# Installation And Deployment Architecture

## Goal

A supported GovOPlaN installation starts with one downloaded, verified
bootstrap artifact. The administrator answers a bounded set of questions and
receives a working base system. Re-running the same tool repairs or
reconfigures that installation instead of creating unrelated state.

The canonical product journey remains
[System Administrator Lifecycle User Story](SYSTEM_ADMINISTRATOR_LIFECYCLE_USER_STORY.md).
This document defines the deployer boundary and the first executable slice.

## First Executable Slice

`tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py` is a standard-library-only deployment
compiler and reconciler. It can be tested without installing GovOPlaN itself.

It currently supports:

- evaluation and self-hosted profiles;
- managed or external PostgreSQL;
- managed, external, or evaluation-only disabled Redis;
- disabled mail, an external relay declaration, or an evaluation-only
  GreenMail service;
- durable local file storage, managed single-node Garage S3, or external
  S3-compatible storage;
- an explicit HAProxy service that load-balances configured WebUI and API
  replicas without access to the Docker socket;
- declarative API, WebUI, and worker replica counts while keeping migrations
  and the scheduler singleton;
- Core, base, or full initial module selections;
- deterministic Compose JSON accepted by Compose v2;
- generated secrets stored in a private `0600` file;
- service-specific environment allowlists so infrastructure containers do not
  receive unrelated application credentials;
- plan, render, doctor, status, and apply commands;
- an installation lock, migration-before-start ordering, readiness polling,
  and an applied-state receipt;
- idempotent reconfiguration that preserves generated secrets;
- a keyed environment fingerprint that detects private binding changes without
  writing secret values to plans or receipts;
- host CPU, memory, disk, entropy, architecture, Docker daemon, Compose,
  listen-port, and external endpoint preflight checks;
- service removal without implicit data-volume deletion.

Create a local evaluation bundle:

```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py init \
  --directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
  --profile evaluation \
  --postgres managed \
  --redis managed \
  --storage garage \
  --mail test-mail \
  --api-replicas 2 \
  --web-replicas 2 \
  --worker-replicas 2 \
  --module-set base
```

Inspect the generated intent and host requirements:

```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py doctor \
  --directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation
```

Change a component without rotating existing generated secrets:

```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py configure \
  --directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
  --redis external \
  --redis-url 'rediss://:password@redis.example.org:6379/0'
```

The private installation directory contains:

| File | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `installation.json` | Versioned, non-secret desired state |
| `secrets.env` | Deployment-local secrets and external service bindings |
| `compose.json` | Deterministic generated Compose definition |
| `garage.toml` | Non-secret managed Garage server configuration |
| `load-balancer.cfg` | Non-secret HAProxy WebUI/API discovery configuration |
| `plan.json` | Latest desired-state diff and readiness findings |
| `receipt.json` | Last successfully applied immutable identities |
| `.deployment.lock` | Same-host operation exclusion |

The specification contract is
[`installation-spec.schema.json`](installation-spec.schema.json).

Build the same dependency-free tool as one downloadable artifact:

```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/build-deployer-zipapp.py \
  --output /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz
python /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz --help
```

To exercise reconciliation with locally available evaluation images:

```sh
python /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz init \
  --non-interactive \
  --directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
  --profile evaluation \
  --api-image local/govoplan-api:test \
  --web-image local/govoplan-web:test
python /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz apply \
  --directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
  --allow-unverified-images \
  --skip-pull
```

Those images must already contain the selected module set. The override exists
only to exercise local orchestration before release artifacts exist; it is
rejected for `self-hosted`.

## Current Production Gates

The tool deliberately reports blockers instead of pretending the source tree is
a production distribution:

1. **OCI release artifacts.** The release pipeline does not yet publish pinned
   multi-architecture API and WebUI images.
2. **Signed distribution manifest.** A channel manifest must bind exact image
   digests, Compose compatibility, SBOM/provenance references, and revocation
   state. Recording a URL and checksum is not signature verification.
3. **First administrator.** Production needs a one-time, restricted enrollment
   identity. The development bootstrap must not be enabled in production.
4. **Image/module composition.** The selected module set must be proven present
   in the exact image or installed from verified offline artifacts before it is
   enabled.
5. **Deployment agent.** Web updates need a separate privileged reconciler with
   a typed command allowlist. The API and browser must never receive the Docker
   socket or arbitrary shell access.
6. **Ingress and certificates.** The managed HAProxy service provides HTTP
   load balancing inside the deployment boundary; it does not issue or renew
   certificates. A self-hosted profile still needs an explicit choice
   between an existing reverse proxy and a supported managed ingress, including
   trusted-proxy boundaries, TLS certificate issuance, renewal, and health
   probing through the public route.

`apply --allow-unverified-images` is therefore restricted to the evaluation
profile. It explicitly acknowledges both mutable image identities and
unverified image/module composition. It is a local test escape hatch, not a
production setting.

## Component Choices

### PostgreSQL

`managed` creates a persistent PostgreSQL container and private generated
credentials. `external` requires an explicit `DATABASE_URL`; switching from
managed to external cannot reuse the old `postgres` Docker hostname
accidentally.

Interactive entry hides external URLs because they commonly contain
credentials. For unattended automation, provide them through a protected
operator mechanism and avoid storing secret-bearing flags in shell history.

Production policy should support external managed databases and local managed
PostgreSQL equally at the application boundary. Backup, point-in-time recovery,
high availability, and major-version upgrades remain deployment properties.

### Redis

`managed` creates an authenticated, append-only Redis container. `external`
requires an explicit `REDIS_URL`. `disabled` is evaluation-only and disables
workers while recording the single-process login-throttle risk acknowledgement.

`doctor` performs a bounded TCP connection check for external PostgreSQL,
Redis, and S3 endpoints. This verifies DNS, routing, and that the port accepts a
connection; it is not an authentication or semantic health check.

Production base installations include Redis because durable queues, distributed
throttling, notifications, scheduled work, and transactional event delivery
must survive API restarts.

### Mail

The first slice distinguishes:

- `disabled`;
- `external-relay`, which records the infrastructure decision but leaves Mail
  server/credential creation as a visible post-install task;
- `test-mail`, an evaluation-only GreenMail service.

A bundled production mail server is intentionally not a default. Operating one
requires DNS, reverse DNS, TLS, DKIM, SPF, DMARC, reputation, abuse handling,
queue monitoring, and upgrade policy. A later profile may support an
operator-selected MTA/relay, but it must expose these requirements rather than
presenting a container as a complete mail service.

### File Storage

`local` uses a durable Compose volume and is appropriate for one-host
installations. `garage` provisions Garage 2.3 in its supported single-node
bootstrap mode, generates a private application key and bucket, and connects
the Files S3 backend to the exact installer-owned internal endpoint. The
deployment-only trust marker cannot authorize another S3 host; arbitrary
external SDK endpoints remain fail-closed until peer pinning is implemented.
Garage metadata and object data use separate persistent volumes. `s3` requires
an external endpoint, region, access key, secret key, and bucket values.
Self-hosted external S3 endpoints must use HTTPS.

Local storage must be included in backup and restore drills. Horizontal API or
worker scale-out requires shared/object storage. The managed Garage profile is
persistent but has no data redundancy; availability-sensitive installations
must use a tested multi-node Garage cluster or another external S3 service.

### Load Balancing And Replicas

The generated Compose topology publishes only `load-balancer`. HAProxy uses
Docker DNS service discovery to distribute public traffic across WebUI replicas
and WebUI API proxy traffic across API replicas. The WebUI and API services do
not publish host ports. HAProxy has no Docker socket and discovers only the
bounded replica slots rendered into `load-balancer.cfg`.

Replica counts are desired state:

```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py configure \
  --directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
  --api-replicas 3 \
  --web-replicas 2 \
  --worker-replicas 4
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py apply \
  --directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation
```

Workers are queue consumers, so they are scaled through Redis rather than put
behind an HTTP load balancer. The migration runner and Celery scheduler remain
singletons. Multiple API replicas are rejected when Redis is disabled because
distributed throttling and queued work cannot then be shared correctly.

This is same-host scaling. Docker Compose uses a bridge network and does not
place containers on another machine. See
[Scaling And Multi-Host Deployment](SCALING_AND_MULTI_HOST_DEPLOYMENT.md) for
the supported topology and promotion path.

## Reconfiguration Semantics

`installation.json` is desired state. `receipt.json` is the last successfully
applied state. `plan` compares their canonical hashes and service sets.

- Adding a managed component creates its service and persistent volume.
- Removing a component removes its service container on apply.
- Volumes are retained by default; deleting data requires a separate,
  deliberately destructive workflow.
- Existing generated credentials are retained unless an explicit future rotate
  operation is requested.
- Private configuration changes are represented by a keyed fingerprint in the
  plan and receipt; plaintext values are never copied there.
- Managed-to-external transitions require the new endpoint in the same
  operation.
- Migrations run as a one-shot service before API/worker replacement.
- The first upgrade from a direct WebUI host port stops that legacy WebUI
  container immediately before HAProxy claims the same endpoint.
- Health must recover before a new receipt is committed.

This is sufficient for one-host reconciliation. Production updates additionally
need backup/restore gates, maintenance/drain state, database compatibility
windows, image signature verification, and rollback/forward-recovery policy.

## Web Update Boundary

The intended update path is:

1. Ops reads the non-secret installation receipt and reports management mode,
   current release, component health, and update availability.
2. An authorized administrator asks Core to create a typed deployment request,
   for example `reconcile_release` or `rollback_release`.
3. Core persists the reviewed immutable plan, actor, expected current receipt,
   and idempotency key.
4. A separately deployed, narrow deployment agent claims the request.
5. The agent verifies signatures/digests, acquires a fenced deployment lock,
   backs up, pulls, migrates, reconciles, probes health, and writes evidence.
6. Ops presents durable progress and the resulting receipt.

The agent owns container-runtime access. It accepts no command strings from the
browser and has no domain-data permissions. Installations managed by Kubernetes,
systemd, or another external orchestrator expose read-only status and an export
of the reviewed update recipe instead of a non-functional update button.

## Distribution Workflow

The downloadable entry point should eventually be:

```sh
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 --fail --location \
  https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/install/v1/bootstrap.pyz \
  --output govoplan-bootstrap.pyz
python3 govoplan-bootstrap.pyz init
```

The published documentation must include an independent checksum/signature
verification command before execution. The zipapp then downloads only a signed
distribution manifest, verifies it against an embedded or explicitly installed
keyring, and renders the same installation contract implemented here.

The source-tree script is the test harness for that future zipapp. It is not yet
the internet bootstrap artifact.

## Verification

Run the focused tests:

```sh
./.venv/bin/python -m unittest -v tests.test_deployment_installer
```

The tests cover profile restrictions, secret persistence, external endpoint
requirements, managed Garage bootstrap, S3 policy, replica validation, HAProxy
discovery configuration, Compose service selection, secret non-disclosure,
service-specific environment isolation, private file modes, external endpoint
preflight, first-plan generation, apply ordering, and receipt-based
idempotency.