65 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
# GovOPlaN Encryption
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<!-- govoplan-repository-type:start -->
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**Repository type:** module (platform).
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<!-- govoplan-repository-type:end -->
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`govoplan-encryption` is the optional provider-neutral boundary for governed key
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vaults, versioned content-protection envelopes, key lifecycle operations,
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recovery ceremonies, and disable/uninstall assurance.
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## Implemented
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- opaque provider capability contracts; raw key material never crosses them;
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- tenant/scope-bound vault and key-version metadata;
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- idempotent provision, rotation, revocation, destruction scheduling, and
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outcome-unknown reconciliation;
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- versioned ciphertext envelopes with authenticated-context and migration
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provenance;
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- resumable, evidence-backed rewrap, re-encryption, decrypt, export, and destroy
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state transitions;
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- recent high-assurance, distinct-custodian quorum recovery authorization;
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- bounded tenant administration for safe vault/envelope status, key lifecycle,
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two-phase migration coordination, recovery decisions, and disable preflight;
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- typed APIs, audit-safe events, Alembic migration, and uninstall blocking;
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- a bundled `local_aesgcm` server-envelope provider using AES-256-GCM and
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SQL-persisted wrapped vault/content keys;
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- owner-facing content protect/open/rewrap and two-phase re-encryption
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operations that never export key material;
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- Files and Postbox encrypted-content adapters and fail-closed fixtures.
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## Provider Boundary
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The bundled provider derives a deployment wrapping key from `MASTER_KEY_B64` and
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keeps vault and per-content keys wrapped in shared SQL state. It provides real
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authenticated encryption at rest, but the application server can decrypt and
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therefore this is not E2EE, an HSM/KMS assurance claim, or independent
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certification. Production backup and restore must preserve the database,
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ciphertext storage, and exact deployment key as separate governed assets.
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No client E2EE protocol, tenant KMS/HSM driver, provider credentials, or formal
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certification profile is bundled. Those remain provider-specific work and must
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pass conformance, backup/restore, key-loss, interoperability, and security review
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before a stronger product claim is made.
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Feature modules continue to own content, authorization, retention, and resource
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ownership. Access approval, resource ownership, Identity Trust, and key custody
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are separate decisions.
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The administration surface intentionally omits provider key references, wrapped
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key references, ciphertext locations, and cryptographic material. Lifecycle
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commands require policy and assurance references; destructive actions explain
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their irreversibility and do not imply that previously obtained plaintext can be
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recalled.
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See [docs/ENCRYPTION_BOUNDARY.md](docs/ENCRYPTION_BOUNDARY.md) for the threat
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model, profile consequences, algorithms, recovery, and disable semantics.
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## Verification
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```bash
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cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-encryption
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PYTHONPATH=src:/mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-core/src \
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/mnt/DATA/git/govoplan/.venv/bin/python -m unittest discover -s tests
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```
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