ci: mount audit workspace safely
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This commit is contained in:
2026-07-23 00:30:28 +02:00
parent 3fc17701df
commit 8b93bbc6b6
5 changed files with 656 additions and 6 deletions

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@@ -164,10 +164,12 @@ The regular `Security Audit` workflow reuses the fingerprinted toolbox image
when the Docker daemon is persistent, which is the normal case for the
self-hosted Gitea runner using the host Docker socket. Trusted push, schedule,
and manual runs scan all registered repositories; authenticated SSH is used
only for the private website repository. Pull-request audit runs stay disabled
while the audit runner exposes its host Docker socket: PR-controlled audit code
must run on a disposable or rootless runner without host-socket access. The
separate
only for the private website repository. The wrapper inspects the Actions job
mount table and forwards only the narrowest writable mount covering the audit
scope; it never inherits the job's Docker socket or unrelated runner mounts.
Pull-request audit runs stay disabled while the audit runner exposes its host
Docker socket: PR-controlled audit code must run on a disposable or rootless
runner without host-socket access. The separate
`Security Audit Toolbox Update` workflow runs weekly with
`SECURITY_AUDIT_UPDATE=1`; it pulls current base images and re-resolves the
allowed tool version ranges into a refreshed local image.