            "Every required area remains visible even when its target answer is unknown.",
            "",
            "| Area | Question | State | Answer | Evidence |",
            "| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
        ]
    )
    questionnaire = _mapping(assessment["questionnaire"])
    for area, answers in questionnaire.items():
        for answer_value in _sequence(answers):
            answer = _mapping(answer_value)
            raw_answer = answer["answer"]
            answer_text = (
                _inline_list(raw_answer)
                if isinstance(raw_answer, list)
                else _text(raw_answer) if raw_answer is not None else "—"
            )
            lines.append(
                "| {} | {} | `{}` | {} | {} |".format(
                    _cell(area.replace("_", " ").title()),
                    _cell(answer["question"]),
                    _cell(answer["state"]),
                    _cell(answer_text),
                    _cell("; ".join(_evidence_labels(answer["evidence"])) or "—"),
                )
            )
    lines.extend(_assessed_matrix("Functional capability matrix", assessment["capabilities"]))
    lines.extend(_assessed_matrix("Infrastructure matrix", assessment["infrastructure"]))
    lines.extend(
        [
            "## Data flows and trust boundaries",
            "",
            "| Flow | From → to | Data | Trust boundary | Controls |",
            "| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
        ]
    )
    for flow_value in assessment["data_flows"]:
        flow = _mapping(flow_value)
        lines.append(
            "| `{}` | {} → {} | {} | {} | {} |".format(
                _cell(flow["id"]),
                _cell(flow["from"]),
                _cell(flow["to"]),
                _cell(_inline_list(flow["data"])),
                _cell(flow["trust_boundary"]),
                _cell(_inline_list(flow["controls"])),
            )
        )
    lines.extend(
        [
            "",
            "## Risks and residual risks",
            "",
            "| Risk | Impact | Treatment | Owner | Residual risk |",
            "| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
        ]
    )
    for risk_value in assessment["risks"]:
        risk = _mapping(risk_value)
        lines.append(
            "| **{}**<br>{} | {} | {} | {} | {} |".format(
                _cell(risk["id"]),
                _cell(risk["statement"]),
                _cell(risk["impact"]),
                _cell(risk["treatment"]),
                _cell(risk["owner"] or "unassigned"),
                _cell(risk["residual_risk"]),
            )
        )
    lines.extend(
        [
            "",
            "## Recommendations",
            "",
            *_bullets(assessment["recommendations"]),
            "",
            "## Proof-of-concept and promotion checks",
            "",
            *_numbered(assessment["proof_checks"]),
            "",
            "## Generation contract",
            "",
            "This report is deterministic output from the schema-validated JSON companion.",
            "The generator rejects duplicate JSON keys, schema drift, secret-bearing field",
            "names, stale checked-in output, and oversized inputs. A new assessment or",
            "release changes the canonical input hash and requires review of the affected",
            "evidence and conclusions through the release-aware reassessment tool.",
            "",
        ]
    )
    return "\n".join(lines)
 def _assessed_matrix(title: str, values: object) -> list[str]:
    lines = [
        "",
        f"## {title}",
        "",
        "| Requirement | Status | Evidence | Conditions and gaps | Recommendation and proof |",
        "| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
    ]
    for item_value in _sequence(values):
        item = _mapping(item_value)
        conditions = [f"Condition: {value}" for value in item["conditions"]]
        gaps = [f"Gap: {value}" for value in item["gaps"]]
        risks = [f"Risk: {value}" for value in item["risks"]]
        lines.append(
            "| **{}**<br>{} | `{}` | {} | {} | {}<br>**Proof:** {} |".format(
                _cell(item["id"]),
                _cell(item["requirement"]),
                _cell(item["status"]),
                _cell("; ".join(_evidence_labels(item["evidence"])) or "Explicit absence of evidence"),
                _cell("; ".join([*conditions, *gaps, *risks]) or "—"),
                _cell(item["recommendation"] or "—"),
                _cell(item["proof_check"] or "—"),
            )
        )
    return lines
 def _evidence_labels(values: object) -> list[str]:
    labels: list[str] = []
    for value in _sequence(values):
        item = _mapping(value)
        label = f"{item['kind']}/{item['scope']}: {item['locator']}"
        if item.get("note"):
            label += f" ({item['note']})"
        labels.append(label)
    return labels
 def _unique_object(pairs: list[tuple[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]:
    result: dict[str, Any] = {}
    for key, value in pairs:
        if key in result:
            raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"Duplicate JSON key: {key!r}")
        result[key] = value
    return result
 def _reject_sensitive_keys(value: object, path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> None:
    forbidden = {
        "access_token",
        "api_key",
        "credential_value",
        "password",
        "private_key",
        "refresh_token",
        "secret",
    }
    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
        for key, nested in value.items():
            normalized = str(key).strip().casefold()
            if normalized in forbidden:
                raise AssessmentGenerationError(
                    f"Assessment contains forbidden sensitive field {_json_path((*path, str(key)))}"
                )
            _reject_sensitive_keys(nested, (*path, str(key)))
    elif isinstance(value, Sequence) and not isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
        for index, nested in enumerate(value):
            _reject_sensitive_keys(nested, (*path, str(index)))
 def _validate_references(assessment: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
    composition = [_mapping(item) for item in _sequence(assessment["composition"])]
    module_ids = [str(item["module_id"]) for item in composition]
    if len(module_ids) != len(set(module_ids)):
        raise AssessmentGenerationError("Composition contains duplicate module IDs")
    modules = {str(item["module_id"]): item for item in composition}
    context = _mapping(assessment["functional_context"])
    required = {str(item) for item in _sequence(context["required_modules"])}
    optional = {str(item) for item in _sequence(context["optional_modules"])}
    unknown_context = (required | optional) - set(modules)
    if unknown_context:
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(
            "Functional context references unknown modules: "
            + ", ".join(sorted(unknown_context))
        )
    if required & optional:
        raise AssessmentGenerationError(
            "Functional context cannot mark a module both required and optional"
        )
    for scenario_value in _sequence(assessment["scenarios"]):
        scenario = _mapping(scenario_value)
        referenced = {str(item) for item in _sequence(scenario["composition"])}
        unknown = referenced - set(modules)
        if unknown:
            raise AssessmentGenerationError(
                f"Scenario {scenario['id']!r} references unknown modules: "
                + ", ".join(sorted(unknown))
            )
        disabled = sorted(
            module_id
            for module_id in referenced
            if not bool(modules[module_id]["enabled"])
        )
        if disabled:
            raise AssessmentGenerationError(
                f"Scenario {scenario['id']!r} references disabled modules: "
                + ", ".join(disabled)
            )
    for collection in ("capabilities", "infrastructure", "data_flows", "risks"):
        identifiers = [
            str(_mapping(item)["id"])
            for item in _sequence(assessment[collection])
        ]
        if len(identifiers) != len(set(identifiers)):
            raise AssessmentGenerationError(
                f"Assessment contains duplicate {collection} IDs"
            )
 def _mapping(value: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
        raise AssessmentGenerationError("Validated assessment contains a non-object value")
    return value
 def _sequence(value: object) -> Sequence[Any]:
    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
        raise AssessmentGenerationError("Validated assessment contains a non-list value")
    return value
 def _text(value: object) -> str:
    return str(value).strip()
 def _cell(value: object) -> str:
    return _text(value).replace("|", "\\|").replace("\r", " ").replace("\n", " ")
 def _inline_list(values: object, *, code: bool = False) -> str:
    items = [_text(item) for item in _sequence(values)]
    if not items:
        return "none"
    if code:
        return ", ".join(f"`{_cell(item)}`" for item in items)
    return "; ".join(items)
 def _bullets(values: object) -> list[str]:
    items = [_text(item) for item in _sequence(values)]
    return [f"- {item}" for item in items] or ["- None recorded."]
 def _numbered(values: object) -> list[str]:
    return [f"{index}. {_text(item)}" for index, item in enumerate(_sequence(values), 1)]
 def _notes(values: object) -> list[str]:
    items = _bullets(values)
    return ["Release notes:", "", *items]
 def _json_path(parts: Iterable[object]) -> str:
    suffix = "".join(f"[{part}]" if str(part).isdigit() else f".{part}" for part in parts)
    return f"${suffix}"
 __all__ = (
    "AssessmentGenerationError",
    "MAX_ASSESSMENT_BYTES",
    "load_bounded_json",
    "render_assessment_markdown",
    "validate_report_input",
 )
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ cd "$META_ROOT"
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_module_package_workflows tests.test_package_registry_release
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_deployment_installer
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_capability_fit_evidence
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_capability_fit_generation tests.test_capability_fit_review
 "$PYTHON" tools/assessments/generate-capability-fit-report.py --check
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_configuration_package_artifacts
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_institutional_governance_journey
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_institutional_service_journey
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ cd "$ROOT"
 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check_dependency_boundaries.py"
 cd "$META_ROOT"
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_capability_fit_generation
 "$PYTHON" tools/assessments/generate-capability-fit-report.py --check
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_configuration_package_artifacts
 PYTHONPATH="$META_ROOT/../govoplan-portal/src:$META_ROOT/../govoplan-forms/src:$META_ROOT/../govoplan-forms-runtime/src:$META_ROOT/../govoplan-cases/src:$ROOT/src${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}" \
  "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_institutional_service_journey