feat: generate evidence-based fit assessments

This commit is contained in:
2026-08-20 12:58:53 +02:00
parent 83ccb7f198
commit 5d4535f7b5
12 changed files with 1487 additions and 10 deletions
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@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ Pinned evidence is retained under `evidence/`; completed reviews and migration
inventories are under `archive/`. They explain or prove a dated state and must
not be read as current product status.
- [Campaign capability and infrastructure fit, 2026-07-22](evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
- [Generated Campaign capability and infrastructure fit, 2026-07-22](evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md)
- [Supporting narrative for the 2026-07-22 assessment](evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
- [Interface surface inventory, 2026-08-03](evidence/snapshots/INTERFACE_SURFACE_INVENTORY.md)
- [Strategic review, 2026-08-05](archive/2026-08/STRATEGIC_REVIEW_2026-08-05.md)
- [Meta repository scan, 2026-07-13](archive/2026-07/META_REPO_SCAN.md)
@@ -93,6 +94,13 @@ evidence inputs, and project configuration. Their paths are intentionally
stable because tools and published schema identifiers consume them; they are
not additional reading-list entries.
Regenerate and verify the human fit report from its JSON input with:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/assessments/generate-capability-fit-report.py
./.venv/bin/python tools/assessments/generate-capability-fit-report.py --check
```
## Maintenance Rules
1. Gitea issues are the only live source for work state, priority, and owner.
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Read this together with:
- [Reference Journey Program](../strategy/REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md)
- [Module Contracts and Install Boundaries](../operations/MODULE_CONTRACTS_AND_INSTALLS.md)
- [Datasource and Definition Graph Architecture](DATASOURCE_AND_DEFINITION_GRAPH_ARCHITECTURE.md)
- [Capability and Infrastructure Fit](../evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
- [Generated Capability and Infrastructure Fit](../evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md)
- [Core Module Architecture](../../../govoplan-core/docs/MODULE_ARCHITECTURE.md)
- [Core External References and Integration Maturity](../../../govoplan-core/docs/EXTERNAL_REFERENCES_AND_INTEGRATION_MATURITY.md)
- [Core Action, Effect, and Automation Layer](../../../govoplan-core/docs/ACTION_EFFECT_AUTOMATION_LAYER.md)
+275 -5
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"$schema": "./capability-fit.schema.json",
"schema_version": "0.1.0",
"schema_version": "0.2.0",
"assessment_id": "campaign-reference-2026-07-22",
"assessed_at": "2026-07-22",
"scope": {
@@ -13,16 +13,30 @@
"Workflow and workflow-driven user stories"
]
},
"facts": [
"The assessment is pinned to signed stable catalog sequence 202607220843 and the exact module commits listed below.",
"The Campaign authoring, validation, build, mock-delivery, managed-file, local-access, and local-audit paths have direct test or contract evidence.",
"The production-like development profile runs PostgreSQL and Redis in containers while application processes use editable source trees.",
"No installed-target, external-provider, reference-readiness, recovery, or production-approval evidence bundle is attached to this assessment."
],
"decisions": [
"Use Campaign as the first reference journey and flagship pilot scenario.",
"Keep Workflow and workflow-driven user stories planned and explicitly postponed for this assessment.",
"Use local GovOPlaN accounts for the bounded pilot; do not claim federated identity support.",
"Do not approve small production until installed-artifact, target mail, monitoring, backup/restore, and recovery proof checks pass."
],
"release": {
"kind": "tagged_release",
"ref": "stable-catalog-202607220843",
"meta_commit": "5447299289a1",
"reproducible": true,
"configuration_packages": [],
"configuration_packages": [
"none: environment-profile basis only"
],
"notes": [
"The live stable catalog has a valid Ed25519 signature trusted through release-key-1.",
"Core v0.1.13 and Campaign v0.1.10 are tagged and package-integrated; this is not target-environment or production approval.",
"No configuration revision or configuration package is pinned yet."
"The absence of a configuration package is pinned explicitly as an environment-profile-only basis; this remains a promotion gap."
]
},
"composition": [
@@ -188,6 +202,125 @@
}
]
},
"scenarios": [
{
"id": "campaign-pilot",
"label": "Controlled Campaign pilot",
"status": "partial",
"recommendation": "Proceed with a bounded internal pilot after its provider, privacy, workload, and recovery proof checks are assigned and passed.",
"composition": [
"core",
"tenancy",
"organizations",
"identity",
"access",
"admin",
"dashboard",
"policy",
"audit",
"campaigns",
"files",
"mail",
"docs",
"ops"
],
"topology": [
"One supervised GovOPlaN API process and one immutable built WebUI behind deployment-owned TLS termination",
"One PostgreSQL database and a durable single-node or shared managed-file path",
"One persistent private Redis broker and one supervised Celery worker when asynchronous delivery is enabled",
"One dedicated non-production SMTP/IMAP account with a restricted safe-recipient policy",
"External health checks, centralized logs, protected secret injection, and coordinated backup storage"
],
"conditions": [
"Use one internal tenant or office and controlled operators.",
"Keep recipient volume non-critical until measured.",
"Enable Addresses only when reusable recipient lists or CardDAV are explicitly in scope.",
"Do not enable or claim Workflow from this assessment."
]
},
{
"id": "small-production-candidate",
"label": "Small-production candidate",
"status": "partial",
"recommendation": "Do not approve production until every listed operational gate has target evidence and the residual risks have named owners.",
"composition": [
"core",
"tenancy",
"organizations",
"identity",
"access",
"admin",
"dashboard",
"policy",
"audit",
"campaigns",
"files",
"mail",
"docs",
"ops"
],
"topology": [
"Immutable separately supervised WebUI, API, and worker artifacts behind monitored reverse-proxy TLS",
"Dedicated or managed PostgreSQL with measured coordinated backup and isolated restore",
"Persistent authenticated Redis with queue-age, queue-depth, and worker-health alerts",
"Durable shared or S3-compatible object storage with versioning, lifecycle, and restore evidence",
"Target-native secret management, centralized monitoring/logging/audit export, and an exercised incident and disaster-recovery procedure"
],
"conditions": [
"Pin and promote a configuration package instead of relying on an environment-only basis.",
"Pass installed-release, target SMTP/IMAP, accessibility, privacy, security, operations, and recovery evidence gates.",
"Agree availability, RPO, RTO, retention, support, and procurement requirements.",
"Run only one scheduler unless distributed leadership or locking is proved."
]
}
],
"functional_context": {
"required_modules": [
"core",
"tenancy",
"organizations",
"identity",
"access",
"admin",
"dashboard",
"policy",
"audit",
"campaigns",
"files",
"mail",
"docs",
"ops"
],
"optional_modules": [
"addresses"
],
"external_systems": [
"Deployment-owned reverse proxy and TLS certificate lifecycle",
"Target SMTP/IMAP service and its DNS, certificate, throttling, bounce, and reply policies",
"Target-native secret store, monitoring/logging platform, backup storage, and incident-response process"
],
"missing_contracts": [
"End-to-end federated identity provider and lifecycle contract",
"Target monitoring, alert delivery, and central audit/SIEM acceptance contract",
"Production configuration-package promotion and approval evidence"
],
"policy_decisions": [
"Recipient allow-list, permitted sender, attachment, retention, and external-disclosure policy",
"Identity, MFA, break-glass, service-account, and joiner/mover/leaver policy",
"Availability, RPO, RTO, support, procurement, and residual-risk ownership"
],
"manual_workarounds": [
"Use controlled local accounts while federation remains outside the verified slice",
"Use one supervised scheduler where periodic work is unavoidable",
"Keep provider reconciliation and production promotion under explicit operator review"
],
"blockers": [
"No promoted configuration package is pinned",
"No installed-target or target SMTP/IMAP proof is attached",
"No coherent target backup/restore or disaster-recovery drill with measured RPO/RTO is attached",
"No target privacy, security, accessibility, operations, or production-approval evidence is attached"
]
},
"questionnaire": {
"scope_outcomes": [
{
@@ -203,6 +336,20 @@
"state": "answered",
"answer": "No; Workflow is planned and explicitly postponed.",
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "scope.users_tenants_organizations",
"question": "Which users, roles, tenants, organization units, and delegated functions participate?",
"state": "assumed",
"answer": "One internal tenant or office with controlled Campaign operators; detailed organization and delegation shape remains target-specific.",
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "outcome.acceptance",
"question": "What constitutes pilot success and production acceptance?",
"state": "answered",
"answer": "Pilot success requires the bounded Campaign journey and proof checks; production additionally requires installed-artifact, provider, privacy, security, operations, recovery, and approval evidence.",
"evidence": []
}
],
"data_policy": [
@@ -219,6 +366,13 @@
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "data.privacy_security_disclosure",
"question": "Which privacy, security, residency, minimization, access, and external-disclosure constraints apply?",
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
}
],
"identity_integrations": [
@@ -235,22 +389,50 @@
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "identity.protocols_lifecycle",
"question": "Which identity protocols, MFA, joiner/mover/leaver, service-account, and break-glass rules are mandatory?",
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "integration.protocols_network",
"question": "Which connector protocols, versions, directions, authentication, certificate, rate-limit, egress, and degraded-mode requirements apply?",
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
}
],
"workload_growth": [
{
"id": "workload.campaign",
"id": "workload.campaign_volume_peaks",
"question": "What are Campaign frequency, recipients per Campaign, send window, import size and attachment volume?",
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "workload.platform",
"id": "workload.tenants_users_concurrency",
"question": "What are tenant, named-user, active-user, concurrent-user, and peak-request assumptions?",
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "workload.files_jobs_audit_growth_retention",
"question": "What are tenant, user, concurrency, file, database, queue and audit growth assumptions?",
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "workload.connector_traffic_batches",
"question": "What connector traffic, scheduled-job, batch, queue-depth, queue-age, and external-rate-limit peaks apply?",
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
}
],
"availability_operations": [
@@ -267,6 +449,13 @@
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
},
{
"id": "hosting.network_constraints",
"question": "Which hosting, network-zone, egress, proxy, DNS, NTP, certificate-authority, residency, or disconnected-operation constraints apply?",
"state": "not_assessed",
"answer": null,
"evidence": []
}
],
"procurement_decisions": [
@@ -754,6 +943,63 @@
"recommendation": "Use target-native secret injection and document rotation/recovery.",
"proof_check": "Rotate a non-production credential and recover from a protected backup."
},
{
"id": "identity.access",
"requirement": "Authenticate users and enforce tenant-scoped authorization through the selected identity mode.",
"status": "verified",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "test",
"scope": "committed_source",
"locator": "govoplan-access/tests/test_auth_dependencies.py"
},
{
"kind": "test",
"scope": "committed_source",
"locator": "govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#cookie-session-csrf"
}
],
"conditions": [
"The bounded pilot accepts local GovOPlaN accounts."
],
"gaps": [
"Target MFA, federation, provisioning, and joiner/mover/leaver requirements are not assessed."
],
"risks": [
"A local-only identity topology may not satisfy institutional production policy."
],
"recommendation": "Use controlled local pilot accounts and assess the mandatory production identity topology separately.",
"proof_check": "Exercise login, role change, account suspension, protected bootstrap, and break-glass recovery in the target."
},
{
"id": "connectors.mail",
"requirement": "Reach the selected SMTP/IMAP and other external connector endpoints under explicit network and provider policy.",
"status": "available_unconfigured",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "test",
"scope": "current_workspace",
"locator": "govoplan-mail/tests",
"note": "Protocol adapters have direct tests; no target provider was exercised"
},
{
"kind": "documentation",
"scope": "documented_model",
"locator": "govoplan-campaign/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md"
}
],
"conditions": [
"The deployment supplies DNS, egress, proxy, CA trust, scoped service accounts, and provider limits."
],
"gaps": [
"No target endpoint, TLS chain, throttling, sender policy, bounce/reply path, or disclosure agreement is assessed."
],
"risks": [
"Provider rejection, delay, or ambiguous outcomes can affect delivery and evidence completeness."
],
"recommendation": "Use a dedicated safe provider account for the pilot and require target interoperability evidence before production.",
"proof_check": "Exercise target-like SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, throttling, outage, retry, and reconciliation through the approved network path."
},
{
"id": "operations.monitoring",
"requirement": "Detect API, database, worker, queue, storage and delivery degradation.",
@@ -780,6 +1026,30 @@
"recommendation": "Integrate external monitoring before small production.",
"proof_check": "Trigger each readiness/delivery failure and verify an actionable alert."
},
{
"id": "operations.audit",
"requirement": "Retain, monitor, review, and where required export security and business audit evidence.",
"status": "partial",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "test",
"scope": "current_workspace",
"locator": "govoplan-audit/tests",
"note": "Local audit persistence and retry behavior are exercised"
}
],
"conditions": [
"Local database audit evidence is part of coordinated backup and access review."
],
"gaps": [
"Target retention enforcement, tamper-evident export, SIEM integration, alerting, and privileged review are not verified."
],
"risks": [
"Local evidence alone may not meet institutional security, records, or incident-response requirements."
],
"recommendation": "Define the target audit retention, export, monitoring, and review controls before production approval.",
"proof_check": "Exercise privileged-event review, retention, export failure/retry, and target SIEM or archive ingestion."
},
{
"id": "operations.backup_restore",
"requirement": "Back up and restore database, files, configuration and keys as a coherent service.",
+66 -1
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@@ -9,9 +9,13 @@
"assessment_id",
"assessed_at",
"scope",
"facts",
"decisions",
"release",
"composition",
"deployment_profile",
"scenarios",
"functional_context",
"questionnaire",
"capabilities",
"infrastructure",
@@ -28,7 +32,7 @@
"format": "uri-reference"
},
"schema_version": {
"const": "0.1.0"
"const": "0.2.0"
},
"assessment_id": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string"
@@ -54,6 +58,8 @@
}
}
},
"facts": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
"decisions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
"release": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
@@ -95,6 +101,33 @@
}
}
},
"scenarios": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 2,
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/scenario" }
},
"functional_context": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"required_modules",
"optional_modules",
"external_systems",
"missing_contracts",
"policy_decisions",
"manual_workarounds",
"blockers"
],
"properties": {
"required_modules": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
"optional_modules": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
"external_systems": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
"missing_contracts": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
"policy_decisions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
"manual_workarounds": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
"blockers": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" }
}
},
"questionnaire": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
@@ -239,6 +272,37 @@
}
}
},
"scenario": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"id",
"label",
"status",
"recommendation",
"composition",
"topology",
"conditions"
],
"properties": {
"id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" },
"label": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" },
"status": { "$ref": "#/$defs/status" },
"recommendation": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" },
"composition": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" }
},
"topology": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/non_empty_string" }
},
"conditions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" }
}
},
"assessed_item": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
@@ -259,6 +323,7 @@
"status": { "$ref": "#/$defs/status" },
"evidence": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/evidence" }
},
"conditions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/string_list" },
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
# GovOPlaN Capability and IT-Infrastructure Fit Assessment
> Generated from [`capability-fit-current.json`](../../capability-fit-current.json).
> Edit and validate the machine-readable assessment, then regenerate this file;
> do not maintain conclusions independently in Markdown.
This is an evidence-based fit assessment, not a production approval or
security certification. Repository or manifest existence alone never counts
as an implemented capability. Unknown target requirements remain explicitly
`not_assessed`.
## Assessment record
| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Assessment ID | `campaign-reference-2026-07-22` |
| Schema version | `govoplan.fit-assessment/0.2.0` |
| Assessed on | 2026-07-22 |
| Scope | Campaign-centric internal pilot and small-production candidate |
| Release | `stable-catalog-202607220843` (tagged_release) |
| Meta commit | `5447299289a1` |
| Deployment profile | `production-like-dev` · `partial` |
| Configuration packages | `none: environment-profile basis only` |
| Canonical input SHA-256 | `5a23f17c5289c5a89d2e92445f2c8b2eef54e3753f1392ebf300aff5508f0bfe` |
## Controlled status vocabulary
| Status | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| `verified` | Implemented and directly exercised by evidence appropriate to the stated scope. |
| `available_unconfigured` | Implemented with supporting evidence, but not configured and exercised in the target. |
| `partial` | A useful subset exists, but a material part of the requirement is missing or unproved. |
| `scaffold` | Contracts or structure exist, but the end-to-end capability is not usable. |
| `external_system` | The deployment or another system must supply the capability. |
| `planned` | Only a concept, backlog item, or design direction exists. |
| `not_fit` | Evidence shows that the assessed composition cannot meet the requirement. |
| `not_assessed` | The requirement or target environment is not sufficiently known. |
## Scope and reference journeys
Reference journeys:
- Internal operator authors, validates, builds, queues, sends and reconciles an email Campaign with managed attachments
- Operator inspects delivery and audit evidence
Explicitly postponed:
- Workflow and workflow-driven user stories
## Facts
- The assessment is pinned to signed stable catalog sequence 202607220843 and the exact module commits listed below.
- The Campaign authoring, validation, build, mock-delivery, managed-file, local-access, and local-audit paths have direct test or contract evidence.
- The production-like development profile runs PostgreSQL and Redis in containers while application processes use editable source trees.
- No installed-target, external-provider, reference-readiness, recovery, or production-approval evidence bundle is attached to this assessment.
## Decisions
- Use Campaign as the first reference journey and flagship pilot scenario.
- Keep Workflow and workflow-driven user stories planned and explicitly postponed for this assessment.
- Use local GovOPlaN accounts for the bounded pilot; do not claim federated identity support.
- Do not approve small production until installed-artifact, target mail, monitoring, backup/restore, and recovery proof checks pass.
## Assumptions
- The pilot can use local accounts and one internal tenant or office.
- A dedicated non-production SMTP/IMAP account and safe recipients are available.
- Pilot load fits one API and one worker until measured otherwise.
- Durable local storage is acceptable for the pilot.
## Unresolved decisions
- What are the target organization's data classes, legal bases, retention and external-disclosure rules?
- Which identity, mail, file, address and monitoring systems are mandatory?
- What are Campaign volume, concurrency, growth, availability, RPO and RTO?
- Who owns each external runtime component and operational control?
- Which accessibility, security, support and procurement constraints are mandatory?
## Pinned release and composition
Release reproducible: **yes**.
Release notes:
- The live stable catalog has a valid Ed25519 signature trusted through release-key-1.
- Core v0.1.13 and Campaign v0.1.10 are tagged and package-integrated; this is not target-environment or production approval.
- The absence of a configuration package is pinned explicitly as an environment-profile-only basis; this remains a promotion gap.
| Module | Repository and commit | Manifest version | Enabled | Role |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `core` | `govoplan-core` @ `d487726f4d2c` | `0.1.13` | yes | API, registry, migrations, sessions, kernel contracts and shared WebUI |
| `tenancy` | `govoplan-tenancy` @ `efbec827616b` | `0.1.8` | yes | Tenant context and lifecycle |
| `organizations` | `govoplan-organizations` @ `39c081c4fb8f` | `0.1.8` | yes | Organization model |
| `identity` | `govoplan-identity` @ `7a1710af896f` | `0.1.8` | yes | Normalized internal identity directory |
| `access` | `govoplan-access` @ `f1d64d247e12` | `0.1.11` | yes | Local authentication, sessions, API keys and RBAC |
| `admin` | `govoplan-admin` @ `11ecf362a36d` | `0.1.8` | yes | Administration surfaces |
| `dashboard` | `govoplan-dashboard` @ `4b960ad37f0d` | `0.1.8` | yes | Module-aware home surface |
| `policy` | `govoplan-policy` @ `1063622d311a` | `0.1.9` | yes | Policy explanation and configuration boundary |
| `audit` | `govoplan-audit` @ `d3d2c60d7dc1` | `0.1.8` | yes | Database audit records and retrying audit outbox |
| `campaigns` | `govoplan-campaign` @ `735e874bd03c` | `0.1.10` | yes | Campaign authoring, build, delivery control and reporting |
| `files` | `govoplan-files` @ `2b34f6e30578` | `0.1.9` | yes | Managed files and Campaign attachments |
| `mail` | `govoplan-mail` @ `3e2302909022` | `0.1.10` | yes | SMTP and IMAP profiles and transports |
| `calendar` | `govoplan-calendar` @ `9bcf41bb1fbb` | `0.1.8` | yes | Optional calendar outside the Campaign pilot minimum |
| `docs` | `govoplan-docs` @ `be52b716caed` | `0.1.10` | yes | Configured-system documentation |
| `ops` | `govoplan-ops` @ `341773a4ff8a` | `0.1.8` | yes | Readiness and deployment-profile visibility |
| `addresses` | `govoplan-addresses` @ `93dddbb8c52a` | `0.1.9` | no | Optional reusable recipient sources and CardDAV |
## Deployment profile
Status: `partial`
PostgreSQL and Redis run in containers while API, WebUI, worker and scheduler run from editable source trees.
Evidence:
- configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/dev/production-like/docker-compose.yml
- documentation/documented_model: govoplan/dev/production-like/README.md
## Recommended scenarios
### Controlled Campaign pilot
Status: `partial`
Proceed with a bounded internal pilot after its provider, privacy, workload, and recovery proof checks are assigned and passed.
Composition: `core`, `tenancy`, `organizations`, `identity`, `access`, `admin`, `dashboard`, `policy`, `audit`, `campaigns`, `files`, `mail`, `docs`, `ops`.
Topology:
- One supervised GovOPlaN API process and one immutable built WebUI behind deployment-owned TLS termination
- One PostgreSQL database and a durable single-node or shared managed-file path
- One persistent private Redis broker and one supervised Celery worker when asynchronous delivery is enabled
- One dedicated non-production SMTP/IMAP account with a restricted safe-recipient policy
- External health checks, centralized logs, protected secret injection, and coordinated backup storage
Conditions:
- Use one internal tenant or office and controlled operators.
- Keep recipient volume non-critical until measured.
- Enable Addresses only when reusable recipient lists or CardDAV are explicitly in scope.
- Do not enable or claim Workflow from this assessment.
### Small-production candidate
Status: `partial`
Do not approve production until every listed operational gate has target evidence and the residual risks have named owners.
Composition: `core`, `tenancy`, `organizations`, `identity`, `access`, `admin`, `dashboard`, `policy`, `audit`, `campaigns`, `files`, `mail`, `docs`, `ops`.
Topology:
- Immutable separately supervised WebUI, API, and worker artifacts behind monitored reverse-proxy TLS
- Dedicated or managed PostgreSQL with measured coordinated backup and isolated restore
- Persistent authenticated Redis with queue-age, queue-depth, and worker-health alerts
- Durable shared or S3-compatible object storage with versioning, lifecycle, and restore evidence
- Target-native secret management, centralized monitoring/logging/audit export, and an exercised incident and disaster-recovery procedure
Conditions:
- Pin and promote a configuration package instead of relying on an environment-only basis.
- Pass installed-release, target SMTP/IMAP, accessibility, privacy, security, operations, and recovery evidence gates.
- Agree availability, RPO, RTO, retention, support, and procurement requirements.
- Run only one scheduler unless distributed leadership or locking is proved.
## Functional matrix context
### Required modules
- core
- tenancy
- organizations
- identity
- access
- admin
- dashboard
- policy
- audit
- campaigns
- files
- mail
- docs
- ops
### Optional modules
- addresses
### External systems and connectors
- Deployment-owned reverse proxy and TLS certificate lifecycle
- Target SMTP/IMAP service and its DNS, certificate, throttling, bounce, and reply policies
- Target-native secret store, monitoring/logging platform, backup storage, and incident-response process
### Missing contracts
- End-to-end federated identity provider and lifecycle contract
- Target monitoring, alert delivery, and central audit/SIEM acceptance contract
- Production configuration-package promotion and approval evidence
### Policy decisions
- Recipient allow-list, permitted sender, attachment, retention, and external-disclosure policy
- Identity, MFA, break-glass, service-account, and joiner/mover/leaver policy
- Availability, RPO, RTO, support, procurement, and residual-risk ownership
### Manual workarounds
- Use controlled local accounts while federation remains outside the verified slice
- Use one supervised scheduler where periodic work is unavoidable
- Keep provider reconciliation and production promotion under explicit operator review
### Blockers
- No promoted configuration package is pinned
- No installed-target or target SMTP/IMAP proof is attached
- No coherent target backup/restore or disaster-recovery drill with measured RPO/RTO is attached
- No target privacy, security, accessibility, operations, or production-approval evidence is attached
## Assessment questionnaire
Every required area remains visible even when its target answer is unknown.
| Area | Question | State | Answer | Evidence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Scope Outcomes | Which journey is assessed? | `answered` | An internal operator authors, validates, builds, queues, sends and reconciles a Campaign with managed attachments. | — |
| Scope Outcomes | Is Workflow in scope? | `answered` | No; Workflow is planned and explicitly postponed. | — |
| Scope Outcomes | Which users, roles, tenants, organization units, and delegated functions participate? | `assumed` | One internal tenant or office with controlled Campaign operators; detailed organization and delegation shape remains target-specific. | — |
| Scope Outcomes | What constitutes pilot success and production acceptance? | `answered` | Pilot success requires the bounded Campaign journey and proof checks; production additionally requires installed-artifact, provider, privacy, security, operations, recovery, and approval evidence. | — |
| Data Policy | Which data classes and legal bases apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Data Policy | What retention, deletion, archive and legal-hold rules apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Data Policy | Which privacy, security, residency, minimization, access, and external-disclosure constraints apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Identity Integrations | May the pilot use local GovOPlaN accounts? | `assumed` | Yes; federation is outside the verified composition. | — |
| Identity Integrations | Which target SMTP/IMAP service and policy apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Identity Integrations | Which identity protocols, MFA, joiner/mover/leaver, service-account, and break-glass rules are mandatory? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Identity Integrations | Which connector protocols, versions, directions, authentication, certificate, rate-limit, egress, and degraded-mode requirements apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Workload Growth | What are Campaign frequency, recipients per Campaign, send window, import size and attachment volume? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Workload Growth | What are tenant, named-user, active-user, concurrent-user, and peak-request assumptions? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Workload Growth | What are tenant, user, concurrency, file, database, queue and audit growth assumptions? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Workload Growth | What connector traffic, scheduled-job, batch, queue-depth, queue-age, and external-rate-limit peaks apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Availability Operations | What availability, RPO and RTO are required? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Availability Operations | Who operates database, queue, storage, TLS, secrets, monitoring, backup and incident response? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Availability Operations | Which hosting, network-zone, egress, proxy, DNS, NTP, certificate-authority, residency, or disconnected-operation constraints apply? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
| Procurement Decisions | Which licensing, accessibility, security, certification, support and procurement conditions are mandatory? | `not_assessed` | — | — |
## Functional capability matrix
| Requirement | Status | Evidence | Conditions and gaps | Recommendation and proof |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **platform.composition**<br>Compose enabled backend and WebUI modules without hard optional-module dependencies. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_module_system.py; contract/current_workspace: govoplan/tools/checks/check-contracts.py (43 modules, 33 providers, 19 requirements, no issues) | Condition: Package integration is verified; repeat checks on the installed target composition.; Gap: No target deployment acceptance is recorded.; Risk: A reproducible module graph can still be installed or configured incorrectly. | Use the signed stable catalog and verify the minimal Campaign composition after installation.<br>**Proof:** Run contract, migration, API and WebUI module-permutation gates on the installed release. |
| **access.local**<br>Provide tenant-scoped local accounts, sessions, API keys and RBAC. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-access/tests/test_auth_dependencies.py; test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#cookie-session-csrf | Condition: Pilot accepts local accounts.; Gap: MFA and federated lifecycle are not part of this conclusion.; Risk: Manual account lifecycle may not satisfy production identity policy. | Use controlled local pilot accounts and define break-glass/bootstrap rules.<br>**Proof:** Exercise joiner, role change, suspension and protected-owner recovery. |
| **campaign.journey**<br>Author, validate, build, queue, send, reconcile and report a Campaign with frozen execution evidence. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#campaign-create-validate-build-mock-send; test/committed_source: govoplan-campaign/tests (Campaign v0.1.10 is exactly the catalog-selected tagged source); configuration/committed_source: https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/catalogs/v1/channels/stable.json#sequence-202607220843 (Core v0.1.13 and Campaign v0.1.10 have matching catalogued Python and WebUI refs) | Condition: This verifies implementation paths, not target-provider delivery.; Gap: Usability and target-provider acceptance remain separate.; Risk: Package integration does not prove provider behavior or production operations. | Use the catalogued Campaign release for usability and target-provider acceptance.<br>**Proof:** Run the complete journey with safe data and the target-like mail service. |
| **files.managed_attachments**<br>Store and resolve managed Campaign attachments on durable storage. | `verified` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-files/tests (14 tests passed); test/current_workspace: govoplan-campaign/tests/test_attachment_building.py | Condition: Deployment provides a durable storage root.; Gap: Target backup and restore are not verified.; Risk: Node-local storage prevents safe independent API scaling. | Use durable local storage for the pilot and assess object/shared storage before scaling.<br>**Proof:** Back up and restore files together with database references. |
| **mail.smtp_imap**<br>Send Campaign mail through SMTP and optionally append sent messages through IMAP. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-mail/tests (22 tests passed); documentation/documented_model: govoplan-campaign/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md | Condition: Use a dedicated non-production service account and safe recipients.; Gap: No target provider, TLS chain, throttling or bounce/reply process was exercised.; Risk: Ambiguous provider outcomes can cause duplicate-send risk if reconciled incorrectly. | Run target-like interoperability and failure drills before production use.<br>**Proof:** Prove SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, throttling and outcome reconciliation. |
| **addresses.recipient_sources**<br>Select reusable address lists as Campaign recipient sources. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-addresses/tests (14 tests passed) | Condition: Enable the Addresses module explicitly.; Gap: Addresses is disabled in the pinned root profile.; Risk: Recipient governance may differ between source data and frozen Campaign evidence. | Enable only when reusable lists are a pilot requirement.<br>**Proof:** Build a Campaign from a source list and verify immutable recipient provenance. |
| **audit.local**<br>Retain tenant/system audit evidence and retry governed audit events. | `verified` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-audit/tests (5 tests passed) | Condition: Conclusion covers local database evidence only.; Gap: No central sink, retention enforcement or tamper-evident archive is verified.; Risk: Local audit evidence may not satisfy organizational records or SIEM requirements. | Define retention and export requirements before production approval.<br>**Proof:** Exercise privileged-event review, retention and any required external export. |
| **identity.federation**<br>Integrate external LDAP/AD, OIDC/SAML or SCIM identity infrastructure. | `scaffold` | documentation/documented_model: govoplan-idm/README.md | Gap: No end-to-end provider connector or federated login is verified.; Risk: Federation-dependent organizations cannot use the current pilot composition without extra implementation. | Use local pilot accounts or assess and implement the selected provider path.<br>**Proof:** Run provider metadata, login/provisioning, deprovisioning and failure tests. |
| **compliance.export_control**<br>Screen persons and organizations against embargo/sanctions lists with review evidence. | `planned` | issue/documented_model: https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/12 | Gap: No provider, list provenance, match policy, review flow or legal evidence exists.; Risk: The current composition must not be represented as performing export-control screening. | Keep outside pilot claims until the user story is implemented and legally validated.<br>**Proof:** Validate list ingestion, versioning, matching, false-positive review and audit evidence. |
| **workflow**<br>Orchestrate the journey through Workflow. | `planned` | observation/documented_model: Assessment scope (Explicitly postponed) | Gap: Workflow is outside this assessment.; Risk: Including it would overstate the assessed composition. | Do not enable or claim Workflow for this reference pilot.<br>**Proof:** Reassess in a later Workflow-focused composition. |
## Infrastructure matrix
| Requirement | Status | Evidence | Conditions and gaps | Recommendation and proof |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **runtime.web_api**<br>Serve matching WebUI and API artifacts with health endpoints. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_module_system.py; route/committed_source: govoplan-core/src/govoplan_core/server/fastapi.py#/health | Condition: Materialize the matching catalogued artifacts in the target.; Gap: No production image or service bundle is supplied by the profile.; Risk: Editable source processes are unsuitable as a production artifact. | Install matching catalogued WebUI/API refs and supervise them as immutable artifacts.<br>**Proof:** Deploy the built artifacts and run health/module-route checks. |
| **runtime.worker**<br>Run durable asynchronous Campaign jobs. | `available_unconfigured` | configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/tools/launch/launch-production-like-dev.sh | Condition: Redis and a supervised worker are required when Celery is enabled.; Gap: Target heartbeat, restart and queue-age alerting are not proved.; Risk: Queued work can stall silently without monitoring. | Start one worker for the pilot and split queues only after measurement.<br>**Proof:** Interrupt and restart a worker while preserving job/reconciliation safety. |
| **runtime.scheduler**<br>Run periodic recovery and cleanup safely. | `partial` | test/committed_source: govoplan-calendar/tests/test_outbox.py (Committed and pushed after the catalogued Calendar v0.1.8 tag) | Condition: Calendar outbox and recovery work is remote-integrated source but not stable-package-integrated.; Gap: No distributed leader election or target supervision is established.; Risk: Multiple schedulers can duplicate periodic dispatch without locking. | Omit from the Campaign-only pilot or run one supervised instance.<br>**Proof:** Prove missed-schedule recovery and single-leader behavior. |
| **data.postgresql**<br>Persist application state in PostgreSQL with explicit migrations. | `verified` | configuration/committed_source: govoplan/dev/postgres; test/committed_source: govoplan/tools/checks/postgres-integration-check.py | Condition: Target database remains deployment-owned.; Gap: HA, patching, WAL policy and capacity are not assessed.; Risk: A single unprotected database is a system-wide failure point. | Use managed or dedicated PostgreSQL with explicit migration and backup controls.<br>**Proof:** Run migrations and restore a target-like database. |
| **queue.redis**<br>Provide the Celery broker and queue persistence. | `available_unconfigured` | configuration/current_workspace: govoplan/dev/production-like/docker-compose.yml#redis | Gap: Authentication, TLS, eviction, HA and queue-loss policy are not assessed.; Risk: Broker loss or eviction can delay work even when database business state survives. | Configure private persistent Redis and monitor queue age/depth.<br>**Proof:** Exercise broker interruption and worker recovery. |
| **storage.local**<br>Persist managed files on a durable single-node/shared path. | `verified` | contract/committed_source: govoplan-files/src/govoplan_files/backend/storage/backends.py | Condition: Path is durable, private, writable and backed up.; Gap: Node-local storage cannot support independent API replicas.; Risk: Files can be lost or become inconsistent with database state. | Use for a bounded pilot only with coordinated backup.<br>**Proof:** Restore files and verify all database references. |
| **storage.object**<br>Use S3-compatible storage for independently scalable file persistence. | `partial` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-files/tests/test_connector_providers.py | Gap: No chosen target service or storage-backend interoperability drill.; Risk: Provider semantics, CA or lifecycle mismatch can break file access/retention. | Select and exercise the target object store before horizontal scaling.<br>**Proof:** Upload, retrieve, version, back up and restore representative objects. |
| **edge.proxy_tls**<br>Terminate HTTPS and enforce proxy/security policy. | `external_system` | route/committed_source: govoplan-ops/src/govoplan_ops/backend/api/v1/routes.py#deployment-security | Gap: No proxy, certificates, renewal, header or request-limit configuration is shipped here.; Risk: Incorrect proxy/cookie/CORS configuration can expose sessions or block legitimate use. | Supply and monitor the edge through the target platform.<br>**Proof:** Run external TLS/header/cookie/CORS and upload-limit tests. |
| **security.secret_store**<br>Inject and rotate master, database, mail and connector secrets. | `external_system` | configuration/committed_source: govoplan/.env.example | Gap: No target secret manager or rotation drill is selected.; Risk: Loss of the master key makes encrypted credentials unavailable; leakage compromises connectors. | Use target-native secret injection and document rotation/recovery.<br>**Proof:** Rotate a non-production credential and recover from a protected backup. |
| **identity.access**<br>Authenticate users and enforce tenant-scoped authorization through the selected identity mode. | `verified` | test/committed_source: govoplan-access/tests/test_auth_dependencies.py; test/committed_source: govoplan-core/tests/test_api_smoke.py#cookie-session-csrf | Condition: The bounded pilot accepts local GovOPlaN accounts.; Gap: Target MFA, federation, provisioning, and joiner/mover/leaver requirements are not assessed.; Risk: A local-only identity topology may not satisfy institutional production policy. | Use controlled local pilot accounts and assess the mandatory production identity topology separately.<br>**Proof:** Exercise login, role change, account suspension, protected bootstrap, and break-glass recovery in the target. |
| **connectors.mail**<br>Reach the selected SMTP/IMAP and other external connector endpoints under explicit network and provider policy. | `available_unconfigured` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-mail/tests (Protocol adapters have direct tests; no target provider was exercised); documentation/documented_model: govoplan-campaign/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md | Condition: The deployment supplies DNS, egress, proxy, CA trust, scoped service accounts, and provider limits.; Gap: No target endpoint, TLS chain, throttling, sender policy, bounce/reply path, or disclosure agreement is assessed.; Risk: Provider rejection, delay, or ambiguous outcomes can affect delivery and evidence completeness. | Use a dedicated safe provider account for the pilot and require target interoperability evidence before production.<br>**Proof:** Exercise target-like SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, throttling, outage, retry, and reconciliation through the approved network path. |
| **operations.monitoring**<br>Detect API, database, worker, queue, storage and delivery degradation. | `partial` | route/committed_source: govoplan-ops/src/govoplan_ops/backend/api/v1/routes.py#/ops/readiness; contract/committed_source: govoplan-core/src/govoplan_core/server/fastapi.py#slow-request-logging | Gap: No metrics exporter, log collector, dashboards, alert routes or SLO is verified.; Risk: Failures and queue backlog can remain unnoticed. | Integrate external monitoring before small production.<br>**Proof:** Trigger each readiness/delivery failure and verify an actionable alert. |
| **operations.audit**<br>Retain, monitor, review, and where required export security and business audit evidence. | `partial` | test/current_workspace: govoplan-audit/tests (Local audit persistence and retry behavior are exercised) | Condition: Local database audit evidence is part of coordinated backup and access review.; Gap: Target retention enforcement, tamper-evident export, SIEM integration, alerting, and privileged review are not verified.; Risk: Local evidence alone may not meet institutional security, records, or incident-response requirements. | Define the target audit retention, export, monitoring, and review controls before production approval.<br>**Proof:** Exercise privileged-event review, retention, export failure/retry, and target SIEM or archive ingestion. |
| **operations.backup_restore**<br>Back up and restore database, files, configuration and keys as a coherent service. | `partial` | documentation/documented_model: govoplan-core/docs/DEPLOYMENT_OPERATOR_GUIDE.md; issue/documented_model: https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/29 | Gap: No target full-service restore drill or measured RPO/RTO exists.; Risk: Partial restore can produce missing files, unusable secrets or inconsistent evidence. | Treat Core #29 and a target restore drill as a production gate.<br>**Proof:** Restore the whole service into an isolated environment and measure it. |
| **operations.disaster_recovery**<br>Recover the service after site or dependency loss within agreed RPO/RTO. | `not_assessed` | absence/current_workspace: No target DR plan or exercise evidence supplied | Gap: RPO/RTO, off-site copies, recovery order, failover, communications and exercise schedule are unknown.; Risk: Service and evidence may be unrecoverable after a major incident. | Define and exercise DR before any availability commitment.<br>**Proof:** Run a documented end-to-end recovery exercise. |
## Data flows and trust boundaries
| Flow | From → to | Data | Trust boundary | Controls |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `browser.api` | User browser → Reverse proxy and GovOPlaN WebUI/API | Session and CSRF cookies; Campaign content; Recipient personal data; Managed files | Client/public to application | HTTPS; Exact CORS origins; Secure cookies; Tenant and RBAC enforcement; Request limits |
| `api.database` | GovOPlaN API and workers → PostgreSQL | Tenant and identity records; Campaign drafts, snapshots and jobs; Connector metadata; Audit evidence | Application to primary state store | Dedicated database identity; Private or encrypted transport; Migrations; Backup and retention |
| `api.queue.worker` | GovOPlaN API → Redis and Celery worker | Job identifiers; Queue routing and retry metadata | Request plane to asynchronous processing plane | Private authenticated broker; Bounded payloads; Idempotent claims; Queue monitoring |
| `worker.mail` | GovOPlaN Campaign worker → External SMTP and IMAP services | Recipient addresses; Message bodies; Attachments; Sent-message copy | GovOPlaN to external communication provider | Scoped service account; TLS and CA policy; Sender and recipient policy; Rate limits; Outcome reconciliation |
| `worker.connectors` | GovOPlaN connector worker → External address, file, object or calendar service | Addresses; Files and provenance; Calendar resources | GovOPlaN to organizational/external content systems | Explicit sync direction; Scoped credentials; Endpoint allow-list; Provenance; Conflict and reconciliation policy |
## Risks and residual risks
| Risk | Impact | Treatment | Owner | Residual risk |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **risk.reproducibility**<br>The signed package selection is reproducible but has not been accepted as an installed target composition. | Installation or configuration drift can still produce uncertain deployed behavior. | Materialize the signed catalog in an isolated target and run installed-artifact acceptance gates. | unassigned | Module and environment differences still require release-environment verification. |
| **risk.delivery_provider**<br>Target SMTP/IMAP behavior and failure modes are unproved. | Failed, delayed or duplicate communication and incomplete evidence. | Run target-like interoperability, throttling and uncertainty drills. | unassigned | External provider outages and ambiguous outcomes remain operational risks. |
| **risk.recovery**<br>Backup/restore and disaster recovery are not demonstrated across all state and keys. | Irrecoverable or inconsistent service after loss. | Complete Core #29 and an isolated full-service restore/DR exercise. | unassigned | Recovery time and data loss remain bounded by the selected external infrastructure. |
## Recommendations
- Proceed only with a controlled internal Campaign pilot after the bounded proof checks pass.
- Use the minimal composition and enable Addresses only for an explicit reusable-recipient journey.
- Do not claim Workflow, export-control screening, identity federation or production DR as implemented.
- Treat installed-release acceptance, target mail proof, monitoring and a coherent restore drill as production gates.
## Proof-of-concept and promotion checks
1. Materialize the signed catalog into an isolated installation and rerun contract, migration and module-permutation gates against the installed artifacts.
2. Collect the isolated installation with the bounded installed-composition evidence contract; require exact enabled package/module versions, complete RECORD verification and immutable provenance anchored to this assessment.
3. Run a safe target-like Campaign through SMTP acceptance, IMAP append, reporting and audit.
4. Drill worker, Redis and ambiguous-delivery failures without duplicate sends.
5. Restore PostgreSQL, managed files, configuration and encrypted credentials and measure RPO/RTO.
6. Validate proxy/TLS, cookies/CORS, account bootstrap, secret redaction, monitoring and alert delivery.
7. Measure representative Campaign/file/queue/database load and external throttling.
8. Require separately issued, expiring and independently scope-authorized evidence before marking target environment, external provider or production approval proof as checked.
## Generation contract
This report is deterministic output from the schema-validated JSON companion.
The generator rejects duplicate JSON keys, schema drift, secret-bearing field
names, stale checked-in output, and oversized inputs. A new assessment or
release changes the canonical input hash and requires review of the affected
evidence and conclusions through the release-aware reassessment tool.
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
# GovOPlaN Capability and IT-Infrastructure Fit Assessment
# Supporting Narrative: 2026-07-22 Capability and Infrastructure Assessment
> **Canonical report:** The schema-validated human report is generated from the
> machine-readable input at
> [`CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md`](CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md).
> This file retains the original hand-authored evidence narrative and operator
> guidance; it is not maintained as a second set of conclusions.
> **Pinned historical evidence:** This document assesses the exact 2026-07-22
> Campaign composition below. It is intentionally not updated to describe later
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Read it together with:
- the [institutional governance target architecture](../../architecture/INSTITUTIONAL_GOVERNANCE_TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md)
- the [selected reference-journey program](../REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md)
- the [current strategy status](../STRATEGY_STATUS.md)
- the [pinned Campaign capability and infrastructure fit assessment](../../evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
- the [generated, pinned Campaign capability and infrastructure fit assessment](../../evidence/snapshots/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md)
- the [interface pattern language](../../architecture/INTERFACE_PATTERN_LANGUAGE.md)
- the [interface surface inventory](../../evidence/snapshots/INTERFACE_SURFACE_INVENTORY.md)
- the [module contract and install model](../../operations/MODULE_CONTRACTS_AND_INSTALLS.md)
+124
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from copy import deepcopy
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "assessments"
RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
if str(tools_root) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
from govoplan_assessment.report_generator import ( # noqa: E402
AssessmentGenerationError,
load_bounded_json,
render_assessment_markdown,
validate_report_input,
)
class CapabilityFitGenerationTests(unittest.TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls) -> None:
cls.assessment = json.loads(
(META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit-current.json").read_text("utf-8")
)
cls.schema = json.loads(
(META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit.schema.json").read_text("utf-8")
)
def test_current_assessment_renders_every_conclusion_from_one_input(self) -> None:
validate_report_input(assessment=self.assessment, schema=self.schema)
first = render_assessment_markdown(self.assessment)
second = render_assessment_markdown(deepcopy(self.assessment))
self.assertEqual(first, second)
self.assertIn("## Facts", first)
self.assertIn("## Decisions", first)
self.assertIn("## Unresolved decisions", first)
self.assertIn("## Risks and residual risks", first)
self.assertIn("## Proof-of-concept and promotion checks", first)
self.assertIn("### Controlled Campaign pilot", first)
self.assertIn("### Small-production candidate", first)
self.assertIn("## Functional matrix context", first)
self.assertIn("### Manual workarounds", first)
self.assertIn("### Blockers", first)
self.assertIn("Workflow and workflow-driven user stories", first)
for status in self.schema["$defs"]["status"]["enum"]:
self.assertIn(f"`{status}`", first)
for collection in ("capabilities", "infrastructure", "data_flows"):
for item in self.assessment[collection]:
self.assertIn(item["id"], first)
infrastructure_ids = {
item["id"] for item in self.assessment["infrastructure"]
}
self.assertTrue(
{
"runtime.web_api",
"runtime.worker",
"runtime.scheduler",
"data.postgresql",
"queue.redis",
"storage.local",
"storage.object",
"edge.proxy_tls",
"identity.access",
"security.secret_store",
"connectors.mail",
"operations.monitoring",
"operations.audit",
"operations.backup_restore",
"operations.disaster_recovery",
}.issubset(infrastructure_ids)
)
def test_questionnaire_retains_all_required_fit_dimensions(self) -> None:
ids = {
item["id"]
for answers in self.assessment["questionnaire"].values()
for item in answers
}
self.assertTrue(
{
"outcome.reference_journey",
"scope.users_tenants_organizations",
"data.classification",
"data.retention",
"data.privacy_security_disclosure",
"identity.protocols_lifecycle",
"integration.protocols_network",
"workload.tenants_users_concurrency",
"workload.campaign_volume_peaks",
"workload.files_jobs_audit_growth_retention",
"workload.connector_traffic_batches",
"availability.rto_rpo",
"hosting.network_constraints",
"operations.ownership",
"procurement.constraints",
}.issubset(ids)
)
def test_duplicate_keys_and_sensitive_fields_fail_closed(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
duplicate = Path(directory) / "duplicate.json"
duplicate.write_text('{"id": 1, "id": 2}', encoding="utf-8")
with self.assertRaisesRegex(AssessmentGenerationError, "Duplicate JSON key"):
load_bounded_json(duplicate, label="assessment")
unsafe = deepcopy(self.assessment)
unsafe["password"] = "must-not-render"
permissive = deepcopy(self.schema)
permissive["additionalProperties"] = True
with self.assertRaisesRegex(AssessmentGenerationError, "sensitive field"):
validate_report_input(assessment=unsafe, schema=permissive)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Generate the human capability-fit report from its machine-readable input."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import tempfile
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "assessments"
RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
if str(tools_root) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
from govoplan_assessment.report_generator import ( # noqa: E402
AssessmentGenerationError,
load_bounded_json,
render_assessment_markdown,
validate_report_input,
)
DEFAULT_ASSESSMENT = META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit-current.json"
DEFAULT_SCHEMA = META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit.schema.json"
DEFAULT_OUTPUT = (
META_ROOT
/ "docs"
/ "evidence"
/ "snapshots"
/ "CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.generated.md"
)
MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Render a deterministic human report from one capability-fit JSON input."
)
parser.add_argument("--assessment", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_ASSESSMENT)
parser.add_argument("--schema", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_SCHEMA)
parser.add_argument("--output", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_OUTPUT)
parser.add_argument(
"--check",
action="store_true",
help="Fail when the output is missing or differs instead of writing it.",
)
return parser.parse_args(argv)
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
args = parse_args(argv)
try:
assessment = load_bounded_json(args.assessment, label="assessment")
schema = load_bounded_json(args.schema, label="assessment schema")
validate_report_input(assessment=assessment, schema=schema)
rendered = render_assessment_markdown(assessment)
encoded = rendered.encode("utf-8")
if len(encoded) > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"Generated report exceeds the {MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES}-byte output limit"
)
if args.check:
try:
current = args.output.read_bytes()
except OSError:
current = None
if current != encoded:
print(
f"Capability-fit report is stale: {args.output}",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return 2
print(f"Capability-fit report is current: {args.output}")
return 0
_atomic_write(args.output, encoded)
print(f"Generated capability-fit report: {args.output}")
return 0
except AssessmentGenerationError as exc:
print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr)
return 1
def _atomic_write(path: Path, content: bytes) -> None:
if not path.parent.is_dir():
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"Output parent directory does not exist: {path.parent}"
)
if path.is_symlink():
raise AssessmentGenerationError("Output path must not be a symbolic link")
descriptor = -1
temporary_name = ""
try:
descriptor, temporary_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=".govoplan-fit-report-",
suffix=".tmp",
dir=path.parent,
)
os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o644)
with os.fdopen(descriptor, "wb", closefd=True) as handle:
descriptor = -1
handle.write(content)
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
os.replace(temporary_name, path)
temporary_name = ""
except OSError as exc:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"Could not write generated report atomically: {exc}"
) from exc
finally:
if descriptor >= 0:
os.close(descriptor)
if temporary_name:
try:
os.unlink(temporary_name)
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
"""Deterministically render one validated capability-fit assessment as Markdown."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
from jsonschema import Draft202012Validator, FormatChecker
from jsonschema.exceptions import SchemaError
MAX_ASSESSMENT_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
STATUS_DEFINITIONS = (
(
"verified",
"Implemented and directly exercised by evidence appropriate to the stated scope.",
),
(
"available_unconfigured",
"Implemented with supporting evidence, but not configured and exercised in the target.",
),
(
"partial",
"A useful subset exists, but a material part of the requirement is missing or unproved.",
),
(
"scaffold",
"Contracts or structure exist, but the end-to-end capability is not usable.",
),
(
"external_system",
"The deployment or another system must supply the capability.",
),
(
"planned",
"Only a concept, backlog item, or design direction exists.",
),
(
"not_fit",
"Evidence shows that the assessed composition cannot meet the requirement.",
),
(
"not_assessed",
"The requirement or target environment is not sufficiently known.",
),
)
class AssessmentGenerationError(ValueError):
"""The assessment cannot be safely validated or rendered."""
def load_bounded_json(path: Path, *, label: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
size = path.stat().st_size
except OSError as exc:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"Could not inspect {label}: {exc}") from exc
if size > MAX_ASSESSMENT_BYTES:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"{label} exceeds the {MAX_ASSESSMENT_BYTES}-byte input limit"
)
try:
payload = json.loads(
path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
object_pairs_hook=_unique_object,
)
except (OSError, UnicodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"Could not read {label}: {exc}") from exc
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"{label} must contain one JSON object")
return payload
def validate_report_input(
*,
assessment: Mapping[str, Any],
schema: Mapping[str, Any],
) -> None:
try:
Draft202012Validator.check_schema(schema)
except SchemaError as exc:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"Assessment schema is invalid: {exc.message}"
) from exc
errors = sorted(
Draft202012Validator(
schema,
format_checker=FormatChecker(),
).iter_errors(assessment),
key=lambda item: tuple(str(part) for part in item.absolute_path),
)
if errors:
details = "; ".join(
f"{_json_path(error.absolute_path)}: {error.message}"
for error in errors[:20]
)
raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"Assessment does not match schema: {details}")
_validate_references(assessment)
_reject_sensitive_keys(assessment)
def render_assessment_markdown(assessment: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
"""Return stable Markdown derived only from a validated assessment object."""
assessment_hash = hashlib.sha256(
json.dumps(
assessment,
sort_keys=True,
separators=(",", ":"),
ensure_ascii=True,
).encode("utf-8")
).hexdigest()
scope = _mapping(assessment["scope"])
release = _mapping(assessment["release"])
profile = _mapping(assessment["deployment_profile"])
lines = [
"# GovOPlaN Capability and IT-Infrastructure Fit Assessment",
"",
"> Generated from [`capability-fit-current.json`](../../capability-fit-current.json).",
"> Edit and validate the machine-readable assessment, then regenerate this file;",
"> do not maintain conclusions independently in Markdown.",
"",
"This is an evidence-based fit assessment, not a production approval or",
"security certification. Repository or manifest existence alone never counts",
"as an implemented capability. Unknown target requirements remain explicitly",
"`not_assessed`.",
"",
"## Assessment record",
"",
"| Field | Value |",
"| --- | --- |",
f"| Assessment ID | `{_cell(assessment['assessment_id'])}` |",
f"| Schema version | `govoplan.fit-assessment/{_cell(assessment['schema_version'])}` |",
f"| Assessed on | {_cell(assessment['assessed_at'])} |",
f"| Scope | {_cell(scope['title'])} |",
f"| Release | `{_cell(release['ref'])}` ({_cell(release['kind'])}) |",
f"| Meta commit | `{_cell(release['meta_commit'])}` |",
f"| Deployment profile | `{_cell(profile['id'])}` · `{_cell(profile['status'])}` |",
f"| Configuration packages | {_inline_list(release['configuration_packages'], code=True)} |",
f"| Canonical input SHA-256 | `{assessment_hash}` |",
"",
"## Controlled status vocabulary",
"",
"| Status | Meaning |",
"| --- | --- |",
]
lines.extend(
f"| `{status}` | {_cell(description)} |"
for status, description in STATUS_DEFINITIONS
)
lines.extend(
[
"",
"## Scope and reference journeys",
"",
"Reference journeys:",
"",
*_bullets(scope["reference_journeys"]),
"",
"Explicitly postponed:",
"",
*_bullets(scope["postponed"]),
"",
"## Facts",
"",
*_bullets(assessment["facts"]),
"",
"## Decisions",
"",
*_bullets(assessment["decisions"]),
"",
"## Assumptions",
"",
*_bullets(assessment["assumptions"]),
"",
"## Unresolved decisions",
"",
*_bullets(assessment["open_questions"]),
"",
"## Pinned release and composition",
"",
f"Release reproducible: **{'yes' if release['reproducible'] else 'no'}**.",
"",
]
)
lines.extend(_notes(release.get("notes", [])))
lines.extend(
[
"",
"| Module | Repository and commit | Manifest version | Enabled | Role |",
"| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
]
)
for module_value in assessment["composition"]:
module = _mapping(module_value)
lines.append(
"| `{}` | `{}` @ `{}` | `{}` | {} | {} |".format(
_cell(module["module_id"]),
_cell(module["repository"]),
_cell(module["commit"]),
_cell(module["manifest_version"]),
"yes" if module["enabled"] else "no",
_cell(module["role"]),
)
)
lines.extend(
[
"",
"## Deployment profile",
"",
f"Status: `{_cell(profile['status'])}`",
"",
_text(profile["description"]),
"",
"Evidence:",
"",
*_bullets(_evidence_labels(profile["evidence"])),
"",
"## Recommended scenarios",
"",
]
)
for scenario_value in assessment["scenarios"]:
scenario = _mapping(scenario_value)
lines.extend(
[
f"### {_text(scenario['label'])}",
"",
f"Status: `{_cell(scenario['status'])}`",
"",
_text(scenario["recommendation"]),
"",
f"Composition: {_inline_list(scenario['composition'], code=True)}.",
"",
"Topology:",
"",
*_bullets(scenario["topology"]),
"",
"Conditions:",
"",
*_bullets(scenario["conditions"]),
"",
]
)
functional_context = _mapping(assessment["functional_context"])
lines.extend(
[
"## Functional matrix context",
"",
"### Required modules",
"",
*_bullets(functional_context["required_modules"]),
"",
"### Optional modules",
"",
*_bullets(functional_context["optional_modules"]),
"",
"### External systems and connectors",
"",
*_bullets(functional_context["external_systems"]),
"",
"### Missing contracts",
"",
*_bullets(functional_context["missing_contracts"]),
"",
"### Policy decisions",
"",
*_bullets(functional_context["policy_decisions"]),
"",
"### Manual workarounds",
"",
*_bullets(functional_context["manual_workarounds"]),
"",
"### Blockers",
"",
*_bullets(functional_context["blockers"]),
"",
]
)
lines.extend(
[
"## Assessment questionnaire",
"",
"Every required area remains visible even when its target answer is unknown.",
"",
"| Area | Question | State | Answer | Evidence |",
"| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
]
)
questionnaire = _mapping(assessment["questionnaire"])
for area, answers in questionnaire.items():
for answer_value in _sequence(answers):
answer = _mapping(answer_value)
raw_answer = answer["answer"]
answer_text = (
_inline_list(raw_answer)
if isinstance(raw_answer, list)
else _text(raw_answer) if raw_answer is not None else ""
)
lines.append(
"| {} | {} | `{}` | {} | {} |".format(
_cell(area.replace("_", " ").title()),
_cell(answer["question"]),
_cell(answer["state"]),
_cell(answer_text),
_cell("; ".join(_evidence_labels(answer["evidence"])) or ""),
)
)
lines.extend(_assessed_matrix("Functional capability matrix", assessment["capabilities"]))
lines.extend(_assessed_matrix("Infrastructure matrix", assessment["infrastructure"]))
lines.extend(
[
"## Data flows and trust boundaries",
"",
"| Flow | From → to | Data | Trust boundary | Controls |",
"| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
]
)
for flow_value in assessment["data_flows"]:
flow = _mapping(flow_value)
lines.append(
"| `{}` | {}{} | {} | {} | {} |".format(
_cell(flow["id"]),
_cell(flow["from"]),
_cell(flow["to"]),
_cell(_inline_list(flow["data"])),
_cell(flow["trust_boundary"]),
_cell(_inline_list(flow["controls"])),
)
)
lines.extend(
[
"",
"## Risks and residual risks",
"",
"| Risk | Impact | Treatment | Owner | Residual risk |",
"| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
]
)
for risk_value in assessment["risks"]:
risk = _mapping(risk_value)
lines.append(
"| **{}**<br>{} | {} | {} | {} | {} |".format(
_cell(risk["id"]),
_cell(risk["statement"]),
_cell(risk["impact"]),
_cell(risk["treatment"]),
_cell(risk["owner"] or "unassigned"),
_cell(risk["residual_risk"]),
)
)
lines.extend(
[
"",
"## Recommendations",
"",
*_bullets(assessment["recommendations"]),
"",
"## Proof-of-concept and promotion checks",
"",
*_numbered(assessment["proof_checks"]),
"",
"## Generation contract",
"",
"This report is deterministic output from the schema-validated JSON companion.",
"The generator rejects duplicate JSON keys, schema drift, secret-bearing field",
"names, stale checked-in output, and oversized inputs. A new assessment or",
"release changes the canonical input hash and requires review of the affected",
"evidence and conclusions through the release-aware reassessment tool.",
"",
]
)
return "\n".join(lines)
def _assessed_matrix(title: str, values: object) -> list[str]:
lines = [
"",
f"## {title}",
"",
"| Requirement | Status | Evidence | Conditions and gaps | Recommendation and proof |",
"| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |",
]
for item_value in _sequence(values):
item = _mapping(item_value)
conditions = [f"Condition: {value}" for value in item["conditions"]]
gaps = [f"Gap: {value}" for value in item["gaps"]]
risks = [f"Risk: {value}" for value in item["risks"]]
lines.append(
"| **{}**<br>{} | `{}` | {} | {} | {}<br>**Proof:** {} |".format(
_cell(item["id"]),
_cell(item["requirement"]),
_cell(item["status"]),
_cell("; ".join(_evidence_labels(item["evidence"])) or "Explicit absence of evidence"),
_cell("; ".join([*conditions, *gaps, *risks]) or ""),
_cell(item["recommendation"] or ""),
_cell(item["proof_check"] or ""),
)
)
return lines
def _evidence_labels(values: object) -> list[str]:
labels: list[str] = []
for value in _sequence(values):
item = _mapping(value)
label = f"{item['kind']}/{item['scope']}: {item['locator']}"
if item.get("note"):
label += f" ({item['note']})"
labels.append(label)
return labels
def _unique_object(pairs: list[tuple[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]:
result: dict[str, Any] = {}
for key, value in pairs:
if key in result:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(f"Duplicate JSON key: {key!r}")
result[key] = value
return result
def _reject_sensitive_keys(value: object, path: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> None:
forbidden = {
"access_token",
"api_key",
"credential_value",
"password",
"private_key",
"refresh_token",
"secret",
}
if isinstance(value, Mapping):
for key, nested in value.items():
normalized = str(key).strip().casefold()
if normalized in forbidden:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"Assessment contains forbidden sensitive field {_json_path((*path, str(key)))}"
)
_reject_sensitive_keys(nested, (*path, str(key)))
elif isinstance(value, Sequence) and not isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
for index, nested in enumerate(value):
_reject_sensitive_keys(nested, (*path, str(index)))
def _validate_references(assessment: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
composition = [_mapping(item) for item in _sequence(assessment["composition"])]
module_ids = [str(item["module_id"]) for item in composition]
if len(module_ids) != len(set(module_ids)):
raise AssessmentGenerationError("Composition contains duplicate module IDs")
modules = {str(item["module_id"]): item for item in composition}
context = _mapping(assessment["functional_context"])
required = {str(item) for item in _sequence(context["required_modules"])}
optional = {str(item) for item in _sequence(context["optional_modules"])}
unknown_context = (required | optional) - set(modules)
if unknown_context:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
"Functional context references unknown modules: "
+ ", ".join(sorted(unknown_context))
)
if required & optional:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
"Functional context cannot mark a module both required and optional"
)
for scenario_value in _sequence(assessment["scenarios"]):
scenario = _mapping(scenario_value)
referenced = {str(item) for item in _sequence(scenario["composition"])}
unknown = referenced - set(modules)
if unknown:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"Scenario {scenario['id']!r} references unknown modules: "
+ ", ".join(sorted(unknown))
)
disabled = sorted(
module_id
for module_id in referenced
if not bool(modules[module_id]["enabled"])
)
if disabled:
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"Scenario {scenario['id']!r} references disabled modules: "
+ ", ".join(disabled)
)
for collection in ("capabilities", "infrastructure", "data_flows", "risks"):
identifiers = [
str(_mapping(item)["id"])
for item in _sequence(assessment[collection])
]
if len(identifiers) != len(set(identifiers)):
raise AssessmentGenerationError(
f"Assessment contains duplicate {collection} IDs"
)
def _mapping(value: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
raise AssessmentGenerationError("Validated assessment contains a non-object value")
return value
def _sequence(value: object) -> Sequence[Any]:
if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
raise AssessmentGenerationError("Validated assessment contains a non-list value")
return value
def _text(value: object) -> str:
return str(value).strip()
def _cell(value: object) -> str:
return _text(value).replace("|", "\\|").replace("\r", " ").replace("\n", " ")
def _inline_list(values: object, *, code: bool = False) -> str:
items = [_text(item) for item in _sequence(values)]
if not items:
return "none"
if code:
return ", ".join(f"`{_cell(item)}`" for item in items)
return "; ".join(items)
def _bullets(values: object) -> list[str]:
items = [_text(item) for item in _sequence(values)]
return [f"- {item}" for item in items] or ["- None recorded."]
def _numbered(values: object) -> list[str]:
return [f"{index}. {_text(item)}" for index, item in enumerate(_sequence(values), 1)]
def _notes(values: object) -> list[str]:
items = _bullets(values)
return ["Release notes:", "", *items]
def _json_path(parts: Iterable[object]) -> str:
suffix = "".join(f"[{part}]" if str(part).isdigit() else f".{part}" for part in parts)
return f"${suffix}"
__all__ = (
"AssessmentGenerationError",
"MAX_ASSESSMENT_BYTES",
"load_bounded_json",
"render_assessment_markdown",
"validate_report_input",
)
+2
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ cd "$META_ROOT"
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_module_package_workflows tests.test_package_registry_release
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_deployment_installer
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_capability_fit_evidence
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_capability_fit_generation tests.test_capability_fit_review
"$PYTHON" tools/assessments/generate-capability-fit-report.py --check
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_configuration_package_artifacts
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_institutional_governance_journey
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_institutional_service_journey
+2
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ cd "$ROOT"
"$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check_dependency_boundaries.py"
cd "$META_ROOT"
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_capability_fit_generation
"$PYTHON" tools/assessments/generate-capability-fit-report.py --check
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_configuration_package_artifacts
PYTHONPATH="$META_ROOT/../govoplan-portal/src:$META_ROOT/../govoplan-forms/src:$META_ROOT/../govoplan-forms-runtime/src:$META_ROOT/../govoplan-cases/src:$ROOT/src${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}" \
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_institutional_service_journey