Record first verified runtime distribution

docs/INSTALLATION_AND_DEPLOYMENT_ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -221,26 +221,39 @@ references and archive hashes; mutable tags or incomplete bundles are rejected.
 
 ## Current Production Gates
 
-The tool deliberately reports blockers instead of pretending the source tree is
+The first immutable production-distribution baseline is published as
-a production distribution:
+[`v0.1.14`](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/releases/tag/v0.1.14)
+from source commit `1f039dd39c1ce2672f4978c8abc6dff862ef1445`. Runtime
+Distribution [run #459](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/runs/459)
+proved migrations, schema compatibility, non-root API/Web readiness, and worker
+delivery/shutdown on both `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`. Its signed manifest
+has SHA-256
+`d703267e01855dee63200cb20921c91c3f95fbff550c8ca76e9a35cba3f69109`
+and pins these runtime indexes:
 
-1. **First publication.** The protected workflow and fail-closed artifact
+- API: `git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-api@sha256:197ed01790986f2bc927eaa5d8348fa118702e5d2dc05feb851fc2643c23764a`
-   contracts are implemented, but a release operator must configure the Gitea
+- WebUI: `git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-web@sha256:e936cca124f1fad29a067834cf17627d4c236410fdc3fa129e0ccb26b8193812`
-   registry/release tokens and runtime Ed25519 key, publish the first pinned
+
-   release, and retain its amd64/arm64 readiness evidence.
+The signed bootstrap has SHA-256
-3. **First administrator.** Production needs a one-time, restricted enrollment
+`1ff946fba82b0895d153b23352d06e30fe18388450dfd37fed6fb9912310efc5`
+and key id `runtime-distribution-2026-01`. The managed-ingress boundary passed
+the same publication run and the independently dispatchable Runtime Ingress
+Drill [run #458](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/runs/458).
+Every later release must renew this evidence; the following target-specific
+gates remain:
+
+1. **First administrator.** Production needs a one-time, restricted enrollment
    identity. The development bootstrap must not be enabled in production.
-4. **Image/module composition.** The deployer now enforces the signed
+2. **Image/module composition.** The deployer enforces the signed
    composition. A selected module not shipped by that release cannot be
    enabled.
-5. **Deployment agent.** Web updates need a separate privileged reconciler with
+3. **Deployment agent.** Web updates need a separate privileged reconciler with
    a typed command allowlist. The API and browser must never receive the Docker
    socket or arbitrary shell access.
-6. **Ingress reachability evidence.** Managed Caddy ingress and the
+4. **Target reachability evidence.** Managed Caddy ingress and the
    existing-proxy contract are implemented. A production claim still requires
    running `doctor` from the target host after public DNS/firewall changes and
-   retaining the first successful container drill and public TLS/readiness
+   retaining public TLS/readiness evidence for that deployment.
-   evidence.
 
 `apply --allow-unverified-images` is therefore restricted to the evaluation
 profile. It explicitly acknowledges both mutable image identities and

docs/SYSTEM_ADMINISTRATOR_LIFECYCLE_USER_STORY.md

@@ -141,12 +141,16 @@ The canonical backlog item is
 
 Implementation status as of the current source tree:
 
-- Slice 1 now has the source-controlled production artifact boundary: offline
+- Slice 1 has a published production-artifact baseline. Immutable
-  per-architecture wheel resolution, non-root API/Web image definitions,
+  [`v0.1.14`](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/releases/tag/v0.1.14)
-  multi-architecture OCI publication, signed composition/SBOM/provenance,
+  binds source commit `1f039dd39c1ce2672f4978c8abc6dff862ef1445`, a signed
-  immutable Gitea assets, a signed one-file deployer, and fail-closed manifest
+  one-file deployer, exact API/Web and managed-dependency image digests,
-  adoption. The first real published release and cross-architecture runtime
+  composition, SBOMs, and provenance. Runtime Distribution
-  evidence remain release-operator work rather than source-code claims.
+  [run #459](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/runs/459)
+  passed migrations, schema checks, non-root API/Web readiness, and worker
+  delivery/shutdown on both amd64 and arm64. Each future release must renew the
+  evidence, and a real installation must still produce topology-specific
+  ingress, failover, backup, and recovery receipts.
 - Slice 6 has a working application-tier foundation: state profiles, shared
   object storage, runtime node registration/heartbeats/drain, fenced scheduler,
   migration serialization, exact-head startup waiting, Ops visibility, and a

tests/test_runtime_distribution.py

@@ -93,6 +93,14 @@ class RuntimeDistributionTests(unittest.TestCase):
         with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "active trusted key"):
             verify_manifest(unknown, self.keyring, now=self.now)
 
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "expected 'candidate'"):
+            verify_manifest(
+                self._manifest(),
+                self.keyring,
+                expected_channel="candidate",
+                now=self.now,
+            )
+
     def test_offline_image_index_is_complete_and_digest_bound(self) -> None:
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-offline-images-") as value:
             root = Path(value)