chore: consolidate platform split checks
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docs/GOVERNANCE_MODEL.md
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docs/GOVERNANCE_MODEL.md
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# GovOPlaN Governance Model
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**Updated:** 2026-07-09
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## Governance Rule
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System policy is authoritative for tenants and all lower levels. Each lower
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level may only narrow what it inherits:
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```text
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system
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-> tenant
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-> user or group owner
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-> campaign
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```
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Lower levels do not widen privileges, allowed profiles, retention durations, or
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credential rights granted by a higher level.
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## Administration Structure
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GovOPlaN separates system administration from scoped configuration:
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```text
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ADMINISTRATION
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- Modules
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- Packages
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- Maintenance
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- Changes
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GLOBAL
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- Tenants
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- Roles
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- Groups and users
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- File connectors
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- Mail servers
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- API keys
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- Retention
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TENANT
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- Roles
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- Groups and users
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- File connectors
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- Mail servers
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- API keys
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- Retention
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GROUP
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- File connectors
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- Mail servers
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- API keys
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- Retention
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USER
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- File connectors
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- Mail servers
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- API keys
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- Retention
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```
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System access scopes remain in the backend for assignment/read boundaries, but
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the UI should present the configuration hierarchy rather than a separate
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"system access" concept.
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## Tenant Governance
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System settings define tenant defaults and whether tenants may narrow selected
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options. Tenant overrides can only restrict:
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- custom groups;
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- custom roles;
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- tenant API keys.
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The backend enforces that tenant governance cannot widen system-denied
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privileges.
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## Mail-Profile Governance
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Mail server profiles may exist at these scopes:
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```text
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system
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tenant
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user
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group
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campaign
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```
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Effective campaign profile availability follows campaign ownership. A campaign
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owned by a user resolves through system, tenant, that user, and campaign
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policy. A group-owned campaign resolves through system, tenant, that group, and
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campaign policy.
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Policy semantics:
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- higher levels define the maximum available profile set;
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- lower levels can further restrict the set;
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- forced profiles mean the lower level must choose from the forced set;
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- a forced set with one profile effectively enforces that profile;
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- campaign-level profile creation is allowed only if the effective policy
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permits it;
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- SMTP/IMAP credentials use one inheritance decision per protocol: lower levels
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must inherit profile credentials, may inherit profile credentials, or must
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provide local credentials;
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- the lower-level override switch for `smtp_credentials.inherit` and
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`imap_credentials.inherit` controls whether descendants may change that
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inheritance decision;
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- deny patterns always win over allow patterns;
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- empty or `*` allowlist means allow all except denied;
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- non-empty allowlist means at least one allow rule must match and no deny rule
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may match.
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Pattern targets:
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```text
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SMTP hostname
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IMAP hostname
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envelope sender
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From header
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recipient domains
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```
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Ownership transfer is intentionally deferred as a two-step workflow: original
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owner initiates, new owner accepts and reselects/repairs the mail profile if
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their effective policy requires it.
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## File-Connector Governance
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File connector profiles and credentials are separated. Profiles describe
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external endpoints; credentials bind authentication material and policy to a
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scope. Concrete linked folders appear as file spaces in the files module.
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Governance follows the same inheritance shape as mail:
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- system and tenant policy can permit, require, or forbid lower-level
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connections/credentials;
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- user or group ownership controls which spaces appear to principals;
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- spaces inherit endpoint and credential policy from their connector profile;
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- connector health and credential tests must not reveal plaintext secrets.
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## Retention Governance
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Retention policy is hierarchical:
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```text
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system -> tenant -> user/group -> campaign
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```
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Managed fields:
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- raw campaign JSON retention days;
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- generated EML retention days;
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- stored report detail retention days;
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- mock mailbox retention days;
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- audit detail retention days.
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Rules:
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- system may set concrete defaults or unlimited retention;
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- system exposes allow-limiting toggles per field;
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- tenants, users/groups, and campaigns may only shorten inherited retention
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where the parent allows limiting;
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- blank lower-level values inherit;
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- mock mailbox retention is currently system-level because mock mailbox records
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do not yet carry tenant/campaign ownership metadata;
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- dry-run/apply retention actions report affected classes before destructive
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cleanup.
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## Role Definitions And Assignments
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### System Roles
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System roles define instance-wide permissions. `system:*` is stored as one
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wildcard and displayed as granting the full system catalogue. System owner is
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protected.
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### Tenant Roles
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Tenant roles can be system-governed templates or tenant-local definitions,
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subject to system tenant-governance settings and actor delegation ceilings.
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Wildcard counts are expanded against the canonical tenant catalogue.
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## Audit Access
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Audit access remains scope-separated:
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```text
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system audit -> system:audit:read
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tenant audit -> active tenant + audit:read
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```
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Audit pages use server pagination, filtering, and bounded grids.
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## Tenant Switching
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Tenant switching preserves the current URL when possible and falls back when a
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route/resource is not accessible in the new tenant context.
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The tenant selector is hidden for ordinary single-tenant accounts and visible
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for multi-tenant or system tenant-management contexts.
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## Administration DataGrid Contract
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Admin lists use bounded container grids:
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- one flexible fill column;
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- fixed total table width;
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- compact action/status/count columns;
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- resizable text/date columns;
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- no intrinsic content growth;
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- sticky headers where needed;
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- server pagination for audit.
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## Deferred Work
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- real SMTP/IMAP test-bed verification and operator runbook;
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- recipient import with column mapping;
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- session/device revocation UI;
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- backup/restore, monitoring, and update procedures;
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- DSAR workflows and evidence bundle verifier;
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- campaign ownership transfer workflow;
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- policy impact analysis before delete/disable/unshare/change;
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- LDAP/OIDC/SAML provisioning;
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- destructive tenant erasure orchestration.
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