test(release): follow relocated operations runbook

fix(release): support validated per-run SSH address family
feat(release): build verified full-registry catalog candidates
2026-09-08 03:02:31 +02:00 · 2026-09-08 02:50:59 +02:00 · 2026-09-08 02:26:19 +02:00 · 2026-09-08 02:06:35 +02:00 · 2026-09-08 01:52:08 +02:00 · 2026-08-24 20:26:44 +02:00
49 changed files with 3485 additions and 128 deletions
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Each WebUI module should be able to announce:
 The contract references surfaces. It does not permit Core or a product package
 to import their implementation.

-The first versioned `product_surfaces` slice is now implemented in Core. It
+The versioned `product_surfaces` slice is implemented in Core. It
 binds a stable product identity and entry path to one or more owner routes,
 View surfaces, presentations, capabilities, search sources, help contexts and
 documentation topics. It also carries standard unavailable/degraded
@@ -80,8 +80,22 @@ explanations and migration aliases. Mail and Postbox contribute the first
 shared identity, `communication.messages`: `/messages` and the migration alias
 `/inbox` select the first currently authorized, View-visible owner while the
 underlying `/mail` and `/postbox` deep links, custody and permissions remain
-unchanged. Alias resolution emits a bounded client telemetry event before the
-redirect.
+unchanged. Tasks, Calendar and Files contribute the corresponding single-owner
+identities:
+
+| Product identity | Stable destination | Compatible owner route |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Work | `/work` | `/tasks` |
+| Calendar | `/agenda` | `/calendar` |
+| Messages | `/messages` (`/inbox` alias) | `/mail`, `/postbox` |
+| Files | `/documents` | `/files` |
+
+Core replaces those owner entries in the ordinary rail with the stable product
+destinations. A collapsed **All available tools** catalogue retains every
+authorized technical owner route independently of View focus; unauthorized
+entries are never disclosed. The original deep links remain valid, and all
+contributing owner paths keep the corresponding product entry active. Alias
+resolution emits a bounded client telemetry event before the redirect.

 Core's `ProductAvailabilityState` is the shared presentation primitive for
 authorization, Policy, configuration, disabled, missing-capability, offline and
@@ -105,10 +119,11 @@ People and Responsibility. They are configurable system/tenant defaults and
 Views projections, not hard-coded repository groups. Empty areas disappear;
 single-destination areas may link directly; familiar tools may remain pinned.

-The complete permission-derived module rail remains available as **All
-available tools**. Its ability to scroll is useful and is not itself the
-product defect. The defect is requiring people to infer a task or outcome from
-repository topology.
+The complete permission-derived module rail is available as the collapsed
+**All available tools** escape. It is deliberately independent of the active
+View while still enforcing authorization. Its ability to scroll is useful and
+is not itself the product defect. The defect is requiring people to infer a
+task or outcome from repository topology.

 Task-local Work, Calendar, Messages and Files tools may be contributed to the
 optional `govoplan-quick-access` rail. Messages composes Mail, Postbox and
@@ -125,6 +140,12 @@ sections, commands, widgets, and fields. A view must not grant a permission or
 change data semantics. Policy can force, allow, or prohibit a surface at system,
 tenant, group, or user scope.

+Core browser conformance exercises the German Anwohnerparkausweis reference
+context with Work, Calendar, Messages and Files entries, verifies that package
+owner labels are absent from the primary rail, expands the technical catalogue,
+and runs WCAG 2 A/AA checks over the result. Unit permutations cover two-owner,
+one-owner, unauthorized-owner and focused-View compositions.
+
 ## Error And Provenance Language

 Normal errors answer:
@@ -39,16 +39,24 @@ The first production-shaped slice is implemented:
  order and optional labels. Scoped Views therefore configure product
  presentation for system, tenant, group, user and Workflow contexts;
 - the expanded left rail groups classified destinations while retaining
-  Dashboard and every authorized unclassified destination under More tools.
+  Dashboard and every authorized unclassified destination under More tools;
+- Core promotes Work (`/work`), Calendar (`/agenda`), Messages (`/messages`)
+  and Files (`/documents`) into stable primary destinations and collapses the
+  compatible owner routes under **All available tools**;
+- **All available tools** is permission-derived but independent of the active
+  View, providing a deliberate escape without granting access or discarding
+  the original `/tasks`, `/calendar`, `/mail`, `/postbox` and `/files` links.

-The baseline classification is now manifest-declared for every ordinary
-user-facing module and enforced by the workspace manifest check. A separately
+The baseline classification and the four initial stable destinations are now
+manifest-declared. The area classification covers every ordinary user-facing
+module and is enforced by the workspace manifest check. A separately
 versioned launch-context contract carries bounded active-object, acting,
 temporal, View and return references into full-page Quick Access fallbacks;
 Cases publishes the first active-object reference. The remaining rollout is to
 add useful bounded tools and active-object publishers only where a maintained
-journey benefits, and to extend browser evidence to a pinned reference
-composition. Authorized global and technical routes remain visible through
+journey benefits. The pinned German Anwohnerparkausweis browser composition
+verifies stable product labels, technical escape, keyboard access and WCAG
+conformance. Authorized global and technical routes remain visible through
 their dedicated shell entry or **All available tools**.

 ## Quick Access Boundary
@@ -166,9 +174,10 @@ areas, and users may personalize them within Policy ceilings. An empty area is
 omitted. An area with one destination may open it directly. A multi-destination
 area provides a useful work/recent/action surface rather than another menu.

-Familiar product nouns such as Calendar, Mail or Files may remain directly
-pinned. The objective is not to hide every module name; it is to prevent
-repository topology from determining a person's workflow.
+Familiar product nouns such as Calendar or Files remain direct product
+destinations. The objective is not to hide every implementation name from
+administrators; it is to prevent repository topology from determining a
+person's workflow.

 The initial module classification is deliberately outcome-oriented:

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ Every other active module requires a reviewed explanation of why it owns no
 persistent subject-data store. Adding a migration invalidates that explanation.

 - Active modules: 72
- Registered and documented DSAR providers: 48
- Reviewed no-store rationales: 24
+- Registered and documented DSAR providers: 49
+- Reviewed no-store rationales: 23
 - Unexplained coverage gaps: 0

 | Module | Repository | Persistence | Coverage | Rationale |
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ persistent subject-data store. Adding a migration invalidates that explanation.
 | `soap` | `govoplan-soap` | No module migration | Reviewed no-store rationale | Transport-only module: SOAP binds explicitly published operations and owns no domain or subject-data store. |
 | `tasks` | `govoplan-tasks` | Migration-owned | Provider | Provider `privacy.dsar.tasks` is registered and documented. |
 | `templates` | `govoplan-templates` | Migration-owned | Provider | Provider `privacy.dsar.templates` is registered and documented. |
-| `tenancy` | `govoplan-tenancy` | No module migration | Reviewed no-store rationale | Orchestration module: tenant lifecycle and settings use Core-owned storage; Access covers account and membership subject data. |
+| `tenancy` | `govoplan-tenancy` | Migration-owned | Provider | Provider `privacy.dsar.tenancy` is registered and documented. |
 | `tickets` | `govoplan-tickets` | Migration-owned | Provider | Provider `privacy.dsar.tickets` is registered and documented. |
 | `transparency` | `govoplan-transparency` | No module migration | Reviewed no-store rationale | Contract-only module: requests, disclosure reviews, and publications are not persisted; reassess before adding a migration-owned store. |
 | `views` | `govoplan-views` | Migration-owned | Provider | Provider `privacy.dsar.views` is registered and documented. |
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+# Full registry candidates / Vollständige Registry-Kandidaten
+
+## Operator workflow (EN)
+
+The canonical `release-catalog.py full-registry` command takes `--package-set`,
+`--package-lock`, `--wheelhouse`, `--webui-packages`, `--output-dir`, and a
+configured `--catalog-signing-key`. Generate the package set with
+`generate-release-package-set.py --profile full` and download its exact artifacts
+with `resolve-package-artifacts.py`; do not substitute locally rebuilt wheels.
+The candidate compares the package set with the exact developer meta-package
+pins, checks archive bytes and package metadata against the lock, and synthesizes
+every entry from its immutable tagged manifest. Native package publication and
+its CI authority remain trusted: this verifies the published artifact identity,
+not independent reproducible-build equivalence to source.
+
+Pass `--selected-repository` once for each newly released repository, including
+Core when it changes. These selected units must have clean, version-aligned
+named branches whose HEAD equals the annotated local and remote release tag.
+Other full-profile packages retain their exact older annotated tags; a later
+workflow-only commit on `main` does not relabel those package contents or force
+a version bump. Every source fetch/push endpoint must match the registered
+origin, and all entries bind their source commit and annotated tag object.
+Git replacement objects, caller Git configuration, and executable-path
+redirection cannot substitute another tagged manifest tree.
+
+The fixed existing website catalog and keyring are authenticated before signing.
+An older catalog without a signed keyring hash can be migrated only through this
+complete rebuild, only when its signature verifies and its entire keyring
+exactly matches the configured known signers. No old entries or artifact hashes
+are reused. The new catalog signs the exact unchanged website keyring hash;
+key rotation remains a separate reviewed operation. Selective candidates still
+reject unpinned base keyrings. New candidate directories are private and
+exclusive: a retry must choose a new directory, not overwrite a reviewed one.
+
+Run these commands on the trusted host, with an operator-private source workspace
+and artifact directory. `RELEASE_PYTHON` must select its private environment and
+`RELEASE_NPM` an absolute npm executable with a trusted sibling Node 22 binary.
+In Flatpak, execute host commands through `flatpak-spawn --host`; sandbox and
+host UID mappings are not interchangeable. Do not weaken trust gates or change
+system-wide permissions.
+
+```sh
+# These paths identify previously prepared private operator resources.
+RELEASE_WORKSPACE=/path/to/private/workspace
+RELEASE_PYTHON="$RELEASE_WORKSPACE/govoplan/.host-venv/bin/python"
+RELEASE_NPM=/path/to/private/node22/bin/npm
+ARTIFACT_ROOT=/path/to/private/artifacts
+RELEASE_CANDIDATE=/path/to/private/new-candidate
+RELEASE_VERSION=0.1.45
+RELEASE_TOOLS="$RELEASE_WORKSPACE/govoplan/tools/release"
+
+umask 077
+"$RELEASE_PYTHON" "$RELEASE_TOOLS/generate-release-package-set.py" \
+  --version "$RELEASE_VERSION" --profile full \
+  --workspace "$RELEASE_WORKSPACE" --output "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/packages.json"
+PATH="$(dirname "$RELEASE_NPM"):/usr/bin:/bin" \
+  "$RELEASE_PYTHON" "$RELEASE_TOOLS/resolve-package-artifacts.py" \
+  --package-set "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/packages.json" \
+  --wheelhouse "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/wheels" \
+  --webui-packages "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/webui" \
+  --lock-output "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/artifacts.lock.json" \
+  --python "$RELEASE_PYTHON" --npm "$RELEASE_NPM"
+
+# Repeat --selected-repository for EVERY newly released unit, not just Core.
+"$RELEASE_PYTHON" "$RELEASE_TOOLS/release-catalog.py" full-registry \
+  --workspace-root "$RELEASE_WORKSPACE" \
+  --package-set "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/packages.json" \
+  --package-lock "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/artifacts.lock.json" \
+  --wheelhouse "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/wheels" --webui-packages "$ARTIFACT_ROOT/webui" \
+  --output-dir "$RELEASE_CANDIDATE" --selected-repository govoplan-core \
+  --catalog-signing-key known-key=/path/to/private/known-key.pem --json
+
+"$RELEASE_PYTHON" "$RELEASE_TOOLS/release-catalog.py" publish-candidate \
+  --workspace-root "$RELEASE_WORKSPACE" --candidate-dir "$RELEASE_CANDIDATE" \
+  --channel stable --npm "$RELEASE_NPM" --build-web \
+  --commit --tag --push --tag-name "catalog-v$RELEASE_VERSION" --json
+```
+
+The last command is a strict non-mutating preview because `--apply` is absent.
+Review its output, then repeat it with `--apply` to publish. The website's locked
+build dependencies must already be installed before `--build-web`. The publisher
+sanitizes the build and Git environments and pushes the verified immutable
+website commit/tag. Source tag publication and registry package availability
+must be complete before candidate generation.
+
+Source tags, registry packages, and a signed module catalog do not imply that a
+new runtime distribution exists. While runtime images are held, leave the Meta
+Gitea runtime Release held too: a normal source-only Release can replace Gitea's
+`releases/latest` discovery result despite having no deployment assets. The
+deployer still requires an explicit signed manifest, digest, and trusted
+keyring; it does not deploy a tag or module catalog directly.
+
+## Betriebsablauf (DE)
+
+`release-catalog.py full-registry` übernimmt den vollständigen Paketbestand,
+die Registry-Sperrdatei, das Wheel-Verzeichnis, die WebUI-Archive und den
+konfigurierten Signaturschlüssel. Zuerst mit
+`generate-release-package-set.py --profile full` die exakten Meta-Paketversionen
+ermitteln und mit `resolve-package-artifacts.py` die veröffentlichten Artefakte
+herunterladen. Lokal neu gebaute Wheels sind kein Ersatz. Der Kandidat prüft
+Paketidentitäten, Dateigrößen und Hashes und erzeugt alle Einträge aus den
+unveränderlichen getaggten Manifesten. Die Registry und ihre veröffentlichende
+CI bleiben eine Vertrauensgrundlage; dies ist kein unabhängiger Nachweis eines
+reproduzierbaren Builds aus dem Quellcode.
+
+Jedes neu veröffentlichte Repository wird mit `--selected-repository`
+angegeben. Nur diese Auswahl muss mit dem sauberen, versionsgleichen HEAD eines
+benannten Branches und dem annotierten lokalen und entfernten Tag übereinstimmen.
+Unveränderte Pakete behalten ihren ursprünglichen Tag, auch wenn auf `main`
+bereits eine spätere Workflow-Korrektur liegt. Alle Quelladressen müssen dem
+registrierten Ursprung entsprechen; Commit und annotiertes Tag-Objekt werden
+für jeden Eintrag gebunden. Git-Ersetzungsobjekte oder fremde Git-Konfiguration
+können dabei keinen anderen Manifestbaum unterschieben.
+
+Vor dem Signieren werden der bestehende Website-Katalog und sein Schlüsselbund
+geprüft. Ein alter Katalog ohne signierten Schlüsselbund-Hash darf ausschließlich
+durch diesen vollständigen Neuaufbau migriert werden: Seine Signatur muss gültig
+sein und der gesamte Schlüsselbund exakt den konfigurierten bekannten Signierern
+entsprechen. Alte Einträge oder Artefakt-Hashes werden nicht übernommen. Der neue
+Katalog bindet den unveränderten Schlüsselbund-Hash; ein Schlüsselwechsel bleibt
+ein eigener geprüfter Vorgang. Selektive Kandidaten verlangen weiterhin einen
+bereits gebundenen Schlüsselbund. Kandidaten werden nur in neuen privaten
+Verzeichnissen erzeugt und niemals überschrieben.
+
+Das obige Befehlsbeispiel wird auf dem vertrauenswürdigen Host ausgeführt. Dafür
+die private Python-Umgebung und einen absoluten `--npm`-Pfad zu Node 22 verwenden;
+unter Flatpak die Host-Werkzeuge über `flatpak-spawn --host` aufrufen. Die
+gesperrten Website-Build-Abhängigkeiten vorher installieren. Keine
+Vertrauensprüfung umgehen und keine globalen Rechte ändern. Die Artefaktordner
+müssen privat und bei der Auflösung leer sein. Vor der Kandidatenerzeugung
+müssen Quell-Tags und Registry-Pakete vollständig veröffentlicht sein.
+
+Die Veröffentlichung zunächst mit `publish-candidate --commit --tag --push
+--build-web` ohne `--apply` prüfen und erst nach Prüfung mit `--apply` ausführen.
+Solange Laufzeit-Images zurückgestellt sind, bleibt auch das Meta-Gitea-Runtime-
+Release zurückgestellt: Ein reines Quellcode-Release könnte sonst als neuestes
+Release erscheinen. Eine Installation benötigt weiterhin ein signiertes
+Laufzeitmanifest, dessen Digest und einen explizit vertrauenswürdigen Schlüsselbund.
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ The private installation directory contains:
 | `plan.json` | Latest desired-state diff and readiness findings |
 | `receipt.json` | Last successfully applied immutable identities |
 | `infrastructure-capabilities.json` | Deterministic non-secret capability states, endpoint metadata, secret references, consumers, and resumable post-install tasks |
+| `infrastructure-dependency-inventory.json` | Owner-only, short-lived Ops evidence of actual module-owned configuration and data that depend on infrastructure capabilities |
 | `distribution-manifest.json` | Canonical signed runtime/image selection adopted by the installer |
 | `distribution-keyring.json` | Explicitly installed public trust anchor for runtime releases |
 | `backup-evidence.json` | Signed provider-neutral coordinated backup and isolated-restore receipt |
@@ -123,6 +124,16 @@ environment or initiating an implicit object migration. Invalid receipts fail
 closed, while a deployment without a mounted receipt continues to run but
 cannot apply receipt-bound configuration fragments.

+Enabled modules may also register a Core infrastructure-dependency provider.
+The authorized Ops endpoint aggregates those providers without importing their
+tables. Mail reports persisted SMTP endpoints, credential-binding counts and
+legacy profiles; Files reports its runtime storage binding plus persisted blob
+counts and byte totals grouped by backend. Ops reports the active PostgreSQL,
+Redis coordination, ingress, and load-balancing runtime bindings. Provider output contains stable
+references, bounded numeric metrics and required migration actions, never
+credentials, endpoint secrets, tenant identifiers or file keys. A provider
+failure makes the entire inventory incomplete.
+
 Build the same dependency-free tool as one downloadable artifact:

 ```sh
@@ -424,10 +435,16 @@ infrastructure capability projections.

 - Adding a managed component creates its service and persistent volume.
 - Removing a component removes its service container on apply.
- Replacing or removing a capability adds a review action that names the prior
-  and desired state/source plus declared module consumers. This does not claim
-  that the deployer can inspect module-owned database configuration; the
-  operator must review that inventory before apply.
+- Reconfiguring, replacing or removing a capability adds a review action that
+  names the prior and desired state/source, declared consumers, actual
+  provider-reported dependency records and each required migration action.
+- The deployer blocks that change when provider inventory is missing,
+  incomplete, more than five minutes old, from another installation, timestamped
+  in the future, or does not cover every impacted capability. It never treats
+  installer-declared consumers as proof that persisted module state is absent.
+- The inventory reports impact; it does not migrate or delete module-owned
+  configuration or data. Complete the reported preparation and collect again
+  immediately before apply.
 - Volumes are retained by default; deleting data requires a separate,
  deliberately destructive workflow.
 - Existing generated credentials are retained unless an explicit future rotate
@@ -455,6 +472,29 @@ dedicated ConfigMap and read-only file mount. Ops validates the bounded schema
 before displaying configured, externally supplied, available-unconfigured, or
 unavailable states and any pending post-install tasks.

+Collect current dependency evidence with an API key whose principal has one of
+the Ops read scopes:
+
+```sh
+export GOVOPLAN_OPS_API_KEY='<short-lived operator API key>'
+python3 govoplan-deploy.pyz collect-infrastructure-inventory \
+  --directory /srv/govoplan/example
+python3 govoplan-deploy.pyz doctor \
+  --directory /srv/govoplan/example
+python3 govoplan-deploy.pyz apply \
+  --directory /srv/govoplan/example
+unset GOVOPLAN_OPS_API_KEY
+```
+
+The command defaults to
+`<public-url>/api/v1/ops/infrastructure/dependencies`; `--ops-url` may select an
+explicit HTTPS endpoint (plain HTTP is accepted only on loopback). `apply`
+refreshes the inventory automatically when `GOVOPLAN_OPS_API_KEY` is present.
+Otherwise an already collected, current inventory may be used. The API key is
+sent only as `X-API-Key`, is never written to the bundle, and the inventory file
+is owner-readable only. Because it contains operational references and counts,
+handle it as private evidence even though it contains no secret material.
+
 Every apply operation is journalled before image pulls or runtime mutation. A
 failure before migration may restore a verified previous bundle. Once migration
 starts, recovery is forward-only unless an independently verified database
@@ -86,6 +86,16 @@ contract. The coordinated release synchronizes `peerDependencies` and
 tag, then synchronizes each lockfile root from the final package metadata. A
 distinct root package remains independent.

+Every module referenced by Core's Git-based `package.release.json` must expose
+its WebUI identity at the repository root, including matching peer requirements
+and `webui/`-prefixed entry exports (also CSS subpaths). npm resolves Git
+dependencies from the repository root, while the native-package workflow packs
+`webui/`; success in one path does not verify the other. Run
+`python tools/checks/check-webui-package-facades.py` after changing either
+manifest or the release composition. The focused gate also runs this check.
+Adding or correcting a facade in an already published repository requires a
+new patch tag; never repair an existing immutable tag in place.
+
 It builds one wheel and, where applicable, one npm tarball. The workflow records
 the source tag, source commit, filename, size, and SHA-256 in
 `package-artifacts.json` before publishing. Gitea rejects a second upload of the
@@ -179,8 +189,13 @@ than invoking `pip`, `npm`, or Git on the target host.

 ## Public module directory

-`tools/release/publish-release-catalog.sh` resolves the selected package set and
-registry lock before it creates a catalog. Catalog entries are synthesized from
+For an operator-reviewed full publication, use
+`tools/release/release-catalog.py full-registry` followed by the same tool's
+`publish-candidate` command. Resolve the package set and registry lock first;
+the older direct-write shell wrapper is not the strict candidate publication
+path. See [Full registry candidates / Vollständige Registry-Kandidaten](FULL_REGISTRY_CANDIDATES.md)
+for the private host runtime, exact artifact checks, and legacy keyring transition.
+Catalog entries are synthesized from
 the exact tagged module manifests, never from a hand-maintained module list or
 the current workspace. Each entry binds its Python wheel and optional WebUI
 tarball to the registry URL, filename, size, SHA-256, package identity, source
@@ -58,6 +58,45 @@ checkouts remain usable for read-only planning, but every durable executor
 fails closed there; clone the registered origins into a private workspace
 before releasing.

+For a host with a confirmed IPv6 connection timeout, set
+`GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY=inet` only for the release-tool invocation.
+When unset, the original SSH command is preserved, including the trusted
+operator's per-host `AddressFamily` configuration (normally `any`). Explicit
+values accepted by the shared source/tag Git helper are exactly `any`, `inet`
+(IPv4 only), and `inet6` (IPv6 only). Empty, misspelled, whitespace-padded, or
+injected values fail before Git starts. The selector only adds the corresponding
+fixed SSH `AddressFamily` option: it does not change DNS, host-key verification,
+the registered remote, authentication, `BatchMode=yes`, or `ConnectTimeout=8`.
+Arbitrary `GIT_SSH_COMMAND` overrides remain ignored. For example, start a
+single local console invocation with:
+
+```sh
+GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY=inet \
+  ./.venv/bin/python tools/release/release-console.py
+```
+
+The same process-scoped setting applies to canonical source/tag readbacks and
+registry-candidate source verification. Under Flatpak, pass it explicitly to
+the host invocation with `flatpak-spawn --host /usr/bin/env
+GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY=inet ...`. It is not a global SSH setting
+and does not affect the website publisher's separate transport sanitizer, npm,
+or HTTP downloads. An IPv4-only setting cannot reach IPv6-only hosts; omit it
+or use `any` when the diagnosed restriction no longer applies.
+
+Deutsch: Bei einem bestätigten IPv6-Verbindungs-Timeout kann für genau einen
+Release-Werkzeugaufruf `GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY=inet` gesetzt werden.
+Ohne diese Variable bleibt der bisherige SSH-Befehl einschließlich der
+vertrauenswürdigen Host-Konfiguration unverändert (normalerweise `any`).
+Explizit zulässig sind ausschließlich `any`, `inet` (nur IPv4) und `inet6`
+(nur IPv6). Andere oder leere Werte werden vor dem Git-Aufruf abgewiesen.
+DNS, Hostschlüsselprüfung, registrierte Quelladresse, Authentifizierung und
+Zeitlimit bleiben unverändert; frei vorgegebene SSH-Befehle bleiben gesperrt.
+Unter Flatpak die Variable ausdrücklich an den Host-Aufruf übergeben. Die
+Auswahl gilt für den gemeinsamen Git-Helfer der Quell-/Tag-Prüfungen, nicht
+für den separaten Website-Publisher, npm oder HTTP-Downloads. Sie ändert keine
+globale Konfiguration. Nach Behebung des Netzwerkproblems die Variable
+weglassen oder auf `any` setzen; IPv4-only erreicht keine IPv6-only-Ziele.
+
 The runtime itself is part of the authority boundary. Durable run creation
 verifies the meta checkout, release/check tooling, repository registry, Python
 environment, loaded `govoplan_core` and cryptography packages, and Git/SSH
@@ -221,6 +260,9 @@ Repository capabilities are frozen into each plan unit (`python-package`,
 `core-release-bundle`, and the universal `git-source`) and determine which
 steps appear. Internally aligned version changes are rendered deterministically
 from recognized TOML, JSON, lockfile, manifest, and package declarations.
+The manifest may use a literal version or a top-level literal `MODULE_VERSION`;
+the latter is updated without rewriting independently versioned interfaces.
+Computed or missing version declarations fail before any metadata is written.
 Pre-existing dirty worktrees remain visible but have no commit executor; the
 console never absorbs unrelated operator changes.

@@ -232,6 +274,17 @@ runs a receipt-bound alignment gate before exposing any atomic branch/tag push.
 A failed step stops later steps while preserving prior receipts for explicit
 retry or reconciliation.

+Local module candidate creation deliberately does not require those candidates
+to be resolved already in Core's release lock: their annotated tags are inputs
+to the next lock-generation step. The internal tag helper applies this ordering
+only when no Core repository is selected and remote publication is disabled.
+Module version/lock consistency, manifest validity, clean/non-behind worktrees,
+and local/remote tag immutability checks still apply. Core candidate tagging
+continues to validate its own complete bundle, and every remote-publication
+preview and execution requires the selected modules to match Core's release
+input and resolved lock. A local candidate is therefore not publication
+approval; a stale Core lock blocks publication without changing remote refs.
+
 The browser likewise retains the request identifier for an uncertain
 resume/retry/reconciliation response and replays it after reload. A successful
 replay selects the returned run state. Transport and server failures retain the
@@ -503,6 +556,15 @@ tree and requires byte-for-byte equality with those validated objects. Tags and
 remote branch updates then reference that exact commit SHA rather than the
 mutable worktree `HEAD`.

+For a full registry-backed release, first build a fresh private candidate using
+`release-catalog.py full-registry`. Pass `--selected-repository` for newly
+released HEAD-bound units, not every unchanged package in the full profile.
+The command independently checks all full-profile registry bytes and annotated
+tag provenance, then feeds this same strict `publish-candidate` transaction.
+It does not create Gitea runtime Releases or dispatch image builds. See
+[Full registry candidates / Vollständige Registry-Kandidaten](FULL_REGISTRY_CANDIDATES.md)
+for the complete EN/DE workflow and the narrowly scoped legacy keyring transition.
+
 Published channels are expected below the public catalog base URL:

 - `https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/catalogs/v1/channels/stable.json`
@@ -515,8 +577,9 @@ updated catalog, and keep the published keyring healthy.

 When a selected module exposes a WebUI package, its requested version must also
 match Core's `webui/package.release.json` input and the resolved
-`package-lock.release.json` entry. The source-tag preflight, selective plan, and
-catalog-candidate writer all enforce this composition boundary. Pins for modules
+`package-lock.release.json` entry. The source-publication preflight, selective
+plan, and catalog-candidate writer all enforce this composition boundary;
+module-only local candidate tags use the staged order described above. Pins for modules
 that are not part of the selective release remain unchanged.

 Release integration also enforces repository and composition version alignment
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# GovOPlaN 0.1.45 — usability, reliability and security hardening
+
+Release coordination: [GovOPlaN #51](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/51).
+The exact independently versioned composition is recorded in
+`packages/govoplan-meta/pyproject.toml`; unchanged modules retain their versions.
+This source release does not by itself establish a deployed or independently
+approved production environment. Package, signed catalog and runtime publication
+results are recorded separately in the coordination issue.
+
+## Runtime publication hold
+
+The [runtime image audit](../security/RUNTIME_IMAGE_AUDIT_2026-09-08.md) completed
+eleven registry-only amd64 scans, but found unresolved vulnerabilities and
+inventory gaps. Runtime publication remains held separately from this source
+release. Patch-only image updates are insufficient; maintained minor-line
+changes, narrowly evidenced finding decisions, arm64/final-layer scans and
+deployment checks remain necessary. No audited candidate was automatically
+adopted and no image was executed during those scans.
+The remaining gates are tracked in
+[GovOPlaN #52](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/52).
+
+## Included changes
+
+- Shared page/action placement, reusable navigation grouping/editing, table and
+  dialog sizing, field alignment, multi-select filters and predictable tree
+  selection. Files, Mail, Search, Notifications and domain pages use the same
+  contracts, with browser regression coverage.
+- Campaign draft saving and independent Mail/ZIP-policy repair, persistent and
+  bulk message review, clearer delivery eligibility, bounded configurable
+  synchronous delivery, guarded workerless recovery, lightweight SMTP/IMAP
+  progress, reused IMAP connections and recipient-complete reporting.
+- Files archive staging/reuse, unpacking previously uploaded archives, numeric
+  progress and bounded traversal. Optional native archive acceleration retains
+  the same validation rules; portable fallbacks remain available.
+- Mail credential references and IMAP folder-name decoding; help topics can be
+  found by area and tags without expanding every occurrence of the same topic.
+- Authentication provenance/scope and browser-cache hardening, patched rich-text
+  dependencies, spreadsheet/archive/template/Dataflow resource limits, batched
+  Docs/Notifications queries and safe Reporting bind names. See the
+  [security/performance review](../security/SECURITY_PERFORMANCE_REVIEW_2026-09-08.md)
+  for measurements, test evidence and remaining limitations.
+- A deterministic governance-journey clock fixture, fresh-process Campaign
+  import coverage, and a new Cases patch aligning its root npm facade with its
+  Python/WebUI package. Historical published tags are not rewritten.
+- Git-root WebUI package facades are aligned with their owning packages, with
+  a cross-composition parity check. Tasks is included in default module
+  discovery; it remains subject to enabled modules and normal permissions.
+
+## Upgrade and verification
+
+Back up the database and file storage before upgrading. Apply the complete
+selected migration graph before starting the new API/workers. This release
+includes additive repair migrations `c58a2d7e9f10` (Core ownership history) and
+`d8f1b4e7a0c3` (Access external-function mappings), plus Campaign delivery-state
+migrations. Existing business evidence is retained; a schema downgrade is not
+a substitute for a reviewed backup/restore plan. Restart API and worker
+processes together after upgrading their matching packages.
+
+Updated UI consumers require Core 0.1.45 where they use its new shared contracts.
+Tenant keys that previously relied on unintended system permissions/wildcards
+must be corrected; the release does not preserve that unsafe behavior. Extremely
+sparse spreadsheets, oversized generated output and excessive archive paths
+can now fail early with a diagnostic.
+
+For archive staging across multiple hosts, provide shared POSIX storage with
+working locks or sticky routing. Background delivery still needs configured
+workers; increasing the synchronous limit does not create a worker or guarantee
+delivery after a process failure. An unknown SMTP outcome must be reconciled,
+not automatically resent.
+
+After deployment, manually verify login/logout and least-privilege API keys,
+Campaign Settings and independent Mail/ZIP saves, archive upload/unpack,
+recipient-complete reports, and SMTP/IMAP progress with an explicitly approved
+test mailbox. No release verification sends real campaign mail automatically.
+
+Hard process isolation, forced-password-change/recovery enforcement, bounded
+Xrechnung subprocess output and large-history pagination remain separate open
+issues. This release is not a claim that all security or performance debt is
+resolved. Production-image scans and multi-host evidence must refer to the
+actual signed runtime being deployed.
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+# Runtime image candidate audit — 8 September 2026
+
+Release coordination: [GovOPlaN #51](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/51).
+Canonical remediation: [GovOPlaN #52](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/52).
+This follow-up to the [source security/performance review](SECURITY_PERFORMANCE_REVIEW_2026-09-08.md)
+records registry-only scans of nine proposed runtime dependencies and two
+same-minor patch candidates. **Runtime publication is held:** patch-only updates
+do not resolve the baseline. Source/package publication is a separate outcome.
+No images were executed, rebuilt, selected for CI, or published by this audit.
+
+## Method and reproducible evidence
+
+Official Trivy **0.74.0** was installed only in a private local task directory,
+without sudo or Docker access. Its Linux-64bit release archive matched both the
+official checksums file and GitHub release asset metadata:
+
+- Archive SHA256: `2ae6fe3ee734b7fdf11335663e18c75ea12dccc76062f09f164a3b0f8be4371a`.
+- Checksums-file SHA256: `bc701c3c3ee8b9acbea2c23257e41381e3854888f51281616a6ba5dc96963821`.
+- Vulnerability database schema 2, updated `2026-09-07T19:06:01.154199452Z`,
+  downloaded from `mirror.gcr.io/aquasec/trivy-db:2`.
+- Scan flags: `--image-src remote --platform linux/amd64 --scanners vuln
+  --format json --no-progress --timeout 8m --max-image-size 2GB --exit-code 0`.
+  Findings were counted from validated JSON; exit zero did not mean clean.
+- Existing Docker credentials were not read; no private keys or secrets were
+  used. Checksums over official HTTPS metadata were verified, not independent
+  Sigstore signatures. See the [official release](https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/tag/v0.74.0)
+  and [registry-only scan documentation](https://trivy.dev/docs/latest/target/container_image/).
+
+Raw evidence is retained locally, not committed:
+`/home/zemion/.cache/govoplan-trivy-remote.yKZgjDOg/scan/`.
+It contains eleven `reports/*-amd64.json` reports/logs, scanner scripts,
+`patch-candidate-inspection.json`, exact successor registry indices, and
+`evidence-checksums.json`. Summary SHA256 values:
+
+- `summary.json`: `f2785a731d637452ab9c0b1f5399772c0f8828a63ca83d5fa7496abdad1c757a`.
+- `patch-summary.json`: `b3fc6273fcdad98864040ccdf3477ecf379afd46e9f94444b1f2910f48c1d85b`.
+
+All eleven executions succeeded without timeout/rate-limit failure. Initial
+summary fields distinguish `scan_execution_complete: true` from
+`coverage_complete: false`: Garage has no detectable package inventory.
+Checksums preserve evidence identity, not indefinite storage availability.
+
+## Exact requested pins and results
+
+All references below use `docker.io/`. Counts are package-vulnerability records,
+not distinct CVEs or confirmed exploitable application defects. A vulnerability
+can appear against several installed packages. Unfixed/unknown records remain.
+
+| Image tag | Exact index SHA256 | Critical / High / Medium / Low / Unknown | Fixable C/H |
+| --- | --- | --- | ---: |
+| `library/python:3.12-slim-bookworm` | `782412e85d0f0984994c290652577d4018aff08145c85b262bb63dc0c7522254` | 5 / 55 / 102 / 103 / 5 | 0 |
+| `library/postgres:16-alpine` | `cf78e76683b9ca8c5733cbbdce6c9262b45b6767934dd0a95e671f9a0fc20685` | 1 / 30 / 28 / 14 / 1 | 31 |
+| `library/redis:7-alpine` | `ff02b58f971e7d7d156a1267e283fcbbeee91773b6aa36c49dac28ecfe28eadf` | 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 | 0 |
+| `nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged:1.29-alpine` | `0c79d56aee561a1d81c63f00eee5fb5fe29279560cdc55e91425133104c7fbe6` | 0 / 33 / 74 / 37 / 20 | 33 |
+| `library/haproxy:3.2.21-alpine` | `66e25cc9a8332635f4e897f7f4b1e5622c25f09f0ee23cddc6ce9bdb3a24772a` | 0 / 2 / 6 / 12 / 0 | 2 |
+| `library/caddy:2.10.2-alpine` | `4c6e91c6ed0e2fa03efd5b44747b625fec79bc9cd06ac5235a779726618e530d` | 7 / 75 / 67 / 37 / 4 | 82 |
+| `dxflrs/garage:v2.3.0` | `866bd13ed2038ba7e7190e840482bc27234c4afaf77be8cfa439ae088c1e4690` | **Unknown: no inventory** | — |
+| `greenmail/standalone:2.1.9` | `3ac5a83dd6727cf95e4d50e18907fb8ee7bbf5f67e8534714dee2fb1b5b2e1d4` | 0 / 0 / 116 / 35 / 0 | 0 |
+| `tonistiigi/binfmt:qemu-v10.2.3-68` | `400a4873b838d1b89194d982c45e5fb3cda4593fbfd7e08a02e76b03b21166f0` | 0 / 9 / 2 / 1 / 1 | 9 |
+
+## Patch-only options and limits
+
+Complete publisher tag listings were inspected for nginx 1.29, Caddy 2.10,
+HAProxy 3.2, GreenMail 2.1 and binfmt qemu10.2. Two newer candidates were
+scanned; their registry index bytes matched both registry and publisher digests,
+and contained amd64 and arm64 manifests:
+
+- `library/haproxy:3.2.23-alpine@sha256:6343ce34a132a5dceaa24767d739df2bd519f8f7c1079ae39e4821334e8eb42e`:
+  same Alpine 3.24.1, 24 detected OS packages, zero reported findings. This is
+  a useful candidate, not a completed compatibility test or application audit.
+- `greenmail/standalone:2.1.13@sha256:3df66b7edd01c8a301343ca5e3601d8674760d4708655573560c24745e624fb2`:
+  upstream changes Ubuntu 22.04 to Debian 13.6; **3 C / 80 H / 98 M / 85 L /
+  5 unknown**, 30 fixable C/H records. Not selected as a no-base-change update.
+- nginx's newest matching Alpine patch is already 1.29.8 at the scanned pin;
+  Caddy 2.10 remains 2.10.2; binfmt qemu10.2 remains 10.2.3-68. No newer matching
+  publisher images were found. The current [official Caddy image catalogue](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/docker-library/official-images/master/library/caddy)
+  uses 2.11.4; switching minor lines requires new scans and compatibility checks.
+
+Priority remediation: Caddy's own seven HIGH records require fixes through
+2.11.4, with additional bundled Go/library fixes that must be re-scanned;
+nginx's packages include curl/libcurl fixes through 8.22.0-r0, OpenSSL 3.5.8-r0,
+c-ares 1.34.8-r0, expat 2.8.1-r0 and libuuid 2.41.6-r1. PostgreSQL's OS records
+require OpenSSL 3.5.8-r0 and libuuid 2.42.3-r1; its CRITICAL plus 21 HIGH Go
+records concern the **gosu helper**, not PostgreSQL server code. binfmt's nine
+HIGH records concern its Go 1.26.4 build, with fixes through 1.26.6. Package
+presence does not establish vulnerable-symbol reachability. No unscanned tag
+is claimed to meet every fix requirement.
+
+## Python triage and coverage caveats
+
+Python image metadata identifies CPython 3.12.14, but Trivy inventories only
+Debian packages and pip, **not CPython/stdlib**. All 60 C/H records concern
+Debian packages: 21 CVEs, 50 `affected` records, 9 `fix_deferred`, 1
+`will_not_fix`, without a recorded fixed Bookworm version. Five util-linux CVEs
+repeat across eight binary packages. These remain installed; they are not all
+removed build dependencies. Pip 25.0.1 separately has five MEDIUM/one LOW
+records, with fixes through 26.2.0; it is install tooling, and the API image uses
+an offline `--no-index` wheelhouse rather than an arbitrary package index.
+
+Narrow triage examples, **not blanket exemptions**:
+
+- Debian states [CVE-2023-45853](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-45853)
+  does not affect the built Bookworm zlib binaries because vulnerable minizip
+  code is not included. Other bundled minizip implementations are separate.
+- [CVE-2026-8376](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-8376)
+  explicitly requires 32-bit Perl; this scan targets amd64.
+- [CVE-2025-7458](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-7458)
+  requires crafted arbitrary SQLite SQL; the managed runtime uses PostgreSQL,
+  but alternate SQLite use must be reviewed.
+- Perl's regex and Archive::Tar records need exact binary/module applicability
+  checks; vendor-deferred status alone is not a finding dismissal.
+
+Only amd64 was scanned. arm64, newly built GovOPlaN API/Web layers and optional
+dependency combinations remain unverified. Garage has no inventory; Redis,
+HAProxy and PostgreSQL source-built executables, CPython and QEMU static
+binaries need supplemental SBOM/source coverage. Zero detected OS findings is
+not zero application vulnerabilities. Trivy also lacks Alpine 3.24 EOL metadata
+and nginx CVE-2026-80256 detail; unknowns are retained. There were no runtime,
+exploitability, secret, misconfiguration, malware or signature-policy checks.
+
+Before lifting the runtime hold: approve and test maintained image-line changes
+where necessary, fix or narrowly disposition findings with evidence, close
+inventory gaps, scan both architectures and final runtime layers, then run
+deployment/ingress smoke checks. Do not silently change base OS, use unpinned
+`latest`, rebuild third-party images, or accept all HIGH/CRITICAL findings.
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+# Security and performance review — 8 September 2026
+
+Coordinated status: [Core #296](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/296).
+This records a workspace-wide automated scan, targeted manual boundary review,
+and a verified implementation pass. It is not a penetration test, an exhaustive
+line-by-line review, or a security certification. The audit was completed on
+local, unpublished changes, preserving existing worktree changes. Subsequent
+release preparation/publication is tracked in
+[GovOPlaN #51](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/51) and the
+[0.1.45 release notes](../releases/0.1.45.md).
+
+## Implemented findings
+
+| Area | Finding and change | Evidence / ownership |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Authentication — high | Preserve service-account provenance and current scope ceilings instead of recalculating them as ordinary membership permissions. Tenant API keys cannot retain canonical system permissions or unsafe wildcard grants. | Previously failing isolated regressions; [Access #21](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access/issues/21). |
+| Authentication — medium | Warm-cache API keys must follow the same explicit-header credential rules as cold authentication. A session cookie cannot turn an API key into a session credential. | Regression covering source-dependent authentication. |
+| Browser authority/cache — medium | Clear reusable data on auth changes and write settlement; fence late 200/304 writes and obsolete 401 side effects. Honor server no-store/no-cache and explicit fresh-read requests. Interactive login/logout remove retained automation keys that could shadow cookie-session identity. | 23 real-client regressions. Unchanged settings keep their object identity, preventing profile-fetch loops. Core `docs/API_CLIENT_CACHE_CONTRACT.md`; owning Access EN/DE session/field documentation. |
+| Spreadsheet resource exhaustion | Validate actual XLSX coordinates before openpyxl traversal; ignore misleading declared dimensions; count blank row gaps toward the existing limits. | [Connectors #18](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-connectors/issues/18), 13 tests and 2 subtests. |
+| Template resource exhaustion | Enforce the existing 5 MiB output budget during substitution and item construction, including UTF-8, HTML escaping and separators. | [Templates #7](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-templates/issues/7), full 20 tests; independent 3,000-case valid-output comparison. |
+| Archive resource exhaustion | Inspect regular TAR member limits before traversing payloads. Limit archive paths to 4,096 UTF-8 bytes / 128 components and count derived directories against entry limits. | [Files #46](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files/issues/46), 55 archive and 15 documentation tests. Extension-header decoding still needs stronger isolation. |
+| Dataflow resource exhaustion | Reject LPAD/RPAD target lengths above the existing 1,000,000-byte preview budget before fill evaluation/allocation. Preserve final serialized-byte checks. | [Dataflow #22](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dataflow/issues/22), full 104 tests and 39 subtests; 7 new guard tests independently rerun. |
+| Docs performance / defense in depth | Batch revision reads per request, avoid loading pending draft bodies for readers, and validate tenant/entry/publication consistency while retaining owner/audience checks. | [Docs #22](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs/issues/22), full 39 tests. |
+| Notifications performance / defense in depth | Batch delivery-attempt loading while preserving recipient checks and rejecting inconsistent attempt references, including already-loaded relationships. | [Notifications #6](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-notifications/issues/6), full 23 tests. |
+| Session-list performance | Apply active/expiry predicates and the existing 100-row cap in SQL, before loading session history. | Query-shape regression in Access. |
+| Reporting correctness | Use structural bind-name suffixes for recursive calculated measures, preserving valid dotted/hyphenated public keys and parameter uniqueness. | [Reporting #10](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-reporting/issues/10), full 29 tests. |
+| Audit hygiene | Redact Gitleaks logs and machine reports on current, history and legacy scanner paths. | 13 audit-wrapper tests enforce the flag. |
+
+All changed module workflows/limits have owning EN/DE DocumentationTopic updates.
+Independent review found no concrete regression in the backend changes.
+
+## Measured performance changes
+
+These are SQL-query counts in isolated 40-item fixtures, not production latency
+or throughput claims. Authorization is still evaluated for each request.
+
+| Projection | Before | After |
+| --- | ---: | ---: |
+| Docs reader entries | 41 SELECTs | 2 SELECTs |
+| Docs editor entries | 81 SELECTs | 2 SELECTs |
+| Notification list with attempts | 41 SELECTs | 2 SELECTs |
+
+The Docs 401-entry batching regression uses 3 SELECTs. Resource guards reject
+oversized work before the formerly expensive allocation/traversal. This does
+not make every legitimate upload or campaign faster. Honoring no-cache can
+increase server validation requests; ETags still avoid retransmitting unchanged
+bodies. That authorization/freshness trade-off is deliberate.
+
+The original audit snapshot measured 517,380 initial JavaScript bytes and
+164,119 gzip bytes. Release preparation's pure-defaults split reduces this to
+516,730 initial bytes and 163,908 gzip bytes. Restoring the missing Tasks
+descriptor then measures 516,987 initial / 163,976 gzip bytes with all 46 module
+descriptors lazy, within the unchanged 524,288 / 164,128 caps. The gzip margin is still small; future
+startup work should reduce eager dependencies, not raise the cap automatically.
+The full 209-case browser suite passed before the split, followed by 13 focused
+browser checks after it. Radon recorded 238 rank-D-or-higher entries; complexity
+is a review-priority signal, not a performance measurement.
+
+## Dependency remediation
+
+Core's full npm audit went from 30 affected package entries to zero. Most initial
+entries were transitive effects of the same Tiptap advisory, not 30 independent
+application exploits. The website went from two affected entries to zero; both
+Mail lockfiles also report zero.
+
+- Tiptap packages are aligned at 3.31.3, with direct minimum ranges raised to
+  3.30.4 in both development and release manifests, with a parity regression.
+  Added an actual installed-library prototype-attribute regression for
+  the [maintainer's security advisory](https://github.com/ueberdosis/tiptap/security/advisories/GHSA-cp6q-959q-f8rh).
+- Core now resolves xmldom 0.9.12, browserslist 4.28.9 and nanoid 3.3.18.
+  The website's affected browserslist/nanoid dependencies are patched too.
+- Development/audit requirements now require pip >=26.2; the local development
+  environment uses 26.2.1. The installed audit originally flagged
+  [CVE-2026-13346](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qwm4-qh6w-59xr), requiring an
+  attacker-controlled package index. This is an installation-tool vulnerability,
+  not evidence of an exposed application endpoint.
+
+The final installed Python audit enumerated 188 distributions: 137 were
+auditable with zero known vulnerabilities, and 51 local distributions were not
+available in PyPI. Those skips are covered by source review, not by a claim of
+dependency-advisory coverage. Production images and every optional dependency
+combination were not independently resolved or scanned.
+
+## Scan coverage and limitations
+
+Evidence directory:
+`/mnt/DATA/tmp/govoplan-security-performance-20260908-gsk8jn/`.
+
+The final `final-quick/manifest.json` captures 79 repositories, tool versions,
+start/end repository fingerprints, report checksums, 168 report artifacts and
+163 validated JSON/SARIF reports. It records an unchanged workspace, complete
+coverage for its four required scanners, no execution errors and no missing
+reports. It ran in report-only mode: exit zero does **not** mean zero warnings.
+
+- Final production Bandit: 447,008 Python lines; 67 warnings (63 low, 4 medium),
+  no high findings. Ruff security rules: 54 warnings. SQL-construction warnings
+  were reviewed against identifier/operator validation and bound values in
+  DuckDB/Reporting; no injection fix was warranted there. XML import warnings
+  were checked: feed/BPMN input parsing uses defusedxml; stdlib imports support
+  types/output construction. Operator-owned fenced-run argv is not a public
+  arbitrary-command endpoint. Xrechnung output buffering remains a follow-up.
+  Assertions and error-swallowing markers remain review/maintenance warnings,
+  not proof that all such code is harmless.
+- Final local Semgrep rules: no findings. The broader OWASP-rule pass applied
+  272 rules to 4,169 tracked targets. Its seven warnings recommended weakening
+  owner-only 0700 permissions; they were rejected as false positives. One
+  Calendar rule timeout was rerun with a 60-second budget: zero findings/errors.
+  Bash and conformance TypeScript checks passed despite two scanner-specific
+  parser limitations. Ignored/dependency/generated paths are not a complete
+  line-by-line source audit.
+- Gitleaks: 79 Git histories plus 79 worktrees, 158 redacted reports, zero
+  detected secrets. This does not establish that deployed credentials are safe
+  or that formerly exposed credentials have been rotated.
+- Tool versions included Semgrep 1.176.1, Bandit 1.9.4, Ruff 0.15.21 and
+  Gitleaks 8.30.1. The downloaded Gitleaks binary archive matched the official
+  release SHA-256 before execution.
+- The containerized full-toolbox path could not access Docker's daemon. Its
+  full-mode Trivy/misconfiguration and additional OSV scans were **not** run.
+  A subsequent [registry-only runtime image audit](RUNTIME_IMAGE_AUDIT_2026-09-08.md)
+  successfully scanned nine pinned candidates and two same-minor successors
+  for amd64 without Docker. It found unresolved vulnerabilities and inventory
+  gaps; runtime publication is held. This does not complete full-toolbox,
+  arm64, final-runtime-image or deployment coverage.
+
+No live application probes, database changes, file operations, mail sends,
+IMAP appends, imports, notification delivery, deployments, commits or pushes
+were performed. Browser tests used isolated mocked fixtures. Package installs,
+builds and temporary audit-tool installation were local development operations.
+
+## Verification and remaining work
+
+- 209/209 browser conformance tests pass; production Core/website builds,
+  conformance TypeScript, 24 Core client/dependency regressions, 4 real-client
+  Files reload checks, and 72/72 manifest checks pass.
+- Access's full 91-test suite passed before the final documentation-only update;
+  the final documentation suite passed all 4 tests. Other module counts appear
+  above. The new authentication/resource tests include demonstrated pre-fix
+  failures rather than only structural assertions.
+- The original focused workspace run stopped at the institutional
+  governance/Portal fixture (`tests/test_institutional_governance_journey.py:223`,
+  `IndexError`). Release preparation fixes its mixed clocks using the existing
+  temporal context, retaining validity-boundary exclusions; 7 journey tests and
+  ambient-year checks pass. Tracked in
+  [Meta #50](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/50).
+- Campaign's apparent host-path issue was ruled out by existing tracked
+  API/build/snapshot guards and 11 passing tests under normal initialization.
+  Release preparation fixes the standalone import cycle through a deferred
+  resolver import without changing validation rules. Fresh-process coverage,
+  all 11 path tests and Campaign's full 611-test suite pass.
+
+Next coordinated work:
+
+1. [Hard resource isolation — Core #297](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/297):
+   regex CPU, aggregate allocation, TAR extension metadata, bounded workers and
+   cancellation, followed by production-like concurrent load tests.
+2. [Forced password change/recovery — Access #22](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access/issues/22):
+   the current flag is advisory only. Do not enable enforcement without a usable
+   local-password/recovery flow and external-provider rules.
+3. [Bound subprocess output — Xrechnung #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-xrechnung/issues/2):
+   enforce the existing 2 MiB limit while draining stdout/stderr, not afterwards.
+4. [Workflow revision batching/history projection — Workflow Engine #3](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow-engine/issues/3):
+   batch evidence lookups; separately define explicit history pagination and
+   authorized-total semantics. Docs/notification history volumes also remain.
+5. Resolve the [runtime image audit](RUNTIME_IMAGE_AUDIT_2026-09-08.md) findings
+   tracked in [Meta #52](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/52)
+   and coverage gaps before lifting its publication hold; complete deployment
+   audits, review exposed development credentials and worker quotas, and
+   benchmark realistic tenant sizes/concurrency. The sanctions
+   transport's fixed HTTPS/redirect allowlist is not a demonstrated arbitrary-URL
+   issue, but migration to Core's pinned egress transport remains desirable.
+
+Operational compatibility: tenant keys relying on accidental system/wildcard
+permissions must be corrected rather than weakening the guard. Extreme sparse
+spreadsheets, overly deep/long archive paths and oversized padding intermediates
+can now fail early with diagnostics. No stored documents or configurations were
+deleted or silently migrated.
@@ -4,87 +4,87 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"

 [project]
 name = "govoplan"
-version = "0.1.41"
+version = "0.1.45"
 description = "Developer convenience package for a versioned GovOPlaN composition"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.12"
 license = { text = "AGPL-3.0-or-later" }
 dependencies = [
-  "govoplan-core[server]==0.1.41",
-  "govoplan-tenancy==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-organizations==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-identity==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-idm==0.1.24",
-  "govoplan-access==0.1.23",
-  "govoplan-admin==0.1.22",
-  "govoplan-policy==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-core[server]==0.1.45",
+  "govoplan-tenancy==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-organizations==0.1.21",
+  "govoplan-identity==0.1.21",
+  "govoplan-idm==0.1.25",
+  "govoplan-access==0.1.25",
+  "govoplan-admin==0.1.23",
+  "govoplan-policy==0.1.23",
  "govoplan-audit==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-dashboard==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-files==0.1.23",
-  "govoplan-mail==0.1.25",
-  "govoplan-campaign==0.1.27",
-  "govoplan-calendar==0.1.22",
-  "govoplan-docs==0.1.22",
-  "govoplan-ops==0.1.20",
+  "govoplan-files==0.1.26",
+  "govoplan-mail==0.1.27",
+  "govoplan-campaign==0.1.28",
+  "govoplan-calendar==0.1.23",
+  "govoplan-docs==0.1.23",
+  "govoplan-ops==0.1.22",
 ]

 [project.optional-dependencies]
 full = [
-  "govoplan-addresses==0.1.21",
-  "govoplan-approvals==0.1.20",
+  "govoplan-addresses==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-approvals==0.1.21",
  "govoplan-assets==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-booking==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-cases==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-cases==0.1.24",
  "govoplan-certificates==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-committee==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-connectors==0.1.25",
+  "govoplan-committee==0.1.21",
+  "govoplan-connectors==0.1.26",
  "govoplan-consultation==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-contracts==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-dataflow==0.1.23",
-  "govoplan-datasources==0.1.24",
+  "govoplan-dataflow==0.1.24",
+  "govoplan-datasources==0.1.25",
  "govoplan-decisions==0.1.19",
-  "govoplan-dist-lists==0.1.20",
+  "govoplan-dist-lists==0.1.21",
  "govoplan-dms==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-encryption==0.1.19",
+  "govoplan-encryption==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-erp==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-evaluation==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-facilities==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-fit-connect==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-forms==0.1.22",
-  "govoplan-forms-runtime==0.1.20",
+  "govoplan-forms==0.1.23",
+  "govoplan-forms-runtime==0.1.21",
  "govoplan-grants==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-helpdesk==0.1.21",
-  "govoplan-identity-trust==0.1.20",
+  "govoplan-identity-trust==0.1.21",
  "govoplan-inspections==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-learning==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-mandates==0.1.19",
-  "govoplan-notifications==0.1.19",
+  "govoplan-notifications==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-parties==0.1.19",
-  "govoplan-payments==0.1.21",
+  "govoplan-payments==0.1.22",
  "govoplan-permits==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-poll==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-portal==0.1.21",
-  "govoplan-postbox==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-portal==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-postbox==0.1.23",
  "govoplan-procurement==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-projects==0.1.19",
-  "govoplan-quick-access==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-records==0.1.22",
-  "govoplan-reporting==0.1.20",
+  "govoplan-projects==0.1.20",
+  "govoplan-quick-access==0.1.21",
+  "govoplan-records==0.1.24",
+  "govoplan-reporting==0.1.21",
  "govoplan-resources==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-rest==0.1.19",
-  "govoplan-risk-compliance==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-scheduling==0.1.21",
-  "govoplan-search==0.1.19",
+  "govoplan-risk-compliance==0.1.21",
+  "govoplan-scheduling==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-search==0.1.20",
  "govoplan-services==0.1.19",
  "govoplan-soap==0.1.19",
-  "govoplan-tasks==0.1.21",
-  "govoplan-templates==0.1.21",
+  "govoplan-tasks==0.1.23",
+  "govoplan-templates==0.1.22",
  "govoplan-tickets==0.1.22",
  "govoplan-transparency==0.1.20",
-  "govoplan-views==0.1.21",
-  "govoplan-voting==0.1.20",
+  "govoplan-views==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-voting==0.1.21",
  "govoplan-wiki==0.1.22",
-  "govoplan-workflow==0.1.22",
+  "govoplan-workflow==0.1.23",
  "govoplan-workflow-engine==0.1.21",
  "govoplan-xrechnung==0.1.21",
 ]
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ bandit>=1.8,<2
 click>=8.3.3
 filelock>=3.20.3
 idna>=3.15
-pip>=26.1.2
+pip>=26.2
 pip-audit>=2.9,<3
 python-multipart>=0.0.31
 radon>=6,<7
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ httpx2>=2.5,<3
 filelock>=3.20.3
 idna>=3.15
 jsonschema>=4,<5
-pip>=26.1.2
+pip>=26.2
 pip-audit>=2.9,<3
 pytest>=9.0.3,<10
 pygments>=2.20,<3
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 # Whole-product release install from immutable, independently versioned module tags.
 # Only add a module after its referenced tag has been published.
 ../govoplan-core[server]
-govoplan-tenancy @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-tenancy.git@v0.1.20
-govoplan-organizations @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-organizations.git@v0.1.20
-govoplan-identity @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-identity.git@v0.1.20
-govoplan-idm @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-idm.git@v0.1.24
-govoplan-access @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access.git@v0.1.23
-govoplan-admin @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-admin.git@v0.1.22
-govoplan-policy @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-policy.git@v0.1.22
+govoplan-tenancy @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-tenancy.git@v0.1.22
+govoplan-organizations @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-organizations.git@v0.1.21
+govoplan-identity @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-identity.git@v0.1.21
+govoplan-idm @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-idm.git@v0.1.25
+govoplan-access @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access.git@v0.1.25
+govoplan-admin @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-admin.git@v0.1.23
+govoplan-policy @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-policy.git@v0.1.23
 govoplan-audit @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-audit.git@v0.1.20
 govoplan-dashboard @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dashboard.git@v0.1.20
-govoplan-files @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files.git@v0.1.23
-govoplan-mail @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail.git@v0.1.25
-govoplan-campaign @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign.git@v0.1.27
-govoplan-calendar @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-calendar.git@v0.1.22
-govoplan-docs @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs.git@v0.1.22
-govoplan-ops @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-ops.git@v0.1.20
+govoplan-files @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files.git@v0.1.26
+govoplan-mail @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail.git@v0.1.27
+govoplan-campaign @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign.git@v0.1.28
+govoplan-calendar @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-calendar.git@v0.1.23
+govoplan-docs @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs.git@v0.1.23
+govoplan-ops @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-ops.git@v0.1.22
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { findTypeOnlyJsxImports } from "../tools/checks/check-jsx-value-imports.mjs";
+
+const findings = (source) => findTypeOnlyJsxImports([{ path: "/fixture.tsx", source }]).map((item) => item.component);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import type { FormGrid, AuthInfo } from "@govoplan/core-webui"; const page = <Dialog><FormGrid /></Dialog>;'), ["FormGrid"]);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import { type FormGrid as Layout } from "ui"; const page = <Layout>Content</Layout>;'), ["Layout"]);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import type Layout from "ui"; const page = <Layout />;'), ["Layout"]);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import type * as ui from "ui"; const page = <ui.Layout />;'), ["ui.Layout"]);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import type { FormGrid } from "ui"; const page = <div title={<FormGrid />} />;'), ["FormGrid"]);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import { FormGrid, type AuthInfo } from "ui"; const page = <FormGrid />;'), []);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import type { FormGrid } from "ui"; function Page({ FormGrid }: Props) { return <FormGrid />; }'), []);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import type * as ui from "ui"; function Page(ui: RuntimeControls) { return <ui.Layout />; }'), []);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import type { Layout } from "ui"; const page: Layout = {};'), []);
+assert.deepEqual(findings('import type { input } from "ui"; const page = <input />;'), []);
+console.log("JSX runtime-import AST regression tests passed (10 cases).");
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 from contextlib import redirect_stderr, redirect_stdout
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 import io
 import json
+import os
 from pathlib import Path
 import stat
 import subprocess
@@ -36,6 +38,7 @@ import govoplan_deploy.cli as deployment_cli  # noqa: E402
 from govoplan_deploy.capabilities import (  # noqa: E402
    capability_change_impacts,
    infrastructure_capability_document,
+    infrastructure_dependency_inventory_from_mapping,
 )
 from govoplan_deploy.cluster_evidence import (  # noqa: E402
    collect_kubernetes_evidence,
@@ -87,6 +90,41 @@ def _kubernetes_test_deployment(component: str, replicas: int) -> dict:
    }


+def _dependency_inventory(
+    installation_id: str,
+    *,
+    generated_at: datetime | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "schema_version": 1,
+        "installation_id": installation_id,
+        "generated_at": (generated_at or datetime.now(UTC)).isoformat(),
+        "complete": True,
+        "inspected_capability_ids": ["coordination.redis", "mail.smtp"],
+        "providers": [
+            {
+                "module_id": "mail",
+                "state": "complete",
+                "capability_ids": ["mail.smtp"],
+                "dependency_count": 1,
+            }
+        ],
+        "dependencies": [
+            {
+                "capability_id": "mail.smtp",
+                "module_id": "mail",
+                "dependency_type": "smtp_endpoint",
+                "dependency_ref": "endpoint:17",
+                "state": "active",
+                "scope": "system",
+                "summary": "Persisted SMTP endpoint has one credential binding.",
+                "metrics": {"credential_binding_count": 1},
+                "required_action": "Rebind or migrate this SMTP endpoint.",
+            }
+        ],
+    }
+
+
 class DeploymentInstallerTests(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_kubernetes_evidence_requires_two_node_spread_and_safe_runtime(
        self,
@@ -1034,6 +1072,28 @@ class DeploymentInstallerTests(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertNotIn("old-secret", impacts["database.postgresql"].detail)
        self.assertNotIn("new-secret", impacts["database.postgresql"].detail)

+    def test_capability_impact_includes_provider_dependency_evidence(self) -> None:
+        previous_spec = default_spec(mail_mode="test-mail", module_set="full")
+        desired_spec = default_spec(mail_mode="disabled", module_set="full")
+        inventory = infrastructure_dependency_inventory_from_mapping(
+            _dependency_inventory(previous_spec.installation_id)
+        )
+
+        impacts = {
+            item.capability_id: item
+            for item in capability_change_impacts(
+                infrastructure_capability_document(previous_spec, {}),
+                infrastructure_capability_document(desired_spec, {}),
+                dependency_inventory=inventory,
+            )
+        }
+
+        mail = impacts["mail.smtp"]
+        self.assertTrue(mail.inventory_inspected)
+        self.assertEqual("endpoint:17", mail.actual_dependencies[0].dependency_ref)
+        self.assertIn("mail:endpoint:17", mail.detail)
+        self.assertIn("Rebind or migrate", mail.required_action)
+
    def test_replica_counts_drive_compose_and_load_balancer_discovery(self) -> None:
        spec = default_spec(
            storage_mode="garage",
@@ -1221,6 +1281,65 @@ class DeploymentInstallerTests(unittest.TestCase):
                    for check in second_plan.checks
                )
            )
+            self.assertTrue(second_plan.blocked)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any(
+                    check.id == "capability.dependency_inventory.missing"
+                    and check.level == "error"
+                    for check in second_plan.checks
+                )
+            )
+
+            atomic_write(
+                paths.dependency_inventory,
+                canonical_json(_dependency_inventory(second_spec.installation_id)),
+                mode=0o600,
+            )
+            evidenced_plan = build_plan(
+                second_spec,
+                paths,
+                include_host_checks=False,
+            )
+
+            self.assertFalse(
+                any(
+                    check.level == "error"
+                    and check.id.startswith("capability.dependency_inventory.")
+                    for check in evidenced_plan.checks
+                )
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(
+                "endpoint:17",
+                {
+                    item.capability_id: item
+                    for item in evidenced_plan.capability_impacts
+                }["mail.smtp"].actual_dependencies[0].dependency_ref,
+            )
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any(
+                    check.id == "capability.dependency_inventory.current"
+                    and check.level == "ok"
+                    for check in evidenced_plan.checks
+                )
+            )
+
+            stale = _dependency_inventory(
+                second_spec.installation_id,
+                generated_at=datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(minutes=6),
+            )
+            atomic_write(
+                paths.dependency_inventory,
+                canonical_json(stale),
+                mode=0o600,
+            )
+            stale_plan = build_plan(second_spec, paths, include_host_checks=False)
+            self.assertTrue(stale_plan.blocked)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any(
+                    check.id == "capability.dependency_inventory.stale"
+                    for check in stale_plan.checks
+                )
+            )

    def test_secret_change_is_planned_without_exposing_secret_values(self) -> None:
        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-deploy-test-") as directory:
@@ -1330,6 +1449,54 @@ class DeploymentInstallerTests(unittest.TestCase):
                )[0],
            )

+    def test_cli_collects_bounded_private_dependency_inventory(self) -> None:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-deploy-test-") as directory:
+            root = Path(directory) / "installation"
+            self.assertEqual(
+                0,
+                run_cli(
+                    [
+                        "init",
+                        "--non-interactive",
+                        "--directory",
+                        str(root),
+                    ]
+                )[0],
+            )
+            payload = _dependency_inventory("govoplan-local")
+            response = MagicMock()
+            response.__enter__.return_value = response
+            response.geturl.return_value = "https://ops.example.test/inventory"
+            response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+            fetch = MagicMock(return_value=response)
+
+            with (
+                patch.dict(os.environ, {"TEST_OPS_KEY": "secret-api-key"}),
+                patch.object(deployment_cli, "urlopen", fetch),
+            ):
+                result, stdout, stderr = run_cli(
+                    [
+                        "collect-infrastructure-inventory",
+                        "--directory",
+                        str(root),
+                        "--ops-url",
+                        "https://ops.example.test/inventory",
+                        "--api-key-env",
+                        "TEST_OPS_KEY",
+                    ]
+                )
+
+            self.assertEqual(0, result, stderr)
+            self.assertIn("1 record(s)", stdout)
+            evidence_path = root / "infrastructure-dependency-inventory.json"
+            self.assertEqual(0o600, stat.S_IMODE(evidence_path.stat().st_mode))
+            self.assertNotIn(
+                "secret-api-key",
+                evidence_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+            )
+            request = fetch.call_args.args[0]
+            self.assertEqual("secret-api-key", request.get_header("X-api-key"))
+
    def test_cli_requires_external_url_when_switching_from_managed(self) -> None:
        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-deploy-test-") as directory:
            root = Path(directory) / "installation"
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from contextlib import ExitStack
+import csv
+from copy import deepcopy
+import hashlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+import tarfile
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+from urllib.parse import quote
+import zipfile
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "tools/release"))
+
+from govoplan_release import full_catalog  # noqa: E402
+from govoplan_release.artifact_identity import selected_artifact_identity_issues  # noqa: E402
+from govoplan_release.catalog import canonical_hash  # noqa: E402
+from govoplan_release.model import RepositorySpec  # noqa: E402
+from govoplan_release.registry_reference import registry_entry_source  # noqa: E402
+from govoplan_release.selective_catalog import (  # noqa: E402
+    load_authenticated_catalog_base, public_key_base64, signature,
+)
+from govoplan_release.source_provenance import (  # noqa: E402
+    SourceTagProvenanceIssue, catalog_source_selection,
+    registered_source_origin_issues,
+)
+from govoplan_release.version_alignment import candidate_catalog_version_issues  # noqa: E402
+
+
+class FullRegistryCatalogTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(self.temp.cleanup)
+        self.root = Path(self.temp.name)
+        self.web = self.root / "addideas-govoplan-website"
+        self.wheels = self.root / "wheels"
+        self.npm = self.root / "npm"
+        self.wheels.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+        self.npm.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+        self.key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+        self.keypath = self.root / "key.pem"
+        self.keypath.write_bytes(self.key.private_bytes(
+            serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
+            serialization.NoEncryption(),
+        ))
+        self.keypath.chmod(0o600)
+        self.keyring = {
+            "keyring_version": "1", "keys": [{
+                "key_id": "known-key", "public_key": public_key_base64(self.key),
+                "status": "active",
+            }],
+        }
+        self.base = {
+            "catalog_version": "1", "channel": "stable", "sequence": 1,
+            "core_release": {"version": "1.0.0"}, "modules": [],
+            "release": {},
+        }
+        self.write_base()
+        self.package_set = {
+            "schema_version": "1", "release_version": "1.2.3", "profile": "full",
+            "registries": {
+                "python": "https://git.add-ideas.de/api/packages/GovOPlaN/pypi/simple",
+                "npm": "https://git.add-ideas.de/api/packages/GovOPlaN/npm/",
+            },
+            "python": [self.package("govoplan-core"), self.package("govoplan-demo")],
+            "webui": [self.package("govoplan-core", webui=True)],
+        }
+        self.seal(self.package_set, "package_set_sha256")
+        self.lock = {
+            "schema_version": "1", "release_version": "1.2.3", "profile": "full",
+            "registries": self.package_set["registries"],
+            "package_set_sha256": self.package_set["package_set_sha256"],
+            "python": [], "webui": [],
+        }
+        for row in self.package_set["python"]:
+            path = self.wheel(row["name"])
+            url = full_catalog._tool("resolve-package-artifacts")["_python_artifact_url"](
+                self.package_set["registries"]["python"], package=row, filename=path.name,
+            )
+            self.lock["python"].append(self.artifact(row, path, url))
+        npm_package = self.package_set["webui"][0]
+        npm_path = self.npm / "govoplan-core-webui-1.2.3.tgz"
+        self.tarball(npm_path, "@govoplan/core-webui", "1.2.3")
+        url = self.package_set["registries"]["npm"] + quote(npm_package["name"], safe="") + "/-/1.2.3/core-webui-1.2.3.tgz"
+        row = self.artifact(npm_package, npm_path, url)
+        row["integrity"] = "sha512-" + base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha512(npm_path.read_bytes()).digest()).decode()
+        self.lock["webui"].append(row)
+        self.seal(self.lock, "lock_sha256")
+        self.set_path = self.root / "package-set.json"
+        self.lock_path = self.root / "package-lock.json"
+        self.write_inputs()
+        self.output = self.root / "candidate"
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def package(repo: str, *, webui: bool = False) -> dict:
+        row = {
+            "name": "@govoplan/core-webui" if webui else repo, "version": "1.2.3",
+            "repository": repo, "tag": "v1.2.3",
+            "commit": ("a" if repo == "govoplan-core" else "b") * 40,
+        }
+        if not webui:
+            row["extras"] = ["server"] if repo == "govoplan-core" else []
+        return row
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def artifact(package: dict, path: Path, url: str) -> dict:
+        encoded = path.read_bytes()
+        return {**package, "filename": path.name, "url": url,
+                "sha256": hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest(), "size": len(encoded)}
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def seal(payload: dict, field: str) -> None:
+        payload.pop(field, None)
+        payload[field] = hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+    def write_inputs(self) -> None:
+        self.set_path.write_text(json.dumps(self.package_set))
+        self.lock_path.write_text(json.dumps(self.lock))
+
+    def write_base(self) -> None:
+        self.base.pop("signatures", None)
+        self.base["signatures"] = [signature(self.base, key_id="known-key", private_key=self.key)]
+        folder = self.web / "public/catalogs/v1"
+        (folder / "channels").mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        (folder / "channels/stable.json").write_text(json.dumps(self.base))
+        (folder / "keyring.json").write_text(json.dumps(self.keyring))
+
+    def wheel(self, package: str) -> Path:
+        stem = package.replace("-", "_")
+        info = f"{stem}-1.2.3.dist-info"
+        files = {
+            f"{stem}/__init__.py": b"VALUE = 1\n",
+            f"{info}/METADATA": f"Metadata-Version: 2.1\nName: {package}\nVersion: 1.2.3\n".encode(),
+            f"{info}/WHEEL": b"Wheel-Version: 1.0\nRoot-Is-Purelib: true\nTag: py3-none-any\n",
+        }
+        record = io.StringIO()
+        writer = csv.writer(record, lineterminator="\n")
+        for name, value in files.items():
+            writer.writerow((name, "", len(value)))
+        writer.writerow((f"{info}/RECORD", "", ""))
+        files[f"{info}/RECORD"] = record.getvalue().encode()
+        path = self.wheels / f"{stem}-1.2.3-py3-none-any.whl"
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(path, "w") as archive:
+            for name, value in files.items():
+                archive.writestr(name, value)
+        return path
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def tarball(path: Path, name: str, version: str, *, duplicate: bool = False) -> None:
+        encoded = json.dumps({"name": name, "version": version}).encode()
+        with tarfile.open(path, "w:gz") as archive:
+            for _ in range(2 if duplicate else 1):
+                member = tarfile.TarInfo("package/package.json")
+                member.size = len(encoded)
+                archive.addfile(member, io.BytesIO(encoded))
+
+    def build(self, *, provenance_errors=(), origin_errors=()) -> dict:
+        registry_generator = full_catalog._tool("generate-release-catalog")
+        tools = {name: dict(full_catalog._tool(name)) for name in (
+            "generate-release-catalog", "generate-release-package-set", "resolve-package-artifacts",
+        )}
+        tools["generate-release-package-set"]["generate_package_set"] = lambda **kwargs: self.package_set
+        self.provenance = {
+            row["repository"]: {"commit_sha": row["commit"], "tag_object_sha": str(index + 1) * 40}
+            for index, row in enumerate(self.package_set["python"])
+        }
+        entry = {
+            "module_id": "demo", "name": "Demo", "version": "1.2.3",
+            "python_package": "govoplan-demo",
+            "python_ref": "govoplan-demo @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-demo.git@v1.2.3",
+        }
+        with ExitStack() as stack:
+            stack.enter_context(patch.object(full_catalog, "_tool", side_effect=lambda name: tools[name]))
+            stack.enter_context(patch.dict(registry_generator["_catalog_payload"].__globals__, {
+                "synthesize_repository_catalog_entries": lambda **kwargs: (dict(entry),),
+            }))
+            stack.enter_context(patch.object(full_catalog, "enforce_selected_version_alignment"))
+            stack.enter_context(patch.object(full_catalog, "registered_source_origin_issues", return_value=origin_errors))
+            self.provenance_check = stack.enter_context(patch.object(full_catalog, "source_tag_provenance_issues", return_value=provenance_errors))
+            stack.enter_context(patch.object(full_catalog, "selected_source_provenance", return_value=self.provenance))
+            return full_catalog.build_full_registry_candidate(
+                package_set_path=self.set_path, package_lock_path=self.lock_path,
+                wheelhouse=self.wheels, webui_packages=self.npm, output_dir=self.output,
+                selected_repositories=("govoplan-core",),
+                signing_keys=(f"known-key={self.keypath}",), workspace_root=self.root,
+            )
+
+    def candidate(self) -> dict:
+        return json.loads((self.output / "channels/stable.json").read_text())
+
+    def test_full_candidate_uses_registry_bytes_and_preserves_unchanged_tag_provenance(self) -> None:
+        result = self.build()
+        candidate = self.candidate()
+        self.assertEqual("ready", result["status"])
+        self.assertEqual(2, result["package_count"])
+        self.assertEqual(1, result["selected_count"])
+        self.assertEqual(self.keyring, json.loads((self.output / "keyring.json").read_text()))
+        self.assertEqual(canonical_hash(self.keyring), candidate["release"]["keyring_sha256"])
+        self.assertEqual(2, len(candidate["release"]["artifacts"]))
+        self.assertIn("/pypi/files/", candidate["core_release"]["python_ref"])
+        self.assertEqual((), candidate_catalog_version_issues(candidate))
+        self.assertEqual((), selected_artifact_identity_issues(candidate))
+        sources = catalog_source_selection(candidate)
+        self.assertEqual((), sources.issues)
+        self.assertEqual({"govoplan-core": "1.2.3"}, sources.selected_versions)
+        self.assertEqual({"govoplan-core": "1.2.3", "govoplan-demo": "1.2.3"}, sources.all_versions)
+        self.assertEqual("b" * 40, sources.selected_commits["govoplan-demo"])
+        self.assertEqual("2" * 40, sources.selected_tag_objects["govoplan-demo"])
+        self.assertEqual(2, self.provenance_check.call_count)
+        for call in self.provenance_check.call_args_list:
+            self.assertEqual({"govoplan-core"}, call.kwargs["require_head_repos"])
+        for path in [self.output, *self.output.rglob("*")]:
+            self.assertEqual(0o700 if path.is_dir() else 0o600, path.stat().st_mode & 0o777)
+
+    def test_legacy_base_is_authenticated_but_remains_rejected_by_selective(self) -> None:
+        self.build()
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "does not pin"):
+            load_authenticated_catalog_base(
+                base_catalog=None, base_keyring=None, web_root=self.web,
+                channel="stable", public_base_url="https://unused.example",
+                signer_public_keys={"known-key": public_key_base64(self.key)},
+            )
+
+    def test_injected_key_or_mismatched_pinned_keyring_is_rejected(self) -> None:
+        for mutation in ("extra-key", "bad-hash"):
+            with self.subTest(mutation=mutation):
+                if mutation == "extra-key":
+                    self.keyring["keys"].append({"key_id": "injected", "status": "active", "public_key": public_key_base64(Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())})
+                else:
+                    self.keyring["keys"] = self.keyring["keys"][:1]
+                    self.base["release"]["keyring_sha256"] = "f" * 64
+                self.write_base()
+                with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                    self.build()
+                self.assertFalse(self.output.exists())
+
+    def test_tampered_base_signature_is_rejected(self) -> None:
+        path = self.web / "public/catalogs/v1/channels/stable.json"
+        payload = json.loads(path.read_text())
+        payload["sequence"] = 999
+        path.write_text(json.dumps(payload))
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "signature verification"):
+            self.build()
+
+    def test_wrong_registry_bytes_and_reused_candidate_fail_closed(self) -> None:
+        self.build()
+        original = (self.output / "channels/stable.json").read_bytes()
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "must not already exist"):
+            self.build()
+        self.assertEqual(original, (self.output / "channels/stable.json").read_bytes())
+        self.output = self.root / "candidate-2"
+        wheel = self.wheels / self.lock["python"][0]["filename"]
+        with wheel.open("ab") as stream:
+            stream.write(b"tampered")
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "bytes differ"):
+            self.build()
+        self.assertFalse(self.output.exists())
+
+    def test_webui_identity_and_url_changes_are_rejected(self) -> None:
+        row = self.lock["webui"][0]
+        original = row["url"]
+        for url in (
+            original + "?alternate=true", original.replace("/-/1.2.3/", "/-/9.9.9/"),
+            original.replace("/npm/", "/npm/../other/"),
+            original.replace("/npm/", "/npm/%2e%2e/other/"),
+            original.replace("/npm/", "/npm/%252e%252e/other/"),
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(url=url):
+                row["url"] = url
+                self.seal(self.lock, "lock_sha256")
+                self.write_inputs()
+                with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "URL differs"):
+                    self.build()
+
+    def test_duplicate_missing_and_symlinked_artifacts_are_rejected(self) -> None:
+        row = self.lock["webui"][0]
+        self.lock["webui"].append(dict(row))
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "duplicate/missing"):
+            full_catalog.verify_registry_artifacts(package_set=self.package_set, lock=self.lock, wheelhouse=self.wheels, webui_packages=self.npm)
+        self.lock["webui"].pop()
+        path = self.npm / row["filename"]
+        moved = self.root / "moved.tgz"
+        path.rename(moved)
+        path.symlink_to(moved)
+        with self.assertRaises(OSError):
+            full_catalog.verify_registry_artifacts(package_set=self.package_set, lock=self.lock, wheelhouse=self.wheels, webui_packages=self.npm)
+
+    def test_archive_metadata_is_bounded_and_not_ambiguous(self) -> None:
+        path = self.npm / "duplicate.tgz"
+        self.tarball(path, "@govoplan/core-webui", "1.2.3", duplicate=True)
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "duplicate"):
+            full_catalog._inspect_npm_metadata(path, name="@govoplan/core-webui", version="1.2.3")
+
+    def test_origin_or_tag_provenance_failure_prevents_output(self) -> None:
+        issue = SourceTagProvenanceIssue("govoplan-core", "v1.2.3", "wrong immutable identity")
+        for kwargs in ({"origin_errors": (issue,)}, {"provenance_errors": (issue,)}):
+            with self.subTest(kwargs=kwargs), self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "gate failed"):
+                self.build(**kwargs)
+            self.assertFalse(self.output.exists())
+
+    def test_registered_source_origin_requires_exact_fetch_and_push_targets(self) -> None:
+        repo = self.root / "govoplan-core"
+        repo.mkdir()
+        spec = RepositorySpec("govoplan-core", "system", "kernel", "git@example.test:trusted/core.git", "govoplan-core")
+        with patch("govoplan_release.source_provenance.load_repository_specs", return_value=(spec,)):
+            for targets in ((spec.remote, spec.remote), ("git@evil.test:core.git", spec.remote), (spec.remote, "git@evil.test:core.git")):
+                with self.subTest(targets=targets), patch("govoplan_release.source_provenance.git_text", side_effect=targets):
+                    issues = registered_source_origin_issues(repo_versions={"govoplan-core": "1.2.3"}, workspace=self.root, remote="origin")
+                    self.assertEqual(targets != (spec.remote, spec.remote), bool(issues))
+
+    def test_registry_metadata_cannot_cross_wire_webui_or_archive_identity(self) -> None:
+        self.build()
+        candidate = self.candidate()
+        entry = candidate["core_release"]
+        entry["webui_package"] = "@govoplan/files-webui"
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "another source repository"):
+            registry_entry_source(entry)
+        candidate = self.candidate()
+        candidate["release"]["artifacts"][0]["archive_sha256"] = "f" * 64
+        self.assertIn("matching inspected wheel", " ".join(selected_artifact_identity_issues(candidate)))
+
+    def test_registry_version_and_selected_source_identity_must_agree(self) -> None:
+        self.build()
+        for field in ("commit_sha", "tag_object_sha"):
+            candidate = self.candidate()
+            candidate["release"]["selected_units"][0][field] = "f" * 40
+            self.assertIn("differs", " ".join(issue.message for issue in catalog_source_selection(candidate).issues))
+        candidate = self.candidate()
+        candidate["modules"][0]["artifact_integrity"]["python"]["git_ref"] = "v9.9.9"
+        self.assertTrue(candidate_catalog_version_issues(candidate))
+
+    def test_repeated_module_projections_must_bind_identical_python_and_webui_bytes(self) -> None:
+        self.build()
+        for kind in ("python", "webui"):
+            for reversed_order in (False, True):
+                with self.subTest(kind=kind, reversed_order=reversed_order):
+                    candidate = self.candidate()
+                    entry = deepcopy(candidate["core_release"])
+                    entry["module_id"] = "another-core-projection"
+                    artifact = entry["artifact_integrity"][kind]
+                    artifact["sha256"] = "f" * 64
+                    if kind == "python":
+                        entry["python_ref"] = artifact["ref"] = entry["python_ref"].split("#sha256=", 1)[0] + "#sha256=" + "f" * 64
+                    if reversed_order:
+                        original = candidate["core_release"]
+                        candidate["core_release"] = entry
+                        entry = original
+                    candidate["modules"].append(entry)
+                    self.assertIn(f"conflicting {kind}", " ".join(selected_artifact_identity_issues(candidate)))
+                    self.assertTrue(candidate_catalog_version_issues(candidate))
+        candidate = self.candidate()
+        repeated = deepcopy(candidate["modules"][0])
+        repeated["module_id"] = "second-demo-projection"
+        candidate["modules"].append(repeated)
+        self.assertEqual((), selected_artifact_identity_issues(candidate))
+        self.assertEqual((), candidate_catalog_version_issues(candidate))
+
+    def test_metadata_inspection_uses_the_opened_archive_not_a_replaced_path(self) -> None:
+        path = self.npm / "original.tgz"
+        replacement = self.npm / "replacement.tgz"
+        saved = self.npm / "saved.tgz"
+        self.tarball(path, "@govoplan/incorrect-webui", "1.2.3")
+        self.tarball(replacement, "@govoplan/core-webui", "1.2.3")
+        real_open = tarfile.open
+
+        def replace_path(*args, **kwargs):
+            self.assertIn("fileobj", kwargs)
+            path.rename(saved)
+            replacement.rename(path)
+            return real_open(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        with patch("govoplan_release.full_catalog.tarfile.open", side_effect=replace_path):
+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "metadata differs"):
+                full_catalog._inspect_npm_metadata(path, name="@govoplan/core-webui", version="1.2.3")
+
+    def test_registry_url_provenance_rejects_package_version_and_traversal_mismatch(self) -> None:
+        self.build()
+        for old, new in (
+            ("/govoplan-core/1.2.3/", "/govoplan-files/1.2.3/"),
+            ("/govoplan-core/1.2.3/", "/govoplan-core/9.9.9/"),
+            ("/pypi/files/", "/pypi/files/%2e%2e/"),
+            ("/pypi/files/", "/pypi/files/%252e%252e/"),
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(new=new):
+                entry = self.candidate()["core_release"]
+                artifact = entry["artifact_integrity"]["python"]
+                artifact["url"] = artifact["url"].replace(old, new)
+                artifact["ref"] = entry["python_ref"] = entry["python_ref"].replace(old, new)
+                with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                    registry_entry_source(entry)
+
+    def test_package_set_must_match_fixed_meta_pins_not_just_its_own_hash(self) -> None:
+        payload = deepcopy(self.package_set)
+        payload["python"][1]["version"] = "9.9.9"
+        self.seal(payload, "package_set_sha256")
+        self.set_path.write_text(json.dumps(payload))
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "exact Meta full pins"):
+            self.build()
+        self.assertFalse(self.output.exists())
+
+    def test_package_set_git_reads_ignore_caller_redirection(self) -> None:
+        tool = full_catalog._tool("generate-release-package-set")
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GIT_DIR": "/outside", "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": "/outside/config", "PATH": "/outside/bin"}):
+            with patch("subprocess.check_output", return_value="a" * 40 + "\n") as execute:
+                self.assertEqual("a" * 40, tool["_git"](self.root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"))
+        self.assertEqual("/usr/bin/git", execute.call_args.args[0][0])
+        self.assertNotIn("GIT_DIR", execute.call_args.kwargs["env"])
+        self.assertEqual(os.devnull, execute.call_args.kwargs["env"]["GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL"])
+        self.assertEqual("/usr/bin:/bin", execute.call_args.kwargs["env"]["PATH"])
+
+    def test_unchanged_real_annotated_ancestor_is_valid_but_selecting_it_requires_head(self) -> None:
+        from tests.test_release_source_provenance import git, git_text, make_repo
+        from govoplan_release.source_provenance import source_tag_provenance_issues
+
+        workspace = self.root / "source-workspace"
+        workspace.mkdir()
+        repo, _remote = make_repo(workspace, self.root, "govoplan-access", "1.2.3")
+        git(repo, "tag", "-a", "v1.2.3", "-m", "reviewed immutable package")
+        git(repo, "push", "origin", "refs/tags/v1.2.3")
+        tagged_commit = git_text(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        (repo / "workflow-only.txt").write_text("post-tag workflow repair\n")
+        git(repo, "add", "workflow-only.txt")
+        git(repo, "commit", "-m", "repair workflow without replacing package")
+        git(repo, "push", "origin", "main")
+        common = {
+            "repo_versions": {"govoplan-access": "1.2.3"}, "workspace": workspace,
+            "expected_commits": {"govoplan-access": tagged_commit},
+            "expected_tag_objects": {"govoplan-access": git_text(repo, "rev-parse", "refs/tags/v1.2.3")},
+        }
+        self.assertEqual((), source_tag_provenance_issues(**common))
+        issues = source_tag_provenance_issues(**common, require_head_repos=("govoplan-access",))
+        self.assertIn("not selected HEAD", " ".join(issue.message for issue in issues))
+
+    def test_tagged_manifest_synthesis_ignores_local_git_replacement_objects(self) -> None:
+        from tests.test_release_source_provenance import git, git_text, make_repo
+        from govoplan_release.catalog_entry_synthesis import materialized_source_tree
+
+        workspace = self.root / "materialization-workspace"
+        workspace.mkdir()
+        repo, _remote = make_repo(workspace, self.root, "govoplan-access", "1.2.3")
+        original = (repo / "pyproject.toml").read_text()
+        tagged_commit = git_text(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        git(repo, "tag", "-a", "v1.2.3", "-m", "reviewed immutable package")
+        (repo / "pyproject.toml").write_text(original.replace("1.2.3", "9.9.9"))
+        git(repo, "add", "pyproject.toml")
+        git(repo, "commit", "-m", "unreviewed replacement tree")
+        git(repo, "replace", tagged_commit, git_text(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD"))
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GIT_DIR": str(self.root / "outside"), "PATH": "/outside/bin"}):
+            with materialized_source_tree(repo, source_ref="v1.2.3") as source:
+                self.assertEqual(original, (source / "pyproject.toml").read_text())
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ from govoplan_core.core.institutional import (
    TemporalRevision,
    service_launch_capability,
 )
+from govoplan_core.core.temporal import (
+    TemporalDataContext,
+    bind_temporal_data_context,
+    reset_temporal_data_context,
+)
 from govoplan_cases.backend.party_context import CasePartyContext
 from govoplan_cases.backend.db.models import (
    CaseAccessGrant,
@@ -134,6 +139,13 @@ class _Registry:


 class InstitutionalGovernanceJourneyTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        # Portal's effective_at does not replace the SQL provider's request-local
+        # read clock. Keep both on the journey date, without bypassing validity
+        # filtering or extending the fixture's finite publication interval.
+        token = bind_temporal_data_context(TemporalDataContext(evaluated_at=NOW))
+        self.addCleanup(reset_temporal_data_context, token)
+
    def test_service_to_formal_outcome_retains_governed_context(self) -> None:
        engine = create_engine("sqlite+pysqlite:///:memory:")
        for table in (
@@ -220,13 +232,44 @@ class InstitutionalGovernanceJourneyTests(unittest.TestCase):
                service_launch_capability("case"): object(),
            }
        )
-        entry = PortalServiceDirectory(service_registry).list_entries(
+        directory = PortalServiceDirectory(service_registry)
+        for outside_interval in (
+            service.temporal.valid_from - timedelta(microseconds=1),
+            service.temporal.valid_to,
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(outside_interval=outside_interval):
+                token = bind_temporal_data_context(
+                    TemporalDataContext(evaluated_at=outside_interval)
+                )
+                try:
+                    # Keep Portal inside the valid interval: the real SQL
+                    # provider must still exclude a service outside its own
+                    # temporal read context, before Portal can project it.
+                    self.assertEqual(
+                        (),
+                        directory.list_entries(
+                            session,
+                            principal,
+                            tenant_id="tenant-1",
+                            effective_at=NOW,
+                            audiences=("resident",),
+                        ),
+                    )
+                finally:
+                    reset_temporal_data_context(token)
+
+        entries = directory.list_entries(
            session,
            principal,
            tenant_id="tenant-1",
            effective_at=NOW,
            audiences=("resident",),
-        )[0]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            (service.reference,),
+            tuple(entry.definition.reference for entry in entries),
+        )
+        entry = entries[0]
        self.assertTrue(entry.available)
        intake = CaseServiceIntake().plan(
            entry.definition,
@@ -62,22 +62,37 @@ class PackageRegistryReleaseTests(unittest.TestCase):
                encoding="utf-8"
            )
        )["project"]["version"]
+        meta_package = ROOT / "packages/govoplan-meta/pyproject.toml"
+        meta_project = tomllib.loads(
+            meta_package.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        )["project"]
+        expected_tasks_pin = next(
+            requirement
+            for requirement in (
+                *meta_project["dependencies"],
+                *meta_project["optional-dependencies"]["full"],
+            )
+            if requirement.startswith("govoplan-tasks==")
+        )
        selected = PACKAGE_SET.parse_meta_package(
-            ROOT / "packages/govoplan-meta/pyproject.toml",
+            meta_package,
            core_version=core_version,
        )

        by_name = {item["name"]: item for item in selected}
        self.assertIn("govoplan-core", by_name)
        self.assertIn("govoplan-records", by_name)
-        self.assertEqual("0.1.21", by_name["govoplan-tasks"]["version"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            expected_tasks_pin,
+            f"govoplan-tasks=={by_name['govoplan-tasks']['version']}",
+        )

        payload = PACKAGE_SET.generate_package_set(
            core_version=core_version,
            requirements=ROOT / "requirements-release.txt",
            workspace=ROOT.parent,
            profile="full",
-            meta_package=ROOT / "packages/govoplan-meta/pyproject.toml",
+            meta_package=meta_package,
        )
        self.assertEqual("full", payload["profile"])
        self.assertEqual(len(selected), len(payload["python"]))
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 from pathlib import Path
+import shlex
 import subprocess
 import sys
 import unittest
@@ -17,6 +18,80 @@ from govoplan_release import git_state  # noqa: E402


 class ReleaseGitStateTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_unset_ssh_address_family_preserves_original_command_and_operator_config(self) -> None:
+        environment = git_state.sanitized_git_environment({})
+
+        self.assertEqual(
+            [
+                "/usr/bin/ssh", "-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "ConnectTimeout=8",
+            ],
+            shlex.split(environment["GIT_SSH_COMMAND"]),
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn("GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY", environment)
+        self.assertEqual(environment, git_state.sanitized_git_environment(environment))
+
+    def test_ssh_address_family_accepts_only_fixed_choices_and_survives_resanitizing(self) -> None:
+        for family in ("any", "inet", "inet6"):
+            with self.subTest(family=family):
+                environment = git_state.sanitized_git_environment({
+                    "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY": family,
+                    "GIT_SSH_COMMAND": "/attacker/ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no",
+                    "GIT_SSH": "/attacker/ssh",
+                    "PATH": "/attacker/bin",
+                })
+
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    [
+                        "/usr/bin/ssh", "-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "ConnectTimeout=8",
+                        "-o", f"AddressFamily={family}",
+                    ],
+                    shlex.split(environment["GIT_SSH_COMMAND"]),
+                )
+                self.assertNotIn("GIT_SSH", environment)
+                self.assertEqual("/usr/bin:/bin", environment["PATH"])
+                self.assertEqual(environment, git_state.sanitized_git_environment(environment))
+
+    def test_invalid_ssh_address_family_is_rejected_before_git_runs(self) -> None:
+        for invalid in (
+            "", "INET", "ipv4", " inet", "inet ", "inet\n",
+            "inet; touch /not-executed", "inet -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no",
+            "$(not-executed)",
+        ):
+            with (
+                self.subTest(value=invalid),
+                patch.dict("os.environ", {"GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY": invalid}),
+                patch.object(git_state.subprocess, "run") as run,
+            ):
+                with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+                    ValueError, "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY must be any, inet, or inet6",
+                ):
+                    git_state.git(Path("/workspace/govoplan-core"), "status", "--porcelain")
+                run.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_source_provenance_readback_keeps_family_but_discards_ssh_command_override(self) -> None:
+        from govoplan_release.source_provenance import inspect_remote_tag
+
+        completed = subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+            [], 0, f"{'a' * 40}\trefs/tags/v1.2.3\n{'b' * 40}\trefs/tags/v1.2.3^{{}}\n", "",
+        )
+        with (
+            patch.dict("os.environ", {
+                "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY": "inet",
+                "GIT_SSH_COMMAND": "/attacker/ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no",
+            }),
+            patch("govoplan_release.repository_tag.subprocess.run", return_value=completed) as run,
+        ):
+            result = inspect_remote_tag(
+                path=Path("/workspace/govoplan-core"), remote="origin",
+                remote_url="git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git", tag="v1.2.3",
+            )
+
+        self.assertEqual("b" * 40, result.commit)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            "/usr/bin/ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=8 -o AddressFamily=inet",
+            run.call_args.kwargs["env"]["GIT_SSH_COMMAND"],
+        )
+
    def test_manifest_version_does_not_confuse_interface_versions(self) -> None:
        from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 import json
+import runpy
 import subprocess
 import sys
 import tempfile
@@ -214,21 +215,23 @@ class ReleaseRepositoryTagTests(unittest.TestCase):
        git(self.repo, "commit", "-m", "Add release WebUI composition")
        git(self.repo, "push", "origin", "main")

-        result = tag_repositories(
-            repos=("govoplan-core", "govoplan-campaign"),
-            repo_versions={"govoplan-core": "0.1.10", "govoplan-campaign": "0.1.10"},
-            workspace_root=self.workspace,
-            apply=True,
-            push=True,
-        )
+        for push in (False, True):
+            with self.subTest(push=push):
+                result = tag_repositories(
+                    repos=("govoplan-core", "govoplan-campaign"),
+                    repo_versions={"govoplan-core": "0.1.10", "govoplan-campaign": "0.1.10"},
+                    workspace_root=self.workspace,
+                    apply=True,
+                    push=push,
+                )

-        self.assertEqual("blocked", result["status"])
-        self.assertIn("no selected repository was mutated", result["detail"])
-        self.assertEqual("skipped", result["repositories"][0]["status"])
-        self.assertEqual("blocked", result["repositories"][1]["status"])
-        self.assertIn("release WebUI composition gate failed", result["repositories"][1]["detail"])
-        for repository in (self.repo, self.remote, campaign, campaign_remote):
-            self.assertFalse(ref_exists(repository, "refs/tags/v0.1.10"))
+                self.assertEqual("blocked", result["status"])
+                self.assertIn("no selected repository was mutated", result["detail"])
+                self.assertEqual("skipped", result["repositories"][0]["status"])
+                self.assertEqual("blocked", result["repositories"][1]["status"])
+                self.assertIn("release WebUI composition gate failed", result["repositories"][1]["detail"])
+                for repository in (self.repo, self.remote, campaign, campaign_remote):
+                    self.assertFalse(ref_exists(repository, "refs/tags/v0.1.10"))

    def test_api_keeps_legacy_source_release_preview_only(self) -> None:
        with TestClient(
@@ -300,6 +303,183 @@ class ReleaseRepositoryTagTests(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertIn("Signed Website Catalog", ui.text)
        self.assertIn("Apply + Website Tag", ui.text)

+    def test_local_module_candidate_precedes_core_lock_but_publication_does_not(self) -> None:
+        campaign, campaign_remote = self._staged_campaign_bundle()
+        remotes = (self.remote, self.manifest_remote, campaign_remote)
+        remote_refs = {path: git_text(path, "show-ref") for path in remotes}
+        arguments = {
+            "repos": ("govoplan-campaign",),
+            "repo_versions": {"govoplan-campaign": "0.1.10"},
+            "workspace_root": self.workspace,
+        }
+
+        preview = tag_repositories(**arguments, apply=False, push=False)
+        self.assertEqual("planned", preview["status"], preview)
+        self.assertFalse(ref_exists(campaign, "refs/tags/v0.1.10"))
+        candidate = tag_repositories(**arguments, apply=True, push=False)
+        self.assertEqual("tagged", candidate["status"], candidate)
+        self.assertEqual("tag", git_text(campaign, "cat-file", "-t", "v0.1.10"))
+        tag_object = git_text(campaign, "rev-parse", "v0.1.10")
+        head = git_text(campaign, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        self.assertEqual(head, git_text(campaign, "rev-parse", "v0.1.10^{commit}"))
+
+        for apply in (False, True):
+            with self.subTest(publish_apply=apply):
+                blocked = tag_repositories(**arguments, apply=apply, push=True)
+                self.assertEqual("blocked", blocked["status"], blocked)
+                self.assertIn(
+                    "release WebUI composition gate failed",
+                    blocked["repositories"][0]["detail"],
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(tag_object, git_text(campaign, "rev-parse", "v0.1.10"))
+                self.assertEqual(remote_refs, {path: git_text(path, "show-ref") for path in remotes})
+
+        lock_path = self.repo / "webui" / "package-lock.release.json"
+        lock = json.loads(lock_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        locked_campaign = lock["packages"]["node_modules/@govoplan/campaign-webui"]
+        locked_campaign["version"] = "0.1.10"
+        locked_campaign["resolved"] = f"git+ssh://git@example.test/acme/govoplan-campaign.git#{head}"
+        lock_path.write_text(json.dumps(lock) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        git(self.repo, "add", "webui/package-lock.release.json")
+        git(self.repo, "commit", "-m", "Resolve reviewed local Campaign candidate")
+
+        core_candidate = tag_repositories(
+            repos=("govoplan-core",),
+            repo_versions={"govoplan-core": "0.1.10"},
+            workspace_root=self.workspace,
+            apply=True,
+            push=False,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual("tagged", core_candidate["status"], core_candidate)
+        self.assertEqual(remote_refs, {path: git_text(path, "show-ref") for path in remotes})
+        published = tag_repositories(**arguments, apply=True, push=True)
+        self.assertEqual("published", published["status"], published)
+        self.assertEqual(tag_object, git_text(campaign_remote, "rev-parse", "v0.1.10"))
+        self.assertEqual(head, git_text(campaign_remote, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"))
+        self.assertEqual(remote_refs[self.remote], git_text(self.remote, "show-ref"))
+
+    def test_local_core_candidate_still_requires_resolved_module_tags(self) -> None:
+        campaign, campaign_remote = self._staged_campaign_bundle()
+        for selected in (("govoplan-core",), ("govoplan-campaign", "govoplan-core")):
+            with self.subTest(selected=selected):
+                result = tag_repositories(
+                    repos=selected,
+                    repo_versions={repo: "0.1.10" for repo in selected},
+                    workspace_root=self.workspace,
+                    apply=True,
+                    push=False,
+                )
+                self.assertEqual("blocked", result["status"], result)
+                core_row = next(row for row in result["repositories"] if row["repo"] == "govoplan-core")
+                self.assertIn("version alignment gate failed", core_row["detail"])
+                self.assertIn("@govoplan/campaign-webui:resolved", core_row["detail"])
+                self.assertIn("expected 'local tag v0.1.10'", core_row["detail"])
+                for repository in (self.repo, self.remote, campaign, campaign_remote):
+                    self.assertFalse(ref_exists(repository, "refs/tags/v0.1.10"))
+
+    def test_local_module_candidate_preserves_version_and_worktree_gates(self) -> None:
+        campaign, campaign_remote = self._staged_campaign_bundle()
+        arguments = {
+            "repos": ("govoplan-campaign",),
+            "workspace_root": self.workspace,
+            "apply": True,
+            "push": False,
+        }
+        mismatch = tag_repositories(**arguments, repo_versions={"govoplan-campaign": "0.1.11"})
+        self.assertEqual("blocked", mismatch["status"], mismatch)
+        self.assertIn("version alignment gate failed", mismatch["repositories"][0]["detail"])
+
+        (campaign / "unreviewed.txt").write_text("operator work\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        dirty = tag_repositories(**arguments, repo_versions={"govoplan-campaign": "0.1.10"})
+        self.assertEqual("blocked", dirty["status"], dirty)
+        self.assertIn("worktree is not clean", dirty["repositories"][0]["detail"])
+        for repository in (campaign, campaign_remote):
+            for tag in ("v0.1.10", "v0.1.11"):
+                self.assertFalse(ref_exists(repository, f"refs/tags/{tag}"))
+
+    def test_local_module_candidate_preserves_manifest_gate(self) -> None:
+        campaign, campaign_remote = self._staged_campaign_bundle()
+        replace_with_unscoped_workflow_manifest(self.manifest_repo)
+        result = tag_repositories(
+            repos=("govoplan-campaign",),
+            repo_versions={"govoplan-campaign": "0.1.10"},
+            workspace_root=self.workspace,
+            apply=True,
+            push=False,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual("blocked", result["status"], result)
+        self.assertIn("scope-conditioned alternative", result["repositories"][0]["detail"])
+        for repository in (campaign, campaign_remote):
+            self.assertFalse(ref_exists(repository, "refs/tags/v0.1.10"))
+
+    def test_local_module_candidate_preserves_remote_tag_immutability(self) -> None:
+        campaign, campaign_remote = self._staged_campaign_bundle()
+        git(campaign, "tag", "-a", "v0.1.10", "-m", "Existing immutable tag", "v0.1.9^{commit}")
+        git(campaign, "push", "origin", "refs/tags/v0.1.10")
+        remote_refs = git_text(campaign_remote, "show-ref")
+        for local_exists in (True, False):
+            with self.subTest(local_exists=local_exists):
+                if not local_exists:
+                    git(campaign, "tag", "-d", "v0.1.10")
+                result = tag_repositories(
+                    repos=("govoplan-campaign",),
+                    repo_versions={"govoplan-campaign": "0.1.10"},
+                    workspace_root=self.workspace,
+                    apply=True,
+                    push=False,
+                )
+                self.assertEqual("blocked", result["status"], result)
+                self.assertIn("immutable tag", result["repositories"][0]["detail"])
+                self.assertIn("not HEAD", result["repositories"][0]["detail"])
+                self.assertEqual(remote_refs, git_text(campaign_remote, "show-ref"))
+                self.assertEqual(local_exists, ref_exists(campaign, "refs/tags/v0.1.10"))
+
+    def _staged_campaign_bundle(self) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
+        campaign, remote = create_release_repo(
+            root=self.root,
+            workspace=self.workspace,
+            name="govoplan-campaign",
+            version="0.1.9",
+        )
+        campaign_webui = campaign / "webui"
+        campaign_webui.mkdir()
+        package_path = campaign_webui / "package.json"
+        package_path.write_text(
+            '{"name":"@govoplan/campaign-webui","version":"0.1.9"}\n', encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+        git(campaign, "add", "webui/package.json")
+        git(campaign, "commit", "-m", "Prior Campaign WebUI package")
+        git(campaign, "tag", "-a", "v0.1.9", "-m", "Prior Campaign release")
+        git(campaign, "push", "origin", "main", "refs/tags/v0.1.9")
+        prior_commit = git_text(campaign, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        for path in (campaign / "pyproject.toml", package_path):
+            path.write_text(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").replace("0.1.9", "0.1.10"), encoding="utf-8")
+        git(campaign, "add", "pyproject.toml", "webui/package.json")
+        git(campaign, "commit", "-m", "Reviewed Campaign candidate")
+
+        core_webui = self.repo / "webui"
+        core_webui.mkdir()
+        dependency_ref = "git+ssh://git@example.test/acme/govoplan-campaign.git#v0.1.10"
+        package = {
+            "name": "@govoplan/core-webui",
+            "version": "0.1.10",
+            "dependencies": {"@govoplan/campaign-webui": dependency_ref},
+        }
+        (core_webui / "package.release.json").write_text(json.dumps(package) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        (core_webui / "package-lock.release.json").write_text(
+            json.dumps({"packages": {
+                "": package,
+                "node_modules/@govoplan/campaign-webui": {
+                    "version": "0.1.9",
+                    "resolved": f"git+ssh://git@example.test/acme/govoplan-campaign.git#{prior_commit}",
+                },
+            }}) + "\n",
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        git(self.repo, "add", "webui/package.release.json", "webui/package-lock.release.json")
+        git(self.repo, "commit", "-m", "Stage Core input before candidate lock resolution")
+        return campaign, remote
+

 def git(cwd: Path, *args: str) -> None:
    result = subprocess.run(
@@ -338,9 +518,50 @@ def add_scoped_workflow_manifest(repo: Path) -> None:
    backend.mkdir(parents=True)
    (package / "__init__.py").write_text("", encoding="utf-8")
    (backend / "__init__.py").write_text("", encoding="utf-8")
+    # This small workspace still has to satisfy the real presentation contract.
+    # Keep that prerequisite shared by both valid and intentionally unscoped
+    # documentation fixtures, so each test reaches its intended release gate.
+    canonical_areas = runpy.run_path(
+        str(META_ROOT / "tools" / "checks" / "check-manifest-shapes.py")
+    )["CANONICAL_PRODUCT_AREAS"]
+    (backend / "release_fixture.py").write_text(
+        """from govoplan_core.core.modules import FrontendModule, ProductAreaContribution
+from govoplan_core.core.views import ViewSurface
+
+
+def fixture_frontend():
+    return FrontendModule(
+        module_id="access",
+        view_surfaces=(
+            ViewSurface(
+                id="access.section.release-fixture",
+                module_id="access",
+                kind="section",
+                label="Release fixture",
+            ),
+        ),
+        product_areas=tuple(
+            ProductAreaContribution(
+                id=area_id,
+                module_id="access",
+                label=label,
+                icon=icon,
+                description=description,
+                order=order,
+                surface_ids=("access.section.release-fixture",),
+            )
+            for area_id, (label, icon, description, order) in CANONICAL_AREAS.items()
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+CANONICAL_AREAS = """ + repr(canonical_areas) + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
    (backend / "manifest.py").write_text(
        """from govoplan_core.core.modules import DocumentationCondition, DocumentationTopic, ModuleManifest, PermissionDefinition
 from govoplan_core.core.provider_governance import declared_module_architecture
+from .release_fixture import fixture_frontend


 def get_manifest():
@@ -348,6 +569,7 @@ def get_manifest():
        id="access",
        name="Access",
        version="0.1.10",
+        frontend=fixture_frontend(),
        permissions=(
            PermissionDefinition(
                scope="access:item:read",
@@ -403,6 +625,7 @@ def replace_with_unscoped_workflow_manifest(repo: Path) -> None:
    manifest.write_text(
        """from govoplan_core.core.modules import DocumentationTopic, ModuleManifest
 from govoplan_core.core.provider_governance import declared_module_architecture
+from .release_fixture import fixture_frontend


 def get_manifest():
@@ -410,6 +633,7 @@ def get_manifest():
        id="access",
        name="Access",
        version="0.1.10",
+        frontend=fixture_frontend(),
        documentation=(
            DocumentationTopic(
                id="access.workflow.unscoped",
@@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ class ReleaseRunApiTests(unittest.TestCase):

    def test_ui_and_runbook_state_tracking_boundary_are_explicit(self) -> None:
        webui = (RELEASE_ROOT / "webui" / "index.html").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        runbook = (META_ROOT / "docs" / "RELEASE_CONSOLE.md").read_text(
+        runbook = (META_ROOT / "docs" / "operations" / "RELEASE_CONSOLE.md").read_text(
            encoding="utf-8"
        )

@@ -13,12 +13,47 @@ if str(RELEASE_ROOT) not in sys.path:
    sys.path.insert(0, str(RELEASE_ROOT))

 from govoplan_release.version_metadata import (  # noqa: E402
+    VersionMetadataError,
    apply_version_metadata_mutations,
    version_metadata_mutations,
 )


 class ReleaseVersionMetadataTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_updates_shared_module_version_without_rewriting_independent_interfaces(self) -> None:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
+            root = Path(temp_dir)
+            backend = root / "src" / "govoplan_example" / "backend"
+            backend.mkdir(parents=True)
+            manifest = backend / "manifest.py"
+            manifest.write_text(
+                'MODULE_VERSION: str = "1.2.3"\n'
+                'manifest = ModuleManifest(id="example", version=MODULE_VERSION,\n'
+                '    provides_interfaces=(ModuleInterfaceProvider(name="api", version="2.0"),))\n',
+                encoding="utf-8",
+            )
+            changed = apply_version_metadata_mutations(root, target_version="1.2.4")
+            self.assertEqual(("src/govoplan_example/backend/manifest.py",), changed)
+            self.assertIn('MODULE_VERSION: str = "1.2.4"', manifest.read_text())
+            self.assertIn('version="2.0"', manifest.read_text())
+            self.assertEqual((), version_metadata_mutations(root, target_version="1.2.4"))
+
+    def test_dynamic_module_version_fails_before_any_metadata_is_written(self) -> None:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
+            root = Path(temp_dir)
+            backend = root / "src" / "govoplan_example" / "backend"
+            backend.mkdir(parents=True)
+            project = root / "pyproject.toml"
+            project.write_text('[project]\nname="govoplan-example"\nversion="1.2.3"\n')
+            before = project.read_bytes()
+            (backend / "manifest.py").write_text(
+                'MODULE_VERSION = compute_version()\n'
+                'manifest = ModuleManifest(id="example", version=MODULE_VERSION)\n',
+            )
+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(VersionMetadataError, "no literal MODULE_VERSION"):
+                apply_version_metadata_mutations(root, target_version="1.2.4")
+            self.assertEqual(before, project.read_bytes())
+
    def test_updates_recognized_metadata_without_changing_interface_versions(
        self,
    ) -> None:
@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ class SecurityAuditWrapperTests(unittest.TestCase):
            if [[ "${1:-}" == 'git' && "${2:-}" == '--help' ]]; then
              exit 0
            fi
+            if [[ " $* " != *" --redact=100 "* ]]; then
+              echo 'secret scans must redact reports and logs' >&2
+              exit 3
+            fi
            output=''
            while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
              if [[ "$1" == '--report-path' ]]; then
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import runpy
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+
+META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+CHECK = runpy.run_path(str(META_ROOT / "tools/checks/check-webui-package-facades.py"))
+
+
+class WebuiPackageFacadeTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.temporary = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(self.temporary.cleanup)
+        self.repository = Path(self.temporary.name) / "govoplan-example"
+        source = self.repository / "webui/src"
+        source.mkdir(parents=True)
+        (source / "index.ts").write_text("export {};\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        (source / "styles.css").write_text(":root {}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        self.webui = {
+            "name": "@govoplan/example-webui", "version": "0.1.2", "type": "module",
+            "main": "src/index.ts",
+            "exports": {".": {"import": "./src/index.ts"}, "./styles.css": "./src/styles.css"},
+            "peerDependencies": {"@govoplan/core-webui": "^0.1.45"},
+            "peerDependenciesMeta": {"@govoplan/core-webui": {"optional": True}},
+        }
+        self.root = {**self.webui, **{
+            field: CHECK["prefixed_entries"](self.webui[field])
+            for field in CHECK["ENTRY_FIELDS"] if field in self.webui
+        }}
+        self.write_manifests()
+
+    def write_manifests(self) -> None:
+        (self.repository / "webui/package.json").write_text(json.dumps(self.webui), encoding="utf-8")
+        (self.repository / "package.json").write_text(json.dumps(self.root), encoding="utf-8")
+
+    def issues(self) -> list[str]:
+        return CHECK["facade_issues"](self.repository, package_name="@govoplan/example-webui")
+
+    def test_matching_conditional_and_css_entries_are_accepted(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual([], self.issues())
+
+    def test_missing_root_or_generic_package_is_rejected(self) -> None:
+        (self.repository / "package.json").unlink()
+        self.assertIn("cannot read", " ".join(self.issues()))
+        self.root = {"name": "@govoplan/example", "version": "0.1.2"}
+        self.write_manifests()
+        self.assertIn("root name differs", " ".join(self.issues()))
+        self.assertIn("no WebUI entry point", " ".join(self.issues()))
+
+    def test_peer_drift_or_missing_entry_is_rejected(self) -> None:
+        self.root["peerDependencies"] = {"@govoplan/core-webui": "^9.0.0"}
+        self.write_manifests()
+        self.assertIn("peerDependencies differs", " ".join(self.issues()))
+        (self.repository / "webui/src/styles.css").unlink()
+        self.assertIn("missing exports entry", " ".join(self.issues()))
+
+    def test_entry_cannot_escape_webui_even_if_it_exists(self) -> None:
+        (self.repository / "outside.ts").write_text("export {};\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        self.root["main"] = "webui/../outside.ts"
+        self.write_manifests()
+        self.assertIn("escapes webui/", " ".join(self.issues()))
+
+    def test_release_composition_checks_only_declared_module_sources(self) -> None:
+        core = self.repository.parent / "govoplan-core/webui"
+        core.mkdir(parents=True)
+        (core / "package.release.json").write_text(json.dumps({"dependencies": {
+            "react": "19.2.7",
+            "@govoplan/example-webui": "git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-example.git#v0.1.2",
+        }}), encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertEqual((1, []), CHECK["check_composition"](self.repository.parent))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -39,11 +39,16 @@ GOVOPLAN_CORE_ROOT="$ROOT" PYTHON="$PYTHON" CHECK_TESTCLIENT_DEPRECATIONS=1 bash
 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-contracts.py" --no-impact
 PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-manifest-shapes.py" --require-architecture
 PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-dsar-coverage.py"
+"$NODE/node" "$META_ROOT/tests/test-jsx-value-imports.mjs"
+"$NODE/node" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-jsx-value-imports.mjs"
+"$NODE/node" "$META_ROOT/../govoplan-files/webui/scripts/test-archive-client.mjs"

 cd "$META_ROOT"
 "$PYTHON" tools/inventory/platform-interface-inventory.py --strict-declarations --strict-endpoints
 "$PYTHON" tools/repo/sync-module-package-workflows.py --check
 "$PYTHON" tools/release/generate-developer-meta-package.py --check
+"$PYTHON" tools/checks/check-webui-package-facades.py
+"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_webui_package_facades
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_module_package_workflows tests.test_package_registry_release
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_deployment_installer
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_capability_fit_evidence
@@ -96,6 +101,15 @@ PY
 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-shared-webui-primitives.py"
 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-shared-webui-foundations.py"
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_module_system
+"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_ownership_history_migration tests.test_ownership tests.test_ownership_api
+"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_navigation_preferences tests.test_api_smoke.ApiSmokeTests.test_navigation_separator_layout_survives_system_tenant_and_personal_saves
+"$PYTHON" -m pytest -q \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-files/tests/test_managed_archives.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-files/tests/test_archive_work.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-files/tests/test_archive_staging.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-files/tests/test_upload_response_batching.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-files/tests/test_archive_performance.py
+"$PYTHON" -m pytest -q /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-access/tests/test_external_function_mapping_migration.py
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-connectors/tests
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-datasources/tests
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-dataflow/tests
@@ -116,13 +130,31 @@ PY
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-identity-trust/tests
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-encryption/tests
 "$PYTHON" -m pytest -q /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-wiki/tests
-"$PYTHON" -m pytest -q /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_approval_gate.py
+"$PYTHON" -m pytest -q \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_approval_gate.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_editor_state_security.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_mail_profile_boundary.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_independent_configuration_repairs.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_incremental_review_persistence.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_reviewed_build_mock.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_delivery_policy_settings.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_synchronous_delivery_policy.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_workerless_recovery.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_imap_batch_integration.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_testbed_claim_recovery.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_campaign_optimistic_concurrency.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_archive_encryption_governance.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-policy/tests/test_campaign_archive_encryption.py \
+  /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-policy/tests/test_archive_encryption_api.py
 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-datasource-composition.py"
 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-sanctions-screening-composition.py"
+"$PYTHON" -m pytest -q /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-mail/tests/test_campaign_protocol_authorization.py /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-mail/tests/test_campaign_imap_batch.py
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-mail/tests
 "$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_api_smoke.ApiSmokeTests.test_mailbox_message_listing_reports_total_count

 cd "$ROOT/webui"
+"$NPM" run test:api-client-cache
+"$NPM" run test:dependency-security
 "$NPM" run test:layout-primitives
 "$NPM" run test:mail-components
 "$NPM" run test:module-capabilities
@@ -155,12 +187,19 @@ cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-postbox/webui
 cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-mail/webui
 "$NPM" run test:mail-ui

+cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-files/webui
+"$NPM" run test:managed-archive
+
 cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/webui
 "$NPM" run test:policy-ui
 "$NPM" run test:template-preview
+"$NPM" run test:review-workflow
 "$NPM" run test:accessibility-contract
 "$NPM" run test:campaign-collaboration
 "$NPM" run test:campaign-work

+cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-policy/webui
+"$NPM" run test:archive-encryption
+
 cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-wiki/webui
 "$NPM" run test:interface-pattern
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/** Reject erased type-only imports used as runtime JSX component tags. */
+import { readFileSync, readdirSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { createRequire } from "node:module";
+import { resolve, relative } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+
+const workspaceRoot = resolve(import.meta.dirname, "../../..");
+const require = createRequire(resolve(workspaceRoot, "govoplan-core/webui/package.json"));
+const ts = require("typescript");
+
+function isTypeOnlyImport(declaration) {
+  if (ts.isImportSpecifier(declaration)) return declaration.isTypeOnly || declaration.parent.parent.isTypeOnly;
+  if (ts.isNamespaceImport(declaration)) return declaration.parent.isTypeOnly;
+  return (ts.isImportClause(declaration) || ts.isImportEqualsDeclaration(declaration)) && declaration.isTypeOnly;
+}
+
+/** Resolve lexical bindings, including shadowing; do not typecheck unrelated
+ * optional dependencies or report ordinary application diagnostics.
+ */
+export function findTypeOnlyJsxImports(sources) {
+  const files = new Map(sources.map(({ path, source }) => [resolve(path),
+    ts.createSourceFile(resolve(path), source, ts.ScriptTarget.Latest, true, ts.ScriptKind.TSX)]));
+  const options = { noEmit: true, noResolve: true, noLib: true, types: [], jsx: ts.JsxEmit.Preserve };
+  const host = ts.createCompilerHost(options);
+  host.getSourceFile = (path) => files.get(resolve(path));
+  const program = ts.createProgram([...files.keys()], options, host);
+  const checker = program.getTypeChecker();
+  const findings = [];
+  for (const [path, source] of files) {
+    function visit(node) {
+      if (ts.isJsxOpeningElement(node) || ts.isJsxSelfClosingElement(node)) {
+        let root = node.tagName;
+        // Lower-case direct tags are intrinsic HTML, not runtime bindings.
+        if (!(ts.isIdentifier(root) && /^[a-z]/.test(root.text))) {
+          while (ts.isPropertyAccessExpression(root)) root = root.expression;
+          const declarations = checker.getSymbolAtLocation(root)?.declarations ?? [];
+          if (declarations.some(isTypeOnlyImport)) {
+            const position = source.getLineAndCharacterOfPosition(node.tagName.getStart(source));
+            findings.push({ path, line: position.line + 1, column: position.character + 1, component: node.tagName.getText(source) });
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      ts.forEachChild(node, visit);
+    }
+    visit(source);
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+
+function sourceFiles(directory) {
+  return readdirSync(directory, { withFileTypes: true }).flatMap((entry) => {
+    const path = resolve(directory, entry.name);
+    return entry.isDirectory() ? sourceFiles(path) : entry.name.endsWith(".tsx") ? [path] : [];
+  });
+}
+
+export function checkWorkspace(root = workspaceRoot) {
+  const modules = readdirSync(root, { withFileTypes: true })
+    .filter((entry) => entry.isDirectory() && entry.name.startsWith("govoplan"))
+    .map((entry) => resolve(root, entry.name, "webui/src")).filter(existsSync);
+  const paths = modules.flatMap(sourceFiles);
+  const findings = findTypeOnlyJsxImports(paths.map((path) => ({ path, source: readFileSync(path, "utf8") })));
+  for (const finding of findings) {
+    console.error(`${relative(root, finding.path)}:${finding.line}:${finding.column}: JSX component ${finding.component} is imported type-only and will be erased at runtime.`);
+  }
+  if (!findings.length) console.log(`JSX runtime-import contract passed: ${paths.length} TSX files across ${modules.length} WebUI modules.`);
+  return findings.length ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+if (process.argv[1] && resolve(process.argv[1]) === fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) {
+  process.exitCode = checkWorkspace();
+}
@@ -677,6 +677,7 @@ run_gitleaks() {
      prepare_machine_report "$REPORTS_DIR/gitleaks-history-$name.json" || return 2
      prepare_machine_report "$REPORTS_DIR/gitleaks-worktree-$name.json" || return 2
      gitleaks git \
+        --redact=100 \
        --config "$ROOT/.gitleaks.toml" \
        --report-format json \
        --report-path "$REPORTS_DIR/gitleaks-history-$name.json" \
@@ -687,6 +688,7 @@ run_gitleaks() {
      # Scan the directory as well so pre-commit audits cover the exact code
      # under review, while retaining the history scan above.
      gitleaks dir \
+        --redact=100 \
        --config "$ROOT/.gitleaks.toml" \
        --report-format json \
        --report-path "$REPORTS_DIR/gitleaks-worktree-$name.json" \
@@ -696,6 +698,7 @@ run_gitleaks() {
    else
      prepare_machine_report "$REPORTS_DIR/gitleaks-$name.json" || return 2
      gitleaks detect \
+        --redact=100 \
        --source "$repo" \
        --config "$ROOT/.gitleaks.toml" \
        --report-format json \
@@ -86,6 +86,12 @@ CENTRAL_COMPONENTS = {
    "CountBadge": pathlib.Path(
        "govoplan-core/webui/src/components/CountBadge.tsx"
    ),
+    "MultiSelectFilter": pathlib.Path(
+        "govoplan-core/webui/src/components/MultiSelectFilter.tsx"
+    ),
+    "ListSelectionFilter": pathlib.Path(
+        "govoplan-core/webui/src/components/ListSelectionFilter.tsx"
+    ),
    "SelectionList": pathlib.Path(
        "govoplan-core/webui/src/components/SelectionList.tsx"
    ),
@@ -190,7 +196,21 @@ REQUIRED_CONSUMERS = {
    "CountBadge": (
        pathlib.Path("govoplan-core/webui/src/layout/Titlebar.tsx"),
        pathlib.Path("govoplan-mail/webui/src/features/mail/MailboxPage.tsx"),
+    ),
+    # Search's old count badge was part of a retired module-local filter menu.
+    # Both surfaces must now compose the owning facet adapter and Core dropdown.
+    "SearchFilters": (
        pathlib.Path("govoplan-search/webui/src/features/search/SearchPage.tsx"),
+        pathlib.Path("govoplan-search/webui/src/components/GlobalSearch.tsx"),
+    ),
+    "MultiSelectFilter": (
+        pathlib.Path("govoplan-search/webui/src/components/SearchFilters.tsx"),
+        pathlib.Path("govoplan-notifications/webui/src/features/notifications/NotificationCenterPage.tsx"),
+        pathlib.Path("govoplan-docs/webui/src/features/docs/DocsPage.tsx"),
+    ),
+    "ListSelectionFilter": (
+        pathlib.Path("govoplan-core/webui/src/components/MultiSelectFilter.tsx"),
+        pathlib.Path("govoplan-core/webui/src/components/table/DataGrid.tsx"),
    ),
    "SelectionListItemContent": (
        pathlib.Path("govoplan-approvals/webui/src/features/approvals/ApprovalsPage.tsx"),
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Check that release Git dependencies expose their owning WebUI package."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+
+
+META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+GIT_REPOSITORY = re.compile(r"/(govoplan-[a-z0-9-]+)\.git#v[^/]+$")
+PARITY_FIELDS = (
+    "name", "version", "type", "dependencies", "optionalDependencies",
+    "peerDependencies", "peerDependenciesMeta",
+)
+ENTRY_FIELDS = ("main", "module", "types", "exports")
+
+
+def prefixed_entries(value: object) -> object:
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return "./webui/" + value[2:] if value.startswith("./") else "webui/" + value
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {key: prefixed_entries(item) for key, item in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [prefixed_entries(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def entry_paths(value: object) -> list[str]:
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return [value]
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return [path for item in value.values() for path in entry_paths(item)]
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [path for item in value for path in entry_paths(item)]
+    return []
+
+
+def facade_issues(repository: Path, *, package_name: str) -> list[str]:
+    issues: list[str] = []
+    try:
+        root = json.loads((repository / "package.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        webui = json.loads((repository / "webui/package.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+        return [f"{repository.name}: cannot read package facades: {exc}"]
+    if not isinstance(root, dict) or not isinstance(webui, dict):
+        return [f"{repository.name}: package manifests must be JSON objects"]
+    if webui.get("name") != package_name:
+        issues.append(f"{repository.name}: WebUI name does not match {package_name}")
+    for field in PARITY_FIELDS:
+        if root.get(field) != webui.get(field):
+            issues.append(f"{repository.name}: root {field} differs from owning WebUI package")
+    for field in ENTRY_FIELDS:
+        expected = prefixed_entries(webui.get(field))
+        if root.get(field) != expected:
+            issues.append(f"{repository.name}: root {field} must target the corresponding webui/ entry")
+        for entry in entry_paths(root.get(field)):
+            path = repository / entry
+            if not path.resolve().is_relative_to((repository / "webui").resolve()):
+                issues.append(f"{repository.name}: {field} entry escapes webui/: {entry}")
+            elif "*" not in entry and not path.is_file():
+                issues.append(f"{repository.name}: missing {field} entry: {entry}")
+    if not root.get("exports") and not root.get("main"):
+        issues.append(f"{repository.name}: root package has no WebUI entry point")
+    return issues
+
+
+def check_composition(workspace: Path, *, core_root: Path | None = None) -> tuple[int, list[str]]:
+    core = core_root or workspace / "govoplan-core"
+    release = json.loads((core / "webui/package.release.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    checked = 0
+    issues: list[str] = []
+    for name, reference in release.get("dependencies", {}).items():
+        if not name.startswith("@govoplan/"):
+            continue
+        match = GIT_REPOSITORY.search(reference) if isinstance(reference, str) else None
+        if match is None:
+            issues.append(f"{name}: release dependency is not a versioned GovOPlaN Git source")
+            continue
+        checked += 1
+        issues.extend(facade_issues(workspace / match.group(1), package_name=name))
+    return checked, issues
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--workspace-root", type=Path, default=META_ROOT.parent)
+    parser.add_argument("--core-root", type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    checked, issues = check_composition(args.workspace_root, core_root=args.core_root)
+    if issues:
+        print("\n".join(issues))
+        return 1
+    print(f"Release WebUI package facade checks passed for {checked} Git dependencies")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
  "resources": "Contract-only module: resource catalog and allocation persistence are not implemented; reassess before adding a migration-owned store.",
  "rest": "Transport-only module: REST binds explicitly published functions and owns no domain or subject-data store.",
  "soap": "Transport-only module: SOAP binds explicitly published operations and owns no domain or subject-data store.",
-  "tenancy": "Orchestration module: tenant lifecycle and settings use Core-owned storage; Access covers account and membership subject data.",
  "transparency": "Contract-only module: requests, disclosure reviews, and publications are not persisted; reassess before adding a migration-owned store.",
  "workflow": "Presentation-only module: Workflow edits and projects Workflow Engine state; Workflow Engine owns persistence and DSAR coverage.",
  "xrechnung": "Stateless validation-contract module: XRechnung persists no invoice, report, diagnostic, or handoff; the invoking Files, Procurement, or Payments workflow remains the subject-data owner. Reassess before adding a validation store."
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ EXISTING_PROXY_FILENAME = "existing-proxy.json"
 PLAN_FILENAME = "plan.json"
 RECEIPT_FILENAME = "receipt.json"
 CAPABILITIES_FILENAME = "infrastructure-capabilities.json"
+DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_FILENAME = "infrastructure-dependency-inventory.json"
 MANIFEST_FILENAME = "distribution-manifest.json"
 KEYRING_FILENAME = "distribution-keyring.json"
 BACKUP_EVIDENCE_FILENAME = "backup-evidence.json"
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ class BundlePaths:
    plan: Path
    receipt: Path
    capabilities: Path
+    dependency_inventory: Path
    manifest: Path
    keyring: Path
    backup_evidence: Path
@@ -141,6 +143,7 @@ def bundle_paths(root: Path) -> BundlePaths:
        plan=resolved / PLAN_FILENAME,
        receipt=resolved / RECEIPT_FILENAME,
        capabilities=resolved / CAPABILITIES_FILENAME,
+        dependency_inventory=resolved / DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_FILENAME,
        manifest=resolved / MANIFEST_FILENAME,
        keyring=resolved / KEYRING_FILENAME,
        backup_evidence=resolved / BACKUP_EVIDENCE_FILENAME,
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
 from typing import Mapping
 from urllib.parse import urlsplit

@@ -18,6 +19,10 @@ CAPABILITY_STATES = frozenset(
        "unavailable",
    }
 )
+DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+DEPENDENCY_STATES = frozenset(
+    {"active", "inactive", "data_present", "pending_work", "runtime_binding"}
+)


@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
@@ -50,13 +55,161 @@ class CapabilityChangeImpact:
    dependent_modules: tuple[str, ...]
    detail: str
    required_action: str
+    actual_dependencies: tuple["CapabilityDependency", ...] = ()
+    inventory_inspected: bool = False

    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
        value = asdict(self)
        value["dependent_modules"] = list(self.dependent_modules)
+        value["actual_dependencies"] = [
+            item.to_dict() for item in self.actual_dependencies
+        ]
        return value


+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CapabilityDependency:
+    capability_id: str
+    module_id: str
+    dependency_type: str
+    dependency_ref: str
+    state: str
+    scope: str
+    summary: str
+    metrics: Mapping[str, int]
+    required_action: str
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "capability_id": self.capability_id,
+            "module_id": self.module_id,
+            "dependency_type": self.dependency_type,
+            "dependency_ref": self.dependency_ref,
+            "state": self.state,
+            "scope": self.scope,
+            "summary": self.summary,
+            "metrics": dict(sorted(self.metrics.items())),
+            "required_action": self.required_action,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class InfrastructureDependencyInventory:
+    installation_id: str
+    generated_at: datetime
+    complete: bool
+    inspected_capability_ids: tuple[str, ...]
+    provider_count: int
+    dependencies: tuple[CapabilityDependency, ...]
+
+    def dependencies_for(
+        self,
+        capability_id: str,
+    ) -> tuple[CapabilityDependency, ...]:
+        return tuple(
+            item for item in self.dependencies if item.capability_id == capability_id
+        )
+
+
+def infrastructure_dependency_inventory_from_mapping(
+    value: object,
+) -> InfrastructureDependencyInventory:
+    if (
+        not isinstance(value, Mapping)
+        or value.get("schema_version") != DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_SCHEMA_VERSION
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency inventory schema is unsupported.")
+    installation_id = _inventory_text(value, "installation_id", maximum=100)
+    generated_at_text = _inventory_text(value, "generated_at", maximum=100)
+    try:
+        generated_at = datetime.fromisoformat(generated_at_text.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Infrastructure dependency inventory timestamp is invalid."
+        ) from exc
+    if generated_at.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency inventory timestamp needs a timezone.")
+    generated_at = generated_at.astimezone(UTC)
+    complete = value.get("complete")
+    if type(complete) is not bool:
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency inventory completion state is invalid.")
+    inspected = _inventory_string_list(
+        value.get("inspected_capability_ids"),
+        maximum_items=100,
+        maximum_length=120,
+    )
+    if len(inspected) != len(set(inspected)):
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency inventory repeats a capability id.")
+    providers = value.get("providers")
+    if not isinstance(providers, list) or len(providers) > 100:
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency provider reports are invalid.")
+    provider_states: list[str] = []
+    provider_declarations: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {}
+    provider_counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for provider in providers:
+        if not isinstance(provider, Mapping):
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency provider report is invalid.")
+        module_id = _inventory_text(provider, "module_id", maximum=120)
+        if module_id in provider_declarations:
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency provider is repeated.")
+        state = _inventory_text(provider, "state", maximum=40)
+        if state not in {"complete", "error"}:
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency provider state is invalid.")
+        provider_states.append(state)
+        count = provider.get("dependency_count")
+        if type(count) is not int or count < 0:
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency provider count is invalid.")
+        capability_ids = _inventory_string_list(
+            provider.get("capability_ids"),
+            maximum_items=30,
+            maximum_length=120,
+        )
+        if len(capability_ids) != len(set(capability_ids)):
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency provider capability is repeated.")
+        provider_declarations[module_id] = capability_ids
+        provider_counts[module_id] = count
+    if complete and any(state != "complete" for state in provider_states):
+        raise ValueError("Complete dependency inventory contains a failed provider.")
+    raw_dependencies = value.get("dependencies")
+    if not isinstance(raw_dependencies, list) or len(raw_dependencies) > 10_000:
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency records are invalid.")
+    dependencies = tuple(_inventory_dependency(item) for item in raw_dependencies)
+    if any(
+        capability_id not in inspected
+        for capability_ids in provider_declarations.values()
+        for capability_id in capability_ids
+    ):
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Infrastructure dependency provider was not covered by the inspection."
+        )
+    if any(item.capability_id not in inspected for item in dependencies):
+        raise ValueError("Dependency record was not covered by the inventory inspection.")
+    identities = {
+        (item.capability_id, item.module_id, item.dependency_type, item.dependency_ref)
+        for item in dependencies
+    }
+    if len(identities) != len(dependencies):
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency inventory repeats a record.")
+    observed_counts = {module_id: 0 for module_id in provider_counts}
+    for dependency in dependencies:
+        declarations = provider_declarations.get(dependency.module_id)
+        if declarations is None or dependency.capability_id not in declarations:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "Infrastructure dependency is outside its provider declaration."
+            )
+        observed_counts[dependency.module_id] += 1
+    if observed_counts != provider_counts:
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency provider count does not match records.")
+    return InfrastructureDependencyInventory(
+        installation_id=installation_id,
+        generated_at=generated_at,
+        complete=complete,
+        inspected_capability_ids=inspected,
+        provider_count=len(providers),
+        dependencies=dependencies,
+    )
+
+
 def infrastructure_capability_document(
    spec: InstallationSpec,
    environment: Mapping[str, str],
@@ -89,6 +242,8 @@ def infrastructure_capability_document(
 def capability_change_impacts(
    previous_document: object,
    desired_document: Mapping[str, object],
+    *,
+    dependency_inventory: InfrastructureDependencyInventory | None = None,
 ) -> tuple[CapabilityChangeImpact, ...]:
    previous = _capability_map(previous_document)
    desired = _capability_map(desired_document)
@@ -141,6 +296,43 @@ def capability_change_impacts(
            previous_secret_refs,
            desired_secret_refs,
        )
+        actual_dependencies = (
+            dependency_inventory.dependencies_for(capability_id)
+            if dependency_inventory is not None
+            else ()
+        )
+        inventory_inspected = bool(
+            dependency_inventory is not None
+            and capability_id in dependency_inventory.inspected_capability_ids
+        )
+        if inventory_inspected and actual_dependencies:
+            references = ", ".join(
+                f"{item.module_id}:{item.dependency_ref}"
+                for item in actual_dependencies
+            )
+            inventory_detail = (
+                f" Provider inventory reports {len(actual_dependencies)} persisted "
+                f"dependency record(s): {references}."
+            )
+        elif inventory_inspected:
+            inventory_detail = (
+                " Provider inventory reports no persisted module-owned dependencies."
+            )
+        else:
+            inventory_detail = " Provider inventory did not inspect this capability."
+        dependency_actions = tuple(
+            dict.fromkeys(
+                item.required_action
+                for item in actual_dependencies
+                if item.required_action.strip()
+            )
+        )
+        required_action = (
+            "Review module-owned configuration and data migration or recovery "
+            "evidence before apply."
+        )
+        if dependency_actions:
+            required_action = f"{required_action} {' '.join(dependency_actions)}"
        impacts.append(
            CapabilityChangeImpact(
                capability_id=capability_id,
@@ -153,11 +345,11 @@ def capability_change_impacts(
                detail=(
                    f"{capability_id} changes from {previous_state}/{previous_source} "
                    f"to {desired_state}/{desired_source}{binding_change}; "
-                    f"declared consumers: {dependent_label}."
-                ),
-                required_action=(
-                    "Review module-owned configuration and data migration or recovery evidence before apply."
+                    f"declared consumers: {dependent_label}.{inventory_detail}"
                ),
+                required_action=required_action,
+                actual_dependencies=actual_dependencies,
+                inventory_inspected=inventory_inspected,
            )
        )
    return tuple(impacts)
@@ -487,3 +679,73 @@ def _binding_change_label(
    if previous_secret_refs != desired_secret_refs:
        changes.append("secret-reference binding")
    return f" with changed {' and '.join(changes)}" if changes else ""
+
+
+def _inventory_text(
+    value: Mapping[str, object],
+    key: str,
+    *,
+    maximum: int,
+) -> str:
+    raw = value.get(key)
+    if not isinstance(raw, str):
+        raise ValueError(f"Infrastructure dependency inventory {key} is invalid.")
+    result = raw.strip()
+    if not result or len(result) > maximum or any(ord(char) < 32 for char in result):
+        raise ValueError(f"Infrastructure dependency inventory {key} is invalid.")
+    return result
+
+
+def _inventory_string_list(
+    value: object,
+    *,
+    maximum_items: int,
+    maximum_length: int,
+) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if not isinstance(value, list) or len(value) > maximum_items:
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency inventory list is invalid.")
+    items: list[str] = []
+    for raw in value:
+        if not isinstance(raw, str):
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency inventory list is invalid.")
+        item = raw.strip()
+        if (
+            not item
+            or len(item) > maximum_length
+            or any(ord(char) < 32 for char in item)
+        ):
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency inventory list is invalid.")
+        items.append(item)
+    return tuple(items)
+
+
+def _inventory_dependency(value: object) -> CapabilityDependency:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency record is invalid.")
+    state = _inventory_text(value, "state", maximum=40)
+    if state not in DEPENDENCY_STATES:
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency state is invalid.")
+    raw_metrics = value.get("metrics")
+    if not isinstance(raw_metrics, Mapping) or len(raw_metrics) > 20:
+        raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency metrics are invalid.")
+    metrics: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for raw_key, raw_count in raw_metrics.items():
+        if not isinstance(raw_key, str):
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency metric name is invalid.")
+        key = raw_key.strip()
+        if not key or len(key) > 80 or any(ord(char) < 32 for char in key):
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency metric name is invalid.")
+        if type(raw_count) is not int or raw_count < 0:
+            raise ValueError("Infrastructure dependency metric value is invalid.")
+        metrics[key] = raw_count
+    return CapabilityDependency(
+        capability_id=_inventory_text(value, "capability_id", maximum=120),
+        module_id=_inventory_text(value, "module_id", maximum=120),
+        dependency_type=_inventory_text(value, "dependency_type", maximum=120),
+        dependency_ref=_inventory_text(value, "dependency_ref", maximum=240),
+        state=state,
+        scope=_inventory_text(value, "scope", maximum=120),
+        summary=_inventory_text(value, "summary", maximum=1000),
+        metrics=metrics,
+        required_action=_inventory_text(value, "required_action", maximum=1000),
+    )
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ import sys
 import time
 from typing import Iterator, Mapping, Sequence
 from urllib.error import URLError
-from urllib.request import urlopen
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen

 from .backup_evidence import (
    DEFAULT_MAX_BACKUP_AGE_SECONDS,
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ from .backup_evidence import (
 )
 from .bundle import (
    BACKUP_RUNTIME_ENV_KEYS,
+    BundlePaths,
    atomic_write,
    bundle_paths,
    canonical_json,
@@ -45,7 +47,11 @@ from .bundle import (
    service_names,
    write_env,
 )
-from .capabilities import infrastructure_capability_document
+from .capabilities import (
+    InfrastructureDependencyInventory,
+    infrastructure_capability_document,
+    infrastructure_dependency_inventory_from_mapping,
+)
 from .cluster_evidence import collect_kubernetes_evidence
 from .distribution import (
    MAX_KEYRING_BYTES,
@@ -81,6 +87,7 @@ from .kubernetes import (
    write_secret_creation_hint,
 )
 from .planning import (
+    MAX_DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_BYTES,
    DeploymentPlan,
    build_plan,
    release_change_requires_backup,
@@ -152,6 +159,39 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
        default=120.0,
        help="Maximum time to wait for the public health endpoint.",
    )
+    apply_parser.add_argument(
+        "--ops-url",
+        help=(
+            "Dependency inventory URL; defaults to "
+            "<public-url>/api/v1/ops/infrastructure/dependencies."
+        ),
+    )
+    apply_parser.add_argument(
+        "--api-key-env",
+        default="GOVOPLAN_OPS_API_KEY",
+        help=(
+            "Environment variable containing an API key authorized to read "
+            "Ops dependency inventory."
+        ),
+    )
+
+    collect_inventory = subparsers.add_parser(
+        "collect-infrastructure-inventory",
+        help="Collect current module-owned capability dependencies from Ops.",
+    )
+    _directory_argument(collect_inventory)
+    collect_inventory.add_argument(
+        "--ops-url",
+        help=(
+            "Dependency inventory URL; defaults to "
+            "<public-url>/api/v1/ops/infrastructure/dependencies."
+        ),
+    )
+    collect_inventory.add_argument(
+        "--api-key-env",
+        default="GOVOPLAN_OPS_API_KEY",
+        help="Environment variable containing an authorized Ops API key.",
+    )

    status = subparsers.add_parser(
        "status", help="Show desired state and current Compose process state."
@@ -425,6 +465,8 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
            return _render_or_doctor(args)
        if args.command == "apply":
            return _apply(args)
+        if args.command == "collect-infrastructure-inventory":
+            return _collect_infrastructure_inventory(args)
        if args.command == "status":
            return _status(args)
        if args.command == "verify-release":
@@ -586,6 +628,25 @@ def _apply(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
            )
        secrets = reconcile_runtime_environment(spec, read_env(paths.env))
        secrets = _write_bundle(spec, paths, secrets)
+        preliminary_plan = build_plan(spec, paths, include_host_checks=False)
+        api_key_env = str(
+            getattr(args, "api_key_env", "GOVOPLAN_OPS_API_KEY")
+        ).strip()
+        api_key = os.environ.get(api_key_env, "").strip()
+        if preliminary_plan.capability_impacts and api_key:
+            try:
+                _collect_dependency_inventory(
+                    spec,
+                    paths,
+                    ops_url=getattr(args, "ops_url", None),
+                    api_key=api_key,
+                )
+                print("Refreshed infrastructure dependency inventory from Ops.")
+            except (OSError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+                print(
+                    f"warning: could not refresh dependency inventory: {exc}",
+                    file=sys.stderr,
+                )
        plan = build_plan(spec, paths, include_host_checks=True)
        _write_plan(paths.plan, plan)
        effective_errors = [
@@ -613,6 +674,8 @@ def _apply(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
        if effective_errors:
            _print_plan(plan)
            raise ValueError("deployment plan is blocked; resolve doctor errors first")
+        if plan.capability_impacts:
+            _print_plan(plan)
        docker = shutil.which("docker")
        if docker is None:
            raise ValueError("Docker CLI is required for apply")
@@ -761,6 +824,70 @@ def _apply(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
        return 0


+def _collect_infrastructure_inventory(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    paths = bundle_paths(args.directory)
+    spec = load_spec(paths.spec)
+    api_key_env = str(args.api_key_env).strip()
+    api_key = os.environ.get(api_key_env, "").strip()
+    if not api_key:
+        raise ValueError(f"{api_key_env} must contain an authorized Ops API key")
+    inventory = _collect_dependency_inventory(
+        spec,
+        paths,
+        ops_url=args.ops_url,
+        api_key=api_key,
+    )
+    state = "complete" if inventory.complete else "incomplete"
+    print(
+        f"Collected {state} provider dependency inventory with "
+        f"{len(inventory.dependencies)} record(s) at {paths.dependency_inventory}."
+    )
+    return 0 if inventory.complete else 1
+
+
+def _collect_dependency_inventory(
+    spec: InstallationSpec,
+    paths: BundlePaths,
+    *,
+    ops_url: str | None,
+    api_key: str,
+) -> InfrastructureDependencyInventory:
+    url = str(ops_url or "").strip() or (
+        spec.public_url.rstrip("/")
+        + "/api/v1/ops/infrastructure/dependencies"
+    )
+    _validate_ops_inventory_url(url)
+    request = Request(
+        url,
+        headers={"Accept": "application/json", "X-API-Key": api_key},
+    )
+    with urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:  # noqa: S310
+        _validate_ops_inventory_url(response.geturl())
+        encoded = response.read(MAX_DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_BYTES + 1)
+    if len(encoded) > MAX_DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_BYTES:
+        raise ValueError("Ops dependency inventory exceeds its size limit")
+    value = json.loads(encoded)
+    inventory = infrastructure_dependency_inventory_from_mapping(value)
+    if inventory.installation_id != spec.installation_id:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Ops dependency inventory belongs to a different installation"
+        )
+    ensure_private_directory(paths.root)
+    atomic_write(paths.dependency_inventory, canonical_json(value), mode=0o600)
+    return inventory
+
+
+def _validate_ops_inventory_url(url: str) -> None:
+    parsed = urlsplit(url)
+    if not parsed.hostname or parsed.username or parsed.password or parsed.fragment:
+        raise ValueError("Ops dependency inventory URL is invalid")
+    loopback = parsed.hostname in {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"}
+    if parsed.scheme != "https" and not (parsed.scheme == "http" and loopback):
+        raise ValueError(
+            "Ops dependency inventory URL requires HTTPS except on loopback"
+        )
+
+
 def _status(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
    paths = bundle_paths(args.directory)
    spec = load_spec(paths.spec)
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
 import hashlib
 import json
 import os
@@ -37,8 +38,10 @@ from .bundle import (
 )
 from .capabilities import (
    CapabilityChangeImpact,
+    InfrastructureDependencyInventory,
    capability_change_impacts,
    infrastructure_capability_document,
+    infrastructure_dependency_inventory_from_mapping,
 )
 from .distribution import (
    MAX_KEYRING_BYTES,
@@ -110,6 +113,9 @@ class DeploymentPlan:


 CommandRunner = Callable[[Sequence[str], Path], subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]]
+MAX_DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 300
+DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS = 60


 def build_plan(
@@ -135,9 +141,13 @@ def build_plan(
        spec,
        read_env(paths.env),
    )
+    dependency_inventory, dependency_inventory_error = (
+        _read_dependency_inventory(paths.dependency_inventory)
+    )
    capability_impacts = capability_change_impacts(
        previous.get("infrastructure_capabilities"),
        infrastructure_capabilities,
+        dependency_inventory=dependency_inventory,
    )

    actions: list[PlanAction] = []
@@ -215,6 +225,14 @@ def build_plan(
        )
        for impact in capability_impacts
    )
+    checks.extend(
+        _dependency_inventory_checks(
+            spec,
+            capability_impacts,
+            dependency_inventory,
+            dependency_inventory_error,
+        )
+    )
    if include_host_checks:
        checks.extend(host_checks(spec, paths, command_runner=command_runner))
    return DeploymentPlan(
@@ -1187,6 +1205,106 @@ def _read_receipt(path: Path) -> Mapping[str, object]:
    return value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}


+def _read_dependency_inventory(
+    path: Path,
+) -> tuple[InfrastructureDependencyInventory | None, str]:
+    if not path.exists():
+        return None, "missing"
+    try:
+        value = load_bounded_json(
+            path,
+            maximum_bytes=MAX_DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_BYTES,
+        )
+        return infrastructure_dependency_inventory_from_mapping(value), ""
+    except (DistributionError, ValueError) as exc:
+        return None, str(exc)
+
+
+def _dependency_inventory_checks(
+    spec: InstallationSpec,
+    impacts: tuple[CapabilityChangeImpact, ...],
+    inventory: InfrastructureDependencyInventory | None,
+    inventory_error: str,
+) -> tuple[Check, ...]:
+    if not impacts:
+        return ()
+    collect_action = (
+        "Run govoplan-deploy collect-infrastructure-inventory with an Ops API "
+        "key, then review the capability impacts before apply."
+    )
+    if inventory is None:
+        if inventory_error == "missing":
+            message = "Current provider dependency inventory is missing."
+            check_id = "capability.dependency_inventory.missing"
+        else:
+            message = f"Provider dependency inventory is invalid: {inventory_error}"
+            check_id = "capability.dependency_inventory.invalid"
+        return (Check(check_id, "error", message, collect_action),)
+    if inventory.installation_id != spec.installation_id:
+        return (
+            Check(
+                "capability.dependency_inventory.installation",
+                "error",
+                "Provider dependency inventory belongs to a different installation.",
+                collect_action,
+            ),
+        )
+    if not inventory.complete:
+        return (
+            Check(
+                "capability.dependency_inventory.incomplete",
+                "error",
+                "Provider dependency inventory is incomplete because at least one provider failed.",
+                "Resolve the provider failure and collect the inventory again.",
+            ),
+        )
+    age_seconds = (datetime.now(UTC) - inventory.generated_at).total_seconds()
+    if age_seconds < -DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS:
+        return (
+            Check(
+                "capability.dependency_inventory.future",
+                "error",
+                "Provider dependency inventory timestamp is in the future.",
+                "Correct host clock skew and collect the inventory again.",
+            ),
+        )
+    if age_seconds > DEPENDENCY_INVENTORY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS:
+        return (
+            Check(
+                "capability.dependency_inventory.stale",
+                "error",
+                "Provider dependency inventory is older than five minutes.",
+                collect_action,
+            ),
+        )
+    impacted_ids = {item.capability_id for item in impacts}
+    missing_ids = sorted(impacted_ids - set(inventory.inspected_capability_ids))
+    if missing_ids:
+        return (
+            Check(
+                "capability.dependency_inventory.coverage",
+                "error",
+                "Provider dependency inventory did not inspect impacted capabilities: "
+                + ", ".join(missing_ids)
+                + ".",
+                collect_action,
+            ),
+        )
+    matching_dependencies = sum(
+        len(inventory.dependencies_for(capability_id))
+        for capability_id in impacted_ids
+    )
+    return (
+        Check(
+            "capability.dependency_inventory.current",
+            "ok",
+            "Current provider inventory inspected every impacted capability and "
+            f"reported {matching_dependencies} persisted dependency record(s) from "
+            f"{inventory.provider_count} provider(s).",
+        ),
+    )
+
+
 def _memory_bytes() -> int | None:
    try:
        for line in Path("/proc/meminfo").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ _BUNDLE_FILES = (
    "backup-verification.json",
    "receipt.json",
    "infrastructure-capabilities.json",
+    "infrastructure-dependency-inventory.json",
 )


@@ -1379,6 +1379,13 @@
      "rationale": "Operational worker, scheduler, reconciliation, or health endpoint; it is not a direct user surface.",
      "repository": "govoplan-notifications"
    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "GET",
+      "path": "/ops/infrastructure/dependencies",
+      "rationale": "Authorized host-deployer preflight consumes this provider inventory directly; it is private operational evidence rather than a product page.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-ops"
+    },
    {
      "category": "worker_internal",
      "method": "GET",
@@ -1713,6 +1720,13 @@
      "rationale": "The module WebUI constructs this endpoint through a mounted router prefix, generic action, or provider path.",
      "repository": "govoplan-projects"
    },
+    {
+      "category": "ui_reachable",
+      "method": "POST",
+      "path": "/records/{}/access-grants/{}/revoke",
+      "rationale": "The restricted-record access dialog revokes a grant through the shared dynamically constructed record mutation path.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-records"
+    },
    {
      "category": "ui_reachable",
      "method": "POST",
@@ -2000,6 +2014,20 @@
      "rationale": "Published integration, interoperability, public-participant, or health endpoint.",
      "repository": "govoplan-soap"
    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "GET",
+      "path": "/admin/tenant-erasure-policy",
+      "rationale": "Tenant-erasure policy is a consequential operator API with recent-authentication and dedicated-permission gates.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
+    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "PATCH",
+      "path": "/admin/tenant-erasure-policy",
+      "rationale": "Tenant-erasure policy is a consequential operator API with recent-authentication and dedicated-permission gates.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
+    },
    {
      "category": "intentionally_headless",
      "method": "GET",
@@ -2007,6 +2035,48 @@
      "rationale": "Tenant deletion preflight is an administrative safety API consumed before a destructive workflow.",
      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "POST",
+      "path": "/admin/tenants/{}/erasure-operations",
+      "rationale": "Tenant erasure is an audited, provider-driven operator workflow whose API exposes the complete review and recovery evidence.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
+    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "GET",
+      "path": "/admin/tenants/{}/erasure-operations/{}",
+      "rationale": "Tenant erasure is an audited, provider-driven operator workflow whose API exposes the complete review and recovery evidence.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
+    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "POST",
+      "path": "/admin/tenants/{}/erasure-operations/{}/approve",
+      "rationale": "Tenant-erasure approval requires typed confirmation, recent authentication, and a distinct authorized account.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
+    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "POST",
+      "path": "/admin/tenants/{}/erasure-operations/{}/cancel",
+      "rationale": "Tenant-erasure cancellation is a recovery control available only before destructive work starts.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
+    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "POST",
+      "path": "/admin/tenants/{}/erasure-operations/{}/execute",
+      "rationale": "Tenant-erasure execution is a consequential operator API with provider checkpoints and fail-closed reconciliation.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
+    },
+    {
+      "category": "intentionally_headless",
+      "method": "POST",
+      "path": "/admin/tenants/{}/erasure-operations/{}/reconcile",
+      "rationale": "Tenant-erasure reconciliation resumes idempotent provider steps after pending or outcome-unknown effects.",
+      "repository": "govoplan-tenancy"
+    },
    {
      "category": "compatibility",
      "method": "POST",
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import json
 from pathlib import Path
 import re
 import subprocess
+import sys
 import tomllib


@@ -216,10 +217,17 @@ def _extras(value: str | None) -> list[str]:


 def _git(repository: Path, *arguments: str) -> str:
+    release_root = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent)
+    if release_root not in sys.path:
+        sys.path.insert(0, release_root)
+    from govoplan_release.git_state import sanitized_git_environment, scoped_git_command
+
    return subprocess.check_output(
-        ["git", "-C", str(repository), *arguments],
+        scoped_git_command(repository, "-C", str(repository), *arguments),
        text=True,
        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        env=sanitized_git_environment(),
+        timeout=30,
    ).strip()


@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ import re
 import stat
 import zipfile

+from .registry_reference import registry_artifact_conflicts, registry_entry_source
+

 WHEEL_PAYLOAD_ALGORITHM = "govoplan-wheel-declared-payload-v1"
 INSTALLED_PAYLOAD_ALGORITHM = "govoplan-installed-record-payload-v1"
@@ -185,10 +187,23 @@ def selected_artifact_identity_issues(payload: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
    modules = payload.get("modules")
    if isinstance(modules, list):
        entries.extend(modules)
+    conflicts = registry_artifact_conflicts(entries)
+    if conflicts:
+        return conflicts
    package_by_repo: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {}
+    registry_artifacts: dict[str, dict[str, object]] = {}
    for entry in entries:
        if not isinstance(entry, dict):
            continue
+        try:
+            registry_source = registry_entry_source(entry)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            return (str(exc),)
+        if registry_source is not None:
+            package = str(entry["python_package"])
+            package_by_repo[registry_source.repository] = (package, registry_source.version)
+            registry_artifacts[package] = entry["artifact_integrity"]["python"]
+            continue
        python_ref = entry.get("python_ref")
        match = _PYTHON_REF.search(python_ref) if isinstance(python_ref, str) else None
        package_name = entry.get("python_package")
@@ -219,6 +234,14 @@ def selected_artifact_identity_issues(payload: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
    issues: list[str] = []
    if malformed_artifacts:
        issues.append("release.artifacts contains malformed or duplicate identities")
+    for package, registry_artifact in registry_artifacts.items():
+        artifact = artifacts_by_package.get(package)
+        if artifact is None or (
+            artifact.get("archive_sha256") != registry_artifact.get("sha256")
+            or artifact.get("archive_size") != registry_artifact.get("size")
+            or artifact.get("package_version") != registry_artifact["registry_identity"].rsplit("@", 1)[-1]
+        ):
+            issues.append(f"registry artifact {package} has no matching inspected wheel byte identity")
    seen_repos: set[str] = set()
    for unit in selected_units:
        if not isinstance(unit, dict):
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from typing import Iterator
 from govoplan_core.core.modules import ModuleManifest
 from govoplan_core.core.versioning import version_satisfies_range

+from .git_state import sanitized_git_environment, scoped_git_command
 from .workspace import load_repository_specs, resolve_repo_path


@@ -255,20 +256,19 @@ def materialized_source_tree(root: Path, *, source_ref: str | None) -> Iterator[
        source_root = temporary / "source"
        source_root.mkdir()
        result = subprocess.run(
-            [
-                "git",
-                "-C",
-                str(root),
+            scoped_git_command(
+                root, "-C", str(root),
                "archive",
                "--format=tar",
                f"--output={archive_path}",
                source_ref,
-            ],
+            ),
            check=False,
            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            text=True,
            timeout=30,
+            env=sanitized_git_environment(),
        )
        if result.returncode != 0:
            detail = result.stderr.strip() or "Git archive failed"
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+"""Build a private full-profile candidate from exact verified registry bytes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from functools import lru_cache
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
+import re
+import runpy
+import stat
+import tarfile
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import quote
+
+from .artifact_identity import inspect_python_wheel, selected_artifact_identity_issues
+from .candidate_artifact import (
+    ensure_private_candidate_root, harden_private_candidate_tree,
+    validate_release_channel,
+)
+from .catalog import canonical_hash
+from .module_directory import write_module_directory
+from .selective_catalog import (
+    authenticate_base_catalog_signatures, authenticate_base_keyring,
+    configured_signer_public_keys, enforce_selected_version_alignment,
+    next_sequence, parse_signing_key, read_bounded_json_source, signature,
+    validate_catalog_object,
+)
+from .source_provenance import (
+    registered_source_origin_issues, selected_source_provenance,
+    source_tag_provenance_issues,
+)
+from .version_alignment import candidate_catalog_version_issues
+from .workspace import META_ROOT, resolve_workspace_root, website_root
+
+
+MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES = 512 * 1024 * 1024
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=3)
+def _tool(name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    # These are fixed, operator-controlled release modules, not caller paths.
+    if name not in {
+        "generate-release-package-set", "generate-release-catalog",
+        "resolve-package-artifacts",
+    }:
+        raise ValueError("unknown registry release tool")
+    return runpy.run_path(str(META_ROOT / "tools" / "release" / f"{name}.py"))
+
+
+def authenticate_full_rebuild_base(
+    *, web_root: Path, channel: str, signer_public_keys: dict[str, str],
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Authenticate the fixed website pair without reusing legacy entry data.
+
+    Only this full rebuild may migrate a legacy catalog without a keyring hash.
+    In that case *every* active website key must exactly equal a configured
+    signer; injecting an additional website key cannot extend trust. Selective
+    candidates retain their stricter existing hash-pinned-base requirement.
+    """
+
+    root = web_root / "public" / "catalogs" / "v1"
+    catalog = read_bounded_json_source(root / "channels" / f"{channel}.json", label="published base catalog")
+    keyring = read_bounded_json_source(root / "keyring.json", label="published website keyring")
+    if not isinstance(catalog, dict) or not isinstance(keyring, dict):
+        raise ValueError("published website catalog/keyring must be objects")
+    trusted_keys = authenticate_base_keyring(keyring)
+    release = catalog.get("release")
+    pinned = release.get("keyring_sha256") if isinstance(release, dict) else None
+    if pinned is None:
+        if trusted_keys != signer_public_keys or len(keyring["keys"]) != len(trusted_keys):
+            raise ValueError("legacy full rebuild requires exactly the configured known website signers")
+    elif pinned != canonical_hash(keyring):
+        raise ValueError("published base catalog does not pin its exact website keyring")
+    if any(trusted_keys.get(key) != value for key, value in signer_public_keys.items()):
+        raise ValueError("full rebuild cannot introduce or replace a website signer")
+    authenticate_base_catalog_signatures(
+        catalog, base_trusted_keys=trusted_keys, configured_signers=signer_public_keys,
+    )
+    validation = validate_catalog_object(
+        catalog, approved_channel=channel, signer_public_keys=signer_public_keys,
+    )
+    if validation.get("valid") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"published base catalog failed validation: {validation.get('error')}")
+    return catalog, keyring
+
+
+def build_full_registry_candidate(
+    *, package_set_path: Path, package_lock_path: Path,
+    wheelhouse: Path, webui_packages: Path, output_dir: Path,
+    selected_repositories: tuple[str, ...], signing_keys: tuple[str, ...],
+    workspace_root: Path | str | None = None, channel: str = "stable",
+    source_remote: str = "origin", public_base_url: str = "https://govoplan.add-ideas.de",
+    expires_days: int = 90, sequence: int | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    channel = validate_release_channel(channel)
+    if not isinstance(expires_days, int) or isinstance(expires_days, bool) or not 1 <= expires_days <= 365:
+        raise ValueError("catalog expiry must be between 1 and 365 days")
+    workspace = resolve_workspace_root(workspace_root)
+    ensure_private_candidate_root(workspace)
+    output = output_dir.expanduser().absolute()
+    ensure_private_candidate_root(output.parent, create=True)
+    if output.exists() or output.is_symlink():
+        raise ValueError("full candidate output must not already exist")
+    parsed_keys = tuple(parse_signing_key(value) for value in signing_keys)
+    if not parsed_keys:
+        raise ValueError("full candidate needs a configured signing key")
+    signer_keys = configured_signer_public_keys(parsed_keys)
+    base, keyring = authenticate_full_rebuild_base(
+        web_root=website_root(workspace), channel=channel, signer_public_keys=signer_keys,
+    )
+    package_set = _hashed_json(package_set_path, "package_set_sha256")
+    lock = _hashed_json(package_lock_path, "lock_sha256")
+    generator = _tool("generate-release-catalog")
+    version = package_set.get("release_version")
+    if package_set.get("profile") != "full" or not isinstance(version, str):
+        raise ValueError("full candidate requires the complete full-profile package set")
+    expected = _tool("generate-release-package-set")["generate_package_set"](
+        core_version=version, requirements=META_ROOT / "requirements-release.txt",
+        workspace=workspace, profile="full",
+        meta_package=META_ROOT / "packages/govoplan-meta/pyproject.toml",
+    )
+    if package_set != expected:
+        raise ValueError("package set differs from exact Meta full pins or immutable tag metadata")
+    generator["_validate_release_inputs"](package_set, lock, core_version=version)
+    if lock.get("registries") != package_set.get("registries"):
+        raise ValueError("artifact lock uses different package registries")
+    versions = {row["repository"]: row["version"] for row in package_set["python"]}
+    origin_failures = registered_source_origin_issues(
+        repo_versions=versions, workspace=workspace, remote=source_remote,
+    )
+    if origin_failures:
+        raise ValueError("Registered source origin gate failed: " + "; ".join(item.describe() for item in origin_failures))
+    selected = set(selected_repositories)
+    if not selected or len(selected) != len(selected_repositories) or not selected <= versions.keys():
+        raise ValueError("selected repositories must be unique members of the full package set")
+    selected_versions = {repo: versions[repo] for repo in sorted(selected)}
+    enforce_selected_version_alignment(repo_versions=selected_versions, workspace=workspace)
+    failures = source_tag_provenance_issues(
+        repo_versions=versions, workspace=workspace, remote=source_remote,
+        require_head_repos=selected,
+    )
+    if failures:
+        raise ValueError("Full source provenance gate failed: " + "; ".join(item.describe() for item in failures))
+    provenance = selected_source_provenance(repo_versions=versions, workspace=workspace)
+    wheel_identities = verify_registry_artifacts(
+        package_set=package_set, lock=lock, wheelhouse=wheelhouse,
+        webui_packages=webui_packages,
+    )
+    generated_at = datetime.now(tz=UTC)
+    resolved_sequence = sequence if sequence is not None else next_sequence(base, generated_at=generated_at)
+    if isinstance(resolved_sequence, bool) or not isinstance(resolved_sequence, int) or resolved_sequence <= int(base.get("sequence") or 0):
+        raise ValueError("full candidate sequence must advance the authenticated published channel")
+    # Fresh tagged manifests, including unchanged tagged ancestors; no legacy
+    # entry, registry hash, source URL or dependency contract is carried over.
+    candidate = generator["_catalog_payload"](
+        package_set=package_set, package_lock=lock, channel=channel,
+        sequence=resolved_sequence, generated_at=generated_at,
+        expires_at=generated_at + timedelta(days=expires_days), workspace=workspace,
+        public_base_url=public_base_url.rstrip("/"),
+    )
+    for entry in [candidate["core_release"], *candidate["modules"]]:
+        repo = entry["python_package"]
+        entry["source"] = {
+            "repository": repo, "tag": f"v{versions[repo]}",
+            "commit": provenance[repo]["commit_sha"],
+            "tag_object_sha": provenance[repo]["tag_object_sha"],
+            "repository_url": f"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/{repo}",
+            "revision_url": f"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/{repo}/commit/{provenance[repo]['commit_sha']}",
+        }
+    candidate["release"].update({
+        "selected_units": [
+            {"repo": repo, "version": versions[repo], "tag": f"v{versions[repo]}", **provenance[repo]}
+            for repo in sorted(selected)
+        ],
+        "keyring_sha256": canonical_hash(keyring),
+        "artifacts": wheel_identities,
+        "base_catalog_sha256": canonical_hash(base),
+    })
+    # Recheck the exact objects used by synthesis, including unchanged source
+    # ancestors, before signing. No late tag movement can change this candidate.
+    origin_failures = registered_source_origin_issues(
+        repo_versions=versions, workspace=workspace, remote=source_remote,
+    )
+    if origin_failures:
+        raise ValueError("Registered source origin changed during synthesis: " + "; ".join(item.describe() for item in origin_failures))
+    failures = source_tag_provenance_issues(
+        repo_versions=versions, workspace=workspace, remote=source_remote,
+        require_head_repos=selected,
+        expected_commits={repo: row["commit_sha"] for repo, row in provenance.items()},
+        expected_tag_objects={repo: row["tag_object_sha"] for repo, row in provenance.items()},
+    )
+    if failures:
+        raise ValueError("Full source provenance changed during synthesis: " + "; ".join(item.describe() for item in failures))
+    failures = candidate_catalog_version_issues(candidate)
+    identity_failures = selected_artifact_identity_issues(candidate)
+    if failures or identity_failures:
+        raise ValueError("full candidate identity validation failed: " + "; ".join(
+            [item.message for item in failures] + list(identity_failures)
+        ))
+    candidate["signatures"] = [signature(candidate, key_id=key, private_key=value) for key, value in parsed_keys]
+    validation = validate_catalog_object(candidate, approved_channel=channel, signer_public_keys=signer_keys)
+    if validation.get("valid") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"signed full candidate failed validation: {validation.get('error')}")
+    # Exclusive output creation preserves earlier reviewed candidates.
+    output.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    (output / "channels").mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    catalog_path = output / "channels" / f"{channel}.json"
+    _write_private_json(catalog_path, candidate)
+    _write_private_json(output / "keyring.json", keyring)
+    write_module_directory(
+        catalog_payload=candidate, keyring_payload=keyring, output_root=output,
+        channel=channel, public_base_url=public_base_url,
+    )
+    result = {
+        "status": "ready", "candidate_dir": str(output), "catalog_path": str(catalog_path),
+        "channel": channel, "sequence": resolved_sequence,
+        "package_count": len(package_set["python"]), "webui_count": len(package_set["webui"]),
+        "selected_count": len(selected), "candidate_catalog_hash": canonical_hash(candidate),
+        "candidate_keyring_hash": canonical_hash(keyring), "validation_valid": True,
+    }
+    _write_private_json(output / "summary.json", result)
+    harden_private_candidate_tree(output)
+    return result
+
+
+def _hashed_json(path: Path, field: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    payload = read_bounded_json_source(path, label=field)
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError(f"{field} input must be an object")
+    unsigned = dict(payload)
+    expected = unsigned.pop(field, None)
+    # Registry tools use their established ASCII-escaped canonical form.
+    encoded = json.dumps(unsigned, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+    if expected != hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest():
+        raise ValueError(f"{field} does not match its contents")
+    return payload
+
+
+def verify_registry_artifacts(
+    *, package_set: dict[str, Any], lock: dict[str, Any],
+    wheelhouse: Path, webui_packages: Path,
+) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
+    """Compare exact registry bytes, metadata and source bindings without installs."""
+
+    identities = []
+    for group, root, suffix in (("python", wheelhouse, ".whl"), ("webui", webui_packages, ".tgz")):
+        ensure_private_candidate_root(root)
+        expected = {row["name"]: row for row in package_set[group]}
+        rows = lock[group]
+        if not isinstance(rows, list) or len(rows) != len(expected):
+            raise ValueError(f"artifact lock has duplicate/missing {group} rows")
+        filenames: set[str] = set()
+        seen: set[str] = set()
+        for row in rows:
+            selected = expected.get(row.get("name")) if isinstance(row, dict) else None
+            if selected is None or row["name"] in seen:
+                raise ValueError(f"artifact lock has unexpected/duplicate {group} identities")
+            seen.add(row["name"])
+            for key in ("name", "version", "repository", "tag", "commit"):
+                if row.get(key) != selected[key]:
+                    raise ValueError("artifact lock differs from selected source identity")
+            filename = row.get("filename")
+            if not isinstance(filename, str) or re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._+-]{0,254}", filename) is None or not filename.endswith(suffix) or filename in filenames:
+                raise ValueError("artifact filename is invalid or duplicated")
+            filenames.add(filename)
+            path = root / filename
+            sha256, sha512, size = _hash_artifact(path)
+            if (sha256, size) != (row.get("sha256"), row.get("size")):
+                raise ValueError(f"registry artifact bytes differ from locked identity: {filename}")
+            if group == "python":
+                expected_url = _tool("resolve-package-artifacts")["_python_artifact_url"](
+                    package_set["registries"]["python"], package=selected, filename=filename,
+                )
+                if row.get("url") != expected_url:
+                    raise ValueError("Python artifact URL differs from the selected registry")
+                identity = inspect_python_wheel(path)
+                if (identity.package_name, identity.package_version, identity.archive_sha256, identity.archive_size) != (row["name"], row["version"], sha256, size):
+                    raise ValueError("wheel metadata or bytes differ from the registry lock")
+                identities.append(identity.catalog_payload())
+            else:
+                expected_url = (
+                    package_set["registries"]["npm"].rstrip("/") + "/"
+                    + quote(row["name"], safe="") + "/-/"
+                    + quote(row["version"], safe="") + "/"
+                    + quote(row["name"].split("/", 1)[1] + "-" + row["version"] + ".tgz", safe="")
+                )
+                if row.get("url") != expected_url:
+                    raise ValueError("WebUI artifact URL differs from the selected registry")
+                if row.get("integrity") != "sha512-" + base64.b64encode(sha512).decode("ascii"):
+                    raise ValueError("WebUI registry integrity differs from downloaded bytes")
+                _inspect_npm_metadata(
+                    path, name=row["name"], version=row["version"],
+                    expected_identity=(sha256, sha512, size),
+                )
+        actual = set()
+        for index, path in enumerate(root.iterdir()):
+            if index >= 1000:
+                raise ValueError("registry artifact directory exceeds its inspection bound")
+            actual.add(path.name)
+        if actual != filenames:
+            raise ValueError(f"registry directory contains unexpected or missing {group} files")
+    return sorted(identities, key=lambda row: str(row["package_name"]))
+
+
+def _hash_artifact(path: Path) -> tuple[str, bytes, int]:
+    descriptor = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0) | getattr(os, "O_NONBLOCK", 0))
+    try:
+        initial = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(initial.st_mode) or not 0 < initial.st_size <= MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES:
+            raise ValueError("registry artifact must be a bounded regular file")
+        digest, sri, total = hashlib.sha256(), hashlib.sha512(), 0
+        while chunk := os.read(descriptor, 1024 * 1024):
+            total += len(chunk)
+            if total > MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES:
+                raise ValueError("registry artifact exceeds its byte bound")
+            digest.update(chunk)
+            sri.update(chunk)
+        final = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if (initial.st_ino, initial.st_size, initial.st_mtime_ns, initial.st_ctime_ns) != (final.st_ino, total, final.st_mtime_ns, final.st_ctime_ns):
+            raise ValueError("registry artifact changed while being inspected")
+        return digest.hexdigest(), sri.digest(), total
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+
+
+def _inspect_npm_metadata(
+    path: Path, *, name: str, version: str,
+    expected_identity: tuple[str, bytes, int] | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    descriptor = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0) | getattr(os, "O_NONBLOCK", 0))
+    try:
+        initial = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(initial.st_mode) or not 0 < initial.st_size <= MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES:
+            raise ValueError("WebUI archive must be a bounded regular file")
+        digest, sri, total = hashlib.sha256(), hashlib.sha512(), 0
+        while chunk := os.read(descriptor, 1024 * 1024):
+            total += len(chunk)
+            if total > MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES:
+                raise ValueError("WebUI archive exceeds its byte bound")
+            digest.update(chunk)
+            sri.update(chunk)
+        if expected_identity is not None and (digest.hexdigest(), sri.digest(), total) != expected_identity:
+            raise ValueError("WebUI archive changed before metadata inspection")
+        os.lseek(descriptor, 0, os.SEEK_SET)
+        with os.fdopen(os.dup(descriptor), "rb") as stream:
+            _inspect_npm_stream(stream, name=name, version=version)
+        final = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        if (initial.st_ino, initial.st_size, initial.st_mtime_ns, initial.st_ctime_ns) != (final.st_ino, total, final.st_mtime_ns, final.st_ctime_ns):
+            raise ValueError("WebUI archive changed during metadata inspection")
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+
+
+def _inspect_npm_stream(stream: Any, *, name: str, version: str) -> None:
+    found = False
+    total = 0
+    with tarfile.open(fileobj=stream, mode="r|gz") as archive:
+        for index, member in enumerate(archive):
+            total += member.size
+            parts = PurePosixPath(member.name).parts
+            if index >= 10000 or total > 1024 * 1024 * 1024 or member.size > 64 * 1024 * 1024:
+                raise ValueError("WebUI archive exceeds its inspection bound")
+            if not parts or parts[0] != "package" or ".." in parts or not (member.isfile() or member.isdir()):
+                raise ValueError("WebUI archive contains an unsafe member")
+            if member.name == "package/package.json":
+                if found or not member.isfile() or member.size > 1024 * 1024:
+                    raise ValueError("WebUI archive has duplicate or oversized metadata")
+                stream = archive.extractfile(member)
+                if stream is None:
+                    raise ValueError("WebUI archive metadata cannot be read")
+                metadata = json.loads(stream.read(1024 * 1024 + 1))
+                if not isinstance(metadata, dict) or (metadata.get("name"), metadata.get("version")) != (name, version):
+                    raise ValueError("WebUI metadata differs from the registry lock")
+                found = True
+    if not found:
+        raise ValueError("WebUI archive metadata is missing")
+
+
+def _write_private_json(path: Path, payload: object) -> None:
+    encoded = (json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode()
+    if len(encoded) > 16 * 1024 * 1024:
+        raise ValueError("candidate JSON exceeds its byte bound")
+    descriptor = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0), 0o600)
+    with os.fdopen(descriptor, "wb") as handle:
+        handle.write(encoded)
@@ -197,6 +197,13 @@ def sanitized_git_environment(
    """Keep only deliberate process/auth inputs and neutralize Git redirection."""

    environment = os.environ if source is None else source
+    address_family = environment.get("GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY")
+    if "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY" in environment and address_family not in (
+        "any", "inet", "inet6",
+    ):
+        raise ValueError(
+            "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY must be any, inet, or inet6"
+        )
    result = {
        key: environment[key]
        for key in (
@@ -221,6 +228,10 @@ def sanitized_git_environment(
            "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin",
        }
    )
+    if address_family is not None:
+        result["GIT_SSH_COMMAND"] += f" -o AddressFamily={address_family}"
+        # Preserve only an explicit, validated choice across re-sanitization.
+        result["GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_ADDRESS_FAMILY"] = address_family
    return result


@@ -27,7 +27,10 @@ from .candidate_artifact import validate_release_channel
 from .model import CatalogPublishResult, CatalogPublishStep
 from .module_directory import module_directory_payloads
 from .selective_catalog import read_bounded_json_source, trusted_keys_from_keyring
-from .source_provenance import catalog_source_selection, source_tag_provenance_issues
+from .source_provenance import (
+    catalog_source_selection, registered_source_origin_issues,
+    source_tag_provenance_issues,
+)
 from .version_alignment import candidate_catalog_version_issues
 from .workspace import (
    DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_ROOT,
@@ -176,6 +179,22 @@ def publish_catalog_candidate(
            for issue in version_issues
        )
        source_selection = catalog_source_selection(candidate_payload)
+        entries = [candidate_payload.get("core_release")]
+        if isinstance(candidate_payload.get("modules"), list):
+            entries.extend(candidate_payload["modules"])
+        if any(
+            isinstance(entry, dict)
+            and isinstance(entry.get("python_ref"), str)
+            and " @ https://" in entry["python_ref"]
+            for entry in entries
+        ):
+            blockers.extend(
+                f"registered source origin: {issue.describe()}"
+                for issue in registered_source_origin_issues(
+                    repo_versions=source_selection.all_versions,
+                    workspace=workspace, remote=source_remote,
+                )
+            )
        blockers.extend(
            f"source provenance: {issue.describe()}"
            for issue in source_selection.issues
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+"""Strict source identities for immutable, registry-backed catalog entries."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+import re
+from urllib.parse import unquote, urlsplit
+
+
+_SHA256 = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{64}\Z")
+_COMMIT = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}(?:[0-9a-f]{24})?\Z")
+_REPO = re.compile(r"govoplan-[a-z0-9-]+\Z")
+_VERSION = re.compile(r"\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:[-+][0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?\Z")
+_PYTHON = re.compile(
+    r"(?P<name>govoplan-[a-z0-9-]+)(?:\[[a-z0-9_,.-]+\])? @ "
+    r"(?P<url>https://\S+)#sha256=(?P<digest>[0-9a-f]{64})\Z"
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class RegistrySource:
+    repository: str
+    version: str
+    commit: str
+    tag_object: str
+
+
+def registry_artifact_conflicts(entries: list[object]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Allow repeated module projections only when package artifacts agree."""
+    observed: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {}
+    issues = []
+    for entry in entries:
+        if not isinstance(entry, dict):
+            continue
+        try:
+            source = registry_entry_source(entry)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            issues.append(str(exc))
+            continue
+        if source is None:
+            continue
+        for kind, identity in entry["artifact_integrity"].items():
+            if kind not in {"python", "webui"}:
+                continue
+            key = (source.repository, kind)
+            encoded = json.dumps(identity, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+            if observed.setdefault(key, encoded) != encoded:
+                issues.append(f"conflicting {kind} registry artifacts for {source.repository}")
+    return tuple(issues)
+
+
+def registry_entry_source(entry: dict[str, object]) -> RegistrySource | None:
+    """Admit registry refs only with a complete matching artifact/source binding.
+
+    Git-backed catalogs keep their existing validation path. An HTTPS Python
+    requirement cannot masquerade as a source-only/non-Python entry when its
+    registry provenance is missing or inconsistent.
+    """
+
+    ref = entry.get("python_ref")
+    if not isinstance(ref, str) or " @ https://" not in ref:
+        return None
+    match = _PYTHON.fullmatch(ref)
+    source = entry.get("source")
+    version = entry.get("version")
+    package = entry.get("python_package")
+    integrity = entry.get("artifact_integrity")
+    if (
+        match is None
+        or not isinstance(source, dict)
+        or not isinstance(integrity, dict)
+        or not isinstance(version, str)
+        or _VERSION.fullmatch(version) is None
+        or package != match.group("name")
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("registry entry has no complete package/source identity")
+    repo = source.get("repository")
+    commit = source.get("commit")
+    tag_object = source.get("tag_object_sha")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(repo, str)
+        or _REPO.fullmatch(repo) is None
+        or repo != package
+        or source.get("tag") != f"v{version}"
+        or not isinstance(commit, str)
+        or _COMMIT.fullmatch(commit) is None
+        or not isinstance(tag_object, str)
+        or _COMMIT.fullmatch(tag_object) is None
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("registry entry has invalid immutable tag provenance")
+    python = _artifact(
+        integrity.get("python"), ref=ref, package=package, version=version,
+        commit=commit,
+    )
+    if python["url"] != match.group("url") or python["sha256"] != match.group("digest"):
+        raise ValueError("registry Python ref differs from its artifact identity")
+    webui_package = entry.get("webui_package")
+    webui_ref = entry.get("webui_ref")
+    if bool(webui_package) != bool(webui_ref):
+        raise ValueError("registry WebUI package and ref must be declared together")
+    if webui_package:
+        if not isinstance(webui_package, str) or re.fullmatch(
+            r"@govoplan/[a-z0-9-]+-webui", webui_package
+        ) is None or not isinstance(webui_ref, str):
+            raise ValueError("registry WebUI package identity is malformed")
+        if webui_package != f"@govoplan/{repo.removeprefix('govoplan-')}-webui":
+            raise ValueError("registry WebUI package belongs to another source repository")
+        webui = _artifact(
+            integrity.get("webui"), ref=webui_ref, package=webui_package,
+            version=version, commit=commit,
+        )
+        if webui_ref != webui["url"]:
+            raise ValueError("registry WebUI ref differs from its artifact identity")
+        sri = webui.get("integrity")
+        try:
+            valid_sri = isinstance(sri, str) and sri.startswith("sha512-") and len(
+                base64.b64decode(sri[7:], validate=True)
+            ) == 64
+        except ValueError:
+            valid_sri = False
+        if not valid_sri:
+            raise ValueError("registry WebUI artifact needs a SHA-512 integrity identity")
+    elif "webui" in integrity:
+        raise ValueError("registry entry carries an unexpected WebUI artifact")
+    return RegistrySource(repo, version, commit, tag_object)
+
+
+def _artifact(
+    value: object, *, ref: str, package: str, version: str, commit: str,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ValueError("registry entry is missing artifact integrity")
+    url = value.get("url")
+    filename = value.get("filename")
+    digest = value.get("sha256")
+    size = value.get("size")
+    parsed = urlsplit(url) if isinstance(url, str) else None
+    url_filename = unquote(parsed.path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]) if parsed else ""
+    decoded_parts = unquote(parsed.path).split("/") if parsed else []
+    expected_filenames = {url_filename}
+    expected_path = [package, version, url_filename]
+    if package.startswith("@govoplan/"):
+        # npm pack includes the scope in its local filename; the registry's
+        # immutable download URL uses the unscoped package basename.
+        expected_filenames = {
+            f"govoplan-{package.split('/', 1)[1]}-{version}.tgz",
+        } if url_filename == f"{package.split('/', 1)[1]}-{version}.tgz" else set()
+        expected_path = [*package.split("/"), "-", version, url_filename]
+    if (
+        parsed is None
+        or parsed.scheme != "https"
+        or not parsed.netloc
+        or parsed.username is not None
+        or parsed.password is not None
+        or parsed.fragment
+        or parsed.query
+        or any(part in {".", ".."} for part in unquote(parsed.path).split("/"))
+        or "%" in unquote(parsed.path)
+        or "\\" in unquote(parsed.path)
+        or any(ord(character) < 32 for character in url)
+        or decoded_parts[-len(expected_path):] != expected_path
+        or not isinstance(filename, str)
+        or re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._+-]{0,254}", filename) is None
+        or filename not in expected_filenames
+        or not isinstance(digest, str)
+        or _SHA256.fullmatch(digest) is None
+        or not isinstance(size, int)
+        or isinstance(size, bool)
+        or not 0 < size <= 512 * 1024 * 1024
+        or value.get("ref") != ref
+        or value.get("registry_identity") != f"{package}@{version}"
+        or value.get("git_ref") != f"v{version}"
+        or value.get("source_commit") != commit
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("registry artifact ref, version, bytes, or source binding is inconsistent")
+    return value
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ def tag_repositories(
    A release tag is only created for a clean, aligned, non-behind worktree.
    Both local and remote tags are resolved to commits before mutation so an
    existing immutable tag can never be moved by this operation.
+    Module-only local candidate tags precede Core's release-lock regeneration;
+    their cross-Core composition gate applies before publication, not creation.
+    Core candidate tags still require a complete aligned release bundle.
    """

    workspace = resolve_workspace_root(workspace_root)
@@ -47,13 +50,19 @@ def tag_repositories(
    selected = tuple(dict.fromkeys(repos))
    results: list[dict[str, object]] = []
    bundle_issues_by_repo: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
-    for issue in selected_release_webui_bundle_issues(
-        repo_versions={repo: repo_versions.get(repo, "") for repo in selected},
-        workspace=workspace,
-    ):
-        bundle_issues_by_repo.setdefault(issue.repo, []).append(
-            f"{issue.source}={issue.actual!r}, expected {issue.expected!r} ({issue.message})"
-        )
+    # Core's final lock is generated from reviewed local module tags. Requiring
+    # that lock before those tags exist makes the documented sequence circular.
+    # This is only a local module staging exception: Core-selected batches and
+    # every publication still run the cross-repository gate, and each selected
+    # repository's own version/lock checks below are always enforced.
+    if push or "govoplan-core" in selected:
+        for issue in selected_release_webui_bundle_issues(
+            repo_versions={repo: repo_versions.get(repo, "") for repo in selected},
+            workspace=workspace,
+        ):
+            bundle_issues_by_repo.setdefault(issue.repo, []).append(
+                f"{issue.source}={issue.actual!r}, expected {issue.expected!r} ({issue.message})"
+            )

    if apply:
        preflight = tag_repositories(
@@ -19,10 +19,33 @@ from .git_state import (
    scoped_git_command,
 )
 from .repository_tag import RemoteTagResult, ref_commit, remote_tag_commit
+from .registry_reference import registry_entry_source
 from .version_alignment import repository_version_issues
 from .workspace import load_repository_specs, resolve_repo_path


+def registered_source_origin_issues(
+    *, repo_versions: dict[str, str], workspace: Path, remote: str,
+) -> tuple[SourceTagProvenanceIssue, ...]:
+    """Bind registry candidate attestations to registered source endpoints."""
+    specs = {spec.name: spec for spec in load_repository_specs(include_website=False)}
+    issues = []
+    for repo, version in sorted(repo_versions.items()):
+        spec = specs.get(repo)
+        if spec is None:
+            issues.append(SourceTagProvenanceIssue(repo, f"v{version}", "source repository is not registered"))
+            continue
+        path = resolve_repo_path(spec, workspace)
+        if path.absolute() != path.resolve() or not path.resolve().is_relative_to(workspace.resolve()):
+            issues.append(SourceTagProvenanceIssue(repo, f"v{version}", "source checkout leaves the private workspace or traverses a symlink"))
+            continue
+        fetch = git_text(path, "remote", "get-url", "--all", remote).splitlines()
+        push = git_text(path, "remote", "get-url", "--push", "--all", remote).splitlines()
+        if fetch != [spec.remote] or push != [spec.remote]:
+            issues.append(SourceTagProvenanceIssue(repo, f"v{version}", "source remote does not exactly match the registered origin"))
+    return tuple(issues)
+
+
 _CATALOG_PYTHON_REF = re.compile(
    r"/(?P<repo>govoplan-[a-z0-9-]+)\.git@v(?P<version>[^\s;]+)$"
 )
@@ -61,6 +84,8 @@ def catalog_source_selection(payload: object) -> CatalogSourceSelection:
        )

    versions: dict[str, str] = {}
+    registry_commits: dict[str, str] = {}
+    registry_tag_objects: dict[str, str] = {}
    issues: list[SourceTagProvenanceIssue] = []
    entries: list[tuple[str, object]] = [("core_release", payload.get("core_release"))]
    modules = payload.get("modules")
@@ -70,6 +95,21 @@ def catalog_source_selection(payload: object) -> CatalogSourceSelection:
    for source, raw_entry in entries:
        if not isinstance(raw_entry, dict):
            continue
+        try:
+            registry_source = registry_entry_source(raw_entry)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            issues.append(SourceTagProvenanceIssue(source, "", str(exc)))
+            continue
+        if registry_source is not None:
+            repo, version = registry_source.repository, registry_source.version
+            previous = versions.setdefault(repo, version)
+            previous_commit = registry_commits.setdefault(repo, registry_source.commit)
+            previous_object = registry_tag_objects.setdefault(repo, registry_source.tag_object)
+            if (previous, previous_commit, previous_object) != (
+                version, registry_source.commit, registry_source.tag_object,
+            ):
+                issues.append(SourceTagProvenanceIssue(repo, f"v{version}", "registry entries have conflicting immutable source identities"))
+            continue
        python_ref = raw_entry.get("python_ref")
        match = _CATALOG_PYTHON_REF.search(python_ref) if isinstance(python_ref, str) else None
        if match is None:
@@ -89,8 +129,8 @@ def catalog_source_selection(payload: object) -> CatalogSourceSelection:
    release = payload.get("release")
    selected_units = release.get("selected_units") if isinstance(release, dict) else None
    selected: dict[str, str] = {}
-    selected_commits: dict[str, str] = {}
-    selected_tag_objects: dict[str, str] = {}
+    selected_commits: dict[str, str] = dict(registry_commits)
+    selected_tag_objects: dict[str, str] = dict(registry_tag_objects)
    if not isinstance(selected_units, list) or not selected_units:
        issues.append(
            SourceTagProvenanceIssue(
@@ -106,16 +146,22 @@ def catalog_source_selection(payload: object) -> CatalogSourceSelection:
            repo = unit.get("repo")
            version = unit.get("version")
            if isinstance(repo, str) and isinstance(version, str):
+                if repo in selected:
+                    issues.append(SourceTagProvenanceIssue(repo, f"v{version}", "duplicate selected repository"))
                selected[repo] = version.removeprefix("v")
                commit = unit.get("commit_sha")
                tag_object = unit.get("tag_object_sha")
                if isinstance(commit, str) and re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64}", commit):
+                    if repo in registry_commits and registry_commits[repo] != commit.lower():
+                        issues.append(SourceTagProvenanceIssue(repo, f"v{version}", "selected commit differs from registry artifact source"))
                    selected_commits[repo] = commit.lower()
                else:
                    issues.append(
                        SourceTagProvenanceIssue(repo, f"v{version.removeprefix('v')}", "selected unit has no valid commit_sha provenance")
                    )
                if isinstance(tag_object, str) and re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64}", tag_object):
+                    if repo in registry_tag_objects and registry_tag_objects[repo] != tag_object.lower():
+                        issues.append(SourceTagProvenanceIssue(repo, f"v{version}", "selected tag object differs from registry artifact source"))
                    selected_tag_objects[repo] = tag_object.lower()
                else:
                    issues.append(
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import subprocess
 import tomllib

 from .git_state import collect_versions, sanitized_git_environment
+from .registry_reference import registry_artifact_conflicts, registry_entry_source
 from .workspace import load_repository_specs, resolve_repo_path


@@ -407,6 +408,11 @@ def candidate_catalog_version_issues(payload: object) -> tuple[VersionAlignmentI
            )

    release = payload.get("release")
+    registry_entries = [core_release, *(modules if isinstance(modules, list) else [])]
+    issues.extend(
+        _catalog_shape_issue("artifact_integrity", issue)
+        for issue in registry_artifact_conflicts(registry_entries)
+    )
    if isinstance(release, dict):
        issues.extend(_catalog_release_issues(release, represented=represented))
    return tuple(issues)
@@ -419,6 +425,15 @@ def _catalog_entry_issues(
    represented: dict[str, str],
 ) -> list[VersionAlignmentIssue]:
    issues: list[VersionAlignmentIssue] = []
+    try:
+        registry_source = registry_entry_source(entry)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        return [_catalog_shape_issue(source, str(exc))]
+    if registry_source is not None:
+        previous = represented.setdefault(registry_source.repository, registry_source.version)
+        if previous != registry_source.version:
+            issues.append(_catalog_shape_issue(source, "repository appears with conflicting catalog versions"))
+        return issues
    version = entry.get("version")
    normalized_version = version.removeprefix("v") if isinstance(version, str) and version else None
    if normalized_version is None:
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ def _render_python_version(
    except SyntaxError as exc:
        raise VersionMetadataError(f"Python metadata is malformed: {path.name}") from exc
    values: list[ast.Constant] = []
+    module_version_references = 0
    for node in ast.walk(tree):
        if not isinstance(node, ast.Call) or _call_name(node.func) != target_name:
            continue
@@ -279,6 +280,28 @@ def _render_python_version(
                and isinstance(keyword.value.value, str)
            ):
                values.append(keyword.value)
+            elif (
+                keyword.arg == keyword_name
+                and isinstance(keyword.value, ast.Name)
+                and keyword.value.id == "MODULE_VERSION"
+            ):
+                module_version_references += 1
+    if module_version_references:
+        if module_version_references != 1 or values:
+            raise VersionMetadataError(
+                f"Python metadata has multiple {target_name}.{keyword_name} values: {path.name}"
+            )
+        rendered, found = _render_python_assignment(
+            payload,
+            path=path,
+            assignment_name="MODULE_VERSION",
+            version=version,
+        )
+        if not found:
+            raise VersionMetadataError(
+                f"Python metadata has no literal MODULE_VERSION declaration: {path.name}"
+            )
+        return rendered, True
    if not values:
        return payload, False
    if len(values) != 1:
@@ -21,6 +21,22 @@ def main() -> int:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
    subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)

+    full = subparsers.add_parser("full-registry", help="Build a strict full-profile candidate from verified registry artifacts.")
+    full.add_argument("--workspace-root", type=Path, default=DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_ROOT)
+    full.add_argument("--package-set", type=Path, required=True)
+    full.add_argument("--package-lock", type=Path, required=True)
+    full.add_argument("--wheelhouse", type=Path, required=True)
+    full.add_argument("--webui-packages", type=Path, required=True)
+    full.add_argument("--output-dir", type=Path, required=True)
+    full.add_argument("--selected-repository", action="append", required=True)
+    full.add_argument("--catalog-signing-key", action="append", required=True)
+    full.add_argument("--channel", default="stable")
+    full.add_argument("--source-remote", default="origin")
+    full.add_argument("--public-base-url", default="https://govoplan.add-ideas.de")
+    full.add_argument("--expires-days", type=int, default=90)
+    full.add_argument("--sequence", type=int)
+    full.add_argument("--json", action="store_true")
+
    selective = subparsers.add_parser(
        "selective", help="Build a signed selective channel catalog candidate."
    )
@@ -143,6 +159,21 @@ def main() -> int:
    )

    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if args.command == "full-registry":
+        require_release_runtime_trust()
+        from govoplan_release.full_catalog import build_full_registry_candidate
+
+        result = build_full_registry_candidate(
+            package_set_path=args.package_set, package_lock_path=args.package_lock,
+            wheelhouse=args.wheelhouse, webui_packages=args.webui_packages,
+            output_dir=args.output_dir, selected_repositories=tuple(args.selected_repository),
+            signing_keys=tuple(args.catalog_signing_key), workspace_root=args.workspace_root,
+            channel=args.channel, source_remote=args.source_remote,
+            public_base_url=args.public_base_url, expires_days=args.expires_days,
+            sequence=args.sequence,
+        )
+        print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+        return 0
    if args.command == "selective":
        require_release_runtime_trust()
        result = build_selective_catalog_candidate(
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
zemion	88b685ff5e	test(release): follow relocated operations runbook Developer Meta-package Release / publish-package (push) Successful in 9s Details Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m41s Details Deployment Installer / deployment-installer (push) Successful in 6s Details Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 14m12s Details	2026-09-08 03:02:31 +02:00
zemion	be57a1823a	fix(release): support validated per-run SSH address family	2026-09-08 02:50:59 +02:00
zemion	6bcb75f577	feat(release): build verified full-registry catalog candidates	2026-09-08 02:26:19 +02:00
zemion	32fe4b7238	chore(release): document hardening and verify complete source package composition	2026-09-08 02:06:35 +02:00
zemion	6a8f53b87d	fix(release): prepare aligned 0.1.45 composition and guarded candidate sequencing	2026-09-08 01:52:08 +02:00
zemion	1cec4ee1d8	chore: compose governed Cases access Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m43s Details Deployment Installer / deployment-installer (push) Successful in 6s Details Security Audit / security-audit (push) Failing after 12m23s Details	2026-08-24 20:26:44 +02:00
zemion	29d03aa2ca	chore: compose purpose-bound Records access Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m44s Details Deployment Installer / deployment-installer (push) Successful in 6s Details Security Audit / security-audit (push) Failing after 12m45s Details	2026-08-24 19:28:37 +02:00
zemion	6fb928d6cf	release: publish stable product destinations Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m43s Details Deployment Installer / deployment-installer (push) Successful in 6s Details Security Audit / security-audit (push) Failing after 12m26s Details Developer Meta-package Release / publish-package (push) Successful in 9s Details	2026-08-24 18:30:01 +02:00
zemion	6edaaadf37	release: align governed tenant erasure Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m44s Details Deployment Installer / deployment-installer (push) Successful in 6s Details Security Audit / security-audit (push) Failing after 12m4s Details Developer Meta-package Release / publish-package (push) Successful in 10s Details	2026-08-24 16:33:16 +02:00
zemion	0b171fbdd4	feat: gate infrastructure changes on provider inventory Security Audit / security-audit (push) Failing after 12m3s Details Developer Meta-package Release / publish-package (push) Successful in 9s Details Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m43s Details Deployment Installer / deployment-installer (push) Successful in 6s Details	2026-08-24 15:18:38 +02:00