WebUI module split; docs
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docs/RBAC_MANIFEST.md
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docs/RBAC_MANIFEST.md
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# Multi Seal Mail - Current RBAC and Resource-Access Model
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**Updated:** 2026-06-16
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**Current migration head:** `f5a6b7c8d9e0`
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## Authorization Equation
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An operation is permitted only when every applicable layer allows it:
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```text
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effective role/API-key capability
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AND resource ownership/share access
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AND workflow state
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AND active governance/policy constraints
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```
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RBAC answers what an actor may do. ACLs answer which resource the actor may do it to. Workflow state and policy decide whether the operation is currently valid.
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## Identity and Scope
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```text
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Account global login identity
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+- User membership tenant-local identity
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+- direct tenant roles
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+- active group memberships
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| +- inherited tenant roles
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+- tenant-local API keys
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Account
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+- direct system-role assignments
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```
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A browser session has one active tenant membership. System privileges do not silently grant tenant data access. API keys remain tenant-local and receive the intersection of their configured scopes and their owner's live tenant scopes on every request.
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## Wildcards
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```text
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tenant:* every canonical tenant permission
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system:* every canonical system permission
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* legacy alias interpreted as tenant:* only
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```
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Tenant wildcards never grant system permissions.
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## Canonical Tenant Permissions - 53
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### Campaigns
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```text
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campaign:read
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campaign:create
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campaign:update
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campaign:copy
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campaign:archive
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campaign:delete
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campaign:share
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campaign:validate
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campaign:build
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campaign:review
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campaign:send_test
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campaign:queue
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campaign:control
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campaign:send
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campaign:retry
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campaign:reconcile
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```
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### Recipients
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```text
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recipients:read
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recipients:write
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recipients:import
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recipients:export
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```
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### Files
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```text
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files:read
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files:download
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files:upload
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files:organize
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files:share
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files:delete
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files:admin
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```
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### Reports and Audit
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```text
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reports:read
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reports:export
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reports:send
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audit:read
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```
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### Mail Servers
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```text
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mail_servers:read
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mail_servers:use
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mail_servers:test
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mail_servers:write
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mail_servers:manage_credentials
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```
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### Tenant Administration
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```text
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admin:users:read
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admin:users:create
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admin:users:update
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admin:users:suspend
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admin:groups:read
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admin:groups:write
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admin:groups:manage_members
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admin:roles:read
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admin:roles:write
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admin:roles:assign
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admin:api_keys:read
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admin:api_keys:create
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admin:api_keys:revoke
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admin:settings:read
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admin:settings:write
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admin:policies:read
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admin:policies:write
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```
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## Canonical System Permissions - 18
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```text
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system:tenants:read
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system:tenants:create
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system:tenants:update
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system:tenants:suspend
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system:accounts:read
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system:accounts:create
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system:accounts:update
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system:accounts:suspend
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system:roles:read
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system:roles:write
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system:roles:assign
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system:access:read
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system:access:assign
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system:audit:read
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system:settings:read
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system:settings:write
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system:governance:read
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system:governance:write
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```
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`system:access:*` remains as a compatibility/read and assignment boundary for cross-tenant/system access handling. It is not a separate primary UI area.
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## Default Tenant Roles
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- **Owner:** `tenant:*`. At least one active operational owner must remain.
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- **Tenant administrator:** settings, policies, users, groups, roles and API keys plus read access to campaigns/files/reports/audit. Real delivery remains separately delegable.
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- **Administrator (legacy):** all tenant permissions for upgraded installations.
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- **Access administrator:** membership and assignment management within delegation limits.
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- **Campaign manager:** prepare, validate and build campaigns; no review approval or real delivery by default.
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- **Reviewer:** inspect and approve prepared campaign messages.
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- **Sender:** mock-test, queue, control, send, retry and reconcile prepared campaigns; can use/test approved mail profiles.
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- **File manager:** managed file operations without campaign delivery rights.
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- **Viewer:** read campaigns, recipients, files and reports.
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- **Auditor:** read campaigns, recipient evidence, reports and audit records; export detailed evidence.
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## Default System Roles
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- **System owner:** `system:*`, protected. At least one active account must retain it.
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- **System administrator:** all specific system permissions, editable and not protected.
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- **System auditor:** read-only system registry/settings/governance/audit role, editable.
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## Delegation Ceiling
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For role definition, assignment and API-key creation:
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```text
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requested scopes subset of actor delegateable scopes
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```
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Rules:
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1. Tenant roles may contain tenant scopes only.
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2. System roles may contain system scopes only.
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3. Definition rights and assignment rights are separate.
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4. Group definition and group membership management are separate.
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5. API-key scopes are intersected with the owner's current effective scopes on every request.
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6. Suspended accounts, users, tenants or groups stop contributing access immediately.
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7. Administrative updates are field-sensitive; a user with only status authority cannot change role assignments.
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## Campaign Ownership and ACLs
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A campaign has exactly one owner:
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```text
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owner user OR owner group
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```
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Additional active shares may target users or groups with `read` or `write`.
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Resolution:
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- owner user: read and write;
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- member of owner group: read and write;
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- explicit read share: read;
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- explicit write share: read and write;
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- `tenant:*`: tenant-wide ACL bypass;
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- ordinary campaign permission without ownership/share: no object access.
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ACLs do not add capabilities. A write share still needs the specific permission for update, validation, review, send, report, retry or reconciliation.
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## Sensitive Recipient Boundary
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Recipient-complete campaign JSON, message data and job detail require `recipients:read`. Recipient edits require `recipients:write`; exports require `recipients:export`; import is reserved for the dedicated recipient import/list workflow.
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## Files
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| Permission | Operations |
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|---|---|
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| `files:read` | list, search, inspect, resolve metadata |
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| `files:download` | download file bytes and generated ZIP archives |
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| `files:upload` | upload files and ZIP contents |
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| `files:organize` | create folders, rename, move, copy and bulk rename |
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| `files:share` | create/revoke file shares |
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| `files:delete` | delete/hide files and folders subject to retention |
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| `files:admin` | tenant-wide administration of user/group file spaces |
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## Mail Servers
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| Permission | Boundary |
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|---|---|
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| `mail_servers:read` | profile metadata and effective policy visibility |
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| `mail_servers:use` | select an approved profile without reading secrets |
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| `mail_servers:test` | run server-side connection tests |
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| `mail_servers:write` | define/edit profiles in allowed scopes |
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| `mail_servers:manage_credentials` | create/replace SMTP/IMAP secrets or campaign-level credentials where policy allows |
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Reusable encrypted profiles now exist. Effective usability is also constrained by hierarchical mail-profile policy, ownership, allowed/forced profile sets, credential inheritance/override rules and allow/deny patterns.
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## Sessions, API Keys and CSRF
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- Browser login creates an HttpOnly session cookie and a separate readable CSRF cookie.
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- Unsafe cookie-authenticated requests require matching CSRF cookie/header and stored CSRF hash.
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- API keys remain supported for CLI/automation and do not use browser CSRF.
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- Login responses still expose a compatibility session token in the response body; the WebUI does not persist it.
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## Legacy Compatibility
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Runtime aliases remain only for names that are no longer canonical, including:
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```text
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campaign:write
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attachments:read
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attachments:write
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admin:users
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admin:users:write
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admin:api_keys:write
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admin:settings
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system:tenants:write
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system:access:write
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```
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Canonical scopes are not widened by runtime alias expansion after migration.
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## Deferred Permission Families
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Add these only with their corresponding implemented features:
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```text
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templates:*
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address_books:*
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recipient_lists:*
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connectors:*
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dsar:*
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system:monitoring:read
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system:backups:run
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system:backups:restore
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system:updates:apply
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system:updates:rollback
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```
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A separate `retention:*` family is not currently canonical because retention is managed through system settings and tenant policy scopes. Add it only if retention operation duties need separation from general policy/settings administration.
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178
docs/SYSTEM_GOVERNANCE_MANIFEST.md
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178
docs/SYSTEM_GOVERNANCE_MANIFEST.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
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# Multi Seal Mail - Current System and Tenant Governance Model
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||||
**Updated:** 2026-06-16
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||||
**Current migration head:** `f5a6b7c8d9e0`
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## Governance Rule
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System policy is authoritative for tenants and all lower levels. Each lower level may only narrow what it inherits:
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```text
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system
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-> tenant
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-> user or group owner
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-> campaign
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```
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Lower levels do not widen privileges, allowed profiles, retention durations or credential rights granted by a higher level.
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## Administration Structure
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```text
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SYSTEM
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- Settings
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- Retention
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- Mail servers
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- Tenants
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- Users
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- Groups
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- System roles
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- Tenant roles
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- Audit
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TENANT
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- Settings boundary
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- Users
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- Groups
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- Roles
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- API keys
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- Mail servers
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- Retention
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- Audit
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USER
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- User mail
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- User retention
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GROUP
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- Group mail
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- Group retention
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```
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There is no separate System access page. Compatibility access scopes remain in the backend for assignment/read boundaries.
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## Tenant Governance
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System settings define tenant defaults and whether tenants may narrow selected options. Tenant overrides can only restrict:
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- custom groups;
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- custom roles;
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- tenant API keys.
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The backend enforces that tenant governance cannot widen system-denied privileges.
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## Mail-Profile Governance
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Mail server profiles may exist at these scopes:
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```text
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system
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tenant
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user
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group
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campaign
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```
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Effective campaign profile availability follows campaign ownership. A campaign owned by a user resolves through system, tenant, that user and campaign policy. A group-owned campaign resolves through system, tenant, that group and campaign policy.
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Policy semantics:
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- higher levels define the maximum available profile set;
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- lower levels can further restrict the set;
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- forced profiles mean the lower level must choose from the forced set;
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- a forced set with one profile effectively enforces that profile;
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- campaign-level profile creation is allowed only if the effective policy permits it;
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- credentials may be inherited from the authoritative profile or supplied by a lower level only when override is allowed;
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- deny patterns always win over allow patterns;
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- empty or `*` allowlist means allow all except denied;
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- non-empty allowlist means at least one allow rule must match and no deny rule may match.
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Pattern targets:
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```text
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SMTP hostname
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IMAP hostname
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envelope sender
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From header
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recipient domains
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```
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Ownership transfer is intentionally deferred as a two-step workflow: original owner initiates, new owner accepts and reselects/repairs the mail profile if their effective policy requires it.
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## Retention Governance
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Retention policy is hierarchical:
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```text
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system -> tenant -> user/group -> campaign
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```
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Managed fields:
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- raw campaign JSON retention days;
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- generated EML retention days;
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- stored report detail retention days;
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- mock mailbox retention days;
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- audit detail retention days.
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Rules:
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- system may set concrete defaults or unlimited retention;
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- system exposes allow-limiting toggles per field;
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- tenants, users/groups and campaigns may only shorten inherited retention where the parent allows limiting;
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- blank lower-level values inherit;
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- mock mailbox retention is currently system-level because mock mailbox records do not yet carry tenant/campaign ownership metadata;
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- dry-run/apply retention actions report affected classes before destructive cleanup.
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## Role Definitions and Assignments
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### System roles
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System roles define instance-wide permissions. `system:*` is stored as one wildcard and displayed as granting the full system catalogue. System owner is protected.
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### Tenant roles
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Tenant roles can be system-governed templates or tenant-local definitions, subject to system tenant-governance settings and actor delegation ceilings. Wildcard counts are expanded against the canonical tenant catalogue.
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## Audit Access
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Audit access remains scope-separated:
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```text
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system audit -> system:audit:read
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tenant audit -> active tenant + audit:read
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```
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Audit pages use server pagination, filtering and bounded grids.
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## Tenant Switching
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Tenant switching preserves the current URL when possible and falls back when a route/resource is not accessible in the new tenant context.
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The tenant selector is hidden for ordinary single-tenant accounts and visible for multi-tenant or system tenant-management contexts.
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## DataGrid Contract in Administration
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Admin lists use bounded container grids:
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- one flexible fill column;
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- fixed total table width;
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- compact action/status/count columns;
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- resizable text/date columns;
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- no intrinsic content growth;
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- sticky headers where needed;
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- server pagination for audit.
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## Still Deferred
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- real SMTP/IMAP test-bed verification and operator runbook;
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- recipient import with column mapping;
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- Seafile/external connector governance;
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- system/tenant/group/user file-space hierarchy and external storage hierarchy;
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- session/device revocation UI;
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- backup/restore, monitoring and update procedures;
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- DSAR workflows and evidence bundle verifier;
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- campaign ownership transfer workflow;
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- policy impact analysis before delete/disable/unshare/change;
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- LDAP/OIDC/SAML provisioning;
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- destructive tenant erasure orchestration.
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user