ci: mount audit workspace safely
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@@ -164,10 +164,12 @@ The regular `Security Audit` workflow reuses the fingerprinted toolbox image
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when the Docker daemon is persistent, which is the normal case for the
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self-hosted Gitea runner using the host Docker socket. Trusted push, schedule,
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and manual runs scan all registered repositories; authenticated SSH is used
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only for the private website repository. Pull-request audit runs stay disabled
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while the audit runner exposes its host Docker socket: PR-controlled audit code
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must run on a disposable or rootless runner without host-socket access. The
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separate
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only for the private website repository. The wrapper inspects the Actions job
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mount table and forwards only the narrowest writable mount covering the audit
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scope; it never inherits the job's Docker socket or unrelated runner mounts.
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Pull-request audit runs stay disabled while the audit runner exposes its host
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Docker socket: PR-controlled audit code must run on a disposable or rootless
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runner without host-socket access. The separate
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`Security Audit Toolbox Update` workflow runs weekly with
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`SECURITY_AUDIT_UPDATE=1`; it pulls current base images and re-resolves the
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allowed tool version ranges into a refreshed local image.
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