Record first verified runtime distribution
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@@ -221,26 +221,39 @@ references and archive hashes; mutable tags or incomplete bundles are rejected.
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## Current Production Gates
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The tool deliberately reports blockers instead of pretending the source tree is
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a production distribution:
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The first immutable production-distribution baseline is published as
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[`v0.1.14`](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/releases/tag/v0.1.14)
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from source commit `1f039dd39c1ce2672f4978c8abc6dff862ef1445`. Runtime
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Distribution [run #459](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/runs/459)
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proved migrations, schema compatibility, non-root API/Web readiness, and worker
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delivery/shutdown on both `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`. Its signed manifest
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has SHA-256
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`d703267e01855dee63200cb20921c91c3f95fbff550c8ca76e9a35cba3f69109`
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and pins these runtime indexes:
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1. **First publication.** The protected workflow and fail-closed artifact
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contracts are implemented, but a release operator must configure the Gitea
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registry/release tokens and runtime Ed25519 key, publish the first pinned
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release, and retain its amd64/arm64 readiness evidence.
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3. **First administrator.** Production needs a one-time, restricted enrollment
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- API: `git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-api@sha256:197ed01790986f2bc927eaa5d8348fa118702e5d2dc05feb851fc2643c23764a`
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- WebUI: `git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-web@sha256:e936cca124f1fad29a067834cf17627d4c236410fdc3fa129e0ccb26b8193812`
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The signed bootstrap has SHA-256
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`1ff946fba82b0895d153b23352d06e30fe18388450dfd37fed6fb9912310efc5`
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and key id `runtime-distribution-2026-01`. The managed-ingress boundary passed
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the same publication run and the independently dispatchable Runtime Ingress
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Drill [run #458](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/runs/458).
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Every later release must renew this evidence; the following target-specific
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gates remain:
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1. **First administrator.** Production needs a one-time, restricted enrollment
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identity. The development bootstrap must not be enabled in production.
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4. **Image/module composition.** The deployer now enforces the signed
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2. **Image/module composition.** The deployer enforces the signed
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composition. A selected module not shipped by that release cannot be
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enabled.
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5. **Deployment agent.** Web updates need a separate privileged reconciler with
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3. **Deployment agent.** Web updates need a separate privileged reconciler with
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a typed command allowlist. The API and browser must never receive the Docker
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socket or arbitrary shell access.
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6. **Ingress reachability evidence.** Managed Caddy ingress and the
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4. **Target reachability evidence.** Managed Caddy ingress and the
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existing-proxy contract are implemented. A production claim still requires
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running `doctor` from the target host after public DNS/firewall changes and
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retaining the first successful container drill and public TLS/readiness
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evidence.
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retaining public TLS/readiness evidence for that deployment.
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`apply --allow-unverified-images` is therefore restricted to the evaluation
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profile. It explicitly acknowledges both mutable image identities and
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@@ -141,12 +141,16 @@ The canonical backlog item is
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Implementation status as of the current source tree:
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- Slice 1 now has the source-controlled production artifact boundary: offline
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per-architecture wheel resolution, non-root API/Web image definitions,
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multi-architecture OCI publication, signed composition/SBOM/provenance,
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immutable Gitea assets, a signed one-file deployer, and fail-closed manifest
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adoption. The first real published release and cross-architecture runtime
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evidence remain release-operator work rather than source-code claims.
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- Slice 1 has a published production-artifact baseline. Immutable
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[`v0.1.14`](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/releases/tag/v0.1.14)
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binds source commit `1f039dd39c1ce2672f4978c8abc6dff862ef1445`, a signed
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one-file deployer, exact API/Web and managed-dependency image digests,
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composition, SBOMs, and provenance. Runtime Distribution
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[run #459](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/runs/459)
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passed migrations, schema checks, non-root API/Web readiness, and worker
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delivery/shutdown on both amd64 and arm64. Each future release must renew the
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evidence, and a real installation must still produce topology-specific
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ingress, failover, backup, and recovery receipts.
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- Slice 6 has a working application-tier foundation: state profiles, shared
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object storage, runtime node registration/heartbeats/drain, fenced scheduler,
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migration serialization, exact-head startup waiting, Ops visibility, and a
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