Release Archive Tools 0.2.0

public/docs/PRIVACY-SECURITY.md

@@ -14,14 +14,18 @@ Archive Tools responds as follows:
 - byte arithmetic uses checked safe integers and bounds before slicing;
 - extraction never targets the filesystem: eligible content is verified and repackaged into a newly created ZIP;
 - ZIP content reads enable CRC-32, strict local/central agreement and overlapping-entry checks;
-- every TAR header checksum is verified, PAX metadata is bounded and GNU long-name extensions are refused;
-- gzip output is counted during streaming and its CRC-32/ISIZE footer is independently verified;
+- every TAR header checksum is verified; PAX and GNU long-name/link metadata are bounded and decoded strictly;
+- gzip output and member count are bounded during streaming and every member's CRC-32/ISIZE footer is independently verified;
 - path collision keys are Unicode-normalized and conservative across case-insensitive platforms;
 - symlinks, hardlinks, devices, FIFOs and unknown types are never restored;
 - imported text is rendered as text, and HTML/SVG are not mounted as documents;
 - raster images must pass byte/dimension/pixel/static checks before a browser decoder sees their Blob URL;
 - nested archives are shown as bytes and never recursively opened;
-- encrypted and multipart ZIP data is unsupported, with no password collection.
+- ZipCrypto and WinZip AES entries require an explicit memory-only password; CRC-32 (where present) and AES authentication codes are checked. ZipCrypto is labelled cryptographically weak;
+- multipart ZIP plus 7z/RAR decompression and extraction remain explicitly
+  unsupported. Bounded 7z/RAR structural inspection validates container/header
+  CRC evidence and inventories safe plaintext metadata only; encrypted or
+  encoded headers are not decrypted.
 
 ## Limits