diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 433205c..29b0b95 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -4,8 +4,18 @@ All notable changes are documented here. ## Unreleased +## 0.2.0 - 2026-08-19 + - Added auditable TOTP time travel using live time, bounded positive or negative period offsets, or a frozen local date/time interpreted in an explicit IANA timezone. - Added DST gap rejection and earlier/later disambiguation for repeated wall-clock times, with effective local time, UTC instant, Unix seconds and TOTP counter diagnostics. +- Added an OTP timeline, bounded clock-drift search, JSON interoperability vectors, and custom RFC 6238 T0 support with provisioning-portability warnings. +- Added complete Google Authenticator multi-QR batch assembly and explicit Aegis, 2FAS, andOTP and legacy FreeOTP JSON importers. +- Added the Apache-2.0 jsQR decoder as a bundled fallback when `BarcodeDetector` is missing or cannot decode an image. +- Added collection health reports for reused secrets, duplicate labels, short secrets and non-default timing. +- Added a versioned encrypted-backup format using PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 and authenticated AES-256-GCM, with no persistent browser storage. +- Added layered WebAuthn registration verification for none, packed/self, FIDO U2F, TPM 2.0, Android Key and Apple anonymous attestation statements. +- Added explicit local import and JWS verification of FIDO Metadata Service v3 snapshots, while keeping signer-chain trust separate and unestablished by default. +- Updated the transitive `nanoid` build dependency to 3.3.18; `npm audit` reports no known vulnerabilities. ## 0.1.0 - 2026-08-19 diff --git a/LICENSES/README.md b/LICENSES/README.md index 8e2172e..8149bb1 100644 --- a/LICENSES/README.md +++ b/LICENSES/README.md @@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ OTP & Passkey Tools is `GPL-3.0-or-later`; the full project licence is at `../LICENSE`. -`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md` identifies shipped packages and adapted algorithms. Release preparation collates the exact installed runtime package licence files into `npm-runtime-licenses.txt`. `QRCode-MIT.txt` preserves the licence for the QR construction algorithm rewritten in this project. +`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md` identifies shipped packages and adapted algorithms. Release preparation collates the exact installed runtime package licence files, including jsQR's Apache-2.0 licence, into `npm-runtime-licenses.txt`. `QRCode-MIT.txt` preserves the licence for the QR construction algorithm rewritten in this project. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b59f18c..5c8cc15 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -9,11 +9,16 @@ Authentication material stays in the active tab. The application has no backend, - RFC 4226 HOTP and RFC 6238 TOTP generation and bounded diagnostic verification using SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512, with exact 64-bit counters and preserved leading zeroes. - Strict `otpauth://` parsing/serialization, random secret generation, masked values, interoperability findings, live period display and a project-owned QR encoder. - Auditable TOTP time travel using positive/negative period offsets or a frozen local date/time in an explicit IANA timezone, including DST-gap rejection and repeated-time disambiguation. +- Bounded clock-drift search, past/current/future OTP timelines, downloadable interoperability vectors and custom RFC 6238 T0 diagnostics. - RFC 6287 OCRA-1 suite parsing and computation for counter, numeric/alphanumeric/hex challenge, PIN/password hash, session and timestamp inputs. Official RFC interoperability vectors cover SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 paths. -- Import of line-delimited provisioning URIs, Google Authenticator migration QR payloads, the documented CSV shape and RFC 6030 PSKC files containing plain secrets. Encrypted PSKC is rejected rather than guessed. -- Explicit URI-list and CSV export with an unencrypted-secret warning. +- Import of line-delimited provisioning URIs, complete Google Authenticator multi-QR batches, Aegis plaintext JSON, 2FAS JSON, andOTP plaintext JSON, legacy FreeOTP JSON, the documented CSV shape and RFC 6030 PSKC files containing plain secrets. Unsupported encrypted vendor formats are rejected rather than guessed. +- Cross-browser QR image decoding through native `BarcodeDetector` when available and a bundled jsQR fallback everywhere else. +- Credential-collection health reports for duplicated secrets/labels, weak secret lengths and non-default timing. +- Explicit URI-list and CSV export with an unencrypted-secret warning, plus a versioned authenticated encrypted backup using PBKDF2-SHA-256 and AES-256-GCM. - Bounded CBOR, `clientDataJSON`, authenticator-data and attestation-object inspection, including flags, RP ID hash, counter, AAGUID, credential ID, COSE key and extensions. - Layered assertion verification for challenge, origin, cross-origin state, RP ID hash, user presence/verification, signature counter, and ES256, RS256, PS256 or Ed25519 signatures. +- Layered registration verification for none, packed/self, FIDO U2F, TPM 2.0, Android Key and Apple anonymous attestation, including certificate signatures and format-specific credential/challenge bindings. +- Explicit offline FIDO Metadata Service v3 JWT snapshot import, signer verification, AAGUID matching and authenticator status display. Imported metadata never silently establishes a trust root. - Serializable registration/request option examples, browser capability diagnostics and an ephemeral in-memory live ceremony lab. ## Security boundary @@ -26,7 +31,7 @@ https://auth.toolbox.add-ideas.de/ The same immutable release can be served there, top-level, with RP ID `auth.toolbox.add-ideas.de`. The RP ID is never widened to `add-ideas.de`, and arbitrary RP IDs can only be inspected offline. -Raw CTAP/token administration is not claimed: browsers expose ordinary WebAuthn but block the FIDO HID usage page from WebHID. Camera and USB permissions are not requested. QR images can be selected locally when the browser implements `BarcodeDetector`; provisioning text can always be pasted. +Raw CTAP/token administration is not claimed: browsers expose ordinary WebAuthn but block the FIDO HID usage page from WebHID. Camera and USB permissions are not requested. QR images can be selected locally in current browsers; provisioning text can always be pasted. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the threat model and limitations. @@ -45,7 +50,7 @@ The Vite base is relative, so both `/` and nested paths work. `npm run toolbox:c ## Static deployment -Serve `dist/` or the contents of `release/auth-tools-0.1.0.zip` over HTTPS. Recommended response headers: +Serve `dist/` or the contents of `release/auth-tools-0.2.0.zip` over HTTPS. Recommended response headers: ```text Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; connect-src 'self'; worker-src 'self' blob:; manifest-src 'self' @@ -62,9 +67,9 @@ For Portal integration, pin the immutable Gitea release ZIP and SHA-256 in `tool - This is an engineering and interoperability workbench, not a certified authenticator, relying-party server, password manager, FIDO certification tool or recovery system. - Live credentials are forgotten on reload and cannot be exported by WebAuthn design. -- Attestation structures are decoded, but 0.1.0 does not establish attestation trust or silently download FIDO Metadata Service data. Assertion signatures are verified only with the explicitly supplied/created credential key. -- Google multi-QR batches must all be supplied; the current UI reviews one payload at a time. Google migration export and encrypted PSKC decryption are not claimed. -- CSV and URI exports contain raw OTP seeds. There is no encrypted vault format in this app. +- Attestation cryptography and metadata status are evidence, not automatic device trust. No trust root or policy is bundled, and FIDO metadata is never downloaded silently. +- All parts of a Google multi-QR batch must be supplied. Google migration export, Aegis password-vault decryption, FreeOTP 2.x encrypted XML and encrypted PSKC decryption are not claimed. +- CSV and URI exports contain raw OTP seeds. The encrypted export is a portable backup file, not a persistent browser vault or recovery service. - QR generation supports byte-mode error-correction M through version 10. Larger provisioning records remain available as text exports. ## Licence diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index c8bb1df..2f81840 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ All inputs are processed in the browser tab. There are no application `fetch`, WebSocket, beacon, analytics, service-worker, credential-storage or remote-metadata paths. OTP secrets, OCRA PIN input, imported files, WebAuthn responses and live test credential metadata are React/session memory and disappear on reload or **Clear session**. -Downloads and clipboard writes require a user action. Exports are not encrypted. The UI masks OTP secrets and provisioning URIs by default, but masking is not memory protection. +Downloads and clipboard writes require a user action. URI/CSV exports are not encrypted; the dedicated encrypted format uses an authenticated cipher and a user-supplied password. The UI masks OTP secrets and provisioning URIs by default, but masking is not memory protection. ## Trust boundaries - The static release and its hosting origin are trusted code. A compromised host can alter JavaScript and steal subsequently entered material; verify the release SHA-256 when this matters. - Imported URIs, CSV, XML, protobuf, JSON, Base64url and CBOR are untrusted. Size/depth/count limits are applied before or during decoding. Imported text is rendered by React, never as markup. The only generated markup insertion is the project-owned QR SVG serializer, which receives an already serialized provisioning URI and emits path coordinates only. - WebAuthn client data is verified as exact strings/bytes. Origins and RP IDs are not suffix-matched. The expected challenge is caller-supplied ceremony state; the tool cannot prove that a server generated or consumed it once. -- Signature verification establishes consistency with the supplied COSE public key, not account ownership or attestation trust. +- Assertion signatures establish consistency with the supplied COSE public key. Attestation checks establish format-specific cryptographic bindings; certificate-chain trust and authenticator policy remain separate. Imported FIDO metadata has its JWS signer checked but does not silently install a trust root. ## Origin isolation @@ -19,22 +19,25 @@ Downloads and clipboard writes require a user action. Exports are not encrypted. ## Cryptography -HMAC, digest, random generation, public-key import and signature verification use the browser Web Cryptography API. No custom cryptographic primitive is implemented. OTP dynamic truncation and OCRA data-input assembly are project code covered by RFC vectors. +HMAC, digest, random generation, PBKDF2 key derivation, AES-GCM authenticated encryption, public-key import and signature verification use the browser Web Cryptography API. No custom cryptographic primitive is implemented. OTP dynamic truncation, OCRA data-input assembly and bounded DER/TPM structure interpretation are project code covered by tests. + +The encrypted backup format uses a 16-byte random salt, 600,000 PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 iterations, a 256-bit AES-GCM key, a 96-bit random IV, a 128-bit authentication tag and authenticated version/KDF/cipher metadata. Decryption failures do not expose partial plaintext. It is an export format, not persistent storage. SHA-1 remains available only where HOTP/TOTP/OCRA interoperability standards require it; it is used inside HMAC or as an explicitly selected OCRA PIN digest, not as a collision-resistant document signature. ## Parser limits - Provisioning URI: 16 KiB. -- Migration/CSV/PSKC input: 4 MiB. +- Migration/CSV/PSKC input: 4 MiB; vendor/encrypted backup input: 16 MiB. - Google protobuf: bounded input, varints at most 10 bytes, supported wire types only. - CBOR: 4 MiB, depth 32, 10,000 items, definite lengths only, duplicate map keys rejected. - OTP secret: 1 KiB; random generation: 16–1,024 bytes. -- Verification windows: TOTP 100 steps maximum; HOTP 10,000 counters maximum. -- QR encoder: version 10 maximum. +- Verification windows: routine TOTP 100 steps maximum; explicit drift search 10,000 periods; HOTP 10,000 counters maximum. +- QR encoder: version 10 maximum. QR decoder: 16 MiB, 4096 px per side and 16 megapixels. +- FIDO Metadata BLOB: 32 MiB, 100,000 entries and 20 signer certificates maximum. -## Not a vault or identity provider +## Not persistent storage or an identity provider -Do not use this app as the only copy of a credential. It does not offer encrypted persistence, recovery codes, account recovery, server-side challenge state, rate limiting, audit logging, device attestation policy, FIDO certification, or phishing protection outside normal browser WebAuthn behavior. +Do not use this app as the only copy of a credential. It does not offer browser persistence, recovery codes, account recovery, server-side challenge state, rate limiting, audit logging, a preconfigured device-attestation trust policy, FIDO certification, or phishing protection outside normal browser WebAuthn behavior. Report vulnerabilities through the repository issue tracker without including real secrets or production assertions. diff --git a/SOURCE.md b/SOURCE.md index 2901bf2..2dd2b8a 100644 --- a/SOURCE.md +++ b/SOURCE.md @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # Corresponding source and provenance -The corresponding source for OTP & Passkey Tools 0.1.0 will be published at: +The corresponding source for OTP & Passkey Tools 0.2.0 is published at: -https://git.add-ideas.de/lotobo/auth-tools/src/tag/v0.1.0 +https://git.add-ideas.de/lotobo/auth-tools/src/tag/v0.2.0 Build that tag with Node.js 22 and the exact `package-lock.json`: @@ -18,14 +18,17 @@ No generated bundle is the preferred source form. No runtime code, metadata or c | Source | Revision | Use | | -------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | | Toolbox SDK | `ef2dab4b46c61812c9a877d8a19fe497b4a4630a`, packages 0.2.3 | manifest, context, shell and build checks | -| Toolbox Portal | `5ed7134d42f0b563bc47a1572107ea94994dfe3c`, tag v0.10.0 | release and UX integration contract | +| Toolbox Portal | tag v0.12.0 | release and UX integration contract | | RFC 4226 | December 2005 | HOTP semantics and vectors | | RFC 6238 | May 2011 | TOTP semantics and vectors | | RFC 6287 | June 2011 | OCRA suite grammar, semantics and vectors | | RFC 6030 | October 2010 | bounded plain-secret PSKC import | | Google Authenticator migration protobuf | observed public interchange schema | local import only; unknown fields are skipped safely | +| Aegis vault specification/importer sources | upstream `master`, accessed 19 August 2026 | bounded plaintext Aegis, andOTP, 2FAS and FreeOTP migration | | Web Authentication | W3C WebAuthn Level 3 Recommendation, 13 January 2026 | client/authenticator structures and ceremony expectations | +| FIDO Metadata Service | v3.1 Proposed Standard, 21 May 2025 | explicit offline Metadata BLOB import and status interpretation | | RFC 8949 / RFC 9052 / RFC 8152 registrations | published versions | bounded CBOR and COSE key interpretation | | QR Code for JavaScript | Kazuhiko Arase, 2009 | QR construction algorithm rewritten in TypeScript under MIT terms | +| jsQR | 1.4.0 | bundled cross-browser QR image decoder under Apache-2.0 | The OCRA implementation was authored from the normative RFC definition and tested with its published interoperability values; the RFC Java reference implementation is not included. The QR module is an acknowledged clean TypeScript rewrite of the MIT-licensed construction algorithm, with deliberately bounded version support. diff --git a/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md b/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md index 36278cb..bb54595 100644 --- a/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +++ b/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md @@ -8,10 +8,11 @@ The release preparation step collates licence files for the exact locked runtime | -------------------------------- | ------- | ---------- | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | | `@add-ideas/toolbox-contract` | 0.2.3 | Apache-2.0 | manifest and context contract | https://git.add-ideas.de/lotobo/toolbox-sdk | | `@add-ideas/toolbox-shell-react` | 0.2.3 | Apache-2.0 | shared shell, theme and actions | https://git.add-ideas.de/lotobo/toolbox-sdk | +| `jsqr` | 1.4.0 | Apache-2.0 | local QR image decoding | https://github.com/cozmo/jsQR | | `react` | 19.2.6 | MIT | application UI | https://github.com/facebook/react | | `react-dom` | 19.2.6 | MIT | browser rendering | https://github.com/facebook/react | -`scheduler`, distributed by the React project under MIT, is the only transitive runtime package. +`scheduler`, distributed by the React project under MIT, is the only transitive runtime package. Exact licence texts, including jsQR's Apache-2.0 terms, are collated from the locked install into the release. ## QR construction diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json index 8dd7222..3a277ad 100644 --- a/package-lock.json +++ b/package-lock.json @@ -1,16 +1,17 @@ { "name": "auth-tools", - "version": "0.1.0", + "version": "0.2.0", "lockfileVersion": 3, "requires": true, "packages": { "": { "name": "auth-tools", - "version": "0.1.0", + "version": "0.2.0", "license": "GPL-3.0-or-later", "dependencies": { "@add-ideas/toolbox-contract": "0.2.3", "@add-ideas/toolbox-shell-react": "0.2.3", + "jsqr": "1.4.0", "react": "19.2.6", "react-dom": "19.2.6" }, @@ -2662,6 +2663,12 @@ "node": ">=6" } }, + "node_modules/jsqr": { + "version": "1.4.0", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/jsqr/-/jsqr-1.4.0.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-dxLob7q65Xg2DvstYkRpkYtmKm2sPJ9oFhrhmudT1dZvNFFTlroai3AWSpLey/w5vMcLBXRgOJsbXpdN9HzU/A==", + "license": "Apache-2.0" + }, "node_modules/keyv": { "version": "4.5.4", "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/keyv/-/keyv-4.5.4.tgz", @@ -3047,9 +3054,9 @@ "license": "MIT" }, "node_modules/nanoid": { - "version": "3.3.16", - "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.16.tgz", - "integrity": "sha512-bzlKTyNJ7+LdGIIwy8ijFpIqEQIvafahV7eYykJ8Cvh42EdJeODoJ6gUJXpQJvej1BddH8OqTXZNE/KfbWAu8Q==", + "version": "3.3.18", + "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.18.tgz", + "integrity": "sha512-DTg4MJbGMWkfi6VZFdNt2/caMbQy4Ou+Op/hJQvGEWcnVfoA1QA+xzRKAzw9jD6+GVOOeYr/mIcuDSdug6F6+w==", "dev": true, "funding": [ { diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 16f3828..2d2b699 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "auth-tools", - "version": "0.1.0", + "version": "0.2.0", "description": "Inspect and test OTP and WebAuthn authentication locally in the browser.", "license": "GPL-3.0-or-later", "author": "Albrecht Degering", @@ -41,9 +41,13 @@ "dependencies": { "@add-ideas/toolbox-contract": "0.2.3", "@add-ideas/toolbox-shell-react": "0.2.3", + "jsqr": "1.4.0", "react": "19.2.6", "react-dom": "19.2.6" }, + "overrides": { + "nanoid": "3.3.18" + }, "devDependencies": { "@add-ideas/toolbox-testkit": "0.2.3", "@eslint/js": "10.0.1", diff --git a/public/CHANGELOG.md b/public/CHANGELOG.md index 433205c..29b0b95 100644 --- a/public/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/public/CHANGELOG.md @@ -4,8 +4,18 @@ All notable changes are documented here. ## Unreleased +## 0.2.0 - 2026-08-19 + - Added auditable TOTP time travel using live time, bounded positive or negative period offsets, or a frozen local date/time interpreted in an explicit IANA timezone. - Added DST gap rejection and earlier/later disambiguation for repeated wall-clock times, with effective local time, UTC instant, Unix seconds and TOTP counter diagnostics. +- Added an OTP timeline, bounded clock-drift search, JSON interoperability vectors, and custom RFC 6238 T0 support with provisioning-portability warnings. +- Added complete Google Authenticator multi-QR batch assembly and explicit Aegis, 2FAS, andOTP and legacy FreeOTP JSON importers. +- Added the Apache-2.0 jsQR decoder as a bundled fallback when `BarcodeDetector` is missing or cannot decode an image. +- Added collection health reports for reused secrets, duplicate labels, short secrets and non-default timing. +- Added a versioned encrypted-backup format using PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 and authenticated AES-256-GCM, with no persistent browser storage. +- Added layered WebAuthn registration verification for none, packed/self, FIDO U2F, TPM 2.0, Android Key and Apple anonymous attestation statements. +- Added explicit local import and JWS verification of FIDO Metadata Service v3 snapshots, while keeping signer-chain trust separate and unestablished by default. +- Updated the transitive `nanoid` build dependency to 3.3.18; `npm audit` reports no known vulnerabilities. ## 0.1.0 - 2026-08-19 diff --git a/public/LICENSES/README.md b/public/LICENSES/README.md index 8e2172e..8149bb1 100644 --- a/public/LICENSES/README.md +++ b/public/LICENSES/README.md @@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ OTP & Passkey Tools is `GPL-3.0-or-later`; the full project licence is at `../LICENSE`. -`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md` identifies shipped packages and adapted algorithms. Release preparation collates the exact installed runtime package licence files into `npm-runtime-licenses.txt`. `QRCode-MIT.txt` preserves the licence for the QR construction algorithm rewritten in this project. +`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md` identifies shipped packages and adapted algorithms. Release preparation collates the exact installed runtime package licence files, including jsQR's Apache-2.0 licence, into `npm-runtime-licenses.txt`. `QRCode-MIT.txt` preserves the licence for the QR construction algorithm rewritten in this project. diff --git a/public/LICENSES/npm-runtime-licenses.txt b/public/LICENSES/npm-runtime-licenses.txt index 709ea6d..7381b77 100644 --- a/public/LICENSES/npm-runtime-licenses.txt +++ b/public/LICENSES/npm-runtime-licenses.txt @@ -398,6 +398,216 @@ Installed from: node_modules/@add-ideas/toolbox-shell-react limitations under the License. +============================================================================== +jsqr@1.4.0 +Declared licence: Apache-2.0 +Installed from: node_modules/jsqr +============================================================================== +--- LICENSE --- + Apache License + Version 2.0, January 2004 + http://www.apache.org/licenses/ + + TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION + + 1. 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We also recommend that a + file or class name and description of purpose be included on the + same "printed page" as the copyright notice for easier + identification within third-party archives. + + Copyright {yyyy} {name of copyright owner} + + Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + + Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + limitations under the License. + + + ============================================================================== react@19.2.6 Declared licence: MIT diff --git a/public/README.md b/public/README.md index b59f18c..5c8cc15 100644 --- a/public/README.md +++ b/public/README.md @@ -9,11 +9,16 @@ Authentication material stays in the active tab. The application has no backend, - RFC 4226 HOTP and RFC 6238 TOTP generation and bounded diagnostic verification using SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512, with exact 64-bit counters and preserved leading zeroes. - Strict `otpauth://` parsing/serialization, random secret generation, masked values, interoperability findings, live period display and a project-owned QR encoder. - Auditable TOTP time travel using positive/negative period offsets or a frozen local date/time in an explicit IANA timezone, including DST-gap rejection and repeated-time disambiguation. +- Bounded clock-drift search, past/current/future OTP timelines, downloadable interoperability vectors and custom RFC 6238 T0 diagnostics. - RFC 6287 OCRA-1 suite parsing and computation for counter, numeric/alphanumeric/hex challenge, PIN/password hash, session and timestamp inputs. Official RFC interoperability vectors cover SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 paths. -- Import of line-delimited provisioning URIs, Google Authenticator migration QR payloads, the documented CSV shape and RFC 6030 PSKC files containing plain secrets. Encrypted PSKC is rejected rather than guessed. -- Explicit URI-list and CSV export with an unencrypted-secret warning. +- Import of line-delimited provisioning URIs, complete Google Authenticator multi-QR batches, Aegis plaintext JSON, 2FAS JSON, andOTP plaintext JSON, legacy FreeOTP JSON, the documented CSV shape and RFC 6030 PSKC files containing plain secrets. Unsupported encrypted vendor formats are rejected rather than guessed. +- Cross-browser QR image decoding through native `BarcodeDetector` when available and a bundled jsQR fallback everywhere else. +- Credential-collection health reports for duplicated secrets/labels, weak secret lengths and non-default timing. +- Explicit URI-list and CSV export with an unencrypted-secret warning, plus a versioned authenticated encrypted backup using PBKDF2-SHA-256 and AES-256-GCM. - Bounded CBOR, `clientDataJSON`, authenticator-data and attestation-object inspection, including flags, RP ID hash, counter, AAGUID, credential ID, COSE key and extensions. - Layered assertion verification for challenge, origin, cross-origin state, RP ID hash, user presence/verification, signature counter, and ES256, RS256, PS256 or Ed25519 signatures. +- Layered registration verification for none, packed/self, FIDO U2F, TPM 2.0, Android Key and Apple anonymous attestation, including certificate signatures and format-specific credential/challenge bindings. +- Explicit offline FIDO Metadata Service v3 JWT snapshot import, signer verification, AAGUID matching and authenticator status display. Imported metadata never silently establishes a trust root. - Serializable registration/request option examples, browser capability diagnostics and an ephemeral in-memory live ceremony lab. ## Security boundary @@ -26,7 +31,7 @@ https://auth.toolbox.add-ideas.de/ The same immutable release can be served there, top-level, with RP ID `auth.toolbox.add-ideas.de`. The RP ID is never widened to `add-ideas.de`, and arbitrary RP IDs can only be inspected offline. -Raw CTAP/token administration is not claimed: browsers expose ordinary WebAuthn but block the FIDO HID usage page from WebHID. Camera and USB permissions are not requested. QR images can be selected locally when the browser implements `BarcodeDetector`; provisioning text can always be pasted. +Raw CTAP/token administration is not claimed: browsers expose ordinary WebAuthn but block the FIDO HID usage page from WebHID. Camera and USB permissions are not requested. QR images can be selected locally in current browsers; provisioning text can always be pasted. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the threat model and limitations. @@ -45,7 +50,7 @@ The Vite base is relative, so both `/` and nested paths work. `npm run toolbox:c ## Static deployment -Serve `dist/` or the contents of `release/auth-tools-0.1.0.zip` over HTTPS. Recommended response headers: +Serve `dist/` or the contents of `release/auth-tools-0.2.0.zip` over HTTPS. Recommended response headers: ```text Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; connect-src 'self'; worker-src 'self' blob:; manifest-src 'self' @@ -62,9 +67,9 @@ For Portal integration, pin the immutable Gitea release ZIP and SHA-256 in `tool - This is an engineering and interoperability workbench, not a certified authenticator, relying-party server, password manager, FIDO certification tool or recovery system. - Live credentials are forgotten on reload and cannot be exported by WebAuthn design. -- Attestation structures are decoded, but 0.1.0 does not establish attestation trust or silently download FIDO Metadata Service data. Assertion signatures are verified only with the explicitly supplied/created credential key. -- Google multi-QR batches must all be supplied; the current UI reviews one payload at a time. Google migration export and encrypted PSKC decryption are not claimed. -- CSV and URI exports contain raw OTP seeds. There is no encrypted vault format in this app. +- Attestation cryptography and metadata status are evidence, not automatic device trust. No trust root or policy is bundled, and FIDO metadata is never downloaded silently. +- All parts of a Google multi-QR batch must be supplied. Google migration export, Aegis password-vault decryption, FreeOTP 2.x encrypted XML and encrypted PSKC decryption are not claimed. +- CSV and URI exports contain raw OTP seeds. The encrypted export is a portable backup file, not a persistent browser vault or recovery service. - QR generation supports byte-mode error-correction M through version 10. Larger provisioning records remain available as text exports. ## Licence diff --git a/public/SECURITY.md b/public/SECURITY.md index c8bb1df..2f81840 100644 --- a/public/SECURITY.md +++ b/public/SECURITY.md @@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ All inputs are processed in the browser tab. There are no application `fetch`, WebSocket, beacon, analytics, service-worker, credential-storage or remote-metadata paths. OTP secrets, OCRA PIN input, imported files, WebAuthn responses and live test credential metadata are React/session memory and disappear on reload or **Clear session**. -Downloads and clipboard writes require a user action. Exports are not encrypted. The UI masks OTP secrets and provisioning URIs by default, but masking is not memory protection. +Downloads and clipboard writes require a user action. URI/CSV exports are not encrypted; the dedicated encrypted format uses an authenticated cipher and a user-supplied password. The UI masks OTP secrets and provisioning URIs by default, but masking is not memory protection. ## Trust boundaries - The static release and its hosting origin are trusted code. A compromised host can alter JavaScript and steal subsequently entered material; verify the release SHA-256 when this matters. - Imported URIs, CSV, XML, protobuf, JSON, Base64url and CBOR are untrusted. Size/depth/count limits are applied before or during decoding. Imported text is rendered by React, never as markup. The only generated markup insertion is the project-owned QR SVG serializer, which receives an already serialized provisioning URI and emits path coordinates only. - WebAuthn client data is verified as exact strings/bytes. Origins and RP IDs are not suffix-matched. The expected challenge is caller-supplied ceremony state; the tool cannot prove that a server generated or consumed it once. -- Signature verification establishes consistency with the supplied COSE public key, not account ownership or attestation trust. +- Assertion signatures establish consistency with the supplied COSE public key. Attestation checks establish format-specific cryptographic bindings; certificate-chain trust and authenticator policy remain separate. Imported FIDO metadata has its JWS signer checked but does not silently install a trust root. ## Origin isolation @@ -19,22 +19,25 @@ Downloads and clipboard writes require a user action. Exports are not encrypted. ## Cryptography -HMAC, digest, random generation, public-key import and signature verification use the browser Web Cryptography API. No custom cryptographic primitive is implemented. OTP dynamic truncation and OCRA data-input assembly are project code covered by RFC vectors. +HMAC, digest, random generation, PBKDF2 key derivation, AES-GCM authenticated encryption, public-key import and signature verification use the browser Web Cryptography API. No custom cryptographic primitive is implemented. OTP dynamic truncation, OCRA data-input assembly and bounded DER/TPM structure interpretation are project code covered by tests. + +The encrypted backup format uses a 16-byte random salt, 600,000 PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 iterations, a 256-bit AES-GCM key, a 96-bit random IV, a 128-bit authentication tag and authenticated version/KDF/cipher metadata. Decryption failures do not expose partial plaintext. It is an export format, not persistent storage. SHA-1 remains available only where HOTP/TOTP/OCRA interoperability standards require it; it is used inside HMAC or as an explicitly selected OCRA PIN digest, not as a collision-resistant document signature. ## Parser limits - Provisioning URI: 16 KiB. -- Migration/CSV/PSKC input: 4 MiB. +- Migration/CSV/PSKC input: 4 MiB; vendor/encrypted backup input: 16 MiB. - Google protobuf: bounded input, varints at most 10 bytes, supported wire types only. - CBOR: 4 MiB, depth 32, 10,000 items, definite lengths only, duplicate map keys rejected. - OTP secret: 1 KiB; random generation: 16–1,024 bytes. -- Verification windows: TOTP 100 steps maximum; HOTP 10,000 counters maximum. -- QR encoder: version 10 maximum. +- Verification windows: routine TOTP 100 steps maximum; explicit drift search 10,000 periods; HOTP 10,000 counters maximum. +- QR encoder: version 10 maximum. QR decoder: 16 MiB, 4096 px per side and 16 megapixels. +- FIDO Metadata BLOB: 32 MiB, 100,000 entries and 20 signer certificates maximum. -## Not a vault or identity provider +## Not persistent storage or an identity provider -Do not use this app as the only copy of a credential. It does not offer encrypted persistence, recovery codes, account recovery, server-side challenge state, rate limiting, audit logging, device attestation policy, FIDO certification, or phishing protection outside normal browser WebAuthn behavior. +Do not use this app as the only copy of a credential. It does not offer browser persistence, recovery codes, account recovery, server-side challenge state, rate limiting, audit logging, a preconfigured device-attestation trust policy, FIDO certification, or phishing protection outside normal browser WebAuthn behavior. Report vulnerabilities through the repository issue tracker without including real secrets or production assertions. diff --git a/public/SOURCE.md b/public/SOURCE.md index 2901bf2..2dd2b8a 100644 --- a/public/SOURCE.md +++ b/public/SOURCE.md @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # Corresponding source and provenance -The corresponding source for OTP & Passkey Tools 0.1.0 will be published at: +The corresponding source for OTP & Passkey Tools 0.2.0 is published at: -https://git.add-ideas.de/lotobo/auth-tools/src/tag/v0.1.0 +https://git.add-ideas.de/lotobo/auth-tools/src/tag/v0.2.0 Build that tag with Node.js 22 and the exact `package-lock.json`: @@ -18,14 +18,17 @@ No generated bundle is the preferred source form. No runtime code, metadata or c | Source | Revision | Use | | -------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | | Toolbox SDK | `ef2dab4b46c61812c9a877d8a19fe497b4a4630a`, packages 0.2.3 | manifest, context, shell and build checks | -| Toolbox Portal | `5ed7134d42f0b563bc47a1572107ea94994dfe3c`, tag v0.10.0 | release and UX integration contract | +| Toolbox Portal | tag v0.12.0 | release and UX integration contract | | RFC 4226 | December 2005 | HOTP semantics and vectors | | RFC 6238 | May 2011 | TOTP semantics and vectors | | RFC 6287 | June 2011 | OCRA suite grammar, semantics and vectors | | RFC 6030 | October 2010 | bounded plain-secret PSKC import | | Google Authenticator migration protobuf | observed public interchange schema | local import only; unknown fields are skipped safely | +| Aegis vault specification/importer sources | upstream `master`, accessed 19 August 2026 | bounded plaintext Aegis, andOTP, 2FAS and FreeOTP migration | | Web Authentication | W3C WebAuthn Level 3 Recommendation, 13 January 2026 | client/authenticator structures and ceremony expectations | +| FIDO Metadata Service | v3.1 Proposed Standard, 21 May 2025 | explicit offline Metadata BLOB import and status interpretation | | RFC 8949 / RFC 9052 / RFC 8152 registrations | published versions | bounded CBOR and COSE key interpretation | | QR Code for JavaScript | Kazuhiko Arase, 2009 | QR construction algorithm rewritten in TypeScript under MIT terms | +| jsQR | 1.4.0 | bundled cross-browser QR image decoder under Apache-2.0 | The OCRA implementation was authored from the normative RFC definition and tested with its published interoperability values; the RFC Java reference implementation is not included. The QR module is an acknowledged clean TypeScript rewrite of the MIT-licensed construction algorithm, with deliberately bounded version support. diff --git a/public/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md b/public/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md index 36278cb..bb54595 100644 --- a/public/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +++ b/public/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md @@ -8,10 +8,11 @@ The release preparation step collates licence files for the exact locked runtime | -------------------------------- | ------- | ---------- | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | | `@add-ideas/toolbox-contract` | 0.2.3 | Apache-2.0 | manifest and context contract | https://git.add-ideas.de/lotobo/toolbox-sdk | | `@add-ideas/toolbox-shell-react` | 0.2.3 | Apache-2.0 | shared shell, theme and actions | https://git.add-ideas.de/lotobo/toolbox-sdk | +| `jsqr` | 1.4.0 | Apache-2.0 | local QR image decoding | https://github.com/cozmo/jsQR | | `react` | 19.2.6 | MIT | application UI | https://github.com/facebook/react | | `react-dom` | 19.2.6 | MIT | browser rendering | https://github.com/facebook/react | -`scheduler`, distributed by the React project under MIT, is the only transitive runtime package. +`scheduler`, distributed by the React project under MIT, is the only transitive runtime package. Exact licence texts, including jsQR's Apache-2.0 terms, are collated from the locked install into the release. ## QR construction diff --git a/public/toolbox-app.json b/public/toolbox-app.json index d836155..84a53a2 100644 --- a/public/toolbox-app.json +++ b/public/toolbox-app.json @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ "schemaVersion": 1, "id": "de.add-ideas.auth-tools", "name": "OTP & Passkey Tools", - "version": "0.1.0", + "version": "0.2.0", "description": "Generate, inspect and verify OTP credentials and test WebAuthn/passkey ceremonies locally in the browser.", "entry": "./", "icon": "./favicon.svg", diff --git a/src/components/HelpDialog.tsx b/src/components/HelpDialog.tsx index 80c9e61..9d40c92 100644 --- a/src/components/HelpDialog.tsx +++ b/src/components/HelpDialog.tsx @@ -35,21 +35,24 @@ export function HelpDialog({

OTP seeds are equivalent to a second-factor credential. This app keeps them in memory only, masks them by default and clears them on reload. - Exports are explicit and unencrypted; move them only through a secure - channel. + Plain URI/CSV exports are explicit and unencrypted. The encrypted + backup option authenticates its contents with AES-GCM and a password; + it is still not a recovery service or persistent browser vault.

OTP clock and counters

TOTP is computed from this device’s clock. A rejected valid-looking - value commonly means clock drift, a different period, or the wrong - hash/digit profile. HOTP counters must remain synchronized. + value commonly means clock drift, a different T0/period, or the wrong + hash/digit profile. The timeline and drift finder are diagnostics; + HOTP counters must remain synchronized.

Passkey inspection

Inspection is offline. Verification is layered: client-data expectations, RP ID hash, authenticator flags, counter and - cryptographic signature are reported separately. Metadata is never - fetched silently. + cryptographic signature are reported separately. Attestation signature + validity, metadata status and trust are distinct results. Metadata is + imported explicitly and never fetched silently.

Live ceremonies

diff --git a/src/components/otp/OtpWorkspace.tsx b/src/components/otp/OtpWorkspace.tsx index 2a3a2d9..81284aa 100644 --- a/src/components/otp/OtpWorkspace.tsx +++ b/src/components/otp/OtpWorkspace.tsx @@ -9,10 +9,21 @@ import { exportOtpAuthList, importCsv, importGoogleMigration, + importGoogleMigrationBatch, importOtpAuthList, importPlainPskc, type ImportResult, } from "../../otp/migration"; +import { + credentialHealthReport, + exportInteroperabilityVectors, + findTotpDrift, + generateTotpTimeline, + type CredentialHealthReport, + type TotpDriftMatch, + type TotpTimelineEntry, +} from "../../otp/diagnostics"; +import { decryptOtpBackup, encryptOtpBackup } from "../../otp/encrypted-backup"; import { hotp, totp, @@ -37,6 +48,11 @@ import { type TimeDisambiguation, } from "../../otp/time"; import { qrSvg } from "../../qr/encoder"; +import { decodeQrImage } from "../../qr/decoder"; +import { + importVendorBackup, + type VendorBackupFormat, +} from "../../otp/vendor-backups"; type TotpTimeMode = "current" | "relative" | "absolute"; @@ -77,23 +93,20 @@ function initialProfile(): OtpProfile { function detectImport(input: string): ImportResult { const trimmed = input.trim(); - if (trimmed.startsWith("otpauth-migration://")) - return importGoogleMigration(trimmed); + if (trimmed.startsWith("otpauth-migration://")) { + const parts = trimmed + .split(/\r?\n/gu) + .map((part) => part.trim()) + .filter(Boolean); + return parts.length > 1 + ? importGoogleMigrationBatch(parts) + : importGoogleMigration(trimmed); + } if (trimmed.startsWith("<")) return importPlainPskc(trimmed); if (/^otpauth:\/\//imu.test(trimmed)) return importOtpAuthList(trimmed); return importCsv(trimmed); } -interface BarcodeResult { - rawValue: string; -} -interface BarcodeDetectorLike { - detect(source: ImageBitmap): Promise; -} -interface BarcodeDetectorConstructor { - new (options: { formats: string[] }): BarcodeDetectorLike; -} - export function OtpWorkspace() { const [profile, setProfile] = useState(initialProfile); const [secretText, setSecretText] = useState(() => @@ -114,12 +127,15 @@ export function OtpWorkspace() { const [verifyCode, setVerifyCode] = useState(""); const [verification, setVerification] = useState(""); const [error, setError] = useState(""); - const [mode, setMode] = useState<"credential" | "ocra" | "migration">( - "credential", - ); + const [mode, setMode] = useState< + "credential" | "diagnostics" | "ocra" | "migration" + >("credential"); const [migrationText, setMigrationText] = useState(""); const [imported, setImported] = useState([]); const [warnings, setWarnings] = useState([]); + const [vendorFormat, setVendorFormat] = useState("aegis"); + const [backupPassword, setBackupPassword] = useState(""); + const [health, setHealth] = useState(null); const timeZones = useMemo(() => supportedTimeZones(), []); const resolvedTime = useMemo(() => { @@ -174,6 +190,7 @@ export function OtpWorkspace() { algorithm: profile.algorithm, digits: profile.digits, period: profile.period, + epoch: profile.epoch ?? 0, timestamp: resolvedTime.timestampMs! / 1000, }) : hotp({ @@ -230,13 +247,24 @@ export function OtpWorkspace() { }).format(resolvedTime.timestampMs), utc: new Date(resolvedTime.timestampMs).toISOString(), unixSeconds: seconds, - counter: totpCounter(seconds, profile.period).toString(), - remaining: profile.period - (seconds % profile.period), + counter: totpCounter( + seconds, + profile.period, + profile.epoch ?? 0, + ).toString(), + remaining: + profile.period - ((seconds - (profile.epoch ?? 0)) % profile.period), }; } catch { return null; } - }, [profile.kind, profile.period, resolvedTime.timestampMs, timeZone]); + }, [ + profile.epoch, + profile.kind, + profile.period, + resolvedTime.timestampMs, + timeZone, + ]); const update = ( key: Key, @@ -281,6 +309,7 @@ export function OtpWorkspace() { algorithm: profile.algorithm, digits: profile.digits, period: profile.period, + epoch: profile.epoch ?? 0, timestamp: resolvedTime.timestampMs! / 1000, window: 2, }) @@ -346,43 +375,74 @@ export function OtpWorkspace() { }; const scanQr = async (file: File) => { try { - if (file.size > 16 * 1024 * 1024) - throw new Error("QR image is larger than the 16 MiB safety limit."); - const Constructor = ( - globalThis as typeof globalThis & { - BarcodeDetector?: BarcodeDetectorConstructor; - } - ).BarcodeDetector; - if (!Constructor) - throw new Error( - "This browser has no BarcodeDetector. Paste the provisioning URI instead.", - ); - const bitmap = await createImageBitmap(file); - try { - if ( - bitmap.width > 4096 || - bitmap.height > 4096 || - bitmap.width * bitmap.height > 16_777_216 - ) - throw new Error( - "QR image dimensions exceed the 4096 px / 16-megapixel safety limit.", - ); - const results = await new Constructor({ formats: ["qr_code"] }).detect( - bitmap, - ); - if (!results[0]?.rawValue) - throw new Error("No QR code was found in the image."); - setMigrationText(results[0].rawValue); - performImport(results[0].rawValue); - } finally { - bitmap.close(); - } + const value = await decodeQrImage(file); + setMigrationText((current) => + current.trim().startsWith("otpauth-migration://") && + value.startsWith("otpauth-migration://") + ? `${current.trim()}\n${value}` + : value, + ); + if (!value.startsWith("otpauth-migration://")) performImport(value); } catch (reason) { setError( reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : "QR decoding failed.", ); } }; + const performVendorImport = () => { + try { + const result = importVendorBackup(vendorFormat, migrationText); + setImported(result.profiles); + setWarnings(result.warnings); + setHealth(null); + setError(""); + } catch (reason) { + setError( + reason instanceof Error + ? reason.message + : "Vendor backup import failed.", + ); + } + }; + const analyzeHealth = async () => { + try { + setHealth(await credentialHealthReport(imported)); + setError(""); + } catch (reason) { + setError( + reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : "Health analysis failed.", + ); + } + }; + const exportEncrypted = async () => { + try { + downloadText( + "otp-credentials.auth-tools.json", + await encryptOtpBackup(imported, backupPassword), + "application/json", + ); + setError(""); + } catch (reason) { + setError( + reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : "Backup encryption failed.", + ); + } + }; + const importEncrypted = async () => { + try { + const profiles = await decryptOtpBackup(migrationText, backupPassword); + setImported(profiles); + setWarnings([ + "Encrypted backup authenticated and decrypted locally in this tab.", + ]); + setHealth(null); + setError(""); + } catch (reason) { + setError( + reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : "Backup decryption failed.", + ); + } + }; return (

@@ -394,6 +454,13 @@ export function OtpWorkspace() { > Credential lab +