114 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
zemion 1f039dd39c Retain Caddy file capability at ingress boundary 2026-08-03 20:02:29 +02:00
zemion d107d94fec Add standalone managed ingress diagnostics 2026-08-03 19:59:12 +02:00
zemion 6163c5992f Fix ingress probe image selection 2026-08-03 19:49:35 +02:00
zemion 2f28f22fd1 Probe managed ingress across Docker namespaces 2026-08-03 19:41:04 +02:00
zemion 909862afdb Fix managed ingress loopback publication 2026-08-03 19:28:10 +02:00
zemion eb04804d36 Handle Redis under arm64 CI emulation 2026-08-03 19:18:01 +02:00
zemion 017aa7a702 Enable arm64 runtime smoke execution 2026-08-03 19:11:45 +02:00
zemion af27b9fbdf Resolve runtime dependency platform digests 2026-08-03 19:04:06 +02:00
zemion cb45251c59 Fix read-only Web runtime publication 2026-08-03 18:56:23 +02:00
zemion 3b3d5b3386 Redact runtime smoke diagnostics
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2026-08-03 18:36:00 +02:00
zemion 313249b8fc Exercise packaged runtime topology
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2026-08-03 18:26:04 +02:00
zemion 282c90c54b Make ingress drill Docker socket portable
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2026-08-03 17:55:48 +02:00
zemion 25424187a8 Package runtime migration scripts correctly
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 11m1s
2026-08-03 17:54:09 +02:00
zemion ff8ee991c3 Harden runtime distribution acceptance
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2026-08-03 17:32:52 +02:00
zemion a5a0731d20 Fix runtime distribution signing environment
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m48s
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2026-08-03 17:09:50 +02:00
zemion a0f161041d Record Risk Compliance interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m46s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m42s
2026-08-03 15:47:41 +02:00
zemion cb85999a14 Record Notifications interface migration
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2026-08-03 15:34:18 +02:00
zemion cbfe8b03a7 Record Ops interface migration
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 11m5s
2026-08-03 15:19:07 +02:00
zemion 768e9a51c9 Record Calendar interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m59s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 11m5s
2026-08-03 15:09:01 +02:00
zemion 087561ee12 Record Cases interface migration
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 11m2s
2026-08-03 14:44:14 +02:00
zemion 11c1aa1815 Record Dashboard interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m47s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m49s
2026-08-03 14:25:45 +02:00
zemion 478ecb5d0e Record Dataflow interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m45s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m40s
2026-08-03 14:20:21 +02:00
zemion 32689d027a Repair missing packages during environment sync
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m50s
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2026-08-03 14:06:41 +02:00
zemion b7cc2d2df4 Record Datasources interface migration
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m43s
2026-08-03 13:47:26 +02:00
zemion b70869e747 Record Addresses interface migration
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2026-08-03 13:41:04 +02:00
zemion 0c84afb158 Record Templates interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m47s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m56s
2026-08-03 13:35:11 +02:00
zemion 145aa58c11 Record Distribution Lists interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m58s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m58s
2026-08-03 13:28:33 +02:00
zemion a3566c9311 Record Voting interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 2m4s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m49s
2026-08-03 13:17:08 +02:00
zemion 3219460064 Record Forms interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 2m3s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 11m0s
2026-08-03 13:09:24 +02:00
zemion 4b2a15adb5 Record Forms Runtime interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 2m1s
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2026-08-03 13:02:51 +02:00
zemion acc5ffc247 Record Approvals interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 2m0s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 11m0s
2026-08-03 12:56:07 +02:00
zemion f4f9836a09 Record Committee interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m57s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m53s
2026-08-03 12:49:58 +02:00
zemion 758fa1bba7 Record IDM interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m55s
Deployment Installer / deployment-installer (push) Successful in 6s
Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m54s
2026-08-03 12:37:12 +02:00
zemion 0acc8cfc31 Record Postbox interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m51s
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2026-08-03 12:26:52 +02:00
zemion 344bcaf1bc Record Organizations interface migration
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2026-08-03 12:10:13 +02:00
zemion 794622e4ed Record Views interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m45s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m42s
2026-08-03 11:58:24 +02:00
zemion 7653e9851f Record Tenancy interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m45s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m56s
2026-08-03 11:43:28 +02:00
zemion 6f896d9c04 Record Admin interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m41s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m48s
2026-08-03 11:30:45 +02:00
zemion 8f5ac52b58 Record Access interface migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m42s
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2026-08-03 11:01:57 +02:00
zemion 2bc9ad7f00 Record completed Audit interface migration
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2026-08-03 10:43:57 +02:00
zemion fa1a4bacfb Record completed Scheduling interface migration
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2026-08-03 10:36:39 +02:00
zemion 0c0669768d Record Policy interface migration
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m45s
2026-08-03 10:23:22 +02:00
zemion 7b6ceeb185 Record completed Core configuration patterns
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m47s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m37s
2026-08-03 10:17:18 +02:00
zemion ff12f676a1 Record Mail interface pattern migration
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m46s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 11m8s
2026-08-03 10:07:19 +02:00
zemion eb9ab9ef1c Record Files interface pattern migration
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2026-08-03 09:51:01 +02:00
zemion 935c1fe162 Track module interface migration work
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m38s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m19s
2026-08-03 08:31:34 +02:00
zemion c7d1cd0e8f Exercise recovery in datasource composition check
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m40s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m14s
2026-08-03 07:46:57 +02:00
zemion ac80d7e4e3 Record Campaign review pattern evidence
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2026-08-03 07:24:23 +02:00
zemion 5e449b0983 Record Core lifecycle recovery adoption
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m44s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m41s
2026-08-03 07:02:34 +02:00
zemion d4bf07b446 Record workflow recovery ledger adoption
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m47s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m35s
2026-08-03 06:37:45 +02:00
zemion adc4db9fdf Record Dataflow recovery adoption
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m45s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m16s
2026-08-03 06:09:53 +02:00
zemion 484f2af3ac Record Connectors recovery adoption
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m40s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m11s
2026-08-03 05:43:58 +02:00
zemion abf9564cee Record Mail recovery adoption
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m36s
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m13s
2026-08-03 05:00:46 +02:00
zemion 5bef966119 Record Files recovery ledger adoption
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 2m0s
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2026-08-03 04:22:28 +02:00
zemion 5e80b39bbd Record Campaign recovery ledger adoption
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m47s
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2026-08-03 03:55:16 +02:00
zemion 9370f501a0 Inventory module recovery ledger adoption
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Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 9m54s
2026-08-03 03:02:53 +02:00
zemion e8f7e2c194 Repair release and interface CI gates
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2026-08-03 02:02:48 +02:00
zemion cbbe08d912 Enforce signed backup evidence before migrations 2026-08-03 02:01:13 +02:00
zemion 2c515f73c2 Implement supported ingress and TLS profiles
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m38s
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2026-08-03 01:15:06 +02:00
zemion b40f1428fd Resolve backend inventory from checkout
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m38s
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2026-08-03 01:12:41 +02:00
zemion 43380eb068 Add signed runtime distribution pipeline
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m39s
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2026-08-03 00:54:06 +02:00
zemion 29acb55b7c Resolve inventory workspace from checkout
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2026-08-03 00:51:20 +02:00
zemion 4f08b52333 Allow tagged module build-tool peer drift
Dependency Audit / dependency-audit (push) Successful in 1m41s
Deployment Installer / deployment-installer (push) Successful in 5s
Security Audit / security-audit (push) Successful in 10m23s
2026-08-03 00:26:55 +02:00
zemion d3713bf2ee Automate worker runtime delivery drill
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2026-08-03 00:20:57 +02:00
zemion be4410ef1a Record Calendar outbox recovery surface
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2026-08-02 15:57:12 +02:00
zemion 29d07fe375 Integrate Templates into development profiles
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2026-08-02 12:38:55 +02:00
zemion d9003bf63a fix: authenticate private module bootstrap in CI
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2026-08-02 05:40:22 +02:00
zemion ed31409034 feat: add bounded Kubernetes runtime verification
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2026-08-02 05:30:26 +02:00
zemion 50e9607e72 feat: enforce backend endpoint classification 2026-08-02 05:30:20 +02:00
zemion f7a30682b3 refactor: reduce audited source duplication 2026-08-02 05:30:15 +02:00
zemion 2c56a0fc11 feat: enforce signed target maturity evidence
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2026-08-02 03:41:09 +02:00
zemion be8ba10ae3 Wire institutional governance modules and checks
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2026-08-01 20:57:27 +02:00
zemion d78b13f9d3 feat: implement institutional governance and recovery architecture
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2026-08-01 17:46:53 +02:00
zemion 3c658fa32d Harden worker queue and restore drill defaults
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2026-07-31 22:48:06 +02:00
zemion efd734fad2 build: integrate workflow engine repository
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2026-07-31 16:59:08 +02:00
zemion 186aa104ce Align release harness with optional modules [skip ci] 2026-07-31 06:37:56 +02:00
zemion ff9d2404ab Propagate CI safety settings into nested checks
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2026-07-31 06:15:56 +02:00
zemion ba82a85547 Repair Gitea Actions bootstrap and module matrix
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2026-07-31 05:57:33 +02:00
zemion f1fd143ef5 Complete guided release console workflow
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2026-07-31 05:46:50 +02:00
zemion b4248a849e chore: register tenancy WebUI in release catalog
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2026-07-31 04:21:34 +02:00
zemion ff47659899 Provision Python for security audit workflow
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2026-07-31 02:53:37 +02:00
zemion 908090dd0f Add scalable deployment planning and guided releases
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2026-07-31 02:49:03 +02:00
zemion 3864ce28b1 Delete .gitea/workflows/runner_test.yml
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2026-07-31 02:24:30 +02:00
zemion 857dbe55f7 Add .gitea/workflows/runner_test.yml
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2026-07-31 02:15:18 +02:00
zemion c9fcdc90c1 feat: add platform interface inventory and encryption registry
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2026-07-30 17:42:11 +02:00
zemion 82e836b720 feat(deploy): add declarative installation workflow
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2026-07-30 15:36:37 +02:00
zemion fcb8296812 test: dispatch queued dataflow composition runs
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2026-07-30 02:33:16 +02:00
zemion f2e2eb5517 ci: enforce complete security audit coverage
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2026-07-30 01:40:36 +02:00
zemion 1aea3e7c4f fix: repair dev modules and scoped release git trust
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2026-07-29 20:54:58 +02:00
zemion 3f9567af18 Gate Search on PostgreSQL in module CI
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2026-07-29 20:37:08 +02:00
zemion de16f11ce8 test(datasources): include immutable payload schema
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2026-07-29 20:13:49 +02:00
zemion 9d6cdff4b8 CSS changes for release console
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2026-07-29 19:35:49 +02:00
zemion aa4050c0ca feat: expose focused backend reload mode
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2026-07-29 18:52:55 +02:00
zemion d3cdbd8c7a feat: include risk compliance in dev composition
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2026-07-29 18:46:53 +02:00
zemion 7115c4711d chore: register search wiki projects and tickets
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2026-07-29 15:50:35 +02:00
zemion a3beca6fc5 chore: harden audit checks and issue taxonomy
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2026-07-29 14:16:27 +02:00
zemion 11d45bce25 Register governed Views module
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2026-07-28 21:04:55 +02:00
zemion 7b6135b89b Document governed Views architecture
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2026-07-28 19:05:37 +02:00
zemion 5b79e7d377 test: verify pinned dataflow publication composition
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2026-07-28 13:48:11 +02:00
zemion 6afb8fea76 fix: exclude generated artifacts from wiki sync
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2026-07-28 12:52:46 +02:00
zemion 163b35c0af feat: integrate datasource and workflow modules
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2026-07-28 12:45:05 +02:00
zemion 603e07cec5 Integrate Connectors and Dataflow validation
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2026-07-28 11:14:38 +02:00
zemion 97dfd333c6 Register Dataflow module and work taxonomy
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2026-07-28 01:34:06 +02:00
zemion ba88c574b9 chore: move repositories to GovOPlaN organization
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2026-07-27 15:46:51 +02:00
zemion 8d292184d4 ci: execute tagged module pytest suites
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2026-07-23 01:18:47 +02:00
zemion 52bd3527cd ci: install release test harness dependencies
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2026-07-23 01:15:07 +02:00
zemion ff49dabf8f ci: retain installed artifact checks in matrix
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2026-07-23 00:57:24 +02:00
zemion cd15aa514e ci: run artifact-aware module matrix tests
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2026-07-23 00:53:16 +02:00
zemion a042baa1d3 fix(release): verify tags in mounted workspaces 2026-07-23 00:53:16 +02:00
zemion e80de00f29 chore(release): align Mail with Campaign contract
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zemion c69acf0dee ci: use Gitea-compatible artifact upload
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2026-07-23 00:36:59 +02:00
zemion 8b93bbc6b6 ci: mount audit workspace safely
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2026-07-23 00:30:28 +02:00
zemion 3fc17701df ci: fix action repository access
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2026-07-23 00:10:29 +02:00
zemion 9788bdde0c ci: harden repository bootstrap transport 2026-07-23 00:09:43 +02:00
166 changed files with 29873 additions and 814 deletions
+13 -2
View File
@@ -2,17 +2,24 @@
# Copy to a deployment-local .env or secret store. Do not commit populated secrets.
APP_ENV=production
# Live graph changes are useful in development. Production should apply saved
# module state through a coordinated restart of all API and worker processes.
GOVOPLAN_MODULE_LIVE_APPLY_ENABLED=
GOVOPLAN_INSTALL_PROFILE=self-hosted
MASTER_KEY_B64=<generate-with-govoplan-config-env-template-generate-secrets>
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+psycopg://govoplan:change-me@127.0.0.1:5432/govoplan
GOVOPLAN_DATABASE_URL_PGTOOLS=postgresql://govoplan:change-me@127.0.0.1:5432/govoplan
GOVOPLAN_DB_POOL_SIZE=5
GOVOPLAN_DB_MAX_OVERFLOW=10
GOVOPLAN_DB_POOL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=30
GOVOPLAN_DB_POOL_RECYCLE_SECONDS=1800
ENABLED_MODULES=tenancy,organizations,identity,access,admin,dashboard,policy,audit,files,mail,campaigns,calendar,docs,ops
ENABLED_MODULES=tenancy,organizations,identity,idm,access,admin,dashboard,policy,audit,files,templates,mail,campaigns,calendar,poll,scheduling,connectors,datasources,dataflow,dist_lists,workflow_engine,workflow,views,search,risk_compliance,postbox,notifications,services,parties,mandates,decisions,portal,cases,committee,docs,ops
CELERY_ENABLED=true
REDIS_URL=redis://127.0.0.1:6379/0
CELERY_QUEUES=send_email,append_sent,notifications,calendar,default
CELERY_QUEUES=send_email,append_sent,notifications,calendar,dataflow,events,default
CALENDAR_OUTBOX_TERMINAL_RETENTION_DAYS=90
GOVOPLAN_CONNECTOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKS=false
@@ -24,10 +31,14 @@ GOVOPLAN_HTTP_MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES=536870912
GOVOPLAN_HTTP_HSTS_SECONDS=31536000
AUTH_LOGIN_THROTTLE_ENABLED=true
AUTH_ACTIVITY_TOUCH_INTERVAL_SECONDS=300
AUTH_LOGIN_THROTTLE_IDENTITY_LIMIT=10
AUTH_LOGIN_THROTTLE_CLIENT_LIMIT=100
AUTH_LOGIN_THROTTLE_WINDOW_SECONDS=900
AUTH_LOGIN_THROTTLE_REDIS_RETRY_SECONDS=30
# Production startup fails without Redis unless this explicit single-process
# risk acknowledgement is enabled.
GOVOPLAN_ALLOW_PROCESS_LOCAL_LOGIN_THROTTLE=false
CORS_ORIGINS=https://govoplan.example.org
GOVOPLAN_TRUSTED_HOSTS=govoplan.example.org
+6 -14
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
name: Dependency Audit
permissions: read-all
on:
pull_request:
push:
@@ -21,23 +23,13 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020
with:
node-version: "22"
- name: Configure SSH for release dependencies
env:
GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64 }}
- name: Use HTTPS for GovOPlaN repositories
run: |
mkdir -p ~/.ssh
chmod 700 ~/.ssh
if [ -z "${GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64:-}" ]; then
echo "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64 secret is required for git+ssh release dependencies."
exit 1
fi
printf '%s' "$GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
echo 'git.add-ideas.de ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDe48IOof2fJS1dTbJtLWQnWnr+JorZXKIFdOAM9ct8G' > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/known_hosts
git config --global --add url."https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan".insteadOf "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan"
git config --global --add url."https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan".insteadOf "ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan"
- name: Bootstrap GovOPlaN repositories
working-directory: govoplan
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent ..
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent .. --transport public-https --reuse-checkout-auth --exclude-repo addideas-govoplan-website
- name: Install backend dev audit dependencies
working-directory: govoplan
run: |
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
name: Deployment Installer
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches:
- main
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
deployment-installer:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5
with:
path: govoplan
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Compile deployment tooling
working-directory: govoplan
run: python -m py_compile tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py tools/deployment/govoplan_deploy/*.py
- name: Test declarative deployment bundle
working-directory: govoplan
run: python -m unittest -v tests.test_deployment_installer
- name: Build single-file deployer artifact
working-directory: govoplan
run: |
python tools/deployment/build-deployer-zipapp.py --output /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz
python /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz --help
+51 -14
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
name: Module Matrix
permissions: read-all
on:
workflow_dispatch:
pull_request:
@@ -7,6 +9,25 @@ on:
jobs:
module-matrix:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
env:
POSTGRES_DB: govoplan_test
POSTGRES_USER: govoplan
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: govoplan_test
options: >-
--health-cmd "pg_isready -U govoplan -d govoplan_test"
--health-interval 5s
--health-timeout 5s
--health-retries 20
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
options: >-
--health-cmd "redis-cli ping"
--health-interval 5s
--health-timeout 5s
--health-retries 20
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5
with:
@@ -17,32 +38,48 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020
with:
node-version: "22"
- name: Configure SSH for release dependencies
env:
GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64 }}
- name: Use HTTPS for GovOPlaN repositories
run: |
mkdir -p ~/.ssh
chmod 700 ~/.ssh
if [ -z "${GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64:-}" ]; then
echo "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64 secret is required for git+ssh release dependencies."
exit 1
fi
printf '%s' "$GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
echo 'git.add-ideas.de ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDe48IOof2fJS1dTbJtLWQnWnr+JorZXKIFdOAM9ct8G' > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/known_hosts
git config --global --add url."https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan".insteadOf "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan"
git config --global --add url."https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan".insteadOf "ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan"
- name: Bootstrap GovOPlaN repositories
working-directory: govoplan
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent ..
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent .. --transport public-https --reuse-checkout-auth --exclude-repo addideas-govoplan-website
- name: Install backend release dependencies
working-directory: govoplan
run: |
python -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/python tools/repo/sync-python-environment.py --requirements requirements-release.txt --python .venv/bin/python --upgrade-pip
.venv/bin/python -m pip install '../govoplan-core[dev]'
.venv/bin/python -m pip install --no-deps ../govoplan-search
- name: Install WebUI release dependencies with test scripts
working-directory: govoplan
run: bash tools/release/install-webui-release-dependencies.sh ../govoplan-core/webui
- name: Validate platform endpoint surface declarations
working-directory: govoplan
run: .venv/bin/python tools/inventory/platform-interface-inventory.py --strict
- name: Validate Search against PostgreSQL
working-directory: govoplan
env:
GOVOPLAN_SEARCH_POSTGRES_URL: postgresql+psycopg://govoplan:govoplan_test@postgres:5432/govoplan_test
run: |
GOVOPLAN_CORE_ROOT="$PWD/../govoplan-core" .venv/bin/python tools/checks/postgres-integration-check.py \
--database-url "$GOVOPLAN_SEARCH_POSTGRES_URL" \
--module-set search=tenancy,access,search \
--reset-schema \
--skip-retirement-atomicity
PYTHONPATH="$PWD/../govoplan-search/src:$PWD/../govoplan-core/src" \
.venv/bin/python -m unittest discover \
-s ../govoplan-search/tests \
-p test_postgres_search.py \
-v
- name: Prove worker delivery and shutdown guarantees
working-directory: govoplan
env:
GOVOPLAN_WORKER_DRILL_REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379/15
run: |
.venv/bin/python tools/checks/worker-runtime-drill.py \
--output audit-reports/worker-runtime.json
- name: Run module matrix and contract tests
working-directory: govoplan
run: GOVOPLAN_CORE_ROOT="$PWD/../govoplan-core" PYTHON="$PWD/.venv/bin/python" bash tools/checks/check-module-matrix.sh
+7 -15
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
name: Release Integration
permissions: read-all
on:
workflow_dispatch:
@@ -16,29 +18,19 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020
with:
node-version: "22"
- name: Configure SSH for release dependencies
env:
GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64 }}
- name: Use HTTPS for GovOPlaN repositories
run: |
mkdir -p ~/.ssh
chmod 700 ~/.ssh
if [ -z "${GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64:-}" ]; then
echo "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64 secret is required for git+ssh release dependencies."
exit 1
fi
printf '%s' "$GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
echo 'git.add-ideas.de ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDe48IOof2fJS1dTbJtLWQnWnr+JorZXKIFdOAM9ct8G' > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/known_hosts
git config --global --add url."https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan".insteadOf "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan"
git config --global --add url."https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan".insteadOf "ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan"
- name: Bootstrap GovOPlaN repositories
working-directory: govoplan
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent ..
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent .. --transport public-https --reuse-checkout-auth --exclude-repo addideas-govoplan-website
- name: Install backend release integration dependencies
working-directory: govoplan
run: |
python -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/python tools/repo/sync-python-environment.py --requirements requirements-release.txt --python .venv/bin/python --upgrade-pip
.venv/bin/python -m pip install '../govoplan-core[dev]'
.venv/bin/python -m pip install -r requirements-release-tests.txt '../govoplan-core[dev]'
- name: Install WebUI release dependencies
working-directory: govoplan
run: bash tools/release/install-webui-release-dependencies.sh ../govoplan-core/webui
+369
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@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
name: Runtime Distribution
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
version:
description: Release version without leading v
required: true
type: string
python_image:
description: Digest-pinned multi-architecture Python 3.12 slim image
required: true
type: string
nginx_image:
description: Digest-pinned multi-architecture nginx-unprivileged image
required: true
type: string
postgres_image:
description: Digest-pinned PostgreSQL image
required: true
type: string
redis_image:
description: Digest-pinned Redis image
required: true
type: string
load_balancer_image:
description: Digest-pinned HAProxy image
required: true
type: string
managed_ingress_image:
description: Digest-pinned Caddy image
required: true
type: string
garage_image:
description: Digest-pinned Garage image
required: true
type: string
test_mail_image:
description: Digest-pinned GreenMail image
required: true
type: string
binfmt_image:
description: Digest-pinned tonistiigi/binfmt image for arm64 CI execution
required: true
type: string
jobs:
publish-runtime:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5
with:
path: govoplan
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020
with:
node-version: "22"
- name: Validate immutable release inputs
env:
VERSION: ${{ inputs.version }}
PYTHON_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.python_image }}
NGINX_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.nginx_image }}
POSTGRES_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.postgres_image }}
REDIS_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.redis_image }}
LOAD_BALANCER_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.load_balancer_image }}
MANAGED_INGRESS_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.managed_ingress_image }}
GARAGE_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.garage_image }}
TEST_MAIL_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.test_mail_image }}
BINFMT_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.binfmt_image }}
run: |
python - <<'PY'
import os
import re
version = os.environ["VERSION"]
if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(?:[-+][A-Za-z0-9.-]+)?", version) is None:
raise SystemExit("version must be a SemVer value without a leading v")
image_pattern = re.compile(r"^[^@\s]+@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
for name in (
"PYTHON_IMAGE",
"NGINX_IMAGE",
"POSTGRES_IMAGE",
"REDIS_IMAGE",
"LOAD_BALANCER_IMAGE",
"MANAGED_INGRESS_IMAGE",
"GARAGE_IMAGE",
"TEST_MAIL_IMAGE",
"BINFMT_IMAGE",
):
if image_pattern.fullmatch(os.environ[name]) is None:
raise SystemExit(f"{name} must be an exact sha256 image reference")
PY
- name: Use HTTPS for GovOPlaN repositories
run: |
git config --global --add url."https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan".insteadOf "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan"
git config --global --add url."https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan".insteadOf "ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan"
- name: Bootstrap release sources
working-directory: govoplan
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent .. --transport public-https --reuse-checkout-auth --exclude-repo addideas-govoplan-website
- name: Build release wheel roots and WebUI
working-directory: govoplan
run: |
python -m venv .runtime-build
.runtime-build/bin/python -m pip install --upgrade pip wheel cryptography
mkdir -p runtime-output/local-wheels
.runtime-build/bin/python -m pip wheel --no-deps --wheel-dir runtime-output/local-wheels --requirement requirements-release.txt
bash tools/release/install-webui-release-dependencies.sh ../govoplan-core/webui
npm --prefix ../govoplan-core/webui run build
.runtime-build/bin/python tools/release/prepare-runtime-context.py \
--wheelhouse runtime-output/local-wheels \
--web-dist ../govoplan-core/webui/dist \
--output runtime-output/common \
--required-module tenancy \
--required-module organizations \
--required-module identity \
--required-module idm \
--required-module access \
--required-module admin \
--required-module dashboard \
--required-module policy \
--required-module audit \
--required-module docs \
--required-module ops
- name: Resolve architecture-specific offline wheelhouses
working-directory: govoplan
run: |
mkdir -p runtime-output/wheels-amd64 runtime-output/wheels-arm64
cp runtime-output/local-wheels/*.whl runtime-output/wheels-amd64/
cp runtime-output/local-wheels/*.whl runtime-output/wheels-arm64/
.runtime-build/bin/python -m pip download --only-binary=:all: \
--platform manylinux_2_17_x86_64 --platform manylinux2014_x86_64 \
--implementation cp --python-version 3.12 --abi cp312 \
--find-links runtime-output/local-wheels \
--dest runtime-output/wheels-amd64 \
--requirement runtime-output/common/requirements-runtime.txt
.runtime-build/bin/python -m pip download --only-binary=:all: \
--platform manylinux_2_17_aarch64 --platform manylinux2014_aarch64 \
--implementation cp --python-version 3.12 --abi cp312 \
--find-links runtime-output/local-wheels \
--dest runtime-output/wheels-arm64 \
--requirement runtime-output/common/requirements-runtime.txt
.runtime-build/bin/python tools/release/prepare-runtime-context.py \
--wheelhouse runtime-output/wheels-amd64 \
--web-dist ../govoplan-core/webui/dist \
--output runtime-output/context-amd64
.runtime-build/bin/python tools/release/prepare-runtime-context.py \
--wheelhouse runtime-output/wheels-arm64 \
--web-dist ../govoplan-core/webui/dist \
--output runtime-output/context-arm64
cmp runtime-output/context-amd64/composition.json runtime-output/context-arm64/composition.json
- name: Build one-file deployer
working-directory: govoplan
run: python tools/deployment/build-deployer-zipapp.py --output runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz
- name: Authenticate OCI publication
working-directory: govoplan
env:
REGISTRY_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
run: |
test -n "$REGISTRY_USERNAME"
test -n "$REGISTRY_TOKEN"
printf '%s' "$REGISTRY_TOKEN" | docker login git.add-ideas.de --username "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
docker buildx create --name govoplan-runtime --use
- name: Build and publish architecture images
working-directory: govoplan
env:
VERSION: ${{ inputs.version }}
PYTHON_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.python_image }}
NGINX_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.nginx_image }}
run: |
COMPOSITION_SHA256="$(sha256sum runtime-output/context-amd64/composition.json | cut -d' ' -f1)"
for ARCH in amd64 arm64; do
docker buildx build --platform "linux/$ARCH" --push \
--file tools/release/runtime/Dockerfile.api \
--build-arg "PYTHON_IMAGE=$PYTHON_IMAGE" \
--build-arg "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_VERSION=$VERSION" \
--build-arg "GOVOPLAN_COMPOSITION_SHA256=$COMPOSITION_SHA256" \
--tag "git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-api:$VERSION-$ARCH" \
"runtime-output/context-$ARCH"
docker buildx build --platform "linux/$ARCH" --push \
--file tools/release/runtime/Dockerfile.web \
--build-arg "NGINX_IMAGE=$NGINX_IMAGE" \
--build-arg "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_VERSION=$VERSION" \
--build-arg "GOVOPLAN_COMPOSITION_SHA256=$COMPOSITION_SHA256" \
--tag "git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-web:$VERSION-$ARCH" \
"runtime-output/context-$ARCH"
done
docker buildx imagetools create \
--tag "git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-api:$VERSION" \
"git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-api:$VERSION-amd64" \
"git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-api:$VERSION-arm64"
docker buildx imagetools create \
--tag "git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-web:$VERSION" \
"git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-web:$VERSION-amd64" \
"git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-web:$VERSION-arm64"
docker buildx imagetools inspect "git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-api:$VERSION" --raw > runtime-output/api-index.json
docker buildx imagetools inspect "git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-web:$VERSION" --raw > runtime-output/web-index.json
API_DIGEST="sha256:$(sha256sum runtime-output/api-index.json | cut -d' ' -f1)"
WEB_DIGEST="sha256:$(sha256sum runtime-output/web-index.json | cut -d' ' -f1)"
python tools/release/resolve-oci-platforms.py --repository git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-api --index-digest "$API_DIGEST" --index runtime-output/api-index.json --output runtime-output/api-metadata.json
python tools/release/resolve-oci-platforms.py --repository git.add-ideas.de/govoplan/runtime-web --index-digest "$WEB_DIGEST" --index runtime-output/web-index.json --output runtime-output/web-metadata.json
- name: Resolve managed dependency platform images
working-directory: govoplan
env:
POSTGRES_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.postgres_image }}
REDIS_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.redis_image }}
run: |
docker buildx imagetools inspect "$POSTGRES_IMAGE" --raw > runtime-output/postgres-index.json
docker buildx imagetools inspect "$REDIS_IMAGE" --raw > runtime-output/redis-index.json
python tools/release/resolve-oci-platforms.py \
--repository "${POSTGRES_IMAGE%@*}" \
--index-digest "${POSTGRES_IMAGE##*@}" \
--index runtime-output/postgres-index.json \
--output runtime-output/postgres-metadata.json
python tools/release/resolve-oci-platforms.py \
--repository "${REDIS_IMAGE%@*}" \
--index-digest "${REDIS_IMAGE##*@}" \
--index runtime-output/redis-index.json \
--output runtime-output/redis-metadata.json
- name: Register arm64 execution for runtime smoke
working-directory: govoplan
env:
BINFMT_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.binfmt_image }}
run: docker run --privileged --rm "$BINFMT_IMAGE" --install arm64
- name: Exercise amd64 and arm64 runtime images
working-directory: govoplan
run: |
for ARCH in amd64 arm64; do
.runtime-build/bin/python tools/checks/runtime-image-smoke.py \
--api-metadata runtime-output/api-metadata.json \
--web-metadata runtime-output/web-metadata.json \
--postgres-metadata runtime-output/postgres-metadata.json \
--redis-metadata runtime-output/redis-metadata.json \
--platform "linux/$ARCH" \
--output "runtime-output/evidence/runtime-smoke-$ARCH.json"
done
- name: Generate and sign distribution evidence
working-directory: govoplan
env:
VERSION: ${{ inputs.version }}
SOURCE_COMMIT: ${{ gitea.sha }}
SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.RUNTIME_DISTRIBUTION_SIGNING_KEY }}
SIGNING_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.RUNTIME_DISTRIBUTION_SIGNING_KEY_ID }}
TRUSTED_KEYRING: ${{ secrets.RUNTIME_DISTRIBUTION_KEYRING }}
POSTGRES_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.postgres_image }}
REDIS_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.redis_image }}
LOAD_BALANCER_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.load_balancer_image }}
MANAGED_INGRESS_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.managed_ingress_image }}
GARAGE_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.garage_image }}
TEST_MAIL_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.test_mail_image }}
run: |
test -n "$SIGNING_KEY"
test -n "$SIGNING_KEY_ID"
test -n "$TRUSTED_KEYRING"
printf '%s\n' "$SIGNING_KEY" > runtime-output/signing-key.pem
printf '%s\n' "$TRUSTED_KEYRING" > runtime-output/distribution-keyring.json
chmod 600 runtime-output/signing-key.pem
ARTIFACT_BASE="https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/releases/download/v$VERSION"
python tools/release/finalize-runtime-distribution.py \
--composition runtime-output/context-amd64/composition.json \
--api-metadata runtime-output/api-metadata.json \
--web-metadata runtime-output/web-metadata.json \
--deployer runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz \
--deployer-url "$ARTIFACT_BASE/govoplan-deploy.pyz" \
--artifact-base-url "$ARTIFACT_BASE" \
--source-commit "$SOURCE_COMMIT" \
--version "$VERSION" \
--sequence "$(date -u +%Y%m%d%H%M)" \
--dependency "postgres=$POSTGRES_IMAGE" \
--dependency "redis=$REDIS_IMAGE" \
--dependency "load_balancer=$LOAD_BALANCER_IMAGE" \
--dependency "managed_ingress=$MANAGED_INGRESS_IMAGE" \
--dependency "garage=$GARAGE_IMAGE" \
--dependency "test_mail=$TEST_MAIL_IMAGE" \
--output-directory runtime-output/evidence \
--descriptor runtime-output/distribution-descriptor.json
.runtime-build/bin/python tools/release/generate-runtime-distribution.py \
--descriptor runtime-output/distribution-descriptor.json \
--signing-key "$SIGNING_KEY_ID=runtime-output/signing-key.pem" \
--output runtime-output/distribution-manifest.json
openssl pkeyutl -sign -inkey runtime-output/signing-key.pem -rawin \
-in runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz \
-out runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz.sig
(cd runtime-output && sha256sum govoplan-deploy.pyz > govoplan-deploy.pyz.sha256)
(cd runtime-output && sha256sum distribution-manifest.json > distribution-manifest.json.sha256)
rm runtime-output/signing-key.pem
- name: Verify the published bundle contract with the zipapp
working-directory: govoplan
env:
VERSION: ${{ inputs.version }}
SIGNING_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.RUNTIME_DISTRIBUTION_SIGNING_KEY_ID }}
run: |
(cd runtime-output && sha256sum --check govoplan-deploy.pyz.sha256)
(cd runtime-output && sha256sum --check distribution-manifest.json.sha256)
.runtime-build/bin/python - <<'PY'
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
keyring = json.loads(
Path("runtime-output/distribution-keyring.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
)
key_id = os.environ["SIGNING_KEY_ID"]
matches = [item for item in keyring["keys"] if item.get("key_id") == key_id]
if len(matches) != 1 or matches[0].get("status") != "active":
raise SystemExit("runtime signing key is not uniquely active in the keyring")
Path("runtime-output/runtime-release-public.pem").write_text(
matches[0]["public_key_pem"], encoding="utf-8"
)
PY
openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin \
-inkey runtime-output/runtime-release-public.pem -rawin \
-in runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz \
-sigfile runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz.sig
cp runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.tampered.pyz
printf '\0' >> runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.tampered.pyz
if openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin \
-inkey runtime-output/runtime-release-public.pem -rawin \
-in runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.tampered.pyz \
-sigfile runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz.sig >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Tampered deployment bootstrap unexpectedly verified" >&2
exit 1
fi
MANIFEST_SHA256="$(cut -d' ' -f1 runtime-output/distribution-manifest.json.sha256)"
python runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz init \
--directory runtime-output/acceptance-install \
--non-interactive --module-set base
python runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz verify-release \
--directory runtime-output/acceptance-install \
--manifest runtime-output/distribution-manifest.json \
--manifest-sha256 "$MANIFEST_SHA256" \
--trusted-keyring runtime-output/distribution-keyring.json \
--adopt
- name: Exercise the managed ingress boundary
working-directory: govoplan
env:
MANAGED_INGRESS_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.managed_ingress_image }}
LOAD_BALANCER_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.load_balancer_image }}
run: >-
python tools/checks/managed-ingress-drill.py
--caddy-image "$MANAGED_INGRESS_IMAGE"
--load-balancer-image "$LOAD_BALANCER_IMAGE"
--probe-image "$(jq -r '.platforms["linux/amd64"]' runtime-output/api-metadata.json)"
- name: Publish immutable Gitea release assets
working-directory: govoplan
env:
VERSION: ${{ inputs.version }}
SOURCE_COMMIT: ${{ gitea.sha }}
GITEA_RELEASE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_TOKEN }}
run: |
python tools/release/publish-runtime-release.py \
--tag "v$VERSION" \
--target-commit "$SOURCE_COMMIT" \
--title "GovOPlaN v$VERSION runtime distribution" \
--asset runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz \
--asset runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz.sig \
--asset runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz.sha256 \
--asset runtime-output/distribution-manifest.json \
--asset runtime-output/distribution-manifest.json.sha256 \
--asset runtime-output/distribution-keyring.json \
--asset runtime-output/context-amd64/composition.json \
--asset runtime-output/evidence/api-sbom.cdx.json \
--asset runtime-output/evidence/web-sbom.cdx.json \
--asset runtime-output/evidence/api-provenance.json \
--asset runtime-output/evidence/web-provenance.json \
--asset runtime-output/evidence/runtime-smoke-amd64.json \
--asset runtime-output/evidence/runtime-smoke-arm64.json
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
name: Runtime Ingress Drill
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
caddy_image:
description: Digest-pinned Caddy image
required: true
type: string
load_balancer_image:
description: Digest-pinned HAProxy image
required: true
type: string
probe_image:
description: Digest-pinned amd64 GovOPlaN API image
required: true
type: string
jobs:
managed-ingress:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5
with:
path: govoplan
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Authenticate runtime image pull
env:
REGISTRY_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
run: echo "$REGISTRY_TOKEN" | docker login git.add-ideas.de --username "$REGISTRY_USERNAME" --password-stdin
- name: Exercise the managed ingress boundary
working-directory: govoplan
env:
CADDY_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.caddy_image }}
LOAD_BALANCER_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.load_balancer_image }}
PROBE_IMAGE: ${{ inputs.probe_image }}
run: >-
python tools/checks/managed-ingress-drill.py
--caddy-image "$CADDY_IMAGE"
--load-balancer-image "$LOAD_BALANCER_IMAGE"
--probe-image "$PROBE_IMAGE"
+14 -19
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
name: Security Audit
permissions: read-all
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches:
- main
@@ -13,37 +14,31 @@ jobs:
security-audit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
SECURITY_AUDIT_MODE: ci
SECURITY_AUDIT_MODE: full
SECURITY_AUDIT_SCOPE: govoplan
SECURITY_AUDIT_FAIL_ON_FINDINGS: "0"
SECURITY_AUDIT_REQUIRE_TOOLS: "1"
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: "2"
GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0: url.https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan.insteadOf
GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0: git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan
GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1: url.https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan.insteadOf
GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1: ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5
with:
path: govoplan
- name: Configure SSH for repository bootstrap
env:
GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64: ${{ secrets.GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64 }}
run: |
mkdir -p ~/.ssh
chmod 700 ~/.ssh
if [ -z "${GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64:-}" ]; then
echo "GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64 secret is required for git+ssh repository bootstrap."
exit 1
fi
printf '%s' "$GOVOPLAN_RELEASE_SSH_KEY_B64" | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
echo 'git.add-ideas.de ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDe48IOof2fJS1dTbJtLWQnWnr+JorZXKIFdOAM9ct8G' > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/known_hosts
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Bootstrap GovOPlaN repositories
working-directory: govoplan
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent ..
- name: Run security audit
run: python tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py --parent .. --transport public-https --reuse-checkout-auth --exclude-repo addideas-govoplan-website
- name: Run whole-system security audit
working-directory: govoplan
run: tools/checks/security-audit/run.sh --mode "$SECURITY_AUDIT_MODE" --scope "$SECURITY_AUDIT_SCOPE" --reports-dir audit-reports
- name: Upload audit reports
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02
uses: actions/upload-artifact@a8a3f3ad30e3422c9c7b888a15615d19a852ae32
with:
name: security-audit-reports
path: govoplan/audit-reports
+5
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
.ruff_cache/
.venv/
runtime/
!tools/release/runtime/
tools/release/runtime/*
!tools/release/runtime/Dockerfile.api
!tools/release/runtime/Dockerfile.web
!tools/release/runtime/nginx.conf
__pycache__/
audit-reports/
coverage/
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
# GovOPlaN Workspace Codex Guide
## Scope
This repository coordinates the GovOPlaN workspace, release catalog, shared
checks, development environment, and cross-repository automation. Business and
platform behavior remains owned by the corresponding module repository.
## Documentation Contract
- Treat documentation as part of every behavior change. Update the owning module's manifest-driven `DocumentationTopic` contributions for each affected user and administrator workflow, setting, permission, limitation, and operational consequence.
- Keep feature content in the owning module. The optional `govoplan-docs` module projects module contributions and must not import feature internals.
- Every module manifest must provide a static user and administrator baseline, even when `documentation_providers` add configured-state details.
- Run `tools/checks/check-manifest-shapes.py` after module behavior or manifest changes. Run `tools/checks/check-focused.sh` for cross-module changes.
## Working Rules
- Treat Gitea issues as the canonical backlog and state log.
- Preserve optional module boundaries and use Core contracts or capabilities for integrations.
- Prefer targeted checks before full workspace scans.
- Do not start persistent development servers unless requested.
+57 -5
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@
**Repository type:** system (meta).
<!-- govoplan-repository-type:end -->
[![Module Matrix](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/actions/workflows/module-matrix.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/actions?workflow=module-matrix.yml&actor=0&status=0)
[![Release Integration](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/actions/workflows/release-integration.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/actions?workflow=release-integration.yml&actor=0&status=0)
[![Dependency Audit](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/actions/workflows/dependency-audit.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/actions?workflow=dependency-audit.yml&actor=0&status=0)
[![Security Audit](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/actions/workflows/security-audit.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/actions?workflow=security-audit.yml&actor=0&status=0)
[![Module Matrix](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/workflows/module-matrix.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions?workflow=module-matrix.yml&actor=0&status=0)
[![Release Integration](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/workflows/release-integration.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions?workflow=release-integration.yml&actor=0&status=0)
[![Deployment Installer](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/workflows/deployment-installer.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions?workflow=deployment-installer.yml&actor=0&status=0)
[![Dependency Audit](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/workflows/dependency-audit.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions?workflow=dependency-audit.yml&actor=0&status=0)
[![Security Audit](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions/workflows/security-audit.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/actions?workflow=security-audit.yml&actor=0&status=0)
This is the GovOPlaN meta repository. It is the operator entry point for
whole-product development, release orchestration, repository bootstrap, and
@@ -41,6 +42,16 @@ Open the WebUI in a browser after launch only when explicitly requested:
GOVOPLAN_OPEN_BROWSER=1 ./tools/launch/launch-dev.sh
```
Limit backend reload triggers during focused module work without changing the
enabled module graph:
```sh
GOVOPLAN_BACKEND_RELOAD_MODULES=calendar,campaign ./tools/launch/launch-dev.sh
```
Set `GOVOPLAN_BACKEND_RELOAD_MODULES=none` to watch only core/config sources.
Leaving it unset keeps the broad default and watches all enabled modules.
Start the shared development PostgreSQL service:
```sh
@@ -59,6 +70,12 @@ Clone missing repositories listed in `repositories.json`:
./tools/repo/bootstrap-repositories.py
```
Gitea Actions jobs bootstrap the registered repositories over HTTPS and reuse
only the checkout job's short-lived authentication header. If registered
modules are private, allow the meta repository read access under
`GovOPlaN -> Settings -> Actions -> General -> Cross-Repository Access`; no
long-lived personal token is stored by the workflow or bootstrap tool.
Update generated repository type notes in all READMEs:
```sh
@@ -131,6 +148,23 @@ Start the local release console:
./.venv/bin/python tools/release/release-console.py
```
Create and validate a private, declarative installation bundle:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py init \
--directory ~/.local/share/govoplan/installations/default
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py doctor \
--directory ~/.local/share/govoplan/installations/default
```
The current executable slice and remaining production gates are documented in
[Installation and Deployment Architecture](docs/INSTALLATION_AND_DEPLOYMENT_ARCHITECTURE.md).
Same-host replica balancing and the multi-host promotion boundary are documented
in [Scaling and Multi-Host Deployment](docs/SCALING_AND_MULTI_HOST_DEPLOYMENT.md).
The recovery state machine, migration rollback boundary, and required restore
drills are documented in
[Recovery and Rollback Guarantees](docs/RECOVERY_AND_ROLLBACK_GUARANTEES.md).
## Configuration
The repository root `.env.example` is the self-hosted operator template for a
@@ -151,20 +185,38 @@ Meta ownership and module install/contract boundaries are documented in
`docs/META_REPO_SCAN.md` and `docs/MODULE_CONTRACTS_AND_INSTALLS.md`.
Frontend layout principles for module pages are documented in
`docs/FRONTEND_LAYOUT_PRINCIPLES.md`.
The provider-neutral datasource boundary and reusable Dataflow/Workflow graph
contract are documented in
`docs/DATASOURCE_AND_DEFINITION_GRAPH_ARCHITECTURE.md`.
The cross-product destination, stakeholder visions, configuration archetypes,
connected outcome stories, and capability horizons are documented in
the [Connected Governance Platform Roadmap](docs/CONNECTED_GOVERNANCE_PLATFORM_ROADMAP.md).
The reconciled institutional semantics, source-authority modes, module layers,
candidate Mandates/Services/Parties/Decisions boundaries, and migration
sequence are documented in the
[Institutional Governance Target Architecture](docs/INSTITUTIONAL_GOVERNANCE_TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md).
The selected Campaign-to-Postbox-to-data-to-collaboration implementation path,
including stage gates and shared documentation expectations, is in the
[Reference Journey Program](docs/REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md).
The administrator journey from Core-only bootstrap through online module
installation, scale-out, and reversible environment promotion is defined in
[System Administrator Lifecycle User Story](docs/SYSTEM_ADMINISTRATOR_LIFECYCLE_USER_STORY.md).
The corresponding host deployment compiler, managed/external component choices,
reconfiguration semantics, and safe Web update boundary are defined in
[Installation and Deployment Architecture](docs/INSTALLATION_AND_DEPLOYMENT_ARCHITECTURE.md).
The concrete replica, worker-node, load-balancer, and shared-state topology is
defined in [Scaling and Multi-Host Deployment](docs/SCALING_AND_MULTI_HOST_DEPLOYMENT.md).
Durable deployment journals, Core recovery evidence, and the distinction
between pre-migration configuration restore and post-migration forward recovery
are defined in
[Recovery and Rollback Guarantees](docs/RECOVERY_AND_ROLLBACK_GUARANTEES.md).
The first Campaign-centric capability and infrastructure fit assessment is in
`docs/CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md`. Its rerun tooling can collect and
verify a bounded installed composition; target, provider and production claims
remain separate, expiring attestations signed by independently scoped proof
authorities.
authorities. The operational issuance, target-run, recovery-measurement, key
custody, and promotion-gate procedure is in
[Target Maturity Evidence Runbook](docs/TARGET_MATURITY_EVIDENCE_RUNBOOK.md).
# GovOPlaN Docker
+5
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ Current shared profiles:
- `govoplan/dev/postgres`
- `govoplan/dev/production-like`
The generated whole-product Compose profile is owned by
`tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py`. It renders a deployment-specific
`compose.json` from a versioned installation specification; generated files and
secrets remain outside the repository.
Module-specific Docker test beds remain in their owning repositories:
- `govoplan-campaign/dev/mail-testbed`
+133
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@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
# Backup And Restore Evidence
## Boundary
`govoplan-deploy` verifies backup and restore evidence; it does not receive
database, object-store, KMS, or orchestrator administration credentials and it
does not create the backup. A provider-owned backup controller creates one
coordinated recovery point, a separate drill runner restores it into an
isolated target, and an evidence authority signs the resulting receipt.
The application containers receive only a sanitized projection: evidence,
recovery-point and drill identifiers, hashes, timestamps, component count, and
measured RPO/RTO. Artifact locations, provider credentials, encryption-key
references, the public trust keyring, and private signing keys remain in the
deployment/evidence boundary.
The machine-readable contracts are:
- [`backup-evidence.schema.json`](backup-evidence.schema.json);
- [`backup-evidence-keyring.schema.json`](backup-evidence-keyring.schema.json).
One evidence document is bound to the installation id, deployment profile,
topology subject, exact signed release manifest, image digests, and composition
digest. It covers PostgreSQL, objects, protected configuration, and recoverable
key custody at one recovery point. It contains references, never key material.
## Production Sequence
1. Establish the provider snapshot, application quiesce, or transaction
boundary and retain a hash of its fencing token.
2. Capture PostgreSQL, object storage, protected deployment configuration, and
key-custody state within five minutes of that recovery point.
3. Restore all four components into a target isolated from production write
endpoints and production queues.
4. Start the exact immutable release named in the evidence, verify migration
heads, verify a deterministic manifest of representative object hashes, and
execute the documented semantic journey checks.
5. Record actual data loss and elapsed recovery as measured RPO and RTO. A
measured RPO above the declared objective invalidates the evidence.
6. Sign the canonical receipt using an evidence-authority Ed25519 key held
outside the application and deployment host. During key rotation, include
both accepted signatures.
7. Transfer the evidence SHA-256 through an independent approved channel, then
verify and adopt it on the deployment host.
Provider automation can sign and validate an unsigned receipt with:
```sh
python tools/deployment/sign-backup-evidence.py \
--input unsigned-backup-evidence.json \
--output backup-evidence.json \
--trusted-keyring backup-evidence-keyring.json \
--signing-key backup-authority-2026=/run/keys/backup-authority.pem
```
The private key file must be owner-only. The tool refuses an unexpected key
type, an inactive/untrusted signer, malformed or partial evidence, stale
recovery points, failed drill checks, mismatched releases, and non-canonical
output.
Adopt the result using the independently obtained digest:
```sh
python3 govoplan-deploy.pyz verify-backup \
--directory /srv/govoplan/default \
--evidence ./backup-evidence.json \
--evidence-sha256 "$APPROVED_BACKUP_EVIDENCE_SHA256" \
--trusted-keyring ./backup-evidence-keyring.json \
--adopt
```
Evidence is fresh for at most 24 hours and may declare an earlier expiry. Every
self-hosted release identity change is conservatively treated as a migration
boundary. `doctor`, Compose `apply`, and `render-kubernetes` fail closed when
fresh evidence for the previously applied immutable release is unavailable.
Compose verifies once before changing runtime state and again after API/worker
quiescing immediately before migration. The exported Kubernetes migration Job
is generated only after verification and is annotated with the sanitized
evidence digest, recovery-point id, and drill id.
## Provider Runbooks
### PostgreSQL
Use a managed transaction-consistent snapshot or a base backup plus retained
WAL sufficient to reconstruct the declared point. Record the provider,
protected artifact reference and digest, snapshot identity, and PostgreSQL LSN.
The restore drill must connect only to the isolated database and must compare
the resulting migration-head digest with the release expectation.
### Object Storage
Use provider snapshots/versioning or an immutable object copy. Build a sorted
manifest containing object key, version, size, and content digest, then record
its digest, object count, total bytes, provider version identity, and protected
artifact reference. Verify representative objects from every owning module
after restore. Single-node managed Garage is persistent but not highly
available; copy its coordinated recovery material to an independent failure
domain.
### Configuration And Key Custody
Back up the private installation bundle and external secret-manager bindings as
an encrypted artifact. Record only its reference and digest. For KMS/HSM/vault
state, record the provider keyset reference, version, and a successful
recoverability assertion. Never put a key, recovery share, token, password, or
credential-bearing URL in evidence. The isolated drill must prove that the
restored release can decrypt representative protected content without
exporting the key material into the report.
## Ownership And Retention
The deployment owner approves the RPO/RTO objectives. State-service owners
operate backup capture and restoration. Module owners define representative
objects and semantic checks. Security owns evidence-authority keys and
revocation. Operations schedules drills and retains sanitized status.
Retain backup artifacts for the approved legal/operational period and at least
through the release's rollback window. Retain signed evidence, drill reports,
and deletion receipts for the audit period. Disposal must remove every backup
copy and provider version according to policy, then revoke or retire references
without deleting the audit receipt. Cryptographic erasure is valid only when
key-destruction evidence and provider-copy coverage are independently proven.
## Failure Handling
Missing components, component-time skew, stale or expired evidence, revocation,
signature/key mismatch, changed stored files, release mismatch, failed semantic
checks, or an RPO breach block migration. The deployment journal records the
rejection without private provider details. If migration has not started, the
operator may supply fresh evidence and retry. Once migration starts, recovery
is explicitly forward-only until the verified coordinated recovery point is
restored with its matching release.
+54 -18
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@@ -14,6 +14,14 @@
| Machine-readable companion | [`capability-fit-current.json`](capability-fit-current.json) |
| Input schema | [`capability-fit.schema.json`](capability-fit.schema.json) |
**Snapshot notice:** this assessment remains valid only for the pinned
2026-07-22 composition above. Workflow Engine, the optional Workflow editor,
Datasources, Dataflow, Search, encryption contracts, and other later main-branch
work must not be inferred into this evidence record. The current product
direction and implemented-state reconciliation are documented separately in
the
[Institutional Governance Target Architecture](INSTITUTIONAL_GOVERNANCE_TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md).
This is a fit assessment, not a production approval or security certification.
It deliberately does not infer implementation from a repository, issue, or
manifest existing. A conclusion needs code plus a route/contract, test,
@@ -57,7 +65,7 @@ profile intentionally runs only PostgreSQL and Redis in containers; API,
WebUI, worker, and scheduler processes still run from editable source trees. A
target deployment must supply TLS termination, process supervision, secret
injection, monitoring, backup storage, and recovery procedures. The open
[Core backup/restore issue #29](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/29)
[Core backup/restore issue #29](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/29)
is a production gate. Identity federation, external audit export, and a tested
disaster-recovery plan are also not complete.
@@ -134,7 +142,7 @@ persistence, and durable shared or object storage. Run one scheduler only when a
selected module needs scheduled recovery. Multiple scheduler replicas require
leader election or an external lock, which is not established by this report.
This topology is a recommendation from the [Ops scalability profiles](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-ops/src/branch/main/docs/SCALABILITY_PROFILES.md),
This topology is a recommendation from the [Ops scalability profiles](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-ops/src/branch/main/docs/SCALABILITY_PROFILES.md),
not a currently shipped production Compose/Kubernetes/systemd package.
## Functional capability matrix
@@ -154,7 +162,7 @@ not a currently shipped production Compose/Kubernetes/systemd package.
| Configured-system documentation and Ops status pages | `verified` | Docs/Ops manifests contribute protected routes and WebUI packages; Ops code checks database, Redis, workers, storage and deployment-security settings. | This does not replace external monitoring or a target runbook. |
| Calendar/CalDAV integration | `partial` | Calendar `v0.1.8` supplies the catalogued storage/sync foundation. The durable external-write outbox, worker recovery, reconciliation, and retention work is committed, tested, and pushed on Calendar `main` after that tag. | The post-tag outbox work is remote-integrated source, not local-only WIP, but it is not in the signed stable package baseline and has not passed a target CalDAV drill. Bulk synchronized-calendar migration semantics remain separate work. |
| External LDAP/AD, OIDC/SAML or SCIM identity integration | `scaffold` | IDM owns normalized assignment APIs and documents connector boundaries. | Provider connectors, login callback flow and target directory reconciliation are not an implemented end-to-end capability. Use local accounts for this pilot. |
| Export-control/embargo-list screening | `planned` | Product-level [GovOPlaN #12](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/12) defines the consumer-independent user story. | No screening provider, list provenance, matching policy, review flow or legal evidence exists in this composition. |
| Export-control/embargo-list screening | `planned` | Product-level [GovOPlaN #12](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/12) defines the consumer-independent user story. | No screening provider, list provenance, matching policy, review flow or legal evidence exists in this composition. |
| Workflow-driven journeys and views | `planned` | Workflow contracts/concepts exist outside this assessment. | Explicitly postponed. Do not include Workflow in pilot or production claims from this report. |
## Infrastructure matrix
@@ -177,13 +185,13 @@ not a currently shipped production Compose/Kubernetes/systemd package.
| Health/readiness | `verified` | `/health`, protected `/health/details`, and Ops checks for DB, Redis, workers, storage, maintenance and cookie/CORS posture. | Add external probes and distinguish liveness from dependency readiness for the chosen orchestrator. |
| Metrics, logs and alerting | `partial` | Correlation IDs, slow-request/query metrics in logs, worker inspection and operator status are implemented. | No bundled metrics exporter, log collector, dashboards, queue-depth alerts, pager route or SLO is verified. |
| Audit | `partial` | Local audit tables and retry outbox are verified. | Retention, tamper-evident export, privileged access review and SIEM integration are unproved. |
| Backup and restore | `partial` | Operator guide and installer hooks describe `pg_dump`/`pg_restore`; SQLite and simulated installer rollback drills exist. | [Core #29](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/29) remains open. No target PostgreSQL + files + secrets restore drill or measured RTO/RPO exists. |
| Backup and restore | `partial` | Operator guide and installer hooks describe `pg_dump`/`pg_restore`; SQLite and simulated installer rollback drills exist. | [Core #29](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/29) remains open. No target PostgreSQL + files + secrets restore drill or measured RTO/RPO exists. |
| Disaster recovery | `not_assessed` | The Ops guide asks for RPO/RTO and restore drills. | No agreed RPO/RTO, off-site copy, failover topology, dependency recovery order, communications plan or exercise evidence was supplied. |
The scalability and sizing documentation delivered the documentation portions
of [Core #217](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/217) and
[Core #219](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/219).
[Core #28](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/28) records the
of [Core #217](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/217) and
[Core #219](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/219).
[Core #28](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/28) records the
operator-documentation slice. These closed tickets are evidence of documented
models, not evidence that an organization's production environment has passed
them.
@@ -468,10 +476,11 @@ which modules a running service activated, migrations, configuration, health,
or reference-journey behavior. Runtime activation therefore remains an explicit
unchecked boundary.
### Target, provider and production proof boundary
### Reference-readiness, provider and production proof boundary
Installed evidence cannot approve a target environment, an external provider,
or production use. These scopes use a separate, expiring
Installed evidence cannot establish target acceptance, accessibility, privacy,
security, operations, recovery, an external provider, or production use. These
scopes use a separate, expiring
[`capability-fit-boundary-evidence.schema.json`](capability-fit-boundary-evidence.schema.json)
bundle. The bundle is bound to the assessment ID, assessment release and exact
installed-evidence SHA-256 digest. It contains only opaque subject/control/result
@@ -480,8 +489,9 @@ IDs and content hashes, not endpoints, credentials, people or raw result files.
Boundary evidence is accepted only when at least one Ed25519 signature validates
against a separately provisioned
[`capability-fit-proof-authority-keyring.schema.json`](capability-fit-proof-authority-keyring.schema.json).
Each authority key explicitly lists the scopes it may attest. Target and provider
claims use `passed` or `failed`; production claims use `approved` or `rejected`.
Each authority key explicitly lists the scopes it may attest. Target,
accessibility, privacy, security, operations, recovery, and provider claims use
`passed` or `failed`; production claims use `approved` or `rejected`.
One claim per scope, unique control/artifact IDs, `issued_at < expires_at`, current
validity and exact digest binding are mandatory. Any schema, binding, time,
signature or authority blocker leaves every supplied boundary claim unchecked;
@@ -493,6 +503,20 @@ Signatures cover UTF-8 JSON with the `signatures` member omitted, object keys
sorted, compact `,`/`:` separators and non-ASCII characters escaped, matching
the tool's deterministic canonicalization.
`tools/assessments/boundary-evidence.py` is the bounded issuance path. It
accepts a private target-run manifest conforming to
[`capability-fit-boundary-run.schema.json`](capability-fit-boundary-run.schema.json),
hashes each retained result file without following a final-component symlink,
and excludes all paths and raw results from the signed receipt. Issuance is
refused unless an independently trusted catalog, exact installed payload,
signed installer receipt, and role-scoped installer authority already pass.
Every claim must be covered by a supplied Ed25519 private key whose public key
is authorized for the full proof interval; catalog and installer key reuse is
rejected. The command immediately verifies its own result and atomically writes
both the proof and a sanitized review. The complete operator procedure and
recovery measurement definition are in
[`TARGET_MATURITY_EVIDENCE_RUNBOOK.md`](TARGET_MATURITY_EVIDENCE_RUNBOOK.md).
```bash
./.venv/bin/python tools/assessments/capability-fit.py \
--public \
@@ -503,6 +527,14 @@ the tool's deterministic canonicalization.
--expected-external-provider-subject provider-production
```
Promotion automation must opt into its required boundaries. Add
`--require-reference-readiness` to require all six target scopes,
`--require-external-provider-proof` when the product depends on a provider, and
`--require-production-approval` for production admission. These switches turn
missing, expired, revoked, mismatched, negative, or otherwise unchecked claims
into a blocking exit status rather than merely reporting them as an unproven
boundary.
With `--installed-evidence`, this command performs comparison and proof-binding
diagnostics. Without an installer receipt, the imported document remains
unsigned, so neither it nor the boundary claim becomes accepted proof. Direct
@@ -554,6 +586,10 @@ Target-environment and production-approval claims must use the assessment's
operator to supply a bounded opaque expected subject with
`--expected-external-provider-subject`; without it, such a claim remains
unchecked and blocks. Expected and observed IDs are retained in proof scope.
Accessibility, privacy, security, operations, and recovery claims use the same
deployment subject. The report emits a cumulative `reference_readiness` verdict
only when all six required scopes are checked and positive. This verdict remains
separate from production approval and from provider-specific acceptance.
Both authority keyrings are governance trust roots. Installer receipt keys use
the strict
@@ -575,22 +611,22 @@ cannot relabel it as current. Live admission must omit it and use the actual
current time.
No boundary bundle or production authority has been supplied for this current
assessment. Target environment, provider and production proof therefore remain
explicitly unchecked rather than inferred from the local GreenMail journey,
source tests or signed release metadata.
assessment. Reference-readiness, provider, and production proof therefore
remain explicitly unchecked rather than inferred from the local GreenMail
journey, source tests, or signed release metadata.
## Evidence used in this slice
- [Production-like profile](../dev/production-like/README.md) and
[Compose dependencies](../dev/production-like/docker-compose.yml)
- [Module contracts and install boundaries](MODULE_CONTRACTS_AND_INSTALLS.md)
- [Core deployment operator guide](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/src/branch/main/docs/DEPLOYMENT_OPERATOR_GUIDE.md)
- [Ops scalability profiles](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-ops/src/branch/main/docs/SCALABILITY_PROFILES.md)
- [Core deployment operator guide](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/src/branch/main/docs/DEPLOYMENT_OPERATOR_GUIDE.md)
- [Ops scalability profiles](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-ops/src/branch/main/docs/SCALABILITY_PROFILES.md)
- Actual module manifests in the pinned repositories and the static contract
checker in this meta repository
- Core module-system/API smoke/auth/install-config tests, plus focused Campaign,
Files, Mail, Audit and Addresses tests
- [Campaign delivery runbook](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/src/branch/main/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md)
- [Campaign delivery runbook](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/src/branch/main/docs/CAMPAIGN_DELIVERY_RUNBOOK.md)
- [Live signed stable catalog](https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/catalogs/v1/channels/stable.json)
and [published keyring](https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/catalogs/v1/keyring.json),
verified against a separately provisioned local trust keyring
+35 -30
View File
@@ -10,12 +10,13 @@ baseline to that destination.
It is a durable direction, not a release promise or a substitute for issue
tracking. Live work state belongs in Gitea issues. The
[Core master roadmap](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/src/branch/main/docs/GOVOPLAN_MASTER_ROADMAP.md)
[Core master roadmap](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/src/branch/main/docs/GOVOPLAN_MASTER_ROADMAP.md)
remains the technical module and wave sequence; this document supplies the
cross-product vision that sequence serves.
Read it together with:
- the [institutional governance target architecture](INSTITUTIONAL_GOVERNANCE_TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md)
- the [selected reference-journey program](REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md)
- the [current capability and infrastructure fit assessment](CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
- the [interface pattern language](INTERFACE_PATTERN_LANGUAGE.md)
@@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ responsibilities, not a new dependency hierarchy.
| Participation and channels | Let internal and external actors enter, receive, discuss, schedule, and respond through suitable channels. | Portal, postbox, mail, notifications, calendar, scheduling, appointments, campaign, consultation, poll |
| Work coordination | Turn an input into owned, reviewable work and make exceptions visible. | Forms/runtime, cases, tasks, approvals, workflow, booking, resources, domain modules |
| Evidence and institutional memory | Preserve what was known, decided, produced, sent, received, retained, corrected, and disclosed. | Files, templates, DMS, records, audit, search, reporting, transparency |
| Institutional governance | Establish who may act, in which capacity, for which organization and tenant, under which policy. | Identity, access, IDM, tenancy, organizations, policy, identity trust, risk/compliance |
| Institutional governance | Establish who may act, in which capacity, for which organization and tenant, under which mandate, jurisdiction, and policy. | Identity, access, IDM, tenancy, organizations, policy, identity trust, risk/compliance; candidate mandate and decision contracts |
| Integration and operations | Connect sources and destinations, operate them safely, and prove their health and recovery. | Connectors, REST/SOAP and public-sector protocols, mail/calendar/file adapters, ERP handoffs, ops, release and configuration packages |
Across these planes, GovOPlaN should maintain a connected context graph rather
@@ -448,7 +449,7 @@ without creating disconnected ticket systems.
- As a manager, I can distinguish demand, backlog, SLA risk, recurring cause,
and verified resolution.
**Composition.** Issue reporting, helpdesk, cases, tasks, facilities, assets,
**Composition.** Tickets, helpdesk profiles, cases, tasks, facilities, assets,
inspections, booking, resources, calendar, files, notifications, connectors,
reporting, policy, and audit.
@@ -530,7 +531,7 @@ access, no hidden cross-module coupling, correction rather than fictional undo,
and a durable action/effect trail.
**Roadmap role.** The canonical product story is
[meta issue #12](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/12). It is a
[meta issue #12](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/12). It is a
future cross-product configuration and contract program, not Campaign work and
not a claim that screening is implemented today.
@@ -1136,11 +1137,12 @@ boundary, and retain operational, security, and evidence guarantees.
| Addresses and directories | Implemented adapters exist but configuration/target proof varies | Directory source, privacy, conflict and lifecycle package | Reusable people/contact source capability |
| Docs/admin/ops/dashboard | Useful cross-product surfaces with incomplete rollout | Configured-system inventory, guided config, monitoring/recovery evidence | Explainability and operation of the configured product |
| Organizations/identity/IDM/access/postbox | Normalized ownership concepts and uneven runtime slices | Function-bound delivery, reassignment/delegation, vacancy and access-evidence proof | Institutional responsibility and durable communication spine |
| Forms/cases/tasks/approvals/search | Concepts and uneven first slices | Extend the proven responsibility path into one manual end-to-end work/evidence journey | Reusable administrative coordination layer |
| Templates/reporting/data sources | Boundary concepts or scaffolds | One reproducible data-backed document/report and safe HIS-style launch | Governed document production, reports, dashboards, and analytical consumption |
| Analytical data products/dataflow | Selected direction; platform contracts not yet implemented | One bounded university source-to-indicator path with staging, quality, lineage and promotion proof | Transparent institutional BI and cross-process reporting |
| Forms/cases/tasks/approvals | Concepts and uneven first slices | Extend the proven responsibility path into one manual end-to-end work/evidence journey, with shared service, party, mandate, and decision semantics | Reusable administrative coordination layer |
| Search | PostgreSQL-backed permission-aware provider and global/contextual UI foundation | Complete provider rollout, indexing operations, and target authorization/performance evidence | Optional cross-module discovery with OpenSearch only as an adapter |
| Templates/reporting/data sources | Templates and governed Datasources foundations exist; Reporting remains an early semantic-model slice | One reproducible data-backed document/report and safe HIS-style launch | Governed document production, reports, dashboards, and analytical consumption |
| Analytical data products/dataflow | Typed graph/runtime foundations, triggers, staging integration, reusable definitions, and golden-flow fixtures exist | One bounded university source-to-indicator path with quality, lineage, promotion, and target-performance proof | Transparent institutional BI and cross-process reporting |
| DMS/collaborative editing | Boundary concept and tag-only scaffold | One Files-backed version lifecycle, then one provider-neutral editing session | Collaborative documents, review, approval and records-ready renditions |
| Workflow/automation | Concept only; no discoverable Workflow runtime; program postponed | Stable action/effect providers and an explicitly reprioritized bounded journey | Configurable governed process coordination |
| Workflow/automation | Headless Workflow Engine and optional editor are implemented foundations with versioned module baselines, BPMN interchange, action/effect execution, and reconciliation | Prove one resumable human/system journey with target recovery and conformance evidence | Configurable governed process coordination without becoming a second domain layer |
| Domain modules | Mostly boundary concepts or seeds | Only the modules required by a reference package | Reusable semantics above the shared spine |
| Connectors and protocols | Catalogue/strategy plus several module-specific adapters | Profile/runtime, source-of-truth, health and one real landscape | Coexistence with institutional IT |
| Records/transparency/risk-compliance/export screening | Planned or early concepts | Evidence contracts and one regulated reference story | Institutional memory, oversight, and assurance |
@@ -1216,8 +1218,9 @@ provides all applicable evidence below.
## Near-term portfolio order
This order is now selected. Detailed slices and gates are in the
[Reference Journey Program](REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md). Workflow-driven
user-story implementation remains paused.
[Reference Journey Program](REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md). Workflow Engine and
the optional editor may support these stages, but Workflow work enters the
portfolio only through an explicit bounded package or reference journey.
0. **Continuous safe foundation.** Keep the composition green and version
aligned; close connector destination pinning, response limits, throttling,
@@ -1250,8 +1253,9 @@ user-story implementation remains paused.
target acceptance for calendar/scheduling/poll and other shipped foundations
without displacing the selected reference path; implement new feature
programs only when they are required by a stage or explicitly reprioritized.
7. **Resume Workflow only by explicit priority decision.** When resumed, start
with stable actions from a demonstrated package; do not turn it into a
7. **Use Workflow only through bounded journeys.** The headless engine and
optional editor now exist. Extend them through stable module-owned actions,
versioned baselines, and demonstrated packages; do not turn Workflow into a
second domain layer.
## Product decisions to make progressively
@@ -1263,8 +1267,8 @@ them; they do not block the product vision today.
reference release?
- Which real identity, groupware, file/DMS, and deployment stack should define
the first integration profile?
- When should the postponed Workflow program resume, and which single package
will constrain its first implementation?
- Which demonstrated package should provide the first target-accepted Workflow
execution and recovery profile?
- Which objects and fields remain authoritative in GovOPlaN versus each target
system, and which conflict/failure behavior is acceptable?
- Which default participant privacy profiles should ship for scheduling,
@@ -1279,8 +1283,9 @@ them; they do not block the product vision today.
- Which exact HIS/CampusOnline interfaces, student-statistics fields and
official keys, accepted calculation, freeze/correction policy, privacy
profile, and drill-down level should define the first analytical data product?
- After the first source-to-report proof, do repeated source/dataflow contracts
justify separate `govoplan-datasources` and `govoplan-dataflow` modules?
- Which database, REST, directory, and managed-file providers should follow the
implemented separation of `govoplan-connectors`, `govoplan-datasources`, and
`govoplan-dataflow`, and which quality/promotion policy should prove it first?
- Which collaborative editor should be the first target, and should its first
accepted experience emphasize concurrent editing, controlled check-out, or
both?
@@ -1381,7 +1386,7 @@ integration. Conversely, 30 repositories had no open issue; for many
later-wave modules this meant no implementation program had been opened, not
that the capability was complete.
[Poll #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-poll/issues/2) was a clear
[Poll #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-poll/issues/2) was a clear
tracker-drift example: its configurable transition engine, agreed transition
matrix/history, idempotent keyed retries, re-decision audit, archive/unarchive,
and preservation behavior were implemented and pushed while the issue still
@@ -1389,27 +1394,27 @@ reported `needs-info`.
Issue anchors that informed the bridge from the baseline into this roadmap:
- [Meta #10](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/10) for the
- [Meta #10](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/10) for the
capability/infrastructure assessment and its target proof;
- [Meta #11](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/11) for the
- [Meta #11](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/11) for the
universal interface and focused-view direction;
- [Core #225](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/225) for
- [Core #225](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/225) for
guided, safe configuration;
- [Core #29](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/29) for the
- [Core #29](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/29) for the
backup/restore production gate;
- [Core #263](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/263) and
[Campaign #63](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/63),
[#62](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/62),
[#65](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/65), and
[#69](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/69) for the
- [Core #263](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/263) and
[Campaign #63](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/63),
[#62](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/62),
[#65](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/65), and
[#69](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/69) for the
reference interface/delivery vocabulary and behavior;
- [Poll #1](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-poll/issues/1) for the
- [Poll #1](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-poll/issues/1) for the
database-enforced respondent invariant exposed by Scheduling;
- [Connectors #6](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-connectors/issues/6)
- [Connectors #6](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-connectors/issues/6)
for the governed connector configuration/simulation foundation;
- [Meta #9](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/9) for the first
- [Meta #9](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/9) for the first
permit-to-payment reference process; and
- [Meta #12](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/12) for the
- [Meta #12](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/12) for the
deliberately deferred, consumer-independent export-control story.
Live Gitea issue state remains canonical. These dated facts explain the roadmap
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
# Datasource And Definition Graph Architecture
## Two-Layer Data Boundary
GovOPlaN separates governed data identity from external acquisition:
| Layer | Owner | Responsibilities |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Datasource layer | `govoplan-datasources` | Governed data/register catalogue, tenant visibility, live/cached/static mode, source authority, staging, immutable materializations, frozen states, schema, quality/freshness policy, institutional provenance, dependencies, and bounded reads |
| Connector layer | `govoplan-connectors` and protocol/provider modules | External protocols, endpoints, connection profiles, credentials, discovery, provider maturity/authority support, health, source-side filtering, query pushdown, and effect reconciliation |
Connectors publish versioned datasource origins. Datasources registers those
origins and presents one stable capability to Dataflow, Workflow, Reporting,
Risk Compliance, and other consumers. Consumers must not import connector
implementations or retain credentials.
The initial provider path is:
1. Connectors imports a bounded JSON/CSV snapshot and exposes it as an origin.
2. Datasources registers it as live or cached, or accepts a direct static upload
through staging.
3. Cached refreshes and static promotions append immutable materializations.
4. Any datasource may expose a frozen state for reproducible execution evidence.
5. Dataflow stores an opaque datasource reference, state policy, and expected
fingerprint.
6. A pinned Dataflow run may publish a complete bounded result as a new
immutable materialization through an idempotent Datasources capability.
Database, REST/HTTP, LDAP/directory, managed file, watched-directory, feed, and
stream providers fit behind the same origin contract. Provider-specific
configuration remains in Connectors.
## Shared Definition Graph
Core owns domain-neutral graph primitives:
- nodes, typed ports, edges, and configuration field descriptors;
- node libraries and category labels;
- graph size, connectivity, cycle, and node-count constraints;
- shared backend validation and frontend connection checks.
Domain modules own their semantics:
- Dataflow provides load, combine, filter, transform, and output nodes. Its
graph is acyclic and has one output.
- Workflow Engine provides trigger, activity, review, decision, wait,
module-action, Dataflow, and outcome semantics. It permits governed loops and
has exactly one trigger plus one or more outcomes. The optional Workflow
module supplies the editor over the same native graph/BPMN language.
This division permits a shared editor shell without making Workflow a special
kind of Dataflow or leaking either module into Core.
## Current Implementation
- Core graph and datasource contracts are versioned at `0.1.0`.
- Workflow Engine owns tenant-isolated definitions, immutable revisions,
activation pinning, module-contributed versioned baselines, runtime instances,
governed action/effect execution, retries, waits, and reconciliation. The
optional Workflow module exposes the reusable native BPMN graph editor.
- Datasources exposes catalogue, origins, staging, promotion, preview,
materialization history, refresh, freeze, retirement, and producer
publication APIs.
- Datasources WebUI exposes all current lifecycle views.
- Connectors adapts existing tabular snapshots to datasource origins.
- Dataflow consumes only Datasources catalogue/lifecycle capabilities and can
request current, live, or latest-frozen state.
- Dataflow exposes typed graph/IR, registry-driven validation/execution/SQL
compilation, expressions and reusable subflows, a pinned run-lifecycle
capability, production worker boundary, and Run/Publish surface. Runs record
lineage and intermediate artifacts and publish only complete bounded results.
- The focused composition check proves Connector origin -> Datasource ->
pinned Dataflow run -> frozen published materialization, including replay.
## Next Slices
1. Add the provider declaration and source-authority binding used consistently
by Connectors, Datasources, configuration packages, Ops, and Docs.
2. Add typed datasource owner/steward, legal/purpose, quality/freshness,
classification, correction, service/process, and downstream dependency
metadata under
[Datasources #6](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-datasources/issues/6).
3. Add SQL database and governed REST origin providers with credential-envelope
references and bounded pushdown.
4. Add managed-file and directory origins.
5. Complete datasource quality rules, schema compatibility policy, retention, and
promotion approvals.
6. Complete scheduled/event/API/chained Dataflow trigger governance, reusable
template inheritance, Reporting publication, human reconciliation transforms,
and target resource/recovery evidence for large runs.
+3 -3
View File
@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ The same pattern is reusable outside GovOPlaN for any project where Codex works
The repository contains Gitea issue templates in `.gitea/ISSUE_TEMPLATE`, a pull request template in `.gitea/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md`, and the label taxonomy in `docs/gitea-labels.json`.
The scripts infer this repository from `origin` (`git@git.add-ideas.de:add-ideas/govoplan.git`). Override inference when needed:
The scripts infer this repository from `origin` (`git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan.git`). Override inference when needed:
```bash
export GITEA_URL=https://git.add-ideas.de
export GITEA_OWNER=add-ideas
export GITEA_OWNER=GovOPlaN
export GITEA_REPO=govoplan
export GITEA_TOKEN=...
```
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ The API scripts also read `GITEA_*` values from the target repository's `.env` f
GITEA_TOKEN=...
# Optional if origin inference is not enough:
GITEA_URL=https://git.add-ideas.de
GITEA_OWNER=add-ideas
GITEA_OWNER=GovOPlaN
GITEA_REPO=govoplan
```
@@ -0,0 +1,542 @@
# Installation And Deployment Architecture
## Goal
A supported GovOPlaN installation starts with one downloaded, verified
bootstrap artifact. The administrator answers a bounded set of questions and
receives a working base system. Re-running the same tool repairs or
reconfigures that installation instead of creating unrelated state.
The canonical product journey remains
[System Administrator Lifecycle User Story](SYSTEM_ADMINISTRATOR_LIFECYCLE_USER_STORY.md).
This document defines the deployer boundary and the first executable slice.
## First Executable Slice
`tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py` is a standard-library-only deployment
compiler and reconciler. It can be tested without installing GovOPlaN itself.
It currently supports:
- evaluation and self-hosted profiles;
- managed or external PostgreSQL;
- managed, external, or evaluation-only disabled Redis;
- disabled mail, an external relay declaration, or an evaluation-only
GreenMail service;
- durable local file storage, managed single-node Garage S3, or external
S3-compatible storage;
- an explicit HAProxy service that load-balances configured WebUI and API
replicas without access to the Docker socket;
- declarative API, WebUI, and worker replica counts while keeping migrations
and the scheduler singleton;
- Core, base, or full initial module selections;
- deterministic Compose JSON accepted by Compose v2;
- generated secrets stored in a private `0600` file;
- service-specific environment allowlists so infrastructure containers do not
receive unrelated application credentials;
- plan, render, doctor, status, apply, Kubernetes export, operation history,
and bounded recovery commands;
- an installation lock, migration-before-start ordering, readiness polling,
and an applied-state receipt;
- a durable hash-chained deployment journal captured before runtime mutation;
- PostgreSQL advisory serialization for Core and module migrations;
- runtime initialization that waits for exact configured migration heads
without mutating schema;
- runtime node registration, heartbeats, drain state, and a fenced scheduler;
- idempotent reconfiguration that preserves generated secrets;
- a keyed environment fingerprint that detects private binding changes without
writing secret values to plans or receipts;
- host CPU, memory, disk, entropy, architecture, Docker daemon, Compose,
listen-port, and external endpoint preflight checks;
- service removal without implicit data-volume deletion.
Create a local evaluation bundle:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py init \
--directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
--profile evaluation \
--postgres managed \
--redis managed \
--storage garage \
--mail test-mail \
--api-replicas 2 \
--web-replicas 2 \
--worker-replicas 2 \
--module-set base
```
Inspect the generated intent and host requirements:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py doctor \
--directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation
```
Change a component without rotating existing generated secrets:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py configure \
--directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
--redis external \
--redis-url 'rediss://:password@redis.example.org:6379/0'
```
The private installation directory contains:
| File | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `installation.json` | Versioned, non-secret desired state |
| `secrets.env` | Deployment-local secrets and external service bindings |
| `compose.json` | Deterministic generated Compose definition |
| `garage.toml` | Non-secret managed Garage server configuration |
| `load-balancer.cfg` | Non-secret HAProxy WebUI/API discovery configuration |
| `Caddyfile` | Non-secret managed-ingress route and ACME policy |
| `existing-proxy.json` | Exact upstream, trusted-source, header, and health contract for an operator-owned proxy |
| `plan.json` | Latest desired-state diff and readiness findings |
| `receipt.json` | Last successfully applied immutable identities |
| `distribution-manifest.json` | Canonical signed runtime/image selection adopted by the installer |
| `distribution-keyring.json` | Explicitly installed public trust anchor for runtime releases |
| `backup-evidence.json` | Signed provider-neutral coordinated backup and isolated-restore receipt |
| `backup-keyring.json` | Explicit public trust anchor for backup evidence authorities |
| `backup-verification.json` | Sanitized local verification/adoption receipt |
| `applied-state/` | Checksum-verified snapshot of the last healthy deployment bundle |
| `operations/<id>/` | Private hash-chained deployment progress and recovery evidence |
| `kubernetes.json` | Optional stateless multi-host Kubernetes export |
| `.deployment.lock` | Same-host operation exclusion |
The specification contract is
[`installation-spec.schema.json`](installation-spec.schema.json).
Build the same dependency-free tool as one downloadable artifact:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/build-deployer-zipapp.py \
--output /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz
python /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz --help
```
To exercise reconciliation with locally available evaluation images:
```sh
python /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz init \
--non-interactive \
--directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
--profile evaluation \
--api-image local/govoplan-api:test \
--web-image local/govoplan-web:test
python /tmp/govoplan-deploy.pyz apply \
--directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
--allow-unverified-images \
--skip-pull
```
Those images must already contain the selected module set. The override exists
only to exercise local orchestration before release artifacts exist; it is
rejected for `self-hosted`.
## Runtime Distribution Boundary
The protected `Runtime Distribution` workflow builds GovOPlaN wheels first,
resolves architecture-specific third-party wheels into offline wheelhouses, and
then assembles the API images with `pip --no-index`. The target host never
clones Git repositories and neither runtime image performs network package
installation. Separate amd64/arm64 API and WebUI images are joined into OCI
indexes and run as non-root identities. The release assets include CycloneDX
application SBOMs, SLSA-style provenance, exact composition evidence, the
single-file deployer, its detached Ed25519 signature, and a signed, expiring
distribution manifest. Evidence generation and signing run through the
workflow's isolated release Python environment so their cryptographic tooling
is explicit and independent of packages preinstalled in the Actions runner.
The API image points Core at the migration scripts installed from the verified
wheel under `/opt/govoplan/runtime/govoplan_core_runtime`; migrations therefore
do not depend on a source checkout or the build host's Python installation
scheme.
Before publication, the exact amd64 and arm64 image manifests each run release
migrations against the pinned PostgreSQL image, reach API and WebUI readiness
as non-root/read-only processes, and complete a task through the pinned Redis
image and packaged worker. Sanitized per-platform smoke receipts are retained
as immutable release assets.
PostgreSQL and Redis indexes are resolved to untagged platform-child digests
before each smoke run. This keeps the evidence architecture-specific and
avoids retargeting one local Docker tag between incompatible platforms.
The CI host registers arm64 execution with an explicitly supplied,
digest-pinned `tonistiigi/binfmt` image immediately before the smoke. This
privileged helper is confined to the release runner and is never part of a
GovOPlaN target deployment or its runtime image set.
Because QEMU user-mode execution triggers Redis's arm64 host-kernel COW guard,
the arm64 smoke suppresses only `ARM64-COW-BUG` while persistence, snapshots,
and append-only files are disabled. Target Redis services never inherit this
test-only option.
The smoke also proves a bounded post-migration table contract and aborts as
soon as a required container exits, rather than allowing a dead process to
consume the full readiness timeout.
Ingress acceptance streams generated configuration into Docker-managed
volumes before starting the read-only containers. It therefore also works when
an Actions job reaches a host or remote Docker daemon through a mounted socket;
the drill never assumes that a job-container path is visible to that daemon.
The drill allocates explicit loopback-only host ports and verifies Docker's
host binding configuration, avoiding daemon-specific random-port shorthand
behavior. Because an Actions job and deployment containers may be Docker
siblings, functional HTTP/TLS checks run from the digest-pinned API image on
the deployment network instead of assuming the Docker host is job-local.
The dispatch-only `Runtime Ingress Drill` workflow exposes the same bounded
check independently so ingress changes can be diagnosed before an immutable
runtime publication; it accepts only digest-pinned Caddy, HAProxy, and API
images and has no push trigger.
The official Caddy binary carries the `NET_BIND_SERVICE` file capability. The
managed-ingress container therefore drops every capability and adds back only
`NET_BIND_SERVICE`; otherwise Linux rejects the binary at `execve` before its
high-port configuration can start. `no-new-privileges`, a read-only root
filesystem, and non-privileged container ports remain enforced.
The bounded setup helper writes only generated public configuration as root so
it can initialize a new volume; the actual HAProxy process retains the image's
non-root identity and runs read-only with all capabilities dropped.
The manifest contract is
[`runtime-distribution-manifest.schema.json`](runtime-distribution-manifest.schema.json),
and its separately distributed trust-anchor contract is
[`runtime-distribution-keyring.schema.json`](runtime-distribution-keyring.schema.json).
Publication is immutable: an existing Gitea release asset must have the same
size and SHA-256 digest or publication fails.
Adopt a downloaded or prefetched release only after obtaining the manifest
digest and trusted keyring through the documented independent channel:
```sh
python3 govoplan-deploy.pyz verify-release \
--directory /srv/govoplan/installation \
--manifest ./distribution-manifest.json \
--manifest-sha256 "$(cut -d' ' -f1 distribution-manifest.json.sha256)" \
--trusted-keyring ./distribution-keyring.json \
--adopt
```
`doctor` and `apply` rehash both stored files, re-run OpenSSL Ed25519
verification, enforce channel/expiry/revocation, compare every selected image,
and prove that all enabled module ids occur in the signed image composition.
An offline image index can bind prefetched OCI archives to the same exact image
references and archive hashes; mutable tags or incomplete bundles are rejected.
## Current Production Gates
The tool deliberately reports blockers instead of pretending the source tree is
a production distribution:
1. **First publication.** The protected workflow and fail-closed artifact
contracts are implemented, but a release operator must configure the Gitea
registry/release tokens and runtime Ed25519 key, publish the first pinned
release, and retain its amd64/arm64 readiness evidence.
3. **First administrator.** Production needs a one-time, restricted enrollment
identity. The development bootstrap must not be enabled in production.
4. **Image/module composition.** The deployer now enforces the signed
composition. A selected module not shipped by that release cannot be
enabled.
5. **Deployment agent.** Web updates need a separate privileged reconciler with
a typed command allowlist. The API and browser must never receive the Docker
socket or arbitrary shell access.
6. **Ingress reachability evidence.** Managed Caddy ingress and the
existing-proxy contract are implemented. A production claim still requires
running `doctor` from the target host after public DNS/firewall changes and
retaining the first successful container drill and public TLS/readiness
evidence.
`apply --allow-unverified-images` is therefore restricted to the evaluation
profile. It explicitly acknowledges both mutable image identities and
unverified image/module composition. It is a local test escape hatch, not a
production setting.
## Component Choices
### PostgreSQL
`managed` creates a persistent PostgreSQL container and private generated
credentials. `external` requires an explicit `DATABASE_URL`; switching from
managed to external cannot reuse the old `postgres` Docker hostname
accidentally.
Interactive entry hides external URLs because they commonly contain
credentials. For unattended automation, provide them through a protected
operator mechanism and avoid storing secret-bearing flags in shell history.
Production policy should support external managed databases and local managed
PostgreSQL equally at the application boundary. Backup, point-in-time recovery,
high availability, and major-version upgrades remain deployment properties.
### Redis
`managed` creates an authenticated, append-only Redis container. `external`
requires an explicit `REDIS_URL`. `disabled` is evaluation-only and disables
workers while recording the single-process login-throttle risk acknowledgement.
`doctor` performs a bounded TCP connection check for external PostgreSQL,
Redis, and S3 endpoints. This verifies DNS, routing, and that the port accepts a
connection; it is not an authentication or semantic health check.
Production base installations include Redis because durable queues, distributed
throttling, notifications, scheduled work, and transactional event delivery
must survive API restarts.
### Mail
The first slice distinguishes:
- `disabled`;
- `external-relay`, which records the infrastructure decision but leaves Mail
server/credential creation as a visible post-install task;
- `test-mail`, an evaluation-only GreenMail service.
A bundled production mail server is intentionally not a default. Operating one
requires DNS, reverse DNS, TLS, DKIM, SPF, DMARC, reputation, abuse handling,
queue monitoring, and upgrade policy. A later profile may support an
operator-selected MTA/relay, but it must expose these requirements rather than
presenting a container as a complete mail service.
### File Storage
`local` uses a durable Compose volume and is appropriate for one-host
installations. `garage` provisions Garage 2.3 in its supported single-node
bootstrap mode, generates a private application key and bucket, and connects
the Files S3 backend to the exact installer-owned internal endpoint. The
managed trust marker cannot authorize another S3 host.
Garage metadata and object data use separate persistent volumes. `s3` requires
an external endpoint, region, access key, secret key, and bucket values.
Self-hosted external S3 endpoints must be clean HTTPS origins. The generated
runtime explicitly sets `FILE_STORAGE_S3_ENDPOINT_TRUSTED=true` for that
operator-selected endpoint. The trust flag is not accepted for local storage
and cannot be combined with installer-managed Garage trust.
Local storage must be included in backup and restore drills. Horizontal API or
worker scale-out requires shared/object storage. The managed Garage profile is
persistent but has no data redundancy; availability-sensitive installations
must use a tested multi-node Garage cluster or another external S3 service.
### Load Balancing And Replicas
The generated Compose topology publishes only `load-balancer` for local or
existing-proxy profiles. With managed ingress, only Caddy publishes host ports
and HAProxy remains private. HAProxy uses
Docker DNS service discovery to distribute public traffic across WebUI replicas
and WebUI API proxy traffic across API replicas. The WebUI and API services do
not publish host ports. HAProxy has no Docker socket and discovers only the
bounded replica slots rendered into `load-balancer.cfg`.
Replica counts are desired state:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py configure \
--directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation \
--api-replicas 3 \
--web-replicas 2 \
--worker-replicas 4
./.venv/bin/python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py apply \
--directory /tmp/govoplan-evaluation
```
Workers are queue consumers, so they are scaled through Redis rather than put
behind an HTTP load balancer. Migrations are serialized with a deployment-wide
PostgreSQL advisory lock. The Celery scheduler is run under a renewable,
fencing-token lease. Multiple API replicas are rejected when Redis is disabled
because distributed throttling and queued work cannot then be shared correctly.
### Public Ingress And TLS
A self-hosted installation is fail-closed until one of these boundaries is
selected:
- `existing-proxy` publishes HAProxy at `listen.address:listen.port` and emits
`existing-proxy.json`. The operator-owned proxy must use the recorded host,
upstream, and health paths. Only the exact CIDRs listed with repeated
`--trusted-proxy-cidr` values may supply `X-Forwarded-*` headers. Public
proxy addresses must be `/32` or `/128`; private ranges are limited to `/24`
or narrower for IPv4 and `/64` or narrower for IPv6.
- `managed` publishes Caddy on the selected HTTP/HTTPS ports, redirects HTTP to
HTTPS, obtains and renews certificates through ACME, and keeps certificate
material exclusively in the private `caddy-data` and `caddy-config` volumes.
The application containers receive no ACME account or TLS private keys.
Example existing-proxy configuration:
```sh
python govoplan-deploy.py configure \
--directory /srv/govoplan \
--ingress existing-proxy \
--trusted-proxy-cidr 172.20.0.7/32
```
Example managed configuration:
```sh
python govoplan-deploy.py configure \
--directory /srv/govoplan \
--ingress managed \
--acme-email operator@example.org
```
Before managed ingress starts, public A/AAAA records must resolve to the target
and inbound TCP 80/443 must reach it. Existing-proxy mode additionally requires
the public proxy and valid certificate to be reachable before apply. After a
successful receipt, `doctor` reports DNS resolution, certificate validity and
remaining lifetime, public `/health/ready`, and the private HAProxy/WebUI path
as separate checks. Reconfiguration retains the certificate volumes; bundle
rollback never deletes or exposes their contents. Include both Caddy volumes
in coordinated backup and restore evidence.
This is same-host scaling. Docker Compose uses a bridge network and does not
place containers on another machine. See
[Scaling And Multi-Host Deployment](SCALING_AND_MULTI_HOST_DEPLOYMENT.md) for
the supported topology and promotion path.
## Reconfiguration Semantics
`installation.json` is desired state. `receipt.json` is the last successfully
applied state. `plan` compares their canonical hashes and service sets.
- Adding a managed component creates its service and persistent volume.
- Removing a component removes its service container on apply.
- Volumes are retained by default; deleting data requires a separate,
deliberately destructive workflow.
- Existing generated credentials are retained unless an explicit future rotate
operation is requested.
- Private configuration changes are represented by a keyed fingerprint in the
plan and receipt; plaintext values are never copied there.
- Managed-to-external transitions require the new endpoint in the same
operation.
- Migrations run as a one-shot service before API/worker replacement.
- API, worker, and scheduler start commands wait for exact configured migration
heads; only the migration command is permitted to change schema.
- API and worker replicas register their software/module composition and
heartbeat in PostgreSQL. Ops can request and cancel a node drain.
- The first upgrade from a direct WebUI host port stops that legacy WebUI
container immediately before HAProxy claims the same endpoint.
- Health must recover before a new receipt and applied-state snapshot are
committed.
Every apply operation is journalled before image pulls or runtime mutation. A
failure before migration may restore a verified previous bundle. Once migration
starts, recovery is forward-only unless an independently verified database
backup is restored. See
[Recovery And Rollback Guarantees](RECOVERY_AND_ROLLBACK_GUARANTEES.md).
Production updates still need operator/provider-created coordinated backup and
restore evidence, a database compatibility declaration, and a
deployment-specific drain policy. The deployer now verifies and enforces the
signed evidence before migration, but does not manufacture backups or receive
provider administration credentials. See
[Backup And Restore Evidence](BACKUP_AND_RESTORE_EVIDENCE.md).
## Stateless Kubernetes Runtime
`render-kubernetes` exports the application tier for a standard orchestrator.
It requires external PostgreSQL, Redis, and S3 and emits no stateful service or
secret value:
```sh
python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py render-kubernetes \
--directory /srv/govoplan/default \
--namespace govoplan \
--secret-name govoplan-runtime
```
The output includes a release-specific migration Job, database-head wait init
containers, API readiness/liveness probes, rolling Deployments, Services, Pod
disruption budgets, a tokenless ServiceAccount, and one fenced scheduler. Apply
the named Secret through the cluster's secret manager and review ingress proxy
CIDRs before deployment. A release-changing export requires adopted backup
evidence and carries only its sanitized digest and identifiers as Job
annotations. Detailed rollout and scaling rules live in
[Scaling And Multi-Host Deployment](SCALING_AND_MULTI_HOST_DEPLOYMENT.md).
## Recovery Commands
List durable deployment operations:
```sh
python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py operations \
--directory /srv/govoplan/default
```
Recover a selected failed operation after reviewing its stage evidence:
```sh
python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py recover \
--directory /srv/govoplan/default \
--operation-id <operation-id>
```
The command reports whether it restored the pre-migration applied bundle,
requires forward recovery, or needs manual intervention. Add `--apply` only
after that decision has been reviewed.
## Web Update Boundary
The intended update path is:
1. Ops reads the non-secret installation receipt and reports management mode,
current release, component health, and update availability.
2. An authorized administrator asks Core to create a typed deployment request,
for example `reconcile_release` or `rollback_release`.
3. Core persists the reviewed immutable plan, actor, expected current receipt,
and idempotency key.
4. A separately deployed, narrow deployment agent claims the request.
5. The agent verifies signatures/digests, acquires a fenced deployment lock,
backs up, pulls, migrates, reconciles, probes health, and writes evidence.
6. Ops presents durable progress and the resulting receipt.
The agent owns container-runtime access. It accepts no command strings from the
browser and has no domain-data permissions. Installations managed by Kubernetes,
systemd, or another external orchestrator expose read-only status and an export
of the reviewed update recipe instead of a non-functional update button.
## Distribution Workflow
The downloadable entry point is a reproducible release asset: sorted source
paths, fixed ZIP metadata, fixed compression settings, and identical source
bytes produce an identical zipapp regardless of checkout timestamps. Obtain the
zipapp, detached signature, checksum, and trusted public keyring through
independently authenticated paths before execution:
```sh
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 --fail --location \
https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/releases/download/vX.Y.Z/govoplan-deploy.pyz \
--output govoplan-deploy.pyz
sha256sum --check govoplan-deploy.pyz.sha256
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
from pathlib import Path
keyring = json.loads(Path("distribution-keyring.json").read_text())
active = [key for key in keyring["keys"] if key["status"] == "active"]
if len(active) != 1:
raise SystemExit("expected exactly one active runtime release key")
Path("runtime-release-public.pem").write_text(active[0]["public_key_pem"])
PY
openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey runtime-release-public.pem -rawin \
-in govoplan-deploy.pyz -sigfile govoplan-deploy.pyz.sig
python3 govoplan-deploy.pyz init
```
The zipapp has no GovOPlaN package dependency. It accepts a bounded HTTPS
manifest or a prefetched file, requires an independently supplied SHA-256
digest and explicit trusted keyring, and executes OpenSSL with a fixed argument
vector for Ed25519 verification. It never evaluates downloaded shell text or
accepts an arbitrary command string.
## Verification
Run the focused tests:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python -m unittest -v tests.test_deployment_installer
```
The tests cover signed release adoption, tamper/expiry/revocation/unknown-key
rejection, architecture composition, offline image integrity, profile
restrictions, secret persistence, external endpoint
requirements, managed Garage bootstrap, S3 policy, replica validation, HAProxy
discovery configuration, Compose service selection, secret non-disclosure,
service-specific environment isolation, private file modes, external endpoint
preflight, first-plan generation, apply ordering, receipt idempotency,
hash-chained recovery journals, migration recovery boundaries, and stateless
Kubernetes rendering.
@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
# Institutional Governance Target Architecture
## Status and sources
This document is the accepted architectural reconciliation of two product
concepts prepared outside the repositories:
- `govoplan_concept_dev.md`
- `software_big_picture.md`
The source concepts describe GovOPlaN as an operational governance platform for
public institutions. This document merges that direction with the implemented
platform state as of 2026-08-01. It is the canonical repository version of the
direction. Gitea issues remain the source of truth for delivery state.
Read this together with:
- [Connected Governance Platform Roadmap](CONNECTED_GOVERNANCE_PLATFORM_ROADMAP.md)
- [Reference Journey Program](REFERENCE_JOURNEY_PROGRAM.md)
- [Module Contracts and Install Boundaries](MODULE_CONTRACTS_AND_INSTALLS.md)
- [Datasource and Definition Graph Architecture](DATASOURCE_AND_DEFINITION_GRAPH_ARCHITECTURE.md)
- [Capability and Infrastructure Fit](CAPABILITY_AND_INFRASTRUCTURE_FIT.md)
- [Core Module Architecture](../../govoplan-core/docs/MODULE_ARCHITECTURE.md)
- [Core External References and Integration Maturity](../../govoplan-core/docs/EXTERNAL_REFERENCES_AND_INTEGRATION_MATURITY.md)
- [Core Action, Effect, and Automation Layer](../../govoplan-core/docs/ACTION_EFFECT_AUTOMATION_LAYER.md)
## Decision
GovOPlaN is a configurable **institutional governance and operations layer** for
public institutions. It should model the institution, coordinate its work,
connect its specialist systems, and preserve why and under whose authority an
action occurred.
GovOPlaN is not intended to become one universal ERP, DMS, groupware suite,
workflow editor, or specialist procedure. It should own the governance concepts
that must remain understandable across those systems and support native,
external, mirrored, synchronized, overlay, and link-only operation explicitly.
This changes product emphasis, not the modular architecture:
1. The current kernel and optional-module model remains.
2. Existing domain owners keep their data and behavior.
3. Cross-module semantics become explicit, versioned contracts.
4. Successful compositions become product and sector packages, not forks or
monolithic replacement applications.
5. Repository creation follows a proof threshold; a noun in the information
model does not automatically require a module.
## What recent work already supersedes
The source concepts predate several implemented foundations. These items are
accepted as the current baseline and must not be reopened as greenfield work.
| Concept requirement | Reconciled current state |
| --- | --- |
| Slim kernel plus installable modules | Implemented through entry-point discovery, `ModuleManifest`, migrations, capabilities, interfaces, WebUI contributions, and permutation checks. |
| Versioned cross-module contracts | Implemented through named interface ranges, capability protocols, static workspace graph checks, activation validation, and release checks. |
| Separate headless workflow runtime and editor | Implemented as `govoplan-workflow-engine` and optional `govoplan-workflow`. Module-owned workflow baselines are versioned and reconciled without replacing local overrides. |
| Provider-neutral external references | Implemented in Core with stable external identity and cumulative integration maturity from discovery through replacement. |
| Governed asynchronous effects | Implemented foundations include the action/effect contract, transactional platform event outbox, module outboxes, idempotency, outcome-unknown states, reconciliation, and worker health. Coverage still varies by provider. |
| Acting identity, function assignment, mandate, and ownership recovery | Implemented foundations span Identity, Organizations, IDM, Access, Mandates, generic ownership transfer/recovery, and audit provenance. Effective competence now resolves through a tenant-bound Mandate capability. |
| Governed data foundations | Connectors, Datasources, Dataflow, Reporting, and Search now exist. Datasources already provides live/cached/static modes, staging, immutable materializations, and publication contracts. |
| Task-focused projections and configured documentation | Views, view-surface declarations, configurable dashboards, and manifest-driven user/admin documentation exist. Rollout and content depth remain incremental. |
| Encryption as an optional capability | Core defines provider-neutral contracts; `govoplan-identity-trust` persists public device keys, key epochs and assurance evidence; and `govoplan-encryption` persists opaque vault/key lifecycle, versioned protection envelopes, quorum recovery authorization, outcome-unknown reconciliation, and disable preflight. A bundled local AES-256-GCM server-envelope provider now stores wrapped key material and supports Files/Postbox protection, rotation, revocation, destruction, rewrap, tamper detection, and fail-closed restore behavior. It is explicitly neither E2EE nor a certified KMS/HSM. |
| Search without mandatory OpenSearch | PostgreSQL-backed, permission-aware search and module provider contracts exist; OpenSearch remains an optional adapter. |
| Scale-out and recovery architecture | Stateless API/worker, shared database/object storage, event delivery, deployment, and recovery contracts are documented and partly exercised. Production profiles and drills remain active work. |
The institutional semantics, provider declaration gate, and first product
compositions described here are now implemented. Subsequent work is
**product depth and stronger maturity evidence**, not another runtime rewrite
or an unimplemented architecture boundary.
## Implementation status (2026-08-01)
The architecture contract is implemented as a bounded, executable vertical
slice. The portfolio declarations and provider governance gates apply to the
whole workspace, while the four semantic domains whose repository thresholds
were proven now have independent persistent owners:
| Area | Implemented state | Remaining rollout |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Module portfolio metadata | Core validates versioned architecture layer/kind, maturity evidence, known limits, ownership boundaries, authority modes, reference packages, target-tested providers, and migration/upgrade/recovery/security/operations documentation. | Complete for all 62 source manifests. Focused and release checks enforce `--require-architecture`; a new module cannot enter the workspace without truthful declaration and repository-local evidence. |
| External providers | Core validates provider objects/field groups, operations, integration maturity, source authority, bounded reads, freshness/health, idempotency, conflicts, outcome-unknown handling, evidence, correction, reconciliation, outage, classification, purpose, retention, and secret handling. Addresses/CardDAV, Files remote storage, Mail SMTP/IMAP, Calendar CalDAV/ICS/Graph/EWS, and Connectors tabular/sanctions providers declare the contract and tenant-bounded secret-free runtime state. | Registry validation rejects any declared external provider without a sanitized state provider. Future adapters must cross the same gate before activation. |
| Institutional context | Core provides versioned temporal, actor/representation, institution/unit/function/task/mandate/jurisdiction/service/case/party/work-item/workflow/approval/decision/record, legal-basis, evidence, information-governance, external-source, presentation, and geographic references. Events, automation actions, audit records, and the transactional Audit outbox preserve the envelope. | Owning modules must progressively require the relevant subset for consequential operations. |
| Semantic provider contracts | Provider-neutral DTOs and protocols cover Mandate resolution, versioned Service definitions, procedure Parties/representation, and formal Decisions. `govoplan-mandates`, `govoplan-services`, `govoplan-parties`, and `govoplan-decisions` now persist immutable revisions behind those contracts with tenant isolation, bounded reads, replay safety, OCC, migrations, uninstall guards, permissions, APIs, capability documentation, and recovery documentation. | The owners are deliberately headless. Procedure-specific UI remains with consuming modules. |
| Formal-outcome proof | Committee persists bodies, meetings, agenda items, minutes, lifecycle events, and an optional protected local Decision projection. Voting separately owns immutable ballot definitions, frozen electorates, recorded casting/replacement, deterministic tally, certification, challenge, annulment, and provider-backed assurance profiles. Committee consumes `voting.ballots` and retains only deliberation linkage and verified aggregate outcome. A bundled `local_confidential` reference provider encrypts server-readable casts outside native ballot rows and exposes only receipts plus aggregate evidence to Committee. | Native recorded ballots remain reconstructable, and the reference confidential provider is neither secret nor certified: its server can decrypt casts while tallying. Secret/electronic-ballot protocol selection, custody, legal acceptance, independent review, and target evidence remain explicit product decisions. |
| Service-to-case proof | Services owns the persistent exact definitions consumed by Portal discovery and Cases intake. Forms owns immutable multi-page/conditional/localized schemas, accessibility assessment and package fragments. Forms Runtime owns definition-aware drafts, validation, submission receipts, status/evidence history, and durable native Case/Workflow handoffs with intent-before-effect and outcome-unknown reconciliation. Portal delegates URL, Case, Form, or Workflow launch to an installed owner while retaining exact Service/Form provenance. | Anonymous intake and concrete attachment/signature providers remain product depth. Portal and Runtime fail closed and explain any absent launcher, target capability, or provider prerequisite. |
| Generic approvals and process execution | Approvals persists exact-subject chains, delegation, separation of duties, quorum, signatures-as-evidence, escalation, OCC, and replay-safe decisions. Campaign proves an exact-version delivery gate. Workflow Engine owns immutable definitions/instances plus API, schedule, event and parent triggers, durable timer/event waits, scale-out claims, current-authority rechecks, and idempotent starts independently of the optional editor. | Policy-authored Approval template selection, concrete signature providers, cron adapters, and broader BPMN execution profiles are product/provider depth on explicit contracts. |
| Device trust and content protection | Identity Trust separates public device keys, epochs, assurance and key-access decisions from login and Access. Encryption separates resource ownership from opaque provider key custody, versioned envelopes, migration evidence, quorum recovery authorization and uninstall proof. Its local server-envelope provider and Files/Postbox adapters prove ciphertext persistence, integrity, rotation/rewrap and fail-closed key loss without leaking plaintext keys across the capability boundary. | Reviewed KMS/HSM/client providers, more owner adapters, target backup/restore/key-loss drills, and E2EE interoperability/certification remain required before stronger deployment claims. |
| Procedure-party proof | Parties persists effective procedure roles, frozen contact snapshots, and representation powers. Existing powers cannot disappear or be silently rewritten; explicit OCC-guarded revocation is required. Cases resolves the provider capability and excludes expired/revoked authority from downstream delivery. | Procedure modules still decide which contextual fields and actions to present. |
| Integrated institutional journey | The executable `product.service-to-decision` fixture uses real SQL-backed Services, Cases, Parties, Mandates, Committee, and Decisions providers. It carries one exact Service version through persisted Case intake, representation and frozen delivery authority, effective Mandate resolution, a body/meeting/agendum/vote/minute sequence, a persisted formal Decision, confirmed Postbox effect, Audit/record evidence, remedy/review, and protected reconstruction. A second executable path proves Portal to exact Form revision, persisted submission, and idempotent replay. | This is architecture and composition evidence. Signed, release-bound target accessibility, privacy, security, operator, delivery-provider, and recovery-drill evidence is still required before the package may claim `reference_ready`. |
| Governed data catalogue | Datasources stores typed governance metadata, exposes bounded tenant-scoped filters and update APIs/UI, carries governance through staging, and snapshots it into immutable materializations. Reporting now persists immutable dataset, semantic-model, report, quality-plan, saved-view, and schedule revisions; executes typed semantic queries with quality gates, access checks, replay, pivoting, export/import assessment, and provenance; and exposes the governed analytical WebUI. | Rich dependency/impact traversal, additional expression functions, and policy-specific field visibility can grow on the established contracts without moving connector, transformation, or source ownership. |
| Portfolio and change governance | Projects now persists tenant-safe, immutable portfolio/project/milestone revisions with OCC, replay, lifecycle rules, restricted memberships, Search ACL indexing, outcomes, benefits, dependencies, capacity assumptions, change impact, and institutional references. Its WebUI exposes the planning catalogue and core planning fields. | Advanced planning structures already accepted by the API can receive deeper specialized editors without creating a second Policy, Reporting, Resources, or Goals owner. |
| Product/package governance | Signed configuration packages distinguish reference, product, sector, deployment, and integration classes; preserve parent/evidence provenance; prevent derived packages from loosening constraints; and preflight provider authority, maturity, exact binding, health, freshness, and recovery expectations. Executable product manifests now exist for governed communication and governed data/assurance and are checked in the module matrix. | Both artifacts deliberately remain product-class until target, accessibility, privacy, security, operations, and recovery evidence justifies reference readiness. |
| Projection and release | Platform metadata, signed module catalogs, release synthesis, Ops, and role-aware Docs retain and display architecture/provider declarations. Module-owned state providers add bounded configured/active, authority, health, freshness, conflict, recovery, and observation state; ordinary-user Docs omits binding detail. Static checks validate evidence paths, and the WebUI build verifies consuming types. | Runtime-state adoption and broader portfolio presentation follow truthful provider declaration rollout. |
The implementation deliberately keeps shared reference contracts in Core and
domain tables in their owners. It does not claim unsupported release maturity:
the four extracted owners and package remain `vertical_slice`/`product` until
target evidence supports a stronger claim. Gitea remains authoritative for
feature depth beyond this architecture contract.
## Target capability layers
The layers describe ownership and dependency direction. They are not navigation
groups and do not imply that every installation exposes every module.
| Layer | Responsibility | Current owners and declared directions |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 0. Runtime and meta | Composition, release, migrations, shared contracts, operations, deployment | Core, meta repository, Admin, Ops |
| 1. Institutional foundation | Institution, tenant, identity, organization, function, authority, access, trust | Tenancy, Identity, Organizations, IDM, Access, Identity Trust, Encryption, Mandates |
| 2. Governance and accountability | Policy, audit, risk, control, explainability, configured projection | Policy, Audit, Risk Compliance, Docs, Views, Search, Decisions |
| 3. Human work and procedure | Intake, cases, tasks, approvals, process execution and editing | Services, Forms, Forms Runtime, Cases, Parties, Tasks, Approvals, Workflow Engine, Workflow, Tickets |
| 4. Communication and participation | Delivery, participation, scheduling, channels, consultation | Portal, Postbox, Notifications, Mail, Campaign, Calendar, Scheduling, Poll, Appointments, Booking, Consultation, Committee, Addresses, Distribution Lists |
| 5. Content, records, and evidence | Managed content, templates, records, knowledge, disclosure | Files, Templates, DMS, Records, Wiki, Transparency, Certificates |
| 6. Data, reporting, and integration | Source access, staging, transformation, search, analytics, protocols | Connectors, Datasources, Dataflow, Reporting, Dashboard, REST, SOAP, XOE/V, XTA/OSCI, FIT-Connect, XRechnung, ERP adapters |
| 7. Domain capabilities | Reusable public-sector subject matter | Projects, Procurement, Contracts, Grants, Resources, Assets, Facilities, Learning, Payments, Ledger, Permits, Inspections, Evaluation, Helpdesk |
| 8. Product and sector packages | Versioned compositions, terminology, forms, processes, controls, reports, integration profiles | Signed configuration packages and reference packages; not runtime modules by default |
## Canonical institutional semantics
The connected model must keep these concepts distinct even where one UI
combines them.
| Concept | Canonical answer | Owner or direction |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Institution and tenant | In which governed installation and tenant does work occur? | Tenancy and Organizations |
| Organization and unit | Where is responsibility situated? | Organizations |
| Function | Which named organizational responsibility can an incumbent hold? | Organizations |
| Identity and account | Who is the person or machine, and through which account do they act? | Identity and Access |
| Function assignment | Who holds or represents a function, for which interval and source? | IDM |
| Role and permission | What application behavior may the acting principal perform? | Access, constrained by Policy |
| Mandate and jurisdiction | Why is an institution, unit, or function competent to act on this subject, territory, population, or interval? | Mandates |
| Service | What governed promise can an institution offer, to whom, under which prerequisites, evidence, channel, deadline, and responsibility? | Services; Portal presents it |
| Case | Which concrete administrative matter is being handled? | Cases |
| Party | In what procedural capacity does a person or organization participate, and who may represent or receive for it? | Parties; Identity/Organizations remain the subject owners |
| Work item | What must a responsible actor do next? | Tasks and domain modules |
| Workflow | How is work coordinated, including waits, human hand-offs, and governed actions? | Workflow Engine; Workflow is the optional editor |
| Approval | Has a proposed action passed a configured review or separation-of-duties gate? | Approvals |
| Decision | What formal institutional outcome was reached, by which competent authority, on which facts, rules, evidence, reasoning, and review path? | Decisions |
| Evidence and record | What proves the input, state, action, effect, correction, and retained institutional memory? | Domain owner, Files/DMS/Records, and Audit |
### Extracted semantic modules
Four horizontal concepts passed the repository proof threshold. Their Core
DTOs and provider protocols remain neutral; their persistent data, lifecycle,
security, APIs, migrations, and recovery behavior now live in independent
repositories.
#### Mandates
Mandates should own public or internal tasks, jurisdiction, responsibility,
decision/signature authority, legal or organizational basis, and effective
history. Organizations continues to own structures and functions; IDM owns
incumbency; Access owns permissions; Policy owns constraints.
`govoplan-mandates` answers: *Was this function competent to act for this case
at the relevant time, and on what basis?* Its resolver evaluates effective
time, task, authority, unit, function, jurisdiction, subject, conflicts, legal
basis, and evidence deterministically. Missing or ambiguous authority fails
closed.
#### Services
Services should own versioned service definitions: audience, prerequisites,
legal basis, evidence, fees, deadlines, channels, responsible unit/function,
jurisdiction, forms, case/workflow/result bindings, remedies, service levels,
and publication status. Portal presents and starts services but should not own
their institutional definition.
`govoplan-services` now owns those exact versioned definitions. Portal is the
first presentation consumer and Cases freezes the selected revision into its
intake context. Availability is an independent capability so publication does
not imply that all runtime prerequisites are satisfied.
#### Parties
Parties should own procedure-local roles and relationships: applicant,
respondent, beneficiary, representative, joint applicant, delivery recipient,
power or authority to represent, and permitted/preferred channels for the
matter. Identity answers who the subject is; Organizations answers which
institutional unit it is; Addresses owns contact points; Parties answers how
the subject participates here.
`govoplan-parties` owns the shared effective-dated lifecycle. Cases retains a
bounded compatibility projection only when the module is absent; that fallback
contains no representation lifecycle and cannot silently become a second
authority source.
#### Decisions
Decisions should own formal outcomes: subject, type, competent authority,
facts, evidence, applicable rule versions, reasoning, operative result,
conditions, effect, delivery/publication, remedy/review, correction, revocation,
and links to observed effects. Approvals own review gates; Poll owns response
collection; Committee owns deliberation, meetings, and votes; Workflow owns
coordination.
`govoplan-decisions` owns the persistent lifecycle and protected reconstruction
surface. Committee supplies deliberation context and records through the
provider capability. Consumers retain exact Decision references without
gaining table access.
## Source authority and integration maturity
Two independent dimensions must be recorded. They must not be collapsed into a
single `sync` flag.
### Source-authority mode
| Mode | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| `native_authoritative` | GovOPlaN owns the authoritative object and lifecycle. |
| `external_authoritative` | The external system owns the object; GovOPlaN reads or acts through it. |
| `external_mirror` | The external system is authoritative and GovOPlaN keeps a governed local projection or immutable snapshots. |
| `governed_sync` | Both sides may change supported fields under explicit conflict and reconciliation rules. |
| `governance_overlay` | GovOPlaN owns policy, responsibility, evidence, or coordination around an externally executed object. |
| `linked_reference` | GovOPlaN keeps only a stable link and minimal display/provenance metadata. |
Authority may be declared per tenant, organization, service, object type,
object, field group, or process step. A broad default must not hide a narrower
override.
### Integration maturity
The implemented maturity ladder remains `discover`, `link`, `search`, `read`,
`publish`, `synchronize`, `migrate`, and `replace`. Maturity says what an
adapter can do. Source-authority mode says who owns truth in a particular
configuration. For example, a connector may support `synchronize`, while a
tenant deliberately configures it as `external_mirror`.
### Provider declaration
Every provider that reads or causes external effects must declare:
- owned object and field groups;
- supported source-authority modes and integration maturity;
- read, write, delete, search, preview, and dry-run operations;
- revision/concurrency tokens, freshness, health, and bounded-read limits;
- idempotency, retry, timeout, conflict, and outcome-unknown behavior;
- evidence, audit, correction, rollback/compensation, and reconciliation paths;
- degraded and outage behavior;
- classification, purpose, retention, and secret-handling requirements.
The common provider declaration composes the external-reference, action/effect,
connector-lifecycle, capability, operational-check, and documentation
contracts. Core, release tooling, Ops, Docs, and configuration-package
preflight validate it; Registry refuses to activate a declared external
provider without bounded, sanitized runtime state.
## Cross-cutting contracts
The following contracts are mandatory for consequential domain objects. They
should be shared reference DTOs and provider protocols, not shared domain
tables in Core.
1. **Time and history:** valid-from/to, recorded-at, superseded-at, revision,
change reason, and stable identity.
2. **Actor and representation:** real account/identity, system or service
account, represented account/function/party, delegation or power, and
mandate reference.
3. **Institutional context:** tenant, institution, organization unit, function,
task/mandate, jurisdiction, service, case, and decision references.
4. **Legal and policy basis:** typed, versioned references to rules,
obligations, policies, exceptions, and the effective decision source.
5. **Requested and observed effect:** intent, approval, dispatch, possible
execution, confirmation, reconciliation, correction, and terminal evidence.
6. **Evidence and provenance:** source, version, checksum, derivation,
responsible actor, timestamps, and inspection links.
7. **Information governance:** classification, purpose, legal basis, retention,
hold, minimization, and disclosure state.
8. **External source:** system/profile/object identity, authority mode,
maturity, version, freshness, health, and conflict state.
9. **Presentation:** language, accessibility, channel, explanation, and
configured availability.
Existing contracts already cover substantial parts of items 1, 2, 5, 6, 8,
and 9. New work should extend those contracts instead of creating parallel DTO
families.
## Existing module direction changes
### Datasources becomes the governed data and register catalogue
The implemented live/cached/static, staging, immutable materialization, and
publication model includes typed governance metadata for owner/steward,
authoritative source and authority mode, legal basis and purpose, semantic
definition, quality and freshness policy, classification, transfer agreement,
correction process, affected services/processes, and dependent flows,
reports, controls, and decisions. Connector credentials and protocol behavior
remain outside Datasources.
### Projects grows into portfolio and change governance
The Projects boundary already includes portfolios and goals. Extend it through
versioned objectives/outcomes, dependencies, capacity, benefits, change impact,
and links to mandates, services, risks, contracts, resources, and indicators.
Do not create a separate Goals module before more than one domain proves an
independent goal lifecycle.
### Reporting becomes evidence-backed institutional measurement
Every report, measure, and indicator should explain the institutional question
or obligation it serves, owner, source/materialization and flow revision,
freshness/quality, calculation version, visibility/purpose limits, publication,
and decisions or actions that consumed it. Reporting owns presentation and
execution; source and transformation owners retain their domains.
### Risk Compliance becomes the horizontal assurance model
Sanctions screening remains a complete vertical slice. The broader reusable
model is:
```text
Obligation -> governed object -> risk -> control -> evidence -> finding -> measure -> effectiveness review
```
Risk Compliance now persists that effective-dated, immutable-revision assurance
graph, exposes bounded tenant-safe traversal/search/editing, and projects each
completed sanctions run into it idempotently. Policy
owns enforceable rules and decisions; Audit owns immutable event evidence;
domain modules own the governed objects and corrective actions.
### Connectors exposes authority and effect behavior
Connector direction (`consume`, `publish`, `bidirectional`) remains useful but
is not enough. Profiles and bindings need the source-authority mode and
provider declaration above. ERP remains an integration family: finance,
workforce, procurement, asset, or other domain modules own semantics while
connectors own transport and source interaction.
### Geography starts as a reference contract
Before adding a `govoplan-geo` module, define a common reference shape for
coordinates, geometry, administrative area, address/location, CRS, source,
accuracy, validity, and external GIS identity. Create a repository only when
GovOPlaN must own spatial datasets, topology, or independent geospatial
lifecycles rather than link to an external GIS.
## Product and sector packages
A module says what capability can exist. A product package says how capabilities
work together for a bounded outcome. A sector package specializes vocabulary,
forms, rules, process baselines, controls, reports, and integration profiles
without forking the platform.
The signed configuration-package mechanism distinguishes:
- **reference package:** tested composition proving a journey and its recovery
behavior;
- **product package:** reusable operating capability such as governed
communication, service-to-decision, procurement/contracts, or governed BI;
- **sector package:** institutional specialization such as municipality,
university/research, ministry/program, regulator, grants authority, or
committee/council;
- **deployment profile:** supported infrastructure and operational topology;
- **integration profile:** supported set of external systems, authority modes,
bindings, and health expectations.
Packages may require modules and capabilities, but package definitions remain
configuration and evidence. They do not gain access to module-owned tables.
## Module portfolio metadata
Repository category is not capability maturity. The runtime manifest, release
catalog, Docs projection, and meta repository inventory use one
machine-readable declaration with at least:
- architecture layer and module kind;
- lifecycle/maturity claim: `concept`, `scaffold`, `vertical_slice`,
`reference_ready`, `supported`, or `lts`;
- evidence supporting the claim and known limits;
- supported source-authority modes;
- owned and explicitly non-owned concepts;
- provided/required capabilities and interfaces;
- reference packages and target-tested providers;
- migration, upgrade, recovery, security, and operations documentation.
Maturity is a release claim and must be checked against evidence. A manifest
must not become “supported” merely because a maintainer changes one string.
Create a repository only when the capability has distinct data ownership,
independent installability, technical assets, a security/lifecycle profile, a
release reason, more than one consumer or a proven reference process, and tests
that justify the boundary. Otherwise use a shared DTO, provider capability,
submodule, configuration fragment, package, or profile.
## Implemented migration sequence
### 0. Align the portfolio and contracts - complete
- This reconciliation is canonical in the meta repository and mirrored to the
Gitea wiki.
- All 62 source manifests carry validated evidence-based architecture metadata.
- External-reference, action/effect, operational-health, ownership, policy,
audit, and documentation primitives compose into one enforced provider
declaration and sanitized runtime-state contract.
- Institutional context, legal basis, evidence, presentation, external source,
information governance, temporal revision, and geo references are shared
Core DTOs rather than shared domain tables.
### 1. Prove responsibility and formal outcome - complete
- Mandate and Decision contracts, deterministic resolution, lifecycle
transitions, persistence providers, APIs, permissions, migrations, recovery,
and tests are implemented.
- Committee and the SQL-backed institutional fixture prove effective-time
authority, persisted meeting/agendum/vote/minute context, approval context,
reasoning, evidence, observed effect, correction/revision rules, protected
reconstruction, and review references.
- The independent Mandates and Decisions repositories were created only after
persistence and reuse passed the repository threshold.
### 2. Separate service and party semantics - complete
- Portal remains the presentation surface while Services owns reusable,
versioned definitions and explainable availability.
- Parties owns procedure roles, contact snapshots, and append-only
representation/revocation authority; Cases consumes the common resolver.
- `product.service-to-decision` proves both through a portable administrative
service composition.
- Forms owns immutable, versioned schemas while Forms Runtime owns drafts,
server validation, submission receipts, status/evidence history, and exact
Service/Form provenance. Portal delegates Form launch through the runtime
capability and fails closed when it is unavailable.
### 3. Complete governed data, portfolio, and assurance - vertical slices complete
- Datasources carries typed governance through staging and immutable
materializations, with bounded catalogue filters and dependency references.
- Reporting owns immutable semantic definitions, safe execution, quality gates,
provenance, schedules, saved views, pivoting, and export/import assessment
without taking source or transformation ownership.
- Risk Compliance persists the horizontal obligation/risk/control/evidence/
finding/measure graph and projects sanctions runs idempotently.
- Projects persists portfolio/outcome/change-governance revisions as a
consuming domain without becoming a second policy or reporting engine.
### 4. Package repeatable public-sector outcomes - complete at product maturity
- Governed communication, governed data/assurance, and service-to-decision are
portable product package manifests with repository-local evidence.
- Package preflight enforces module, capability, provider authority, health,
freshness, and recovery expectations without cross-module table access.
- Sector and `reference_ready` claims remain gated on target-environment,
recovery, accessibility, privacy, security, and operator evidence. This is a
maturity gate, not missing architecture implementation.
## What remains after the executable architecture slice
The remaining work is not another Core or cross-module architecture rewrite.
It falls into two explicitly different categories, neither of which can be
truthfully completed by adding generic platform code:
1. **Concrete provider packages:** the Committee ballot adapter contract is
complete, but a real secret/electronic ballot provider requires a selected
protocol and product decisions for voter eligibility, custody, secrecy,
recount, challenge, retention, and operational assurance. Equivalent future
adapters must satisfy the declared provider and recovery gates.
Provider selection and certification are tracked in
[Committee #1](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-committee/issues/1).
2. **Target-produced maturity evidence:** `reference_ready`, `supported`, and
`lts` cannot be generated from source code. An exact release and deployment
must produce signed, expiring accessibility, privacy, security, operator,
provider, backup/restore, rollback, and recovery-drill evidence. The verifier
and schemas are implemented; the actual claims require those real runs.
A bounded issuer now hashes retained reports, checks role-scoped signing
authority and exact installed-release origin, emits sanitized signed
receipts, verifies them immediately, and exposes admission-enforcing CLI
gates. The real pinned-release evidence run is tracked in
[GovOPlaN #37](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/37).
Forms and Forms Runtime no longer constitute an architecture gap. Conditional
multi-page/localized authoring, package-fragment import, and durable native
Case/Workflow handoffs are implemented. Remaining depth is limited to
anonymous/public identity profiles, concrete file/signature providers, and
additional handoff target adapters. Those use the implemented immutable
definition, runtime, policy, evidence, service-launch, and domain-owner
boundaries rather than requiring another split. Public/provider decisions stay
tracked in Forms Runtime
[#2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms-runtime/issues/2) and
[#3](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms-runtime/issues/3).
Approvals, Voting, Workflow trigger/wait dispatch, Identity Trust, and
Encryption now likewise have repository owners, neutral Core contracts,
persistence, migrations, recovery/disable semantics, documentation and focused
tests. Their remaining tickets concern concrete providers, deeper adapters and
target evidence, not an unresolved institutional architecture boundary.
Everything else described as architecture in this document now has a
repository owner, versioned contract, bounded implementation, migration and
recovery boundary where state exists, documentation, and executable evidence.
Further work in those modules is product breadth, UX depth, provider adoption,
and evidence renewal.
## Delivery tracking
The completed cross-repository architecture epic is
[GovOPlaN #29](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/29).
Its implementation work packages and resulting owners are:
- [Core #279](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/279):
validated module architecture and provider authority declarations;
- [Core #280](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/280):
shared institutional-context and governed reference primitives;
- [GovOPlaN #30](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/30) and
[govoplan-mandates](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mandates):
Mandates semantics and persistent resolver;
- [GovOPlaN #31](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/31) and
[govoplan-services](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-services):
Services semantics, catalogue, and availability;
- [GovOPlaN #32](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/32) and
[govoplan-parties](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-parties):
Parties and representation semantics and resolver;
- [GovOPlaN #33](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/33) and
[govoplan-decisions](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-decisions):
formal Decisions semantics and registry;
- [Datasources #6](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-datasources/issues/6):
governed data/register catalogue;
- [Risk Compliance #7](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-risk-compliance/issues/7):
horizontal assurance graph;
- [GovOPlaN #34](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/34):
product and sector package classes; and
- [Docs #19](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs/issues/19):
configured architecture, maturity, and source-authority explanations;
- [Forms #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms/issues/2):
immutable reusable definitions and the designer surface; and
- [Forms Runtime #1](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms-runtime/issues/1):
definition-aware submissions and Portal service launch;
- [Forms #3](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms/issues/3) and
[Forms Runtime #4](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms-runtime/issues/4):
conditional/localized definition depth and governed native handoffs;
- [Approvals #1](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-approvals/issues/1)
and [Campaign #22](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/22):
generic exact-subject approval chains and one consequential delivery gate;
- `govoplan-voting`: governed recorded ballots plus fail-closed provider-backed
assurance profiles consumed by Committee; and
- Identity Trust #1 and Encryption #1-#3: public device trust, provider-neutral
key/protection lifecycle, recovery authorization and disable proof, plus a
bounded local server-envelope provider and Files/Postbox fixtures; external
KMS/HSM/client-provider conformance remains separately gated.
Existing Projects #1, Reporting #4, Portal #1, Cases #1, Datasources #1,
Risk Compliance #2, GovOPlaN #14, and GovOPlaN #19 carry product-depth and
reference-readiness work instead of duplicating the completed architecture
contract.
## Completion evidence
The architecture direction is established by the following executable and
machine-enforced evidence:
- the `product.service-to-decision` composition and SQL-backed golden fixture
retain institutional context from service entry through a persisted case,
party, authority/work context, committee deliberation, decision, observed
communication effect, minute/record, and review references;
- the Portal/Form journey retains the exact published Service and Form
revisions through persisted draft state, validates on the server, and returns
the same submission on an idempotent launch replay;
- the system can answer who acted, for whom, in which function, under which
mandate and jurisdiction, using which rule and evidence versions;
- every implemented external binding declares authority mode, maturity,
operations, health, freshness, conflict, and recovery behavior, and Registry
rejects a declaration without sanitized runtime state;
- every material report or decision can be reconstructed from governed source
and transformation versions;
- product/package manifests are portable without cross-module table access or
code forks, while future sector packages inherit the same signed-package
constraints; and
- documentation and Ops explain the configured composition and its limits to
users, administrators, operators, and auditors.
These criteria complete the architecture contract at `vertical_slice` and
`product` maturity. They do not waive the separately enforced evidence needed
for a module or package to claim `reference_ready`, `supported`, or `lts`.
The capability-fit verifier now computes that cumulative readiness gate from
independently signed, expiring claims bound to the exact assessed release,
installed payload, deployment subject, controls, and artifact hashes. Actual
target runs and recovery drills remain operator-produced evidence.
+8 -8
View File
@@ -444,25 +444,25 @@ reason to infer that a pattern is satisfied.
and does not duplicate a central component.
- Behavioral/accessibility evidence is linked from the rollout matrix and issue.
- Configured-system help can reach the applicable pattern or reference topic
when [Docs #15](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-docs/issues/15)
when [Docs #15](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs/issues/15)
supplies that experience.
## First Pilot: Campaign
[Campaign #74](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/74)
[Campaign #74](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/74)
is the first full-domain audit and migration. It should prove patterns before
generic extraction:
- [#59](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/59) and
[#73](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/73): stable,
- [#59](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/59) and
[#73](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/73): stable,
accessible preview and attachment-detail overlays
- [#63](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/63): review
- [#63](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/63): review
stages, outcomes, blockers, and intervention vocabulary
- [#62](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/62): explicit
- [#62](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/62): explicit
synchronous/asynchronous send mode and durable delivery progress
- [#65](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/65): one
- [#65](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/65): one
coherent report filtering and count-affordance model
- [#35](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/35): guided
- [#35](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/35): guided
first-campaign entry
These slices do not depend on the Workflow runtime. Campaign's current
+205 -90
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,20 @@ The applicable design contract is
## Snapshot And Method
Snapshot refreshed: 2026-07-22.
The source-derived inventory command is documented in
[`PLATFORM_CONTROL_PLANE.md`](PLATFORM_CONTROL_PLANE.md). It produces
machine-readable field, label, translation, route, API-reference, and module
manifest evidence. This hand-maintained document remains the reviewed product
interpretation and rollout ledger; generated evidence does not replace it.
Snapshot refreshed: 2026-08-03.
The generated snapshot contains 65 module manifests, 35 WebUI-contributing
repositories, 40 statically declared module routes, 1,156 UI fields, and 836
backend endpoints. All backend endpoints are classified and no stale endpoint
declarations were found. The 234 endpoints without a static WebUI reference are
kept visible as review evidence; they may intentionally serve workers, public
clients, connectors, or external integrations.
Evidence was read from tracked Git `HEAD` in the local GovOPlaN checkouts:
@@ -49,33 +62,50 @@ Inventory states:
| Session/bootstrap state | `govoplan-core` `App.tsx` and `AppShell` | All browser sessions during bootstrap | Understand that session/platform state is loading; state contract | Unreviewed; core shell |
| `/` authenticated redirect | `govoplan-core` chooses the first visible navigation destination | Authenticated; result depends on visible nav contributions | Enter the actor's first accessible service area; navigation behavior, not a content page | Unreviewed; focused-view/default-route work must preserve this fallback |
| `/dashboard` fallback | `govoplan-core` `DashboardPage` only when the Dashboard module is absent | Authenticated; no route-specific scope in core | Cross-module starting point; dashboard | Unreviewed; compare with module dashboard before shared changes |
| `/settings` | `govoplan-core` `SettingsPage` | Authenticated; contributed sections and integrations filter internally | Profile, UI/workspace preference, local connection, and user-scoped integration settings; configuration | Unreviewed; Core #225 program |
| `/settings` | `govoplan-core` `SettingsPage` | Authenticated; contributed sections and integrations filter internally | Profile, UI/workspace preference, local connection, and user-scoped integration settings; configuration | Core-owned pattern migration complete in [Core #225](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/225), commit `fa32cca` |
| Shell chrome | `AppShell`, `Titlebar`, `IconRail`, `BreadcrumbBar`, `HelpMenu`, language menu, unsaved-change provider | Public/authenticated variants; nav filtered later | Tenant/actor context, global navigation, help, language, session and maintenance state | Unreviewed; platform-owned prerequisite for focused views |
## Direct Module Route Contributions
The access guard column reports only the route-level declaration in
`module.ts`. Inner APIs and controls may impose additional checks.
The access column summarizes only the route-level declaration in `module.ts`.
Inner APIs and controls may impose additional checks. Public and compatibility
routes are called out explicitly because they do not have the same manifest
semantics as authenticated navigation routes.
| Route | Owner / render evidence | Route-level access evidence | Primary task | Target archetype | Status / priority |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-access` `AdminPage` | Any core `adminReadScopes` | Administer system and tenant concerns assembled from module sections | Administration/configuration | Contributed; unreviewed; P1 under [Core #225](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/225) |
| `/address-book` | `govoplan-addresses` `AddressBookPage` | `addresses:contact:read` | Browse and manage contacts, address books, and lists | Directory/list-detail | Contributed; unreviewed; P2 after Campaign |
| `/calendar` | `govoplan-calendar` `CalendarPage` | `calendar:event:read` | Browse calendars/events and act on calendar data | Directory/list-detail | Contributed; metadata gap; unreviewed; P2 after Campaign |
| `/campaigns` | `govoplan-campaign` `CampaignListPage` | `campaigns:campaign:read` | Find, compare, create, and open campaigns | List-detail entry | Pilot; P1 [Campaign #74](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/74) |
| `/campaigns/:campaignId/*` | `govoplan-campaign` `CampaignResourceRoute` and `CampaignWorkspace` | `campaigns:campaign:read`, plus resource probe | Configure, review, send, and inspect one campaign/version | List-detail workspace containing edit, review, monitoring, and evidence surfaces | Pilot; P1 Campaign #74 |
| `/operator` | `govoplan-campaign` `OperatorQueuePage` | `campaigns:campaign:read` and any of queue, control, retry, or reconcile | Monitor and intervene in campaign jobs through authority-specific controls | Monitoring/work queue | Pilot; durable queue controls delivered in [Campaign #78](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/78); #74 audit remains |
| `/reports` | `govoplan-campaign` `AggregateReportsPage` | `campaigns:report:read` | Compare privacy-protected cross-campaign outcome totals without recipient detail, diagnostics, export, or drill-down | Aggregate reporting | Pilot; aggregate-reader surface delivered in [Campaign #80](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/80); #74 audit remains |
| `/templates` | `govoplan-campaign` `TemplatesPage` | No route guard declared in `module.ts` | Browse/manage campaign templates | Directory/list-detail | Pilot audit; permission intent must be verified; P2 |
| `/dashboard` | `govoplan-dashboard` `DashboardPage` | No route-specific scope | Assemble module-provided actionable widgets | Dashboard | Contributed; unreviewed; P2 |
| `/docs` | `govoplan-docs` `DocsPage` | Docs read or system/tenant settings read scopes | Read configured, available, and evidence-aware documentation | Documentation directory/reference | Contributed; unreviewed; P1 [Docs #15](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-docs/issues/15) after initial pattern content |
| `/files` | `govoplan-files` `FilesPage` | `files:file:read` | Browse folders/files and perform managed-file work | Directory/explorer | Contributed; metadata gap; unreviewed; P2 after Campaign |
| `/idm` | `govoplan-idm` `IdmPage` | Any IDM assignment/write or organization function-assign scope | Inspect and govern identity/function assignments | List-detail/configuration | Contributed; unreviewed; P2 |
| `/mail` | `govoplan-mail` `MailboxPage` | `mail:mailbox:read` | Browse mailboxes and messages | Directory/list-detail | Contributed; metadata gap; unreviewed; P2 after Campaign |
| `/notifications` | `govoplan-notifications` `NotificationCenterPage` | `notifications:notification:read` | Inspect and acknowledge notification state | List-detail/inbox | Contributed without a nav item or backend frontend metadata; navigation intent unknown; P2 discovery |
| `/ops` | `govoplan-ops` `OpsPage` | Ops read or system/tenant settings read scopes | Inspect runtime health and readiness | Monitoring | Contributed; unreviewed; P2 |
| `/organizations` | `govoplan-organizations` `OrganizationsPage` | Organization model/unit/function or admin settings read scopes | Model and inspect organizational structures/functions | Directory/list-detail | Contributed; unreviewed; P2 |
| `/scheduling` | `govoplan-scheduling` `SchedulingPage` | `scheduling:schedule:read` | Plan and decide scheduling requests and availability | List-detail/guided decision | Contributed; metadata gap; unreviewed; P2 |
| Routes | Owner | Route-level access | Primary archetype | Migration issue |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `/admin` | Access | Any declared administration/read scope | Administration/configuration host | Access pattern migration complete in [Access #19](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access/issues/19), commit `1409dbf`; shared host contract complete in [Core #225](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/225) |
| `/address-book` | Addresses | `addresses:contact:read` | Governed source directory, contact/list detail, external-provider operation, governance facts, and reversible correction | Addresses pattern migration complete in [Addresses #23](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-addresses/issues/23), commit `f9a7185` |
| `/approvals` | Approvals | `approvals:workspace:read` | Work queue/guided decision | Approvals pattern migration complete in [Approvals #3](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-approvals/issues/3), commit `24e9559` |
| `/calendar` | Calendar | `calendar:event:read` | Full-height calendar workspace with filterable collection/agenda sidebar, continuous and bounded date views, guarded VEVENT and source editors, synchronized-source status, durable outbox recovery, and destructive remote-move evidence | Calendar pattern migration complete in [Calendar #22](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-calendar/issues/22), commit `d7fd944` |
| `/campaigns`, `/campaigns/:campaignId/*`, `/campaigns/queue`, `/campaigns/reports`, `/templates` | Campaign | Campaign read/report/control scopes; template route has no route guard | List-detail, guided review, monitoring, reporting | [Campaign #74](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/74) |
| `/operator` | Campaign | Campaign read plus queue/control scope | Compatibility redirect to `/campaigns/queue` | Campaign #74; retire under the compatibility policy |
| `/cases`, `/cases/:caseId` | Cases | `cases:case:read` | Governed case directory and detail workspace with guarded OCC lifecycle editor, provider-owned references, immutable timeline/history, and confirmed object-access editor | Cases pattern migration complete in [Cases #4](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-cases/issues/4), commit `43b4cc8` |
| `/committee` | Committee | `committee:workspace:read` | Governed workspace | Committee pattern migration complete in [Committee #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-committee/issues/2), commit `e64af30` |
| `/dashboard` | Dashboard | No route-specific scope | View-specific personal workspace with module/permission-filtered widget library, guarded four-column composition, nested widget settings, server/browser fallback, and optimistic layout persistence | Dashboard pattern migration complete in [Dashboard #3](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dashboard/issues/3), commit `da3947f` |
| `/dataflow` | Dataflow | Pipeline read/admin | Governed library, guarded graph/constrained-SQL definition editor, typed node inspector, bounded intermediate preview, automation triggers, and durable run/deployment evidence | Dataflow pattern migration complete in [Dataflow #20](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dataflow/issues/20), commit `109ddcd` |
| `/datasources` | Datasources | Catalogue read/source admin | Governed catalogue, staging preflight, optional-origin directory, authority editor, and immutable evidence | Datasources pattern migration complete in [Datasources #7](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-datasources/issues/7), commit `6406ce7` |
| `/distribution-lists` | Distribution Lists | List read/write/admin | Governed directory, immutable-revision editor, expansion preview, and evidence register | Distribution Lists pattern migration complete in [Distribution Lists #8](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dist-lists/issues/8), commit `6cdd804` |
| `/docs` | Docs | Documentation or settings read | Documentation/reference | [Docs #15](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs/issues/15) |
| `/files` | Files | `files:file:read` | Directory/explorer | Files pattern migration complete in [Files #42](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files/issues/42), commit `d8ae506` |
| `/forms` | Forms | `forms:definition:read` | Definition library/editor | Forms pattern migration complete in [Forms #4](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms/issues/4), commit `e505536` |
| `/forms-runtime`, `/forms-runtime/:instanceId` | Forms Runtime | Participate or workspace read | Guided form execution | Forms Runtime pattern migration complete in [Forms Runtime #5](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms-runtime/issues/5), commit `07dd35b` |
| `/idm` | IDM | Assignment, function-change, relationship, or organization scopes | Directory/governed change | IDM pattern migration complete in [IDM #12](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-idm/issues/12), commit `d864317` |
| `/mail`, `/mail/bounces` | Mail | Mailbox or bounce read/manage | Directory/explorer, operational evidence | Mail pattern migration complete in [Mail #20](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail/issues/20), commit `7844d9c` |
| `/notifications` | Notifications | `notifications:notification:read` | Inbox/list-detail with guarded recipient state, confirmed local cancellation/dispatch, and sanitized delivery evidence | Notifications pattern migration complete in [Notifications #4](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-notifications/issues/4), commit `ad6a31f` |
| `/ops` | Ops | Operations or settings read | Monitoring/evidence with contextual run, drain, readiness-blocker, and recovery guidance | Ops pattern migration complete in [Ops #4](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-ops/issues/4), commit `2b32643` |
| `/organizations` | Organizations | Model/unit/function or settings read | Directory/hierarchy editor | Organizations pattern migration complete in [Organizations #7](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-organizations/issues/7), commit `97acfcb` |
| `/portal` | Portal | `portal:service:read` | Service portal | [Portal #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-portal/issues/2) |
| `/postbox` | Postbox | `postbox:postbox:read` | Inbox/list-detail | Postbox pattern migration complete in [Postbox #26](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-postbox/issues/26), commit `a97eb3b` |
| `/projects` | Projects | `projects:project:read` | List-detail/project workspace | [Projects #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-projects/issues/2) |
| `/reporting`, `/reports` | Reporting | `reporting:definition:read` | Reporting/definition library | [Reporting #8](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-reporting/issues/8) |
| `/risk-compliance` | Risk Compliance | Workspace or sanctions read | Immutable source evidence, version-pinned screening, list-detail review, and revisioned assurance graph with explicit blockers and consequences | Risk Compliance pattern migration complete in [Risk Compliance #8](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-risk-compliance/issues/8), commit `24d80a6` |
| `/scheduling` | Scheduling | `scheduling:schedule:read` | List-detail/guided decision | Scheduling pattern migration complete in [Scheduling #8](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-scheduling/issues/8), commit `c17cbda` |
| `/scheduling/public/:requestId/:token` | Scheduling | Public signed token | Public participation | Scheduling #8 complete in `c17cbda` |
| `/search` | Search | `search:result:read` | Search overlay/results | [Search #4](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-search/issues/4) |
| `/templates` | Templates | Template read/write/publish/render/admin | Governed library, immutable-revision editor, compatibility preview, and render evidence | Templates pattern migration complete in [Templates #5](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-templates/issues/5), commit `72fafa2` |
| `/voting` | Voting | `voting:ballot:read` | Governed ballot workspace | Voting pattern migration complete in [Voting #1](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-voting/issues/1), commit `2625990` |
| `/workflow` | Workflow | Definition read or instance admin | Graph editor/execution evidence | [Workflow #15](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow/issues/15) |
## Manifest And Runtime Route Alignment
@@ -85,28 +115,27 @@ loading reason about the configured interface without executing module UI code.
is recorded here as an evidence gap; this inventory does not infer whether each
gap is intentional.
| Module | `module.ts` routes | Backend manifest frontend routes | Backend nav alignment | Result |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Access | `/admin` | `/admin` | Aligned | Described |
| Addresses | `/address-book` | `/address-book` | Aligned | Described |
| Admin | No direct route; `admin.sections` | None | Not applicable | Composed surface |
| Audit | No direct route; `admin.sections` | None | Not applicable | Composed surface |
| Calendar | `/calendar` | None | `/calendar` nav exists | Metadata gap |
| Campaign | Five routes | None | Four top-level nav items exist | Metadata gap; wildcard resource route is also undescribed |
| Dashboard | `/dashboard` | `/dashboard` | Aligned | Described |
| Docs | `/docs` | `/docs` | Aligned | Described |
| Files | `/files` | None | `/files` nav exists | Metadata gap |
| IDM | `/idm` | `/idm` | Aligned | Described |
| Mail | `/mail` | None | `/mail` nav exists | Metadata gap |
| Notifications | `/notifications` | No frontend metadata | No nav item | Metadata and discovery gap |
| Ops | `/ops` | `/ops` | Aligned | Described |
| Organizations | `/organizations` | `/organizations` | Aligned | Described |
| Policy | No direct route; `admin.sections` | None | Not applicable | Composed surface |
| Scheduling | `/scheduling` | None | `/scheduling` nav exists | Metadata gap |
The generated comparison is aligned for all authenticated canonical routes.
Two deliberate exceptions remain visible:
Before a release claims a complete configured-system route inventory, add a
contract check or explicit exceptions so executable routes and manifest
metadata cannot silently diverge.
- Campaign contributes `/operator` as a compatibility redirect for saved View
projections; its canonical and manifest-declared destination is
`/campaigns/queue`.
- Scheduling contributes `/scheduling/public/:requestId/:token` through the
separate `publicRoutes` contract. Authenticated manifest routes intentionally
do not describe public signed-token entry points yet.
Admin, Audit, Policy, Tenancy, and Views contribute composed administration or
settings surfaces rather than direct routes. Their migration issues are
[Admin #8](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-admin/issues/8),
[Audit #8](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-audit/issues/8),
[Policy #11](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-policy/issues/11),
[Tenancy #6](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-tenancy/issues/6), and
[Views #2](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-views/issues/2).
Release evidence must continue to run the generated inventory and manifest
shape checks so new executable routes, public routes, aliases, and composed
surfaces cannot silently diverge from their declared metadata.
## Composed Surfaces And Extension Points
@@ -115,30 +144,113 @@ enabled and the actor passes the declared filters.
| Host surface | Contributor and evidence | Contributed regions/actions | Pattern implication | Audit |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `/admin` | Access host (`AdminPage`) | System tenants/users/roles, tenant users/groups/roles/API keys/settings, function-role mappings, user/group mail and file connector scopes | One stable admin information architecture must contain both host-owned and contributed sections | Unreviewed; P1 Core #225 |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-admin` `admin.sections` | Overview; system settings; configuration changes; configuration packages; role/group templates; module management | Configuration, guided operations, review/preflight, consequence | In progress under Core #225; surface-level evidence still needed |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-audit` `admin.sections` | System audit; tenant audit | Evidence/provenance and reporting | Unreviewed |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-files` `admin.sections` and `files.connectors` | System and tenant file connections plus scoped connector managers used by Access | Adaptive configuration, discovery/test, policy and credentials | First migration family in Core #225; verification incomplete in this inventory |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-organizations` `admin.sections` | Tenant organization settings | Configuration/list-detail | Unreviewed |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-policy` `admin.sections` | System, tenant, group, and user retention | Effective value, source/provenance, consequential configuration | Unreviewed; Core #225 phase 4 |
| `/admin` and `/settings` | `govoplan-mail` `mail.profiles` | System/tenant/group/user mail profile and policy managers | Same server/credential/policy grammar as file connectors | Unreviewed; Core #225 mail migration |
| `/settings` | Core host | Profile; interface; workspace; local connection | Personal configuration with adaptive forms and immediate feedback | Unreviewed |
| `/settings` | Files and Mail named capabilities | User-scoped file connections and mail profiles/policy | Optional integration regions disappear cleanly when capability absent | Unreviewed |
| `/admin` | Access host (`AdminPage`) | System tenants/users/roles, tenant users/groups/roles/API keys/settings, function-role mappings, user/group mail and file connector scopes | One stable admin information architecture must contain both host-owned and contributed sections | Pattern migration, contextual help, explained permission/protection states, optional-module blockers, localization, and focused evidence complete in Access #19 (`1409dbf`); Core #225 shared host contract complete |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-admin` `admin.sections` | Overview; system settings; configuration changes; configuration packages; role/group templates; module management | Configuration, guided operations, review/preflight, consequence | Pattern migration, contextual help, explained permission/protection/applicability states, guarded consequential actions, localization, and focused evidence complete in Admin #8 (`d428f33`) |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-tenancy` `admin.sections` | System tenant registry and active-tenant settings | Administration directory, effective configuration, lifecycle consequence | Pattern migration, contextual help, explained permission/lifecycle/system-policy states, dirty-state guards, localization, and focused evidence complete in Tenancy #6 (`e76fe16`) |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-audit` `admin.sections` | System audit; tenant audit | Evidence/provenance and reporting | Pattern migration, localized evidence projection, contextual help, and focused tests complete in Audit #8 (`6d3fcc1`) |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-files` `admin.sections` and `files.connectors` | System and tenant file connections plus scoped connector managers used by Access | Adaptive configuration, discovery/test, policy and credentials | Pattern migration, contextual help, blocker explanations and focused evidence complete in Files #42 (`d8ae506`) |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-organizations` `admin.sections` | Tenant organization settings | Configuration/list-detail | Pattern migration, tenant-owned provenance, contextual help, guarded settings/editor drafts, explained permission states, localization and focused evidence complete in Organizations #7 (`97acfcb`) |
| `/admin` | `govoplan-policy` `admin.sections` | System, tenant, group, and user retention | Effective value, source/provenance, consequential configuration | Pattern migration complete in Policy #11 (`f964ed7`) with Core editor contract `fa32cca` |
| `/admin` and `/settings` | `govoplan-mail` `mail.profiles` | System/tenant/group/user mail profile and policy managers | Same server/credential/policy grammar as file connectors | Pattern migration, contextual help, policy/target/permission blockers and focused evidence complete in Mail #20 (`7844d9c`; shared test-reason contract Core `2d0551a`) |
| `/settings` | Core host | Profile; interface; workspace; local connection | Personal configuration with adaptive forms and immediate feedback | Pattern migration complete in Core #225 (`fa32cca`) |
| `/settings` | Files and Mail named capabilities | User-scoped file connections and mail profiles/policy | Optional integration regions disappear cleanly when capability absent | Files #42, Mail #20 and Core #225 complete |
| `/admin` and `/settings` | `govoplan-views` `admin.sections`, `settings.sections`, and `views.runtime` | System/tenant definition and assignment editors, personal/group editors, global selector | Versioned presentation projection with inheritance, lockout safeguards, optional directory targets, and no authorization effect | Pattern migration, contextual help, localized selector/editor, guarded drafts, explained inherited/permission/capability states, and focused evidence complete in Views #2 (`c125f33`) |
| `/settings` | `govoplan-notifications` `settings.sections` | Notification preferences | Personal configuration | Unreviewed |
| `/dashboard` | Dashboard host and `dashboard.widgets` | Installed-modules widget; Ops health widget when Ops contributes it | Widget ordering, staleness, permissions, destination behavior | Unreviewed |
| `/organizations` | IDM `organizations.functionActions` | Action leading to assignment view filtered by IDM scopes | Cross-module context action through explicit capability | Unreviewed |
| `/organizations` | IDM `organizations.functionActions` | Action leading to assignment view filtered by IDM scopes | Cross-module context action through explicit capability | IDM pattern migration complete in IDM #12 (`d864317`) |
| Campaign attachments/import | Files `files.fileExplorer` | Folder tree, managed chooser, file listing/pattern resolution/sharing | Optional domain composition without sibling-private imports | Pilot audit under Campaign #74 |
| Campaign review/send | Mail runtime `mail.devMailbox` | Mock-mail verification when backend advertises runtime capability | Optional review stage with unavailable/optional states | Pilot audit under Campaign #63/#62 |
| Campaign review/send | Mail runtime `mail.devMailbox` | Mock-mail verification when backend advertises runtime capability | Optional review stage with unavailable/optional states | Explicit intervention and review-progress vocabulary delivered in Campaign #63; send modes/progress delivered in #62/#79 |
Other named capability exports (`files.connectors`, `organizations.functionPicker`,
and mail profile validation) are contracts consumed inside the composed surfaces
above; they are not independent routes.
## Core Configuration Surface Map
Core #225 now supplies and verifies the platform-owned configuration contract.
The durable Core inventory is
`govoplan-core/docs/INTERFACE_PATTERN_MIGRATION.md`.
| Surface / code evidence | Primary task | Target pattern | Material consequence/state | Completion evidence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `/settings` (`SettingsPage`) | Change personal profile, interface/workspace preferences, or local development connection | Two-zone typed settings workspace | Changes are user-scoped; save and test actions distinguish clean, busy, and active states | Contextual help, unsaved guard, typed controls and keyboard-explainable disabled actions in Core `fa32cca` |
| Reusable credentials (`CredentialEnvelopeManager`) | Compare and configure scoped reusable authentication material | Repeated administration plus adaptive create/edit | Secret values are write-only; permission and missing-owner states block mutation explicitly; deletion can break dependent connections | Actionable blocker, stable row actions, typed references, unsaved guard and shared destructive confirmation |
| Retention (`RetentionPolicyManagement`) | Inspect effective retention and narrow permitted local values | Effective-policy editor | Parent locks, source paths and write authority control whether sensitive evidence can be retained | Typed narrowing controls, source-path help, lock/target/permission blockers and clean/loading/save reasons |
| Shared configuration primitives | Compose module-owned settings without sibling-private imports | Platform behavior contract | Consequence, focus, help, async, confirmation and permission semantics remain consistent | Core component suites, 121 module-system tests and full-product type/build/bundle gates |
No primary Core configuration flow requires raw JSON. Expert JSON remains
limited to diagnostics, interchange, conflict evidence, or read-only inspection.
## Policy Surface Map
Policy #11 verifies the four composed retention sections. The durable
module-level inventory is
`govoplan-policy/docs/INTERFACE_PATTERN_MIGRATION.md`.
| Surface / code evidence | Primary task | Target pattern | Material consequence/state | Completion evidence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| System retention | Set the instance ceiling and run retention | Effective-policy editor plus destructive operation | An applied run can irreversibly redact/delete retained content; dry-run and applied evidence remain distinct | Core source-path/lock contract, permission and busy reasons, shared confirmation, typed/filterable outcome grid and audit-oriented wording |
| Tenant retention | Narrow the inherited system ceiling | Effective-policy editor | Tenant policy cannot silently loosen its parent | Core typed controls, effective path and parent-lock explanation |
| Group and user retention | Select an authorized target and narrow inherited policy | Targeted effective-policy editor | Selection exposes only bounded account/group labels; no retained content is returned | Delta-backed target loading, retry, missing-target blocker and responsive shared admin composition |
Automated evidence for Policy `f964ed7` comprises 50 backend/manifest tests,
the Policy interface structural gate, 65 manifest-shape checks, and the
full-product TypeScript/Vite build with structural localization, theme and
bundle-budget gates. Policy uses no sibling-private imports.
## Files Surface Map
Files #42 classifies and verifies the complete Files-owned route and composition
boundary. The durable module-level inventory is
`govoplan-files/docs/INTERFACE_PATTERN_MIGRATION.md`.
| Surface / code evidence | Primary task | Target pattern | Material consequence/state | Completion evidence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `/files` (`FilesPage`) | Browse spaces/folders and repeatedly act on current content | Full-height directory/explorer | Navigation is low consequence; upload, synchronize, move, copy and share are medium; delete is high | Stable two-pane composition, contextual help, selection/permission/state-specific disabled reasons, shared confirmation and responsive collapse |
| Upload/archive, transfer, rename and connector-import dialogs | Supply, validate and review one bounded change | Adaptive create/edit or guided import | Writes managed content and may resolve conflicts or import untrusted bytes | Shared dialogs/drop zone, bounded archive preflight, conflict review, explicit confirmation and no browser-native confirmation |
| Share/access explanation | Inspect or change who can use a resource | Review/decision | Grants can disclose content; delete/revoke changes access | Shared access explanation, action components and destructive confirmation; backend redaction remains authoritative |
| File connector tree and connection/credential dialogs | Compare and configure external endpoints and reusable credentials | Administration plus adaptive create/edit | Endpoint, secret and capability changes can enable remote access | Shared connection tree/forms/advanced panel, endpoint discovery and login test, unsaved-change guard, read-only deployment provenance and actionable disabled reasons |
| Connector policy card | Narrow effective connector use | Effective-policy editor | Inherited deny/allow rules affect lower scopes | Typed selectors, deny-precedence warning, effective sources, contextual admin help and permission blocker |
| `files.widget.spaces` | See available spaces and enter Files | Dashboard widget | Space/provider names remain permission-filtered | Shared loading, alert and status components; bounded configuration and refresh |
| `files.fileExplorer` capability | Select a governed managed snapshot for another module | Directory chooser | Exact file/version becomes another module's governed input | Capability-only composition, no sibling-private import, stable chooser/confirmation and exact snapshot evidence |
Automated evidence for commit `d8ae506` comprises 104 Files backend tests,
three focused Files WebUI structure tests, the full-product TypeScript/Vite
build, structural localization audit, theme contract and bundle budget. Shared
Dialog and disabled-tooltip behavior provide focus entry/return and
keyboard-reachable explanations; responsive source order is guarded at 1050 px
and 760 px. Secrets are not returned to the WebUI, and JSON remains only an
advanced provider-compatibility escape hatch rather than the primary editor.
## Mail Surface Map
Mail #20 classifies and verifies the complete Mail-owned route and composition
boundary. The durable module-level inventory is
`govoplan-mail/docs/INTERFACE_PATTERN_MIGRATION.md`.
| Surface / code evidence | Primary task | Target pattern | Material consequence/state | Completion evidence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `/mail` (`MailboxPage`) | Browse an authorized provider mailbox without changing it | Full-height directory/explorer | Message metadata and content are private; every provider read is bounded and non-mutating | Stable three-pane composition, contextual help, explicit no-profile blocker, refresh reasons, keyboard rows, paging and responsive collapse |
| Mail profile tree and profile/server/credential dialogs | Compare and configure reusable transport identities | Administration plus guided/adaptive create/edit | Endpoint and credential changes can enable external effects | Shared connection tree/dialog/stage rail/forms, focused hierarchy editors, unsaved guard, connection tests, permission/target blockers and disabled-save reasons |
| Mail policy card | Narrow profile visibility, lower-scope definitions and transport/address patterns | Effective-policy editor | Inherited allow/deny rules affect delivery and lower scopes | Typed selectors and controls, effective source path, lock/read-only blocker, dirty-save state and contextual admin help |
| `/mail/bounces` watcher table | Configure and explicitly scan bounded IMAP evidence sources | Operational administration | Provider access changes durable source cursors and evidence | Shared grid/status/loading/alerts, actionable no-profile and busy states, field help and stable row actions |
| `/mail/bounces` observations and watcher removal | Review sanitized delivery outcomes or stop future scans | Evidence/reporting plus destructive confirmation | Recipient diagnostics are sensitive; watcher removal retains existing evidence | Bounded sanitized rows and shared confirmation with retained-evidence consequence |
| `mail.profiles` and reference-selector capabilities | Select/validate Mail-owned transport from another module | Governed capability composition | A selected identity can perform external effects | Stable references, Mail-owned authorization/secret resolution, no sibling-private imports and clean optional absence |
Automated evidence for Mail commit `7844d9c` and Core commit `2d0551a`
comprises 114 Mail backend tests, Mail's focused UI/model/structure suite, the
Core shared mail-component suite, 65 manifest-shape checks and the full-product
TypeScript/Vite build with structural localization, theme and bundle-budget
gates. Shared Dialog and disabled-tooltip behavior provides focus containment,
return and keyboard-reachable explanations. Responsive source order is guarded
at 1250 px, 900 px and 760 px. Passwords remain write-only, mailbox responses
are bounded, and bounce evidence excludes raw provider messages.
## Campaign Pilot Surface Map
Campaign is detailed first because it exercises almost every archetype. The
recipient-data editor is now consolidated into the `recipients` section on
remote `main`; [Campaign #67](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/67)
remote `main`; [Campaign #67](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/67)
records the accepted and verified integration boundary.
Campaign already consumes core primitives including `ModuleSubnav`, `Card`,
@@ -150,25 +262,25 @@ prove that the composition or states satisfy the pattern.
| Surface / code evidence | Primary task | Target pattern | Material consequence/state | Known issue / rollout |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Campaign list (`CampaignListPage`) | Find, compare, create, open | List-detail entry | Campaign lifecycle/status and creation | Audit in [#74](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/74); guided entry [#35](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/35) |
| Campaign list (`CampaignListPage`) | Find, compare, create, open | List-detail entry | Campaign lifecycle/status and creation | Audit in [#74](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/74); guided entry [#35](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/35) |
| Overview (`CampaignOverviewPage`) | Understand/edit campaign identity, version, access, lifecycle | Object overview plus adaptive edit | Lock/archive/delete/access changes need real consequence and reversibility wording | #74 remaining audit |
| Fields (`CampaignFieldsPage`) | Define recipient/template field schema | Structured editor | Schema changes can invalidate recipient/template data | #74 audit |
| Attachments/files (`AttachmentsDataPage`, `AttachmentRulesOverlay`) | Select sources and attachment/ZIP rules | Directory chooser plus adaptive rule editor | Missing or mismatched files affect built messages | #74; attachment-detail [#59](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/59) |
| Attachments/files (`AttachmentsDataPage`, `AttachmentRulesOverlay`) | Select sources and attachment/ZIP rules | Directory chooser plus adaptive rule editor | Missing or mismatched files affect built messages | #74; attachment-detail [#59](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/59) |
| Recipients (`RecipientDataPage`) | Select/import/map/edit recipients, address fields and per-recipient values/files | Import/mapping plus list-detail editor | Personal data, validation, bulk activation, file links | Consolidated editor delivered in #67; #74 remaining audit and guided entry #35 |
| Template (`TemplateDataPage`, placeholder/expression dialogs) | Author subject/body and preview substitutions | Adaptive editor plus stable preview | Generated communication content and unresolved expressions | #74; stable overlay [#73](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/73) |
| Template (`TemplateDataPage`, placeholder/expression dialogs) | Author subject/body and preview substitutions | Adaptive editor plus stable preview | Generated communication content and unresolved expressions | #74; stable overlay [#73](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/73) |
| Mail settings (`MailSettingsPage` settings view) | Select/configure campaign mail transport | Adaptive configuration | Credentials, SMTP/IMAP destinations, test outcomes | #74; align with Core #225 mail pattern |
| Campaign settings (`GlobalSettingsPage` settings view) | Configure campaign behavior | Adaptive configuration | Can alter validation/build/send behavior | #74 audit |
| Mail policy (`MailSettingsPage` policy view) | Inspect/override effective mail policy | Effective policy/provenance editor | Inheritance and locks affect allowed delivery | #74; Core #225 policy pattern |
| Campaign policy (`GlobalSettingsPage` policy view) | Inspect/override campaign policy | Effective policy/provenance editor | Inheritance, actor authority, and blocked edits | #74; Core #225 policy pattern |
| Review/send (`ReviewSendPage`) | Validate, build, mock-test, confirm/send, inspect results | Guided review/decision plus durable progress | External communication, bounded synchronous execution, persisted queue mode, partial effects, retries, evidence | Bounded synchronous and explicit/persisted queued modes delivered in [#62](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/62) and [#79](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/79); [#63](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/63) wording and #74 audit remain |
| Message and attachment detail overlays | Inspect one built/mock message and its attachment links | Stable detail/review dialog | Personal data, exact outbound content, reviewed state | Delivered and verified in [#59](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/59) and [#73](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/73) |
| Campaign report (`CampaignReportPage`) | Filter and inspect delivery outcomes | Reporting/list-detail | Partial, failed, explicitly excluded/skipped, SMTP/IMAP outcomes and retries | Server-owned filtering and counts delivered in [#65](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/65) with the full-result DataGrid contract from [Core #263](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/263); excluded semantics in [#66](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/66) |
| Review/send (`ReviewSendPage`) | Validate, build, mock-test, confirm/send, inspect results | Guided review/decision plus durable progress | External communication, bounded synchronous execution, persisted queue mode, partial effects, retries, evidence | Blocking/non-blocking interventions and reviewed/remaining evidence delivered in [#63](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/63); bounded synchronous and explicit/persisted queued modes delivered in [#62](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/62) and [#79](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/79); #74 audit remains |
| Message and attachment detail overlays | Inspect one built/mock message and its attachment links | Stable detail/review dialog | Personal data, exact outbound content, reviewed state | Delivered and verified in [#59](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/59) and [#73](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/73) |
| Campaign report (`CampaignReportPage`) | Filter and inspect delivery outcomes | Reporting/list-detail | Partial, failed, explicitly excluded/skipped, SMTP/IMAP outcomes and retries | Server-owned filtering and counts delivered in [#65](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/65) with the full-result DataGrid contract from [Core #263](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/263); excluded semantics in [#66](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/66) |
| Audit (`CampaignAuditPage`) | Inspect campaign evidence/history | Provenance timeline/report | Actor/action/effect trace | #74 audit |
| JSON (`CampaignJsonView`) | Inspect expert representation | Advanced diagnostics/reference | Raw data may contain personal/configuration values; not a primary editor | #74 privacy/redaction audit |
| Create wizard (`CreateWizard`) | Seed a campaign through basics, sender, fields, recipients, template, attachments, review, send | Guided setup | Current steps mix creation and later consequential delivery; completion semantics need audit | Guided first campaign [#35](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/35) |
| Create wizard (`CreateWizard`) | Seed a campaign through basics, sender, fields, recipients, template, attachments, review, send | Guided setup | Current steps mix creation and later consequential delivery; completion semantics need audit | Guided first campaign [#35](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/35) |
| Review/send wizard routes | Alternate guided review/send shells | Guided review | Tracked routes exist; implementation relationship to `ReviewSendPage` must be established, not guessed | #74 inventory decision |
| Operator queue (`OperatorQueuePage`) | Monitor jobs and intervene | Monitoring/work queue | Campaign/version/job identity, historical active-version discovery, fixed action positions, authority-aware disabled states, exact non-overlapping queue counts, server-paged jobs, bounded refresh, retry/queue/reconcile per version, campaign-wide pause/resume/cancel, and leave/return progress | Durable operator controls delivered in [#78](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/78); #74 wording/accessibility audit remains |
| Aggregate reports (`AggregateReportsPage`) | Compare cross-campaign delivery outcomes | Privacy-preserving aggregate reporting | Tenant/campaign ACL, deployment/tenant small-cell policy, complementary and overlapping-cell suppression, explicit denominator, and no recipient detail/diagnostics/export/drill-down | Separate aggregate-reader surface delivered in [#80](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign/issues/80); not parity with the permission-gated per-campaign detail report |
| Operator queue (`OperatorQueuePage`) | Monitor jobs and intervene | Monitoring/work queue | Campaign/version/job identity, historical active-version discovery, fixed action positions, authority-aware disabled states, exact non-overlapping queue counts, server-paged jobs, bounded refresh, retry/queue/reconcile per version, campaign-wide pause/resume/cancel, and leave/return progress | Durable operator controls delivered in [#78](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/78); #74 wording/accessibility audit remains |
| Aggregate reports (`AggregateReportsPage`) | Compare cross-campaign delivery outcomes | Privacy-preserving aggregate reporting | Tenant/campaign ACL, deployment/tenant small-cell policy, complementary and overlapping-cell suppression, explicit denominator, and no recipient detail/diagnostics/export/drill-down | Separate aggregate-reader surface delivered in [#80](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/80); not parity with the permission-gated per-campaign detail report |
| Templates route (`TemplatesPage`) | Browse template records | Directory/list-detail | Template availability and later generated outputs | #74 audit; verify missing route guard intent |
The five review stages currently named in code are `Validate and inspect`,
@@ -176,49 +288,52 @@ The five review stages currently named in code are `Validate and inspect`,
results`. Campaign #63 owns the intervention and status vocabulary; Workflow is
not required to define or implement it.
## Repositories Without A WebUI Route Contribution
## Repositories Without A WebUI Package
The following local repositories contain a backend manifest but no
`webui/src/module.ts` at this snapshot:
The generated manifest snapshot reports no WebUI package for:
`govoplan-approvals`, `govoplan-assets`, `govoplan-booking`,
`govoplan-certificates`, `govoplan-committee`, `govoplan-consultation`,
`govoplan-contracts`, `govoplan-dist-lists`, `govoplan-evaluation`,
`govoplan-facilities`, `govoplan-forms-runtime`, `govoplan-grants`,
`govoplan-helpdesk`, `govoplan-identity`, `govoplan-inspections`,
`govoplan-issue-reporting`, `govoplan-learning`, `govoplan-permits`,
`govoplan-poll`, `govoplan-procurement`, `govoplan-records`,
`govoplan-resources`, `govoplan-rest`, `govoplan-risk-compliance`,
`govoplan-soap`, `govoplan-tenancy`, and `govoplan-transparency`.
`govoplan-assets`, `govoplan-booking`, `govoplan-certificates`,
`govoplan-connectors`, `govoplan-consultation`, `govoplan-contracts`,
`govoplan-decisions`, `govoplan-encryption`, `govoplan-evaluation`,
`govoplan-facilities`, `govoplan-grants`, `govoplan-helpdesk`,
`govoplan-identity`, `govoplan-identity-trust`, `govoplan-inspections`,
`govoplan-learning`, `govoplan-mandates`, `govoplan-parties`,
`govoplan-permits`, `govoplan-poll`, `govoplan-procurement`,
`govoplan-records`, `govoplan-resources`, `govoplan-rest`,
`govoplan-services`, `govoplan-soap`, `govoplan-tickets`,
`govoplan-transparency`, `govoplan-wiki`, and `govoplan-workflow-engine`.
This is only negative route evidence. It does not classify the backend module's
maturity or decide that it needs a WebUI. Connector-only, capability-only, or
backend-only modules may remain intentionally headless.
Tenancy does provide composed administration surfaces despite having no direct
route. This section is only negative package evidence; connector-only,
capability-only, runtime-only, and backend-only modules may intentionally remain
headless. A new WebUI should be created only for a concrete user task, not to
make every module symmetrical.
## Rollout Matrix
| Order | Scope | Current evidence | Target | Owner / issue | Verification gate | Status |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 | Product grammar and route inventory | Doctrine, ledger, layout rules, module contract, current route sources | One reconciled pattern language and evidence inventory | Meta [#11](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/11) | Docs links/diff checks; issue/wiki sync after integration | Initial slice in this document |
| 0 | Product grammar and route inventory | Doctrine, ledger, layout rules, module contract, current route sources | One reconciled pattern language and evidence inventory | Meta [#11](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/11) | Docs links/diff checks; issue/wiki sync after integration | Initial slice in this document |
| 1 | Campaign baseline integration | Recipient-editor WIP and tracker state have been reconciled with remote `main` | Integrated, testable baseline before migration claims | Campaign #67 and tracker cleanup | Backend and focused WebUI suites; issue evidence | Complete 2026-07-22 |
| 2 | Campaign previews/details | Stable shared dialog with bounded scrolling and fixed responsive preview workspace | Stable header/body/footer, accessible long-content detail | Campaign #59 and #73 | Review-preview and overlay structure tests | Complete 2026-07-22 |
| 3 | Campaign review/interventions | Five domain-owned stages with unresolved intervention language | Clear stages, outcomes, blockers, next actor/action, reviewed evidence | Campaign #63 | State matrix behavior/accessibility tests and agreed vocabulary | P1 needs product wording decision |
| 3 | Campaign review/interventions | Five domain-owned stages use central blocker and guided-review primitives; validation/build warnings name action, actor, and destination; hard blockers, individual review, and group review remain distinct; reviewed/remaining counts survive reload through build-bound review evidence | Clear stages, outcomes, blockers, next actor/action, reviewed evidence | Campaign #63 | `reviewProgress` state tests, shared-component structure contract, TypeScript build, configured-system help topic, and Campaign documentation tests | Complete 2026-08-03 (`d635f3a`; Core primitives and contextual help `b823a22`) |
| 4 | Campaign send/progress | A hard deployment ceiling bounds synchronous delivery; the selected synchronous, worker-queue, or database-queue mode is explicit and persisted; progress and recovery survive navigation; immediate-send response and audit evidence are allowlisted | Pre-send mode/consequence plus durable leave/return progress, retry and reconciliation without recipient/provider leakage | Campaign #62 and #79 | Boundary/concurrency/preflight, async selection, persisted mode, sanitized response/audit, partial/failure/retry and reload/return tests | Complete 2026-07-22 (`7e16603`, `60efd1c`, `62a6879`, `b0282eb`, `f095a3e`) |
| 5 | Campaign report filtering | Core DataGrid distinguishes client/full-result from server-owned queries; Campaign applies filter/sort/count before pagination and synchronizes count shortcuts with the grid query | One shared server-owned status/list/filter/count model | Campaign #65 and Core #263 | DataGrid contract/build tests plus exact shortcut/query/filter/count and large-result behavior | Complete 2026-07-22 (`e6062fe`, `cece71d`, `aa4ec66`, `4eb651c`) |
| 6 | Campaign operator recovery | A durable campaign/version queue page exposes historical work, exact non-overlapping state counts, persisted mode, permission-safe controls, server-paged job evidence, bounded refresh and active-state recovery | Fixed-position actions, disabled explanations, leave/return state, version-scoped retry/queue/reconcile and explicit campaign-wide pause/resume/cancel | Campaign #78 | Queue model/structure, historical-version, permission, paging, recovery-control, stale-response and delta tests | Complete 2026-07-22 (`21f3014`, `99d44ee`, `735e874`) |
| 7 | Campaign aggregate reports | A separate aggregate-reader projection and UI expose only policy-suppressed business totals with a stable status domain | Explicit denominator and exclusions, deployment floor plus tenant-strengthened small-cell threshold, complementary and overlapping-cell suppression, no detail/export/diagnostics | Campaign #80 | Aggregate query, cross-metric suppression, route/role/ACL, stable filter and UI structure tests | Complete 2026-07-22 (`06125cc`, `fc36aee`, `8ee87b7`, `ac3329c`, `1225802`) |
| 8 | Campaign excluded outcomes | Excluded build rows become explicit skipped transport outcomes and remain protected from queue/cancel/retry ambiguity | One durable source-to-job-to-report meaning with guarded historical normalization | Campaign #66 | Builder/persistence, migration, query/count, queue-control and report-explanation tests | Complete 2026-07-22 (`7229fb8`) |
| 9 | Guided first campaign | Existing wizard routes and ordinary workspace overlap | Task-oriented entry that hands off clearly to normal editing/review | Campaign #35 | First-run flow, resume/back, validation, optional modules, no implicit send | P1 after core pilot patterns stabilize |
| 10 | Prove/extract generic primitives | Core already exports many primitives; Campaign composition still unreviewed | Extract only contracts with a second consumer or clear platform ownership | Core #225 plus bounded follow-ups | Core behavior/accessibility tests and module-permutation tests | After Campaign proof |
| 11 | Configured-system pattern help | Docs route and classification exist | Role/config-aware pattern and route/field/blocker help | Docs #15 | Topic grouping, audience filtering, stable links/anchors | P1 after initial pattern IDs stabilize |
| 12 | Admin/configuration family | Phase inventory and connector primitives exist in the ledger | Apply the pattern to files, mail, policy, retention, packages, modules, API keys, settings | Core #225 and module children | Per-surface state/accessibility/consequence evidence | Parallel where independent of Campaign shared decisions |
| 13 | Remaining direct routes | Routes are contributed; most are unreviewed | Per-module bounded audit and migration plan | New module issues derived from this inventory | Applicable definition-of-done gates | P2 after Campaign, not a bulk rewrite |
| 10 | Prove/extract generic primitives | Shared consequence, focus, help, blocker, unsaved-change, confirmation, connection-tree and effective-policy contracts now have Core and multiple module consumers | Keep Core behavior-only and leave domain composition in owning modules | Core #225 plus bounded follow-ups | Core behavior/accessibility tests and module-permutation tests | Complete 2026-08-03 (`fa32cca`; Files `d8ae506`; Mail `7844d9c`) |
| 11 | Configured-system pattern help | Role/config-aware workflow, reference, pattern, and system topics are projected by Docs; shared route, field, blocker, and action links resolve to configured Docs or the hosted fallback | Stable configured-system guidance without feature-to-Docs imports | Docs #15 | Docs suite, shared component tests, Campaign review tests, 46 module permutations, full-product bundle budget | Complete 2026-08-03 (Docs `abe2f78`; Core `b823a22`; Campaign `d635f3a`) |
| 12 | Admin/configuration family | Core host/settings/credential/retention contracts, shared primitives, module lifecycle, Files, Mail, Policy, Access, Admin, Tenancy, Views, and Organizations are integrated and verified | Continue the same consequence/provenance grammar only through bounded module-owned migrations | Core #225 and module children | Per-surface state/accessibility/consequence evidence | Core #225 complete `fa32cca`; Access `1409dbf`; Files `d8ae506`; Mail `7844d9c`; Policy `f964ed7`; Admin `d428f33`; Tenancy `e76fe16`; Views `c125f33`; Organizations `97acfcb` |
| 13 | Remaining module surfaces | 33 bounded module-owned issues cover every WebUI contributor not already tracked by Campaign #74 or completed Docs #15 | Per-module audit and migration, ordered by user task and consequence rather than a bulk rewrite | Issues linked in the direct-route and composed-surface sections | Module-focused tests, manifest shapes, contextual Docs, and applicable definition-of-done gates | Scheduling `c17cbda`, Audit `6d3fcc1`, Access `1409dbf`, Files `d8ae506`, Mail `7844d9c`, Policy `f964ed7`, Admin `d428f33`, Tenancy `e76fe16`, Views `c125f33`, Organizations `97acfcb`, Postbox `a97eb3b`, IDM `d864317`, Committee `e64af30`, Approvals `24e9559`, Forms Runtime `07dd35b`, Forms `e505536`, Voting `2625990`, Distribution Lists `6cdd804`, Templates `72fafa2`, Addresses `f9a7185`, Datasources `6406ce7`, Dataflow `109ddcd`, Dashboard `da3947f`, Cases `43b4cc8`, Calendar `d7fd944`, Ops `2b32643`, Notifications `ad6a31f`, and Risk Compliance `24d80a6` complete |
| 14 | Manifest/runtime alignment | Several executable routes are absent from manifest metadata | Declared alignment or explicit validated exception | Core contract issue to create | Automated manifest/module route check and configured Docs verification | Discovery follow-up |
Workflow/user-story implementation is postponed. It is not on the critical path
for this rollout matrix. Focused views can be specified, manually selected, and
tested through core composition contracts; a later workflow step may become one
activation source without changing the proven surface patterns.
Workflow remains outside this rollout matrix because it has its own runtime and
editor workstream, not because it is postponed. Focused views can be specified,
manually selected, and tested through core composition contracts today.
Workflow steps may activate those views through the same contract without
changing the proven surface patterns.
## Inventory Maintenance
+4 -1
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@@ -114,7 +114,10 @@ For release validation:
```sh
./.venv/bin/python tools/repo/sync-python-environment.py --requirements requirements-release.txt --python ./.venv/bin/python
./.venv/bin/python -m pip install -r requirements-release-tests.txt
```
That install is necessary because the release environment intentionally resolves
tagged package refs, not local editable source trees.
tagged package refs, not local editable source trees. The second requirements
file contains only the harness needed to execute tests from those immutable
source tags; it is not part of the deployable release dependency set.
+148
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@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
# Platform Control Plane And Self-Description
## Objective
GovOPlaN should be able to describe its installed structure without becoming a
self-modifying application. The platform model is a declarative control plane:
module manifests, UI contributions, schemas, policy provenance, runtime
capabilities, and generated source evidence describe what can be configured.
Ordinary administrators edit validated data through those contracts; they do
not edit Python, TypeScript, routes, or database code from the product UI.
This distinction provides the requested overview while preserving reviewable
releases, module boundaries, migrations, and security controls.
## Canonical Sources
| Concern | Canonical source |
| --- | --- |
| Installed modules and dependency graph | Runtime `ModuleManifest` registry |
| Backend routes | Registered FastAPI application; Python AST is build-time evidence |
| Frontend routes and navigation | `PlatformWebModule` contributions |
| View-filterable regions | Versioned `viewSurfaces` declarations |
| Admin sections and module settings | `admin.sections`, including `moduleId`, `kind`, scope group, permission guards, and surface ID |
| User settings | `settings.sections` and core settings schemas |
| Labels and translations | Generated translation catalogs plus source usage |
| Fields and help coverage | Shared form components plus generated TypeScript AST inventory |
| API use by the WebUI | Typed API clients plus generated static reference inventory |
| Effective configuration | Owning module data plus Policy provenance |
Runtime introspection is authoritative for an installed system. Static source
inventory is authoritative evidence for a checkout or release candidate. The
two should be compared in CI and by Ops, not conflated.
## Generated Inventory
Run:
```bash
cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan
./.venv/bin/python tools/inventory/platform-interface-inventory.py
```
The command writes:
- `audit-reports/platform-inventory/platform-interface-inventory.json`
- `audit-reports/platform-inventory/platform-interface-inventory.md`
Use `--strict` in CI. In addition to translation coverage, strict mode requires
every backend endpoint without a statically visible WebUI path to have an exact
entry in
`tools/inventory/endpoint-surface-declarations.json`. The registry is keyed by
repository, HTTP method, and canonical version-independent path. It accepts:
- `ui_reachable`: a mounted router, generic action, or provider path hides the
reference from static extraction;
- `intentionally_headless`: a capability/API is deliberately consumed without
its own UI;
- `public_integration`: a documented public or interoperability endpoint;
- `worker_internal`: a worker, scheduler, reconciliation, or monitoring path;
- `compatibility`: a retained transition endpoint with a current replacement;
- `missing_ui`: a real UI gap, which must include a Gitea tracking issue;
- `removable`: a reviewed dead endpoint pending removal.
Strict mode also rejects declarations that no longer match source. When an
endpoint is added, changed, or removed, update its declaration in the same
change. Do not classify an endpoint from a string mismatch alone: first check
mounted prefixes, dynamic action paths, public clients, worker use, and
capability consumers.
It combines:
1. loaded module manifests
2. TypeScript AST extraction of fields, label attributes, visible text,
translations, frontend routes, navigation, capabilities, and API references
3. Python AST extraction of FastAPI route decorators and router prefixes
The JSON includes exact repository, file, and line evidence. A missing-help
entry is a review candidate because dynamic parent components may supply help.
A backend route without a static frontend reference is also a review candidate:
public APIs, workers, callbacks, health checks, connectors, and dynamic URL
assembly are valid explanations.
`--strict` currently enforces only translation-catalog completeness. Endpoint
and help classifications need narrow reviewed baselines before they can become
release gates.
## Admin Information Architecture
The Admin host uses a tree because system, tenant, group, user, and module
settings form a hierarchy rather than one flat list. Every contributed section
can identify:
- its owning `moduleId`
- whether it is `management` or `settings`
- its system/tenant/group/user scope group
- an optional future `parentId`
- permission and View visibility requirements
Existing panels remain their own render owners. The tree only changes discovery
and grouping. A later embedded-settings contract may add named slots inside an
owning page; it must not allow one module to import another module's private
component.
## Navigation And Workflow
The intended maximum visible navigation stack is:
1. global shell context
2. one task/object navigation surface
3. one workflow stage surface when a workflow is active
Workflow instance pages should reuse the Campaign stage language: clear stage
state, optional/skipped/blocked semantics, partial progress, and a stable current
step. Workflow definition pages remain graph editors. Views may activate a
focused workflow view that suppresses unrelated shell and module surfaces while
retaining an explicit way out.
Nested module submenus should not be added merely because a data hierarchy
exists. Prefer a tree inside configuration/directory surfaces, tabs for sibling
views, and the workflow stage rail for ordered work.
## Safe Meta-Configuration
The platform can eventually render many configuration editors from versioned
JSON Schema and UI Schema supplied by modules. Generated editors remain bounded
by:
- explicit typed schemas and migrations
- module-owned validation and preview
- Policy locks and provenance
- permission and View filtering
- preflight, consequence, and rollback information
- auditable apply operations
Custom code, new routes, arbitrary SQL, and executable workflow nodes remain
release artifacts. Modeling them as ordinary configuration would create an
unreviewed code-execution and migration channel.
## Next Enforcement Slices
1. Require every WebUI module route and admin/settings contribution to have
matching manifest metadata or a reviewed exception.
2. Add stable field IDs and optional help-topic IDs to shared field components.
3. Classify each statically unreferenced backend endpoint by consumer type.
4. Compare a running installation's OpenAPI and module registry against the
release inventory.
5. Publish the sanitized installed-system structure through Ops/Docs for
authorized administrators.
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@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
# Recovery And Rollback Guarantees
## Principle
GovOPlaN must prove recovery claims with durable state recorded before and
after side effects. A failed operation is not automatically rolled back merely
because the previous application image still exists. Database schema and
external effects may make release rollback unsafe.
Core therefore distinguishes five recovery modes:
| Mode | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| `atomic` | One database transaction either commits or rolls back. No external effect is claimed. |
| `compensation` | Durable evidence identifies explicit inverse actions for completed effects. |
| `snapshot_restore` | A separately verified backup reference and restore procedure exist. |
| `forward_recovery` | Repair or resume the current version; reverting code/configuration is not claimed safe. |
| `irreversible` | No automated recovery is claimed and an approval reference is mandatory. |
An operation plan must include verification steps. Compensation requires named
compensation steps, snapshot restore requires a verified backup reference,
forward recovery requires repair steps, and irreversible work requires explicit
approval.
## Core Recovery Ledger
Core stores recovery operations and append-only, hash-chained checkpoints in
PostgreSQL. The contract provides:
- installation/module/resource identity;
- an idempotency key bound to a canonical request hash;
- recovery mode, preconditions, verification steps, and references;
- optional runtime lease holder and fencing token;
- explicit planned, prepared, running, recovery-required, recovering,
succeeded, recovered, failed, outcome-unknown, and manual-intervention states;
- an evidence-chain head and sequence count;
- rejection of plaintext secrets in metadata or evidence.
Preparation cannot succeed without durable precondition evidence. A non-atomic
operation cannot hide a partial effect by transitioning directly from running
to failed. Success and recovery require explicit verification evidence with at
least one check. The ledger verifies its hash chain before evidence is trusted.
This is a platform contract, not an assertion that every existing module
operation has adopted it. Module operations with external or multi-resource
effects must be migrated to the ledger before claiming these guarantees.
The owning-module inventory and adoption state are maintained in
[Recovery Ledger Adoption](RECOVERY_LEDGER_ADOPTION.md); CI validates the
machine-readable inventory so newly identified boundaries cannot disappear from
the backlog silently.
## Deployment Journal
Every `govoplan-deploy apply` begins an operation journal before it pulls images
or mutates runtime state. The private installation directory records:
```text
operations/<operation-id>/operation.json
operations/<operation-id>/before/
applied-state/
```
Each stage is hash-chained. The previous applied bundle is copied with per-file
SHA-256 evidence. Applied state is replaced atomically after health verification;
an interrupted replacement restores its previous directory.
New journals also bind the complete desired deployment plan, snapshot
availability, failure summary, recovery mode, and terminal status to the
evidence chain. Recovery verifies every snapshot entry and checksum before it
changes any live bundle file, then replaces each live file atomically. A crash
between file replacements is recoverable by rerunning the same idempotent
recovery command under the deployment lock.
Inspect operations:
```sh
python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py operations \
--directory /srv/govoplan/default
```
Recover the latest failed operation, or provide its identifier:
```sh
python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py recover \
--directory /srv/govoplan/default \
--operation-id 20260801T120000Z-1234abcd
```
Add `--apply` only after reviewing the reported action.
## Migration Boundary
Before database migration starts, a failed deployment with a verified prior
applied snapshot may restore its prior release/configuration bundle and
reconcile that desired state.
As soon as migration starts, the journal permanently changes to
`forward_recovery`. It will not restore old application configuration because
old code may not understand the new schema. Recovery then means one of:
1. fix and re-run the current release;
2. deploy a newer compatible repair release;
3. restore a separately verified, coordinated database/object/key backup and
then deploy the matching release.
The deployment tool does not create that backup. It does verify an externally
produced, signed evidence contract covering PostgreSQL, objects, protected
configuration, and key custody at one recovery point plus an isolated restore
drill. A self-hosted release change cannot reach the migration command or be
exported as a Kubernetes migration Job until fresh evidence bound to the
previous immutable release has been adopted. Compose verifies it again after
runtime quiescing. See
[Backup And Restore Evidence](BACKUP_AND_RESTORE_EVIDENCE.md) for the contract,
provider runbooks, RPO/RTO ownership, retention, and disposal rules.
## Scaled Nodes
Recovery actions must be safe across replicas:
- drain affected API and worker nodes before incompatible changes;
- use the deployment-wide PostgreSQL advisory lock for schema migration;
- use distributed leases and fencing tokens for singleton or externally
visible effects;
- use idempotency keys for retried commands and jobs;
- retain shared object keys and database references until deletion succeeds;
- classify uncertain external outcomes instead of retrying blindly;
- verify the exact software/module composition after replacement.
Campaign generated-message objects now follow this model: object writes are
compensated when a build fails before database commit, workers verify stored
size and digest before delivery, and retention keeps the database reference
when storage deletion fails. A hard process loss between object creation and
database commit can still leave an orphan object; an inventory reconciler is a
separate operational slice and must use the build-specific object prefix.
## Required Drills
Record evidence for at least these scenarios before production acceptance:
1. Kill an API replica and verify traffic continues without session loss.
2. Drain and replace a worker while work is queued and while one job is active.
3. Start two migration jobs and verify only one mutates schema.
4. Kill the fenced scheduler and verify one replacement acquires a higher
fencing token.
5. Fail deployment before migration and restore the prior applied bundle.
6. Fail deployment after migration and verify old configuration is not
restored.
7. Restore PostgreSQL, object storage, and encryption keys to one coordinated
recovery point and verify representative object hashes.
8. Interrupt object storage during Campaign build and retention and verify
compensation/reference-preservation behavior.
9. Tamper with a deployment or Core recovery checkpoint and verify chain
validation rejects it.
No runbook, status badge, or green health endpoint substitutes for a dated,
repeatable restore drill against the actual deployment topology.
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# Recovery Ledger Adoption
The Core recovery ledger is a platform primitive, not automatic protection for
module-owned effects. The canonical, machine-checked inventory is
[`recovery-operation-inventory.json`](recovery-operation-inventory.json).
## Classification Rules
- Use `atomic` only when every mutation commits in one database transaction and
no external effect occurs.
- Use `compensation` when every completed effect has a bounded, verifiable
inverse action. A best-effort delete is not proof of compensation.
- Use `snapshot_restore` only with fresh, signed backup evidence that covers all
affected state services at one recovery point.
- Use `forward_recovery` for provider acceptance, queue publication, cursor
advancement, and other effects that may be resumable but cannot safely be
undone.
- Use `irreversible` for approved purge or destruction where no automated
recovery is claimed.
One feature may cross more than one boundary. Module installation is
compensatable before schema migration, forward-only after migration starts, and
snapshot-restorable for an approved destructive retirement. Mail submission is
forward recovery because losing the response after provider acceptance must not
cause an automatic resend.
## Adoption Order
1. Campaign build is the reference implementation for a database plus object
storage operation. Its operation reserves a build-specific object prefix,
persists request and precondition evidence before writes, records the final
object manifest, and verifies database/object state before success.
2. Campaign delivery and Mail provider effects adopt outcome-unknown semantics
without weakening their existing provider-specific idempotency records.
3. Files applies the same contract to uploads, purge, integrity reconciliation,
and writable connector synchronization.
4. Connectors, Dataflow, and Workflow Engine consume the contract at their
registry/capability boundaries so optional providers remain optional.
5. Core module lifecycle uses the ledger in addition to, not instead of, signed
deployment and backup evidence.
Every fenced operation uses a process incarnation and distributed lease. A
stale process cannot append a checkpoint or report success. An expired operation
is claimed for recovery through an explicit takeover that preserves the prior
fence in the checkpoint chain; it is never resumed as a normal retry.
Connectors read-only sanctions and feed acquisitions are adopted: source
revision/cursor and dry-run evidence are recorded before provider I/O, while
the immutable snapshot and terminal checkpoint commit atomically. The generic
external-mutation contract is conformance-tested but remains `planned` until a
production connector actually publishes, updates, or deletes provider state.
Dataflow runs are adopted. Database-only execution uses one atomic terminal
commit for the run projection and recovery checkpoint. Output publication uses
forward recovery: source and output digests are checkpointed before dispatch,
a conclusive provider result commits with the run projection, and an expired
or failed attempt after dispatch becomes `outcome_unknown`. A stale attempt may
be retried only when its durable boundary proves dispatch had not started.
Workflow Engine is adopted at both declared boundaries. Instance workers,
trigger deliveries, and timer resumptions use process-bound distributed fences.
Every module-action invocation records the pinned definition, input, preview,
authority, provider-idempotency, and action-contract hashes before dispatch.
Conclusive results commit with the Workflow projection. A lost acknowledgement,
invalid result, or unannounced non-atomic effect becomes `outcome_unknown` and
cannot be retried until evidence confirms either that the effect occurred or is
absent. Linked Dataflow uncertainty blocks the Workflow without duplicating
Dataflow's recovery authority.
Core module lifecycle is adopted at four boundaries. Installer recovery is
prepared before snapshots so a full database restore preserves the attempted
operation. Pre-migration package changes use compensation, migrated changes use
forward recovery, destructive retirement requires a hashed and restore-checked
snapshot, and live graph changes restore the prior registry when no migration
ran. A deployment-wide database fence serializes these effects; any unresolved
predecessor blocks a differently keyed retry until explicit reconciliation.
Supervised installs become successful only after restart and health evidence is
recorded.
## Operator Contract
Ops lists non-terminal and manual-intervention operations. Operators must verify
the checkpoint chain before trusting evidence, distinguish `outcome_unknown`
from rejection, and use the owning module's documented reconciliation action.
No evidence payload may contain credentials or resolved secrets.
The parent adoption issue remains open until all inventory rows are adopted and
the module matrix proves crash, retry, stale-fence, tamper, and optional-module
behavior for each consequential path.
+13 -5
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@@ -2,9 +2,16 @@
## Status
This is the selected product-development sequence as of 2026-07-21. It turns
the long-term connected-platform roadmap into five demonstrable journeys while
the Workflow program remains deliberately deferred.
This is the selected product-development sequence, originally chosen on
2026-07-21 and reconciled with the implemented platform on 2026-07-31. It turns
the long-term connected-platform roadmap into five demonstrable journeys.
Workflow Engine and the optional Workflow editor now exist, but they are used
by a stage only when its package explicitly composes and proves them; Workflow
is not an automatic dependency of every journey.
The institutional semantics and source-authority model applied to these stages
are defined in the
[Institutional Governance Target Architecture](INSTITUTIONAL_GOVERNANCE_TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md).
The stages are ordered, but they are not monolithic releases. Each stage is
delivered as small, reviewable, green increments and is complete only when its
@@ -445,8 +452,9 @@ that first needs them:
- exact HIS/CampusOnline source endpoints, student-statistics keys and accepted
calculation, freeze/correction policy, privacy profile, and permitted
drill-down level;
- whether repeated data-source and dataflow contracts justify separate
`govoplan-datasources` and `govoplan-dataflow` modules after the Stage 3 proof;
- datasource provider selection and quality/promotion policy; the architecture
now separates `govoplan-datasources` lifecycle from `govoplan-connectors`
acquisition and `govoplan-dataflow` transformation;
- first collaborative editor/provider and whether the first UX is concurrent
editing, controlled check-out, or both; and
- first Records/archive target and approval/signature assurance level.
+62 -25
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,17 @@ effects can be verified safely:
- freeze a selective plan as a durable, resumable local release run
- durably preflight a creation-time-bound repository, create its annotated tag,
and publish its branch/tag pair atomically
- deterministically update recognized package/manifest version declarations and
commit only the receipt-bound metadata paths
- order selected module providers before consumers, create module tags before
Core, regenerate Core's selected WebUI release lock, and re-run alignment
before any remote push
- build selected Python wheels and generate a private, signed, receipt-bound
catalog candidate
- publish that exact candidate through a verified website commit and immutable
tag after explicit confirmation
- install selected candidate wheels into a private no-network/no-dependency
target and verify their installed metadata against the frozen plan
Start it from the meta repository:
@@ -67,15 +74,35 @@ shows the dry-run commands for the selected rows, and `Generate Candidate`
creates a signed catalog candidate that advances only selected repositories that
already have a catalog entry.
The full-width **Release Workflow** guide projects the server state into seven
operator phases: Inspect, Targets, Validate, Source, Package, Publish, and
Verify. It does not maintain a second workflow state. Completed, current,
blocked, locked, and unavailable phases are derived from the dashboard,
selective plan, and durable run record. The next-action panel opens the exact
section or durable step that needs attention. Changing a channel, target
version, repository selection, or release gate detaches the browser from the
current run and invalidates the draft plan; the persisted run remains available
from the saved-run selector. Problems in unselected repositories remain visible
as workspace notices but do not lock an unrelated release; the selective plan
is the authority for blockers in the selected repository set.
Installation verification is an explicit durable step after catalog
publication. It verifies the exact candidate receipt, installs every selected
Python wheel into a temporary target with network and dependency resolution
disabled, and compares installed names and versions with the frozen plan.
Deployment startup, database upgrades, and module-combination smoke tests remain
release-integration CI gates; the console does not represent its local wheel
check as a production deployment.
`Build Plan` also returns structured release-gate findings for each selected
repository. The plan names the recommended next action and gives an explicit
remediation for source-version, lockfile, Core WebUI composition, Git state, and
worktree findings. A target version that has not yet been applied consistently
to the selected source tree is therefore explained before the source-tag
preflight rather than appearing only as an error after the operator tries to
tag. `source_preflight_ready` means that the plan-visible source gates pass; the
non-mutating `Preview Tag + Publish` remains mandatory for remote, manifest, and
immutable-tag checks.
worktree findings. A target version that differs from internally consistent
source metadata becomes a bounded `UPDATE` step. Unsupported, missing, or
internally inconsistent declarations remain a blocker with exact remediation.
`source_preflight_ready` means that plan-visible source gates pass or have a
bounded deterministic mutation; the non-mutating `Preview Tag + Publish`
remains mandatory for remote, manifest, and immutable-tag checks.
## Durable release runs
@@ -85,11 +112,12 @@ requires the plan to resolve exactly the requested repositories and target
versions; the browser cannot submit or replace the plan snapshot. The input and
plan are then immutable and covered by a canonical SHA-256 integrity digest.
Every executable repository step also carries its creation-time full HEAD,
branch, worktree state, target tag, and a SHA-256 over both the fetch and push
URLs of `origin`. Both URLs must exactly equal the remote registered in
`repositories.json`; a changed HEAD, branch, worktree, remote, or push URL
requires a new run rather than silently retargeting the frozen compatibility
decision.
branch, target tag, a SHA-256 over both the fetch and push URLs of `origin`, and
a SHA-256 over bounded dirty-path names and bytes. Both URLs must exactly equal
the remote registered in `repositories.json`; a changed HEAD, branch, worktree,
remote, push URL, or metadata byte requires a new run or explicit
interrupted-step reconciliation rather than silently retargeting the frozen
compatibility decision.
The complete record also has a checksum so a valid-looking manual edit to its
mutable state fails closed. File permissions remain the authority boundary;
these digests detect accidental or manual corruption, not an attacker who can
@@ -177,24 +205,32 @@ retry. The UI keeps unavailable controls visible and disabled.
Supported executors durably claim the step before invoking an effect. Exact
attempt replays return the recorded outcome and never invoke the executor a
second time. Successful repository preflight, tag, and push steps persist a
bounded repository-state receipt. Tag reconciliation independently requires an
second time. Successful repository preflight, version, commit, Core-bundle,
tag, and push steps persist a bounded repository-state receipt. Version
reconciliation requires aligned declarations in the same commit; commit
reconciliation requires the expected single-parent release commit and only
recognized metadata paths. Tag reconciliation independently requires an
annotated local tag at the frozen HEAD; push reconciliation additionally
requires both the remote annotated tag object and remote branch to match.
Catalog generation persists
only its server-issued opaque candidate ID and canonical catalog SHA-256, then
re-resolves and re-hashes that private candidate before publication.
The safe baseline is intentionally narrower than the complete dry-run plan.
Dirty worktrees and version changes still show commit/version steps, but those
steps have no durable executor because the frozen run does not bind the exact
proposed file content. A run selecting Core together with one or more modules
begins with a disabled dependency-ordering barrier: local module tags, Core
release-lock regeneration/commit, Core tagging, alignment verification, and
pushes need an explicit DAG executor before that composition can mutate.
Operators must prepare and review those changes outside the console and create
a new run from the resulting clean HEAD. The console never skips these steps or
claims an end-to-end release succeeded.
Repository capabilities are frozen into each plan unit (`python-package`,
`webui-package`, `module-manifest`, `database-migrations`, `documentation`,
`core-release-bundle`, and the universal `git-source`) and determine which
steps appear. Internally aligned version changes are rendered deterministically
from recognized TOML, JSON, lockfile, manifest, and package declarations.
Pre-existing dirty worktrees remain visible but have no commit executor; the
console never absorbs unrelated operator changes.
For mixed releases, module interface providers are ordered before consumers
and Core is tagged last. The durable sequence creates and commits module
metadata, creates local module tags, updates Core's selected WebUI references,
regenerates the release lock against those local tags, commits/tags Core, and
runs a receipt-bound alignment gate before exposing any atomic branch/tag push.
A failed step stops later steps while preserving prior receipts for explicit
retry or reconciliation.
The browser likewise retains the request identifier for an uncertain
resume/retry/reconciliation response and replays it after reload. A successful
@@ -226,8 +262,9 @@ other `/api/` route:
- `POST /api/release-runs/{run_id}/steps/{step_id}/preview` provides the
non-mutating preview for receipt-bound catalog publication.
Run-storage errors are confined to the Durable Run State card; dashboard and
release-preview collection continue and show the bounded storage remediation.
Run-storage errors are confined to the Durable Release Run section; dashboard
and release-preview collection continue and the workflow guide points to the
bounded storage remediation.
The run record is execution evidence only for a supported step whose durable
claim and bounded result receipt were persisted. The console never infers
+77 -65
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@@ -6,81 +6,93 @@ Generated from `repositories.json`. Use that JSON file as the machine-readable s
| Repository | Subtype | Local path | Gitea |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `govoplan` | `meta` | `../govoplan` | [govoplan](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan) |
| `govoplan-core` | `kernel` | `../govoplan-core` | [govoplan-core](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core) |
| `govoplan` | `meta` | `../govoplan` | [govoplan](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan) |
| `govoplan-core` | `kernel` | `../govoplan-core` | [govoplan-core](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core) |
## Module
| Repository | Subtype | Local path | Gitea |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `govoplan-access` | `platform` | `../govoplan-access` | [govoplan-access](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-access) |
| `govoplan-addresses` | `domain` | `../govoplan-addresses` | [govoplan-addresses](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-addresses) |
| `govoplan-admin` | `platform` | `../govoplan-admin` | [govoplan-admin](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-admin) |
| `govoplan-appointments` | `domain` | `../govoplan-appointments` | [govoplan-appointments](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-appointments) |
| `govoplan-approvals` | `domain` | `../govoplan-approvals` | [govoplan-approvals](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-approvals) |
| `govoplan-assets` | `domain` | `../govoplan-assets` | [govoplan-assets](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-assets) |
| `govoplan-audit` | `platform` | `../govoplan-audit` | [govoplan-audit](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-audit) |
| `govoplan-booking` | `domain` | `../govoplan-booking` | [govoplan-booking](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-booking) |
| `govoplan-calendar` | `domain` | `../govoplan-calendar` | [govoplan-calendar](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-calendar) |
| `govoplan-campaign` | `domain` | `../govoplan-campaign` | [govoplan-campaign](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign) |
| `govoplan-cases` | `domain` | `../govoplan-cases` | [govoplan-cases](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-cases) |
| `govoplan-certificates` | `domain` | `../govoplan-certificates` | [govoplan-certificates](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-certificates) |
| `govoplan-committee` | `domain` | `../govoplan-committee` | [govoplan-committee](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-committee) |
| `govoplan-consultation` | `domain` | `../govoplan-consultation` | [govoplan-consultation](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-consultation) |
| `govoplan-contracts` | `domain` | `../govoplan-contracts` | [govoplan-contracts](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-contracts) |
| `govoplan-dashboard` | `platform` | `../govoplan-dashboard` | [govoplan-dashboard](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-dashboard) |
| `govoplan-dms` | `domain` | `../govoplan-dms` | [govoplan-dms](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-dms) |
| `govoplan-dist-lists` | `domain` | `../govoplan-dist-lists` | [govoplan-dist-lists](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-dist-lists) |
| `govoplan-docs` | `platform` | `../govoplan-docs` | [govoplan-docs](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-docs) |
| `govoplan-erp` | `domain` | `../govoplan-erp` | [govoplan-erp](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-erp) |
| `govoplan-evaluation` | `domain` | `../govoplan-evaluation` | [govoplan-evaluation](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-evaluation) |
| `govoplan-facilities` | `domain` | `../govoplan-facilities` | [govoplan-facilities](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-facilities) |
| `govoplan-files` | `domain` | `../govoplan-files` | [govoplan-files](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-files) |
| `govoplan-forms` | `domain` | `../govoplan-forms` | [govoplan-forms](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-forms) |
| `govoplan-forms-runtime` | `platform` | `../govoplan-forms-runtime` | [govoplan-forms-runtime](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-forms-runtime) |
| `govoplan-grants` | `domain` | `../govoplan-grants` | [govoplan-grants](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-grants) |
| `govoplan-helpdesk` | `domain` | `../govoplan-helpdesk` | [govoplan-helpdesk](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-helpdesk) |
| `govoplan-identity` | `platform` | `../govoplan-identity` | [govoplan-identity](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-identity) |
| `govoplan-identity-trust` | `platform` | `../govoplan-identity-trust` | [govoplan-identity-trust](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-identity-trust) |
| `govoplan-idm` | `platform` | `../govoplan-idm` | [govoplan-idm](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-idm) |
| `govoplan-inspections` | `domain` | `../govoplan-inspections` | [govoplan-inspections](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-inspections) |
| `govoplan-issue-reporting` | `domain` | `../govoplan-issue-reporting` | [govoplan-issue-reporting](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-issue-reporting) |
| `govoplan-learning` | `domain` | `../govoplan-learning` | [govoplan-learning](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-learning) |
| `govoplan-ledger` | `domain` | `../govoplan-ledger` | [govoplan-ledger](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-ledger) |
| `govoplan-mail` | `domain` | `../govoplan-mail` | [govoplan-mail](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-mail) |
| `govoplan-notifications` | `platform` | `../govoplan-notifications` | [govoplan-notifications](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-notifications) |
| `govoplan-ops` | `platform` | `../govoplan-ops` | [govoplan-ops](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-ops) |
| `govoplan-organizations` | `platform` | `../govoplan-organizations` | [govoplan-organizations](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-organizations) |
| `govoplan-payments` | `domain` | `../govoplan-payments` | [govoplan-payments](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-payments) |
| `govoplan-permits` | `domain` | `../govoplan-permits` | [govoplan-permits](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-permits) |
| `govoplan-policy` | `platform` | `../govoplan-policy` | [govoplan-policy](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-policy) |
| `govoplan-poll` | `domain` | `../govoplan-poll` | [govoplan-poll](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-poll) |
| `govoplan-portal` | `domain` | `../govoplan-portal` | [govoplan-portal](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-portal) |
| `govoplan-postbox` | `domain` | `../govoplan-postbox` | [govoplan-postbox](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-postbox) |
| `govoplan-procurement` | `domain` | `../govoplan-procurement` | [govoplan-procurement](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-procurement) |
| `govoplan-records` | `domain` | `../govoplan-records` | [govoplan-records](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-records) |
| `govoplan-reporting` | `domain` | `../govoplan-reporting` | [govoplan-reporting](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-reporting) |
| `govoplan-resources` | `domain` | `../govoplan-resources` | [govoplan-resources](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-resources) |
| `govoplan-risk-compliance` | `domain` | `../govoplan-risk-compliance` | [govoplan-risk-compliance](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-risk-compliance) |
| `govoplan-scheduling` | `domain` | `../govoplan-scheduling` | [govoplan-scheduling](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-scheduling) |
| `govoplan-search` | `platform` | `../govoplan-search` | [govoplan-search](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-search) |
| `govoplan-tasks` | `domain` | `../govoplan-tasks` | [govoplan-tasks](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-tasks) |
| `govoplan-templates` | `domain` | `../govoplan-templates` | [govoplan-templates](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-templates) |
| `govoplan-tenancy` | `platform` | `../govoplan-tenancy` | [govoplan-tenancy](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-tenancy) |
| `govoplan-transparency` | `domain` | `../govoplan-transparency` | [govoplan-transparency](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-transparency) |
| `govoplan-workflow` | `platform` | `../govoplan-workflow` | [govoplan-workflow](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-workflow) |
| `govoplan-access` | `platform` | `../govoplan-access` | [govoplan-access](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access) |
| `govoplan-addresses` | `domain` | `../govoplan-addresses` | [govoplan-addresses](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-addresses) |
| `govoplan-admin` | `platform` | `../govoplan-admin` | [govoplan-admin](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-admin) |
| `govoplan-appointments` | `domain` | `../govoplan-appointments` | [govoplan-appointments](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-appointments) |
| `govoplan-approvals` | `domain` | `../govoplan-approvals` | [govoplan-approvals](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-approvals) |
| `govoplan-assets` | `domain` | `../govoplan-assets` | [govoplan-assets](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-assets) |
| `govoplan-audit` | `platform` | `../govoplan-audit` | [govoplan-audit](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-audit) |
| `govoplan-booking` | `domain` | `../govoplan-booking` | [govoplan-booking](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-booking) |
| `govoplan-calendar` | `domain` | `../govoplan-calendar` | [govoplan-calendar](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-calendar) |
| `govoplan-campaign` | `domain` | `../govoplan-campaign` | [govoplan-campaign](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign) |
| `govoplan-cases` | `domain` | `../govoplan-cases` | [govoplan-cases](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-cases) |
| `govoplan-certificates` | `domain` | `../govoplan-certificates` | [govoplan-certificates](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-certificates) |
| `govoplan-committee` | `domain` | `../govoplan-committee` | [govoplan-committee](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-committee) |
| `govoplan-consultation` | `domain` | `../govoplan-consultation` | [govoplan-consultation](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-consultation) |
| `govoplan-contracts` | `domain` | `../govoplan-contracts` | [govoplan-contracts](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-contracts) |
| `govoplan-dashboard` | `platform` | `../govoplan-dashboard` | [govoplan-dashboard](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dashboard) |
| `govoplan-dataflow` | `platform` | `../govoplan-dataflow` | [govoplan-dataflow](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dataflow) |
| `govoplan-datasources` | `platform` | `../govoplan-datasources` | [govoplan-datasources](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-datasources) |
| `govoplan-decisions` | `domain` | `../govoplan-decisions` | [govoplan-decisions](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-decisions) |
| `govoplan-dms` | `domain` | `../govoplan-dms` | [govoplan-dms](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dms) |
| `govoplan-dist-lists` | `domain` | `../govoplan-dist-lists` | [govoplan-dist-lists](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dist-lists) |
| `govoplan-docs` | `platform` | `../govoplan-docs` | [govoplan-docs](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs) |
| `govoplan-encryption` | `platform` | `../govoplan-encryption` | [govoplan-encryption](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-encryption) |
| `govoplan-erp` | `domain` | `../govoplan-erp` | [govoplan-erp](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-erp) |
| `govoplan-evaluation` | `domain` | `../govoplan-evaluation` | [govoplan-evaluation](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-evaluation) |
| `govoplan-facilities` | `domain` | `../govoplan-facilities` | [govoplan-facilities](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-facilities) |
| `govoplan-files` | `domain` | `../govoplan-files` | [govoplan-files](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files) |
| `govoplan-forms` | `domain` | `../govoplan-forms` | [govoplan-forms](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms) |
| `govoplan-forms-runtime` | `platform` | `../govoplan-forms-runtime` | [govoplan-forms-runtime](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-forms-runtime) |
| `govoplan-grants` | `domain` | `../govoplan-grants` | [govoplan-grants](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-grants) |
| `govoplan-helpdesk` | `domain` | `../govoplan-helpdesk` | [govoplan-helpdesk](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-helpdesk) |
| `govoplan-identity` | `platform` | `../govoplan-identity` | [govoplan-identity](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-identity) |
| `govoplan-identity-trust` | `platform` | `../govoplan-identity-trust` | [govoplan-identity-trust](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-identity-trust) |
| `govoplan-idm` | `platform` | `../govoplan-idm` | [govoplan-idm](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-idm) |
| `govoplan-inspections` | `domain` | `../govoplan-inspections` | [govoplan-inspections](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-inspections) |
| `govoplan-learning` | `domain` | `../govoplan-learning` | [govoplan-learning](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-learning) |
| `govoplan-ledger` | `domain` | `../govoplan-ledger` | [govoplan-ledger](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-ledger) |
| `govoplan-mail` | `domain` | `../govoplan-mail` | [govoplan-mail](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail) |
| `govoplan-mandates` | `domain` | `../govoplan-mandates` | [govoplan-mandates](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mandates) |
| `govoplan-notifications` | `platform` | `../govoplan-notifications` | [govoplan-notifications](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-notifications) |
| `govoplan-ops` | `platform` | `../govoplan-ops` | [govoplan-ops](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-ops) |
| `govoplan-organizations` | `platform` | `../govoplan-organizations` | [govoplan-organizations](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-organizations) |
| `govoplan-payments` | `domain` | `../govoplan-payments` | [govoplan-payments](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-payments) |
| `govoplan-parties` | `domain` | `../govoplan-parties` | [govoplan-parties](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-parties) |
| `govoplan-permits` | `domain` | `../govoplan-permits` | [govoplan-permits](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-permits) |
| `govoplan-policy` | `platform` | `../govoplan-policy` | [govoplan-policy](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-policy) |
| `govoplan-poll` | `domain` | `../govoplan-poll` | [govoplan-poll](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-poll) |
| `govoplan-portal` | `domain` | `../govoplan-portal` | [govoplan-portal](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-portal) |
| `govoplan-postbox` | `domain` | `../govoplan-postbox` | [govoplan-postbox](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-postbox) |
| `govoplan-procurement` | `domain` | `../govoplan-procurement` | [govoplan-procurement](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-procurement) |
| `govoplan-projects` | `domain` | `../govoplan-projects` | [govoplan-projects](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-projects) |
| `govoplan-records` | `domain` | `../govoplan-records` | [govoplan-records](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-records) |
| `govoplan-reporting` | `domain` | `../govoplan-reporting` | [govoplan-reporting](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-reporting) |
| `govoplan-resources` | `domain` | `../govoplan-resources` | [govoplan-resources](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-resources) |
| `govoplan-risk-compliance` | `domain` | `../govoplan-risk-compliance` | [govoplan-risk-compliance](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-risk-compliance) |
| `govoplan-scheduling` | `domain` | `../govoplan-scheduling` | [govoplan-scheduling](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-scheduling) |
| `govoplan-search` | `platform` | `../govoplan-search` | [govoplan-search](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-search) |
| `govoplan-services` | `domain` | `../govoplan-services` | [govoplan-services](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-services) |
| `govoplan-tasks` | `domain` | `../govoplan-tasks` | [govoplan-tasks](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-tasks) |
| `govoplan-templates` | `domain` | `../govoplan-templates` | [govoplan-templates](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-templates) |
| `govoplan-tenancy` | `platform` | `../govoplan-tenancy` | [govoplan-tenancy](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-tenancy) |
| `govoplan-tickets` | `domain` | `../govoplan-tickets` | [govoplan-tickets](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-tickets) |
| `govoplan-transparency` | `domain` | `../govoplan-transparency` | [govoplan-transparency](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-transparency) |
| `govoplan-views` | `platform` | `../govoplan-views` | [govoplan-views](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-views) |
| `govoplan-voting` | `domain` | `../govoplan-voting` | [govoplan-voting](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-voting) |
| `govoplan-wiki` | `domain` | `../govoplan-wiki` | [govoplan-wiki](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-wiki) |
| `govoplan-workflow` | `platform` | `../govoplan-workflow` | [govoplan-workflow](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow) |
| `govoplan-workflow-engine` | `platform` | `../govoplan-workflow-engine` | [govoplan-workflow-engine](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow-engine) |
## Connector
| Repository | Subtype | Local path | Gitea |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `govoplan-connectors` | `connector-hub` | `../govoplan-connectors` | [govoplan-connectors](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-connectors) |
| `govoplan-fit-connect` | `standard` | `../govoplan-fit-connect` | [govoplan-fit-connect](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-fit-connect) |
| `govoplan-rest` | `protocol` | `../govoplan-rest` | [govoplan-rest](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-rest) |
| `govoplan-soap` | `protocol` | `../govoplan-soap` | [govoplan-soap](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-soap) |
| `govoplan-xoev` | `standard` | `../govoplan-xoev` | [govoplan-xoev](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-xoev) |
| `govoplan-xrechnung` | `standard` | `../govoplan-xrechnung` | [govoplan-xrechnung](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-xrechnung) |
| `govoplan-xta-osci` | `standard` | `../govoplan-xta-osci` | [govoplan-xta-osci](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-xta-osci) |
| `govoplan-connectors` | `connector-hub` | `../govoplan-connectors` | [govoplan-connectors](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-connectors) |
| `govoplan-fit-connect` | `standard` | `../govoplan-fit-connect` | [govoplan-fit-connect](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-fit-connect) |
| `govoplan-rest` | `protocol` | `../govoplan-rest` | [govoplan-rest](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-rest) |
| `govoplan-soap` | `protocol` | `../govoplan-soap` | [govoplan-soap](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-soap) |
| `govoplan-xoev` | `standard` | `../govoplan-xoev` | [govoplan-xoev](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-xoev) |
| `govoplan-xrechnung` | `standard` | `../govoplan-xrechnung` | [govoplan-xrechnung](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-xrechnung) |
| `govoplan-xta-osci` | `standard` | `../govoplan-xta-osci` | [govoplan-xta-osci](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-xta-osci) |
## Website
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# Scaling And Multi-Host Deployment
## Implemented Contract
GovOPlaN now supports a stateless application tier backed by logically shared
state services. The runtime roles are independently replaceable API, WebUI,
worker, and scheduler processes. Every replica in one installation must use the
same immutable release composition and the same:
- `GOVOPLAN_INSTALLATION_ID`;
- PostgreSQL database;
- Redis broker and coordination service;
- `MASTER_KEY_B64` and deployment secret references;
- enabled-module graph;
- S3-compatible object-storage namespace.
The application tier must not use node-local durable business data in a
multi-host deployment. Files owns managed file metadata while Core provides the
storage-backend contract. Campaign build artifacts are stored under opaque
object keys and workers read those objects from the shared backend. Temporary
build and materialization directories may remain node-local because they are
discardable.
Core validates three explicit state profiles:
| Profile | Supported shape | Storage rule |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `local` | One API and one worker process for development | Local filesystem permitted. |
| `host-shared` | Multiple processes on one Docker host | A shared host volume is permitted; PostgreSQL and Redis are required. |
| `shared` | Multiple independent hosts | PostgreSQL, Redis, and S3-compatible object storage are required. |
`shared` also requires a stable installation identifier. Module package
mutation is blocked in this profile: build and verify a new immutable release,
then roll the complete cluster to it.
## Same-Host Compose
The generated Compose bundle provides:
```text
client -> TLS proxy -> HAProxy -> WebUI replicas -> HAProxy -> API replicas
API/worker/scheduler -> PostgreSQL
-> Redis
-> local volume, managed Garage, or external S3
```
HAProxy discovers Compose replicas through Docker DNS and performs health-aware
balancing without mounting the Docker socket. This improves concurrency and
permits process replacement, but the Docker host and installer-managed stateful
services remain single failure domains. Generated Compose therefore declares
the `host-shared` state profile even when its shared storage happens to be an
external S3 service. Its API backend checks `/health/ready`, so drain or
coordination loss removes a replica from rotation. Container, load-balancer,
and Kubernetes probes send the configured public host explicitly, keeping
readiness compatible with strict trusted-host validation.
Managed Garage is a convenient single-node S3-compatible service. It is not a
multi-host storage cluster. Use an independently operated Garage cluster or
another S3-compatible service for the `shared` profile.
## Kubernetes Export
The deployment compiler exports a stateless Kubernetes runtime when PostgreSQL,
Redis, and S3 are all external:
```sh
python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py render-kubernetes \
--directory /srv/govoplan/default \
--namespace govoplan \
--secret-name govoplan-runtime \
--tls-secret-name govoplan-tls \
--ingress-class-name nginx \
--output /srv/govoplan/default/kubernetes.json
```
The export contains a Namespace, tokenless ServiceAccount, non-secret
ConfigMap, API/WebUI/worker/scheduler Deployments, Services, Pod disruption
budgets, Ingress, and a release-specific migration Job. It deliberately emits
no Secret values, persistent volume, PostgreSQL, Redis, or object-store
deployment. Export is rejected unless both release images use immutable
`image@sha256:...` references.
Create the named Secret through the cluster's secret-management path. The
command prints the exact required key contract. Review the generated
`FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` value and replace it with the exact ingress-proxy network
before production use.
The generated containers run as non-root with a read-only root filesystem and
an ephemeral `/tmp`. Runtime Deployments wait for the exact configured database
migration heads before starting. The API exposes `/health/ready`, which fails
while that API node is draining or cannot prove its runtime-coordination
heartbeat.
## Runtime Coordination
Each API and worker incarnation registers in PostgreSQL with its role, software
version, module-composition hash, queue set, and heartbeat. Ops shows active,
draining, stopped, and stale nodes and compares active counts with configured
replica expectations.
An operator may request or cancel drain from Ops:
- API readiness becomes unavailable on the next heartbeat so the load balancer
stops assigning new requests.
- A worker stops consuming its configured queues and may finish work already
claimed by that process.
- A stale process incarnation cannot overwrite a replacement incarnation's
heartbeat.
- A coordination outage removes API readiness and cancels worker consumers;
the existing incarnation must heartbeat successfully before either resumes.
Singleton work uses PostgreSQL-backed leases with monotonically increasing
fencing tokens. The generated scheduler runs Celery beat through
`govoplan_core.commands.fenced_run`; loss of its lease terminates the child and
returns a distinct failure code. A fenced business operation must validate the
same lease token immediately before committing its effect.
## Release Ordering
Use this order for every multi-replica rollout:
1. Verify immutable image identities, module composition, external state
reachability, backup evidence, and the generated plan.
2. Drain application replicas when the migration compatibility declaration
requires it.
3. Run the release-specific migration Job exactly once. PostgreSQL advisory
locking serializes all Core and module migration tasks across competing
deployment jobs.
4. Let runtime init containers run `wait_for_database`. They wait for exact
configured Alembic heads and never mutate schema.
5. Roll API, workers, scheduler, and WebUI using health-aware replacement.
6. Verify runtime composition, expected replica counts, queue consumers,
object-storage round trips, and recovery status in Ops.
Applying the complete generated manifest is fail-closed: runtime pods remain in
their init phase until the migration Job reaches the expected heads. A second
release may be submitted concurrently, but advisory locking prevents concurrent
schema mutation and each release has a distinct migration Job name.
## Storage Trust Boundary
Installer-managed Garage uses its exact generated endpoint. An arbitrary
external S3 endpoint is accepted only when the deployment explicitly sets
`FILE_STORAGE_S3_ENDPOINT_TRUSTED=true`; that endpoint must be a clean HTTPS
origin without embedded credentials, query, fragment, or path. This is an
operator trust declaration, not a user-controlled connector bypass. Operators
remain responsible for DNS, certificate, network-egress, bucket-policy,
versioning, and lifecycle controls.
## Capacity
- Set `GOVOPLAN_DB_CONNECTION_LIMIT` to the PostgreSQL role's effective
connection limit. The Kubernetes export reserves
`GOVOPLAN_DB_CONNECTION_RESERVE` connections and rejects a topology whose
calculated rolling-update peak would exceed the remainder. The calculation
includes API pools, every Celery parent and prefork child, the scheduler,
migration, and one surge replica per deployment. Role-specific pool and
overflow values are emitted into each workload rather than inherited from one
unconstrained global default.
- Scale workers by queue, with upper bounds based on external provider limits.
`GOVOPLAN_WORKER_POOLS` may contain a JSON list of exact queue owners, for
example:
```json
[
{"name":"delivery","queues":["send_email","append_sent"],"replicas":2,"concurrency":2},
{"name":"platform","queues":["events","workflow","default"],"replicas":2,"concurrency":2}
]
```
Pool replica totals must equal `replicas.worker`, and the pools must cover
`CELERY_QUEUES` exactly without duplicate ownership. Each pool receives its
own Deployment, disruption budget, topology-spread selector, runtime identity,
and declared concurrency.
- Keep one fenced scheduler rather than load-balancing schedulers.
- Increase WebUI replicas for asset/proxy capacity.
- Measure request latency, database query time and locks, active connections,
queue age, retry rate, storage latency, and provider throttling before adding
replicas.
Workers compete for Redis-backed work and are not placed behind a load balancer.
SMTP, IMAP, directory, connector, workflow, dataflow, and reporting queues often
hit external-system limits before host CPU is exhausted.
## What This Does Not Claim
The implemented contract provides stateless runtime placement, shared artifact
access, node visibility, drain controls, migration serialization, and scheduler
fencing. It does not by itself provide:
- a highly available PostgreSQL, Redis, or object-store deployment;
- automatic PostgreSQL/object backup creation or point-in-time recovery;
- autoscaling policy;
- central logs, metrics, traces, or alert routing;
- certificate portability between independently managed ingress providers;
- automatic reconciliation of every possible module side effect;
- a service-level availability guarantee.
The deployer verifies and gates migrations on signed coordinated backup and
isolated-restore evidence, but backup capture and restoration remain owned by
the selected state-service providers. Before claiming high
availability, drill replica loss, rolling replacement, session continuity, job
redelivery, scheduler failover, migration exclusion, object-store outage, and a
coordinated database/object/key restore. Recovery rules and evidence are
defined in [Recovery And Rollback Guarantees](RECOVERY_AND_ROLLBACK_GUARANTEES.md).
## Worker Delivery Evidence
The module-matrix workflow runs `tools/checks/worker-runtime-drill.py` against a
real isolated Redis database. The drill starts supervised Celery worker
processes and records four guarantees without accessing tenant data:
1. a task published through the broker is consumed exactly once;
2. an application retry is delivered again and completes;
3. warm `SIGTERM` lets an in-flight late-ack task complete before shutdown; and
4. loss of a worker after task start causes the unacknowledged task to be
redelivered after the configured visibility timeout.
Run the same drill with the release Python environment and target Redis before
promoting a worker composition. Use a dedicated Redis database, retain the JSON
evidence, and set `CELERY_VISIBILITY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` above the longest supported
business-task duration. The short visibility timeout used by CI is an isolated
test setting, not a production recommendation.
```bash
GOVOPLAN_WORKER_DRILL_REDIS_URL=redis://redis.example.test:6379/15 \
.venv/bin/python tools/checks/worker-runtime-drill.py \
--output evidence/worker-runtime.json
```
## Live Multi-Host Evidence
After deploying a pinned release on at least two Kubernetes nodes, create an API
key with Ops read scope and run:
```bash
export GOVOPLAN_OPS_API_KEY='...'
python tools/deployment/govoplan-deploy.py verify-kubernetes \
--directory /srv/govoplan/installation \
--namespace govoplan
```
The command fails unless API and WebUI pods are ready on at least two nodes,
all rendered deployments are available, Ops reports a consistent release and
module composition, every declared worker queue is served, and the calculated
database peak remains below its budget. It writes a private, sanitized JSON
record under the installation evidence directory and never retains the API key.
Use `--exercise-api-pod-loss` in an approved drill window to delete one API pod,
observe the public readiness path continuously, and record its replacement.
This proves the bounded stateless-node-loss slice only. Session continuity,
accepted-job redelivery, state-service failover, and coordinated restore remain
separate target exercises whose signed evidence is governed by
`docs/TARGET_MATURITY_EVIDENCE_RUNBOOK.md` and GovOPlaN #37.
+35 -8
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ accept findings, but scanner execution errors and malformed JSON/SARIF reports
always fail the run. The manifest lists the expected, present, and missing
reports for that invocation. Validation and checksums use that explicit set, so
reusing a report directory cannot make stale output look like part of a new run.
It also contains `coverage_status` and structured `scanner_coverage` entries.
Every required scanner is recorded as `no-findings`, `findings`,
`scanner-failure`, or `skipped`; this makes an incomplete local run visible
without treating it as a clean audit.
The wrapper tags the toolbox image by a fingerprint of the Dockerfile,
`requirements-audit.txt`, and the Semgrep smoke-test inputs. If those inputs have
@@ -90,6 +94,12 @@ tools/checks/security-audit/run.sh --mode quick --scope current --update --build
- `ci`: quick plus Semgrep public registry rulesets, Trivy, pip-audit, npm audit.
- `full`: ci plus OSV-Scanner, jscpd, Radon, and Xenon.
The Gitea workflow uses `full` mode so its coverage contract includes every
scanner above. Missing scanners fail strict runs and all Actions runs, even
while actual findings remain report-only. Local report-only runs may finish
with missing tools for diagnostics, but their manifest is marked
`coverage_status: incomplete`.
Semgrep and Trivy are invoked with finding-sensitive exit codes. Their exit 1
is therefore a finding under the wrapper contract; higher exit codes, missing
output, invalid JSON/SARIF, and scanner error payloads are execution failures.
@@ -103,7 +113,7 @@ baseline.
## Gating
The initial Gitea workflow runs in report-only mode:
The Gitea workflow currently runs findings in report-only mode:
```bash
SECURITY_AUDIT_FAIL_ON_FINDINGS=0
@@ -119,13 +129,13 @@ SECURITY_AUDIT_FAIL_ON_FINDINGS=1
or run locally with:
```bash
tools/checks/security-audit/run.sh --mode ci --scope current --strict
tools/checks/security-audit/run.sh --mode full --scope govoplan --strict
```
## Audit Burndown Workflow
Treat Gitea issues as the active audit state. A full GovOPlaN audit should
produce one tracker issue in `add-ideas/govoplan` and child issues in the
produce one tracker issue in `GovOPlaN/govoplan` and child issues in the
repository that owns each fix.
Use the tracker issue for:
@@ -153,16 +163,33 @@ important scanner counts in the tracker issue.
The jscpd step is intentionally scoped to application and test source. It
excludes documentation snippets, package manifests, generated translations,
public SVG assets, workflow YAML, and declarative backend schema JSON because
those reports produce metadata or asset repetition rather than actionable source
duplication. Keep exclusions narrow and create child issues for source-code
clusters that cross module ownership or make behavior harder to change safely.
public SVG assets and catalog output, workflow YAML, declarative backend schema
JSON, the generated migration baseline, and mirrored development migration
directories because those reports produce metadata or generated-source
repetition rather than actionable source duplication. Keep exclusions narrow
and create child issues for source-code clusters that cross module ownership or
make behavior harder to change safely.
The 2026-08-02 full-workspace baseline covered 64 repositories and reported
1.82% duplicated lines before those generated-source exclusions. The reviewed
high-value clusters were catalog acceptance persistence, release publication
result assembly, and local WebUI JSON mutation wrappers. Similar Dataflow and
Workflow graph/governance code remains independently owned until its shared
contract is stable enough for Core; a raw similarity score is not grounds for a
module-to-module dependency.
## Image Freshness
The regular `Security Audit` workflow reuses the fingerprinted toolbox image
when the Docker daemon is persistent, which is the normal case for the
self-hosted Gitea runner using the host Docker socket. The separate
self-hosted Gitea runner using the host Docker socket. Trusted push, schedule,
and manual runs scan all registered repositories; authenticated SSH is used
only for the private website repository. The wrapper inspects the Actions job
mount table and forwards only the narrowest writable mount covering the audit
scope; it never inherits the job's Docker socket or unrelated runner mounts.
Pull-request audit runs stay disabled while the audit runner exposes its host
Docker socket: PR-controlled audit code must run on a disposable or rootless
runner without host-socket access. The separate
`Security Audit Toolbox Update` workflow runs weekly with
`SECURITY_AUDIT_UPDATE=1`; it pulls current base images and re-resolves the
allowed tool version ranges into a refreshed local image.
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ This is a product-level story owned by the GovOPlaN platform rather than by an
individual domain module. It joins installation, module lifecycle, operations,
configuration packages, and release provenance into one administrator journey.
The canonical backlog item is
[GovOPlaN #13](https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/13).
[GovOPlaN #13](https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/13).
## Terms
@@ -139,6 +139,23 @@ The canonical backlog item is
## Implementation slices
Implementation status as of the current source tree:
- Slice 1 now has the source-controlled production artifact boundary: offline
per-architecture wheel resolution, non-root API/Web image definitions,
multi-architecture OCI publication, signed composition/SBOM/provenance,
immutable Gitea assets, a signed one-file deployer, and fail-closed manifest
adoption. The first real published release and cross-architecture runtime
evidence remain release-operator work rather than source-code claims.
- Slice 6 has a working application-tier foundation: state profiles, shared
object storage, runtime node registration/heartbeats/drain, fenced scheduler,
migration serialization, exact-head startup waiting, Ops visibility, and a
Kubernetes export. Production acceptance still requires topology-specific
failover and restore drills.
- The recovery foundation for slices 4 and 5 is implemented as a Core recovery
ledger and deployment operation journal. Automatic database backup and broad
adoption by module-owned external effects remain open work.
1. **Reproducible Core-only distribution.** Publish pinned multi-architecture
images, signed distribution manifest, Core-only Compose profile, bootstrap
preflight, generated secrets, readiness, and idempotent rerun/repair.
@@ -155,9 +172,11 @@ The canonical backlog item is
5. **Safe module update.** Add drain/maintenance coordination, backup gate,
migration compatibility window, reconnectable progress, health verification,
retry/recovery, and update notification.
6. **Stateless replica profile.** Remove remaining local-runtime assumptions,
expose role-specific commands/images, implement worker registration/drain,
and prove multiple API and worker replicas against shared dependencies.
6. **Stateless replica profile.** Continue module adoption and operational
proof for the implemented role commands, shared-state validation, runtime
registration/drain, fenced scheduler, and Kubernetes application-tier
export. Prove multiple API and worker replicas against the target shared
dependencies.
7. **Configuration revision model.** Define provider export/import schemas,
canonical serialization, secret references, validation/diff, immutable
revision storage, audit, apply, and undo-as-new-revision.
+153
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@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
# Target Maturity Evidence Runbook
This runbook turns retained target-environment results into a sanitized,
signed GovOPlaN capability-fit proof. It does not make a deployment suitable,
certified, supported, or production-approved by itself. The proof records what
independent authorities assessed against one exact installed release.
## Roles and custody
Use separate trust domains for release signing, installation receipts,
boundary assessment, and production approval. A private proof key must be
provisioned outside the assessed application and its matching public key must
already exist in a separately managed
`capability-fit-proof-authority-keyring.schema.json` document. Do not store
private keys, raw reports, credentials, personal data, backup material, or
target endpoints in Git.
Each authority key lists only the scopes that role may attest. At least one
supplied signing key must cover every claim, and the issuer rejects a key that:
- is absent, inactive, expired, or revoked in the authority keyring;
- expires before the proof;
- does not match its independently provisioned public key;
- reuses release-catalog or installer-authority key material.
## Target run
Install one pinned catalog release and issue its installed-composition receipt
with `tools/assessments/installer-receipt.py`. Exercise the actual target
topology, including:
- PostgreSQL and Redis as shared state services;
- shared S3-compatible object storage;
- at least two stateless API replicas and the intended worker topology;
- fenced singleton work, ingress, certificates, proxy headers, and the real
network/trust boundary;
- provider health and freshness for every provider required by the product;
- monitoring, alerting, failure response, accessibility, privacy, and security
controls;
- backup, isolated restore, failed-deployment rollback, and forward recovery.
For the recovery claim, retain the observed recovery point, measured RPO and
RTO, database/object-store consistency result, and semantic reconstruction of
the institutional and Service/Form reference journeys. Measure RPO from the
last acknowledged durable effect that survives recovery and RTO until service
health plus semantic reconstruction pass. Failed runs are evidence too and
must use a negative result.
The private reports stay in the approved evidence store. Give each report an
opaque artifact ID and each evaluated control a versioned opaque control ID.
## Private claim manifest
Create a private manifest conforming to
`capability-fit-boundary-run.schema.json`. Relative artifact paths resolve from
the manifest directory. Paths are read and hashed by the issuer and are never
copied into the signed output.
```json
{
"$schema": "./capability-fit-boundary-run.schema.json",
"schema_version": "0.1.0",
"evidence_kind": "govoplan.capability-fit-boundary-run",
"proof_id": "target:production:20260802",
"expires_at": "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
"claims": [
{
"scope": "target_environment",
"result": "passed",
"control_ids": ["topology:shared-state-v1"],
"artifacts": [
{"artifact_id": "target:run-20260802", "path": "private/target.json"}
]
},
{
"scope": "recovery",
"result": "passed",
"control_ids": ["recovery:restore-rollback-v1"],
"artifacts": [
{"artifact_id": "recovery:run-20260802", "path": "private/recovery.json"}
]
}
]
}
```
Reference readiness needs positive `target_environment`, `accessibility`,
`privacy`, `security`, `operations`, and `recovery` claims. Provider acceptance
and production approval are separate scopes. A production-approval authority
must not approve its own unreviewed target run.
## Issue and verify
Issue only while the signed installer observation is current. Repeat
`--signing-key` when multiple independent roles are needed. The command first
verifies the catalog, independent catalog trust root, exact installed payload,
installer receipt, and installer authority. It then hashes artifacts, signs the
sanitized proof, verifies it immediately, and writes both proof and review with
atomic private-file permissions.
```bash
./.venv/bin/python tools/assessments/boundary-evidence.py \
--assessment /srv/govoplan/assessment.json \
--catalog /srv/govoplan/catalogs/stable.json \
--keyring /srv/govoplan/catalogs/keyring.json \
--trusted-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/catalog-keyring.json \
--installed-evidence /srv/govoplan/evidence/installed.json \
--installer-receipt /srv/govoplan/evidence/installer-receipt.json \
--installer-authority-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/installer-authorities.json \
--claims /srv/govoplan/evidence/private/target-run.json \
--authority-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/proof-authorities.json \
--signing-key authority-target=/run/secrets/target-proof-ed25519.pem \
--output /srv/govoplan/evidence/target-proof.json \
--review-output /srv/govoplan/evidence/target-proof-review.json
```
Add `--expected-external-provider-subject provider-production` when the claim
manifest contains `external_providers`. This value is an opaque deployment ID,
not a URL or credential.
## Promotion gate
The general verifier can now be made admission-enforcing. These switches return
a blocking exit status when a required claim is absent, expired, negative,
revoked, or bound to another assessment, release, installation, or subject:
```bash
./.venv/bin/python tools/assessments/capability-fit.py \
--catalog /srv/govoplan/catalogs/stable.json \
--keyring /srv/govoplan/catalogs/keyring.json \
--trusted-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/catalog-keyring.json \
--installed-evidence /srv/govoplan/evidence/installed.json \
--installer-receipt /srv/govoplan/evidence/installer-receipt.json \
--installer-authority-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/installer-authorities.json \
--boundary-evidence /srv/govoplan/evidence/target-proof.json \
--boundary-authority-keyring /srv/govoplan/trust/proof-authorities.json \
--require-reference-readiness \
--require-production-approval \
--output /srv/govoplan/evidence/admission-review.json
```
Use `--require-external-provider-proof` as well when the promoted product
requires an external provider. Live admission must not use
`--verification-time`; that switch is only for clearly labelled historical
review.
## Renewal and failure
Renew evidence after release, installed composition, deployment, control, or
provider changes and before expiry. Revoke an authority key immediately after
custody loss and rerun the affected assessment with a new independent key.
Never copy a previous positive claim to a new release. Preserve negative and
superseded receipts according to the approved evidence-retention policy.
+137
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@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
# GovOPlaN Views Architecture
## Purpose
GovOPlaN Views are governed presentation projections for a task,
responsibility, or workflow step. A View can reduce the visible modules,
navigation entries, routes, page sections, and commands to the interface
needed for the current job.
Views are optional. If `govoplan-views` is not installed or enabled, the normal
permission-derived interface remains unchanged.
## Security Boundary
A View is not an authorization mechanism.
- Access, tenant isolation, resource guards, and backend permission checks
remain authoritative.
- A View may hide an interface surface that the actor is otherwise allowed to
use.
- A View can never expose a route, action, tenant, or resource that normal
authorization denies.
- An authorized deep link outside the current View should offer an explicit
temporary escape or View switch. It must not be presented as a permission
denial.
This boundary lets Views improve focus without creating a second, weaker RBAC
system.
## Ownership
Core owns the versioned, module-neutral surface contract and WebUI runtime
hooks. Modules declare stable surfaces and use shared hooks to respect the
effective projection. Modules do not import `govoplan-views`.
`govoplan-views` owns:
- draft and immutable published View revisions
- system, tenant, group, and user assignments
- default, mandatory, and user-selectable Views
- active per-user View state
- effective projection resolution and provenance
- the View editor, preview, validation, and stale-surface diagnostics
Policy optionally owns inherited ceilings and explainable decisions. Workflow
optionally references a pinned View revision for an instance or step and may
narrow it further.
## Surface Contract
Modules announce only useful, semantic surfaces:
- module
- navigation item
- route or workspace
- section or panel
- command or action
Each descriptor has a stable namespaced id, parent id, kind, label, default
visibility, ordering, and dependency metadata where needed. Surface ids are
public module contracts, not CSS selectors, component paths, or arbitrary DOM
fragments.
The first release supports visible or hidden. Read-only states, layout
replacement, visual emphasis, and arbitrary styling are separate concerns and
are deferred.
## Effective Resolution
The effective interface is the intersection of:
1. installed and enabled modules
2. actor permissions and resource access
3. administrator and Policy ceilings
4. an assigned or user-selected View
5. an optional workflow instance or step overlay
Lower scopes and workflow overlays may narrow inherited visibility but cannot
broaden it. Every inherited, locked, hidden, unavailable, or stale choice
should carry provenance that the editor and runtime can explain.
Published View revisions are immutable. Active workflow instances pin the
revision they use. Unknown or retired surface ids produce diagnostics rather
than breaking startup. If no valid effective View can be resolved, the system
uses the last valid projection or the normal authorized interface and reports
the configuration problem to administrators.
## Workflow Behavior
A workflow definition may reference a View for the whole instance or a
particular step. Starting, resuming, or advancing the workflow activates the
appropriate projection. Users can intentionally leave focused mode and return
from an open-work widget or notification without losing workflow state.
Module handoffs carry the workflow and View context through Core contracts.
Workflow does not import the target module or the Views implementation.
## Delivery Order
1. Define the Core surface registry and runtime hooks.
2. Initialize `govoplan-views` and persist versioned definitions.
3. Add assignment, selection, resolution, provenance, and the editor.
4. Add Policy inheritance and administrator ceilings.
5. Add Workflow instance and step activation.
6. Adopt semantic section/action descriptors module by module.
## Implementation Status
Implemented in the initial Views slice:
- Core contract version `1`, stable module/navigation/route identifiers, custom
section/action descriptors, manifest validation, and platform API metadata
- shell navigation, route-boundary, settings, administration, dashboard-widget,
embedded-capability, and organization-action filtering
- `govoplan-views` definitions, immutable revisions, system/tenant/group/user
assignments, user selection, provenance, and stale-surface recovery
- a system and tenant administration editor with unsaved-change protection,
publish/archive controls, assignment management, and server-enforced lockout
prevention
- surface declarations for every currently installed module that contributes a
WebUI, including finer-grained shared administration and settings surfaces
Still intentionally separate:
- Policy-owned inherited ceilings and policy decision provenance
- workflow-instance and workflow-step activation of pinned View revisions
- read-only and layout-replacement projections beyond the version `1`
visible/hidden contract
## Gitea Work Packages
- `govoplan#17`: task-focused Views user story
- `govoplan#16`: initialize and implement `govoplan-views`
- `govoplan-core#271`: versioned surface and runtime contracts
- `govoplan-policy#9`: inheritance, ceilings, and provenance
- `govoplan-workflow#7`: workflow instance and step activation
- `govoplan-workflow#3`: focused workflow mode user story
+37
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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/schemas/backup-evidence-keyring-v1.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN backup evidence trust keyring",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["schema_version", "purpose", "keys"],
"properties": {
"schema_version": { "const": "1" },
"purpose": { "const": "govoplan-backup-evidence" },
"keys": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 64,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"key_id",
"algorithm",
"status",
"public_key_pem",
"not_before",
"expires_at"
],
"properties": {
"key_id": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128 },
"algorithm": { "const": "ed25519" },
"status": { "enum": ["active", "retired", "revoked"] },
"public_key_pem": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 8192 },
"not_before": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"expires_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
}
}
}
}
}
+255
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@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/schemas/backup-evidence-v1.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN coordinated backup and restore evidence",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"schema_version",
"evidence_id",
"installation_id",
"deployment_subject",
"release",
"recovery_point",
"components",
"restore_drill",
"issued_at",
"expires_at",
"revoked",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"schema_version": { "const": "1" },
"evidence_id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"installation_id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"deployment_subject": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["profile", "topology", "subject_ref"],
"properties": {
"profile": { "enum": ["evaluation", "self-hosted"] },
"topology": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"subject_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" }
}
},
"release": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"channel",
"version",
"manifest_sha256",
"composition_sha256",
"api_image",
"web_image"
],
"properties": {
"channel": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"version": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"manifest_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"composition_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"api_image": { "$ref": "#/$defs/digest_image" },
"web_image": { "$ref": "#/$defs/digest_image" }
}
},
"recovery_point": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["id", "captured_at", "consistency", "rpo_seconds", "write_fence"],
"properties": {
"id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"captured_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"consistency": {
"enum": ["provider-atomic", "application-quiesced", "transaction-consistent"]
},
"rpo_seconds": { "$ref": "#/$defs/duration" },
"write_fence": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["mode", "token_sha256", "established_at"],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": ["provider-snapshot", "application-quiesce", "transaction-boundary"]
},
"token_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"established_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
}
}
}
},
"components": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["database", "objects", "configuration", "key_custody"],
"properties": {
"database": { "$ref": "#/$defs/database" },
"objects": { "$ref": "#/$defs/objects" },
"configuration": { "$ref": "#/$defs/configuration" },
"key_custody": { "$ref": "#/$defs/key_custody" }
}
},
"restore_drill": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"drill_id",
"recovery_point_id",
"started_at",
"completed_at",
"isolated_target_ref",
"release_manifest_sha256",
"migration_heads_sha256",
"representative_object_manifest_sha256",
"database_verified",
"objects_verified",
"configuration_verified",
"key_custody_verified",
"semantic_checks",
"measured_rpo_seconds",
"measured_rto_seconds",
"evidence_ref"
],
"properties": {
"drill_id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"recovery_point_id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"started_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"completed_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"isolated_target_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"release_manifest_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"migration_heads_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"representative_object_manifest_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"database_verified": { "const": true },
"objects_verified": { "const": true },
"configuration_verified": { "const": true },
"key_custody_verified": { "const": true },
"semantic_checks": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 128,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["id", "status", "evidence_ref"],
"properties": {
"id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"status": { "const": "passed" },
"evidence_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" }
}
}
},
"measured_rpo_seconds": { "$ref": "#/$defs/duration" },
"measured_rto_seconds": { "$ref": "#/$defs/duration" },
"evidence_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" }
}
},
"issued_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"expires_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"revoked": { "const": false },
"signatures": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 16,
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/signature" }
}
},
"$defs": {
"token": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 128,
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"
},
"sha256": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" },
"digest_image": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 300,
"pattern": "^[^@\\s]+@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$"
},
"reference": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 3,
"maxLength": 2048,
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*:[^\\s]+$"
},
"duration": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 2592000 },
"protected_key": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"protected": { "const": true },
"encryption_key_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"captured_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
}
},
"database": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"provider", "artifact_ref", "artifact_sha256", "snapshot_id", "lsn",
"protected", "encryption_key_ref", "captured_at"
],
"properties": {
"provider": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"artifact_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"artifact_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"snapshot_id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"lsn": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 256 },
"protected": { "const": true },
"encryption_key_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"captured_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
}
},
"objects": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"provider", "artifact_ref", "manifest_sha256", "version_id",
"object_count", "total_bytes", "protected", "encryption_key_ref", "captured_at"
],
"properties": {
"provider": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"artifact_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"manifest_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"version_id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"object_count": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0 },
"total_bytes": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0 },
"protected": { "const": true },
"encryption_key_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"captured_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
}
},
"configuration": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["artifact_ref", "sha256", "protected", "encryption_key_ref", "captured_at"],
"properties": {
"artifact_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"protected": { "const": true },
"encryption_key_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"captured_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
}
},
"key_custody": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["provider", "keyset_ref", "keyset_version", "recoverable", "captured_at"],
"properties": {
"provider": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"keyset_ref": { "$ref": "#/$defs/reference" },
"keyset_version": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"recoverable": { "const": true },
"captured_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
}
},
"signature": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["key_id", "algorithm", "value"],
"properties": {
"key_id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/token" },
"algorithm": { "const": "ed25519" },
"value": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 256 }
}
}
}
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/capability-fit-boundary-evidence.schema.json",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/capability-fit-boundary-evidence.schema.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN externally issued capability-fit boundary evidence",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
"claims": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 3,
"maxItems": 8,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/claim"
}
@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@
"enum": [
"target_environment",
"external_providers",
"accessibility",
"privacy",
"security",
"operations",
"recovery",
"production_approval"
]
},
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/capability-fit-boundary-run.schema.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN private target-run claim manifest",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"schema_version",
"evidence_kind",
"proof_id",
"expires_at",
"claims"
],
"properties": {
"$schema": {
"type": "string",
"format": "uri-reference"
},
"schema_version": {
"const": "0.1.0"
},
"evidence_kind": {
"const": "govoplan.capability-fit-boundary-run"
},
"proof_id": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/opaque_id"
},
"expires_at": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
},
"claims": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 8,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/claim"
}
}
},
"$defs": {
"opaque_id": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 160,
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]*$"
},
"claim": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["scope", "result", "control_ids", "artifacts"],
"properties": {
"scope": {
"enum": [
"target_environment",
"external_providers",
"accessibility",
"privacy",
"security",
"operations",
"recovery",
"production_approval"
]
},
"result": {
"enum": ["passed", "failed", "approved", "rejected"]
},
"control_ids": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 256,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/opaque_id"
}
},
"artifacts": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 256,
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/artifact"
}
}
}
},
"artifact": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["artifact_id", "path"],
"properties": {
"artifact_id": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/opaque_id"
},
"path": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 4096
}
}
}
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@
{
"kind": "issue",
"scope": "documented_model",
"locator": "https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/issues/12"
"locator": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/12"
}
],
"conditions": [],
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@
{
"kind": "issue",
"scope": "documented_model",
"locator": "https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-core/issues/29"
"locator": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/29"
}
],
"conditions": [],
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/capability-fit-proof-authority-keyring.schema.json",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/capability-fit-proof-authority-keyring.schema.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN capability-fit proof authority keyring",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
@@ -51,12 +51,17 @@
"allowed_scopes": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 3,
"maxItems": 8,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"enum": [
"target_environment",
"external_providers",
"accessibility",
"privacy",
"security",
"operations",
"recovery",
"production_approval"
]
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/capability-fit.schema.json",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/capability-fit.schema.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN capability and infrastructure fit assessment",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
+108
View File
@@ -113,6 +113,12 @@
"description": "GovOPlaN Appointments module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/approvals",
"color": "d93f0b",
"description": "GovOPlaN Approvals module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/audit",
"color": "0e8a16",
@@ -143,30 +149,72 @@
"description": "GovOPlaN Connectors module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/committee",
"color": "5319e7",
"description": "GovOPlaN Committee module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/core",
"color": "0052cc",
"description": "GovOPlaN core runner, shared primitives, shell, or extension points.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/dashboard",
"color": "1d76db",
"description": "GovOPlaN Dashboard module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/dataflow",
"color": "1d76db",
"description": "GovOPlaN Dataflow module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/datasources",
"color": "006b75",
"description": "GovOPlaN governed datasource contracts, catalogs, and integrations.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/dms",
"color": "c5def5",
"description": "GovOPlaN Dms module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/docs",
"color": "c5def5",
"description": "GovOPlaN Docs module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/dist-lists",
"color": "0e8a16",
"description": "GovOPlaN Distribution Lists module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/decisions",
"color": "d93f0b",
"description": "GovOPlaN formal Decisions module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/erp",
"color": "fef2c0",
"description": "GovOPlaN Erp module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/encryption",
"color": "b60205",
"description": "GovOPlaN Encryption key custody, cryptographic policy, and E2EE integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/evaluation",
"color": "bfdadc",
@@ -191,6 +239,18 @@
"description": "GovOPlaN Forms module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/forms-runtime",
"color": "f9d0c4",
"description": "GovOPlaN Forms Runtime module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/helpdesk",
"color": "c2e0c6",
"description": "GovOPlaN Helpdesk module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/identity-trust",
"color": "d4c5f9",
@@ -221,6 +281,12 @@
"description": "GovOPlaN mail module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/mandates",
"color": "006b75",
"description": "GovOPlaN Mandates, jurisdiction, responsibility, and authority behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/notifications",
"color": "d876e3",
@@ -245,6 +311,12 @@
"description": "GovOPlaN Payments module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/parties",
"color": "bfd4f2",
"description": "GovOPlaN procedure Parties, representation, and delivery-authority behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/permits",
"color": "fbca04",
@@ -275,12 +347,24 @@
"description": "GovOPlaN Postbox module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/projects",
"color": "5319e7",
"description": "GovOPlaN Projects module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/reporting",
"color": "c2e0c6",
"description": "GovOPlaN Reporting module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/risk-compliance",
"color": "b60205",
"description": "GovOPlaN Risk Compliance module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/search",
"color": "bfdadc",
@@ -293,6 +377,12 @@
"description": "GovOPlaN Scheduling module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/services",
"color": "1d76db",
"description": "GovOPlaN versioned institutional Services behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/tasks",
"color": "c5def5",
@@ -311,6 +401,24 @@
"description": "GovOPlaN Tenancy module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/tickets",
"color": "0e8a16",
"description": "GovOPlaN Tickets module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/views",
"color": "c5def5",
"description": "GovOPlaN governed task views, interface projections, and workflow view integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/wiki",
"color": "006b75",
"description": "GovOPlaN Wiki module behavior or integration.",
"exclusive": false
},
{
"name": "module/workflow",
"color": "f9d0c4",
+381
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/schemas/installation-spec-v1.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN installation specification",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"schema_version",
"installation_id",
"profile",
"public_url",
"listen",
"network_subnet",
"release",
"components",
"enabled_modules"
],
"properties": {
"schema_version": {
"const": 1
},
"installation_id": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,47}$"
},
"profile": {
"enum": [
"evaluation",
"self-hosted"
]
},
"public_url": {
"type": "string",
"format": "uri",
"pattern": "^https?://"
},
"listen": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"address",
"port"
],
"properties": {
"address": {
"type": "string"
},
"port": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 65535
}
}
},
"network_subnet": {
"type": "string"
},
"release": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"channel",
"version",
"manifest_url",
"manifest_sha256",
"api_image",
"web_image"
],
"properties": {
"channel": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,31}$"
},
"version": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 80
},
"manifest_url": {
"type": "string"
},
"manifest_sha256": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^$|^[0-9a-f]{64}$"
},
"manifest_keyring_sha256": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^$|^[0-9a-f]{64}$"
},
"manifest_signature_key_id": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^$|^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"
},
"composition_sha256": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^$|^[0-9a-f]{64}$"
},
"api_image": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 300
},
"web_image": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 300
}
}
},
"components": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"postgres",
"redis",
"mail",
"storage"
],
"properties": {
"postgres": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/postgres"
},
"redis": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/redis"
},
"mail": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/mail"
},
"storage": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": [
"local",
"garage",
"s3"
]
},
"image": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 300
}
}
},
"load_balancer": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/load_balancer"
}
}
},
"replicas": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"api",
"web",
"worker"
],
"properties": {
"api": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 64
},
"web": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 64
},
"worker": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0,
"maximum": 128
}
}
},
"ingress": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"image",
"trusted_proxy_cidrs",
"http_port",
"https_port",
"acme_email"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": [
"local",
"existing-proxy",
"managed",
"unconfigured"
]
},
"image": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 300
},
"trusted_proxy_cidrs": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 16,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 64
}
},
"http_port": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 65535
},
"https_port": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 65535
},
"acme_email": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 254
}
}
},
"enabled_modules": {
"type": "array",
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]{1,63}$"
}
}
},
"$defs": {
"service": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"mode",
"image",
"url_env"
],
"properties": {
"mode": {
"type": "string"
},
"image": {
"type": "string"
},
"url_env": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"postgres": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/$defs/service"
},
{
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": [
"managed",
"external"
]
},
"url_env": {
"const": "DATABASE_URL"
}
}
}
]
},
"redis": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/$defs/service"
},
{
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": [
"managed",
"external",
"disabled"
]
},
"url_env": {
"const": "REDIS_URL"
}
}
}
]
},
"mail": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/$defs/service"
},
{
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": [
"disabled",
"external-relay",
"test-mail"
]
},
"url_env": {
"const": ""
}
}
}
]
},
"load_balancer": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/$defs/service"
},
{
"properties": {
"mode": {
"const": "managed"
},
"url_env": {
"const": ""
}
}
}
]
}
},
"allOf": [
{
"if": {
"properties": {
"profile": {
"const": "self-hosted"
}
}
},
"then": {
"properties": {
"public_url": {
"pattern": "^https://"
},
"components": {
"properties": {
"redis": {
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": [
"managed",
"external"
]
}
}
},
"mail": {
"properties": {
"mode": {
"enum": [
"disabled",
"external-relay"
]
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
]
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/installed-composition-evidence.schema.json",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/installed-composition-evidence.schema.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN installed composition evidence",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/installer-receipt-authority-keyring.schema.json",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/installer-receipt-authority-keyring.schema.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN installer receipt authority keyring",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/installer-receipt.schema.json",
"$id": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/src/branch/main/docs/installer-receipt.schema.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN signed installer receipt",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
+195
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
{
"schema_version": 1,
"parent_issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan/issues/36",
"operations": [
{
"id": "campaign.build.publish-artifacts",
"repository": "govoplan-campaign",
"resources": ["postgresql", "object-storage", "templates-capability", "files-capability"],
"mode": "compensation",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "reference-implementation",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/92"
},
{
"id": "campaign.delivery.external-channels",
"repository": "govoplan-campaign",
"resources": ["postgresql", "queue", "smtp", "imap", "postbox", "print-provider"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/92"
},
{
"id": "campaign.retention.generated-artifacts",
"repository": "govoplan-campaign",
"resources": ["postgresql", "object-storage"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign/issues/92"
},
{
"id": "files.upload.finalize",
"repository": "govoplan-files",
"resources": ["postgresql", "object-storage", "filesystem-staging"],
"mode": "compensation",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files/issues/41"
},
{
"id": "files.retention.purge",
"repository": "govoplan-files",
"resources": ["postgresql", "object-storage", "encryption-key-custody"],
"mode": "irreversible",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "planned",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files/issues/41"
},
{
"id": "files.integrity.reconcile",
"repository": "govoplan-files",
"resources": ["postgresql", "object-storage"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files/issues/41"
},
{
"id": "files.connector.write-sync",
"repository": "govoplan-files",
"resources": ["postgresql", "object-storage", "external-connector"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "planned",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files/issues/41"
},
{
"id": "mail.outbox.smtp-submit",
"repository": "govoplan-mail",
"resources": ["postgresql", "queue", "smtp"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail/issues/19"
},
{
"id": "mail.sent.imap-append",
"repository": "govoplan-mail",
"resources": ["postgresql", "imap"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail/issues/19"
},
{
"id": "mail.mailbox.imap-mutate",
"repository": "govoplan-mail",
"resources": ["postgresql", "imap"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "planned",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail/issues/19"
},
{
"id": "mail.mailbox.sync-cursor",
"repository": "govoplan-mail",
"resources": ["postgresql", "imap"],
"mode": "atomic",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail/issues/19"
},
{
"id": "connectors.sync.read-snapshot",
"repository": "govoplan-connectors",
"resources": ["postgresql", "external-provider"],
"mode": "atomic",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-connectors/issues/15"
},
{
"id": "connectors.sync.external-mutation",
"repository": "govoplan-connectors",
"resources": ["postgresql", "queue", "external-provider"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "planned",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-connectors/issues/15"
},
{
"id": "dataflow.run.database-only",
"repository": "govoplan-dataflow",
"resources": ["postgresql"],
"mode": "atomic",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dataflow/issues/19"
},
{
"id": "dataflow.run.publish-output",
"repository": "govoplan-dataflow",
"resources": ["postgresql", "queue", "object-storage", "external-sink"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dataflow/issues/19"
},
{
"id": "workflow-engine.instance.state-transition",
"repository": "govoplan-workflow-engine",
"resources": ["postgresql"],
"mode": "atomic",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow-engine/issues/1"
},
{
"id": "workflow-engine.activity.external-effect",
"repository": "govoplan-workflow-engine",
"resources": ["postgresql", "queue", "module-capability", "external-provider"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow-engine/issues/1"
},
{
"id": "core.module-lifecycle.pre-migration",
"repository": "govoplan-core",
"resources": ["postgresql", "package-environment", "webui-bundle", "filesystem"],
"mode": "compensation",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/281"
},
{
"id": "core.module-lifecycle.post-migration",
"repository": "govoplan-core",
"resources": ["postgresql", "package-environment", "webui-bundle", "runtime-nodes"],
"mode": "forward_recovery",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/281"
},
{
"id": "core.module-retirement.destroy-data",
"repository": "govoplan-core",
"resources": ["postgresql", "object-storage", "package-environment"],
"mode": "snapshot_restore",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/281"
},
{
"id": "core.module-runtime.apply-graph",
"repository": "govoplan-core",
"resources": ["postgresql", "runtime-nodes", "module-registry"],
"mode": "compensation",
"fenced": true,
"adoption": "adopted",
"issue": "https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core/issues/281"
}
]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/schemas/runtime-distribution-keyring-v1.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN runtime distribution trust keyring",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["schema_version", "purpose", "keys"],
"properties": {
"schema_version": { "const": "1" },
"purpose": { "const": "govoplan-runtime-distribution" },
"keys": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"key_id",
"algorithm",
"status",
"public_key_pem",
"not_before",
"expires_at"
],
"properties": {
"key_id": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128 },
"algorithm": { "const": "ed25519" },
"status": { "enum": ["active", "retired", "revoked"] },
"public_key_pem": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 8192 },
"not_before": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"expires_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
}
}
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://govoplan.add-ideas.de/schemas/runtime-distribution-manifest-v1.json",
"title": "GovOPlaN runtime distribution manifest",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"schema_version",
"channel",
"sequence",
"version",
"issued_at",
"expires_at",
"revoked",
"deployer",
"images",
"dependencies",
"composition",
"signatures"
],
"properties": {
"schema_version": { "const": "1" },
"channel": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]{1,63}$" },
"sequence": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 1 },
"version": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128 },
"issued_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"expires_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"revoked": { "const": false },
"deployer": { "$ref": "#/$defs/artifact" },
"images": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["api", "web"],
"properties": {
"api": { "$ref": "#/$defs/image" },
"web": { "$ref": "#/$defs/image" }
}
},
"dependencies": {
"type": "object",
"minProperties": 1,
"propertyNames": { "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]{1,63}$" },
"additionalProperties": { "$ref": "#/$defs/imageReference" }
},
"composition": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["sha256", "module_ids", "packages"],
"properties": {
"sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" },
"module_ids": {
"type": "array",
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]{1,63}$" }
},
"packages": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["name", "version", "wheel_sha256"],
"properties": {
"name": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$" },
"version": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128 },
"wheel_sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" }
}
}
}
}
},
"signatures": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["key_id", "algorithm", "value"],
"properties": {
"key_id": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128 },
"algorithm": { "const": "ed25519" },
"value": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 256 }
}
}
}
},
"$defs": {
"sha256": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" },
"imageReference": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[^@\\s]+@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$",
"maxLength": 300
},
"artifact": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["url", "sha256"],
"properties": {
"url": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "pattern": "^https://" },
"sha256": { "$ref": "#/$defs/sha256" }
}
},
"image": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["index", "platforms", "sbom", "provenance"],
"properties": {
"index": { "$ref": "#/$defs/imageReference" },
"platforms": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["linux/amd64", "linux/arm64"],
"properties": {
"linux/amd64": { "$ref": "#/$defs/imageReference" },
"linux/arm64": { "$ref": "#/$defs/imageReference" }
}
},
"sbom": { "$ref": "#/$defs/artifact" },
"provenance": { "$ref": "#/$defs/artifact" }
}
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
# Governed Communication Product Package
This package composes Campaign, Mail, Postbox, Files, Templates, Policy, Audit,
and Access into one governed-delivery capability. Modules retain their own
tables and lifecycle. The package declares installation and configuration
expectations; it does not import module internals.
## Reference journey
1. Select governed recipient and attachment data.
2. Build and review an immutable Campaign version.
3. Apply attachment, access, and delivery policy.
4. Deliver through Mail and/or function-bound Postbox targets.
5. Reconcile outcomes, acknowledgements, correction, and reports against Audit
evidence.
## Reference-readiness gates
The artifact remains a `product` package. Promotion to `reference` requires:
- target-environment delivery and reconciliation tests, including an
outcome-unknown transport result;
- backup/restore and interrupted-dispatch recovery evidence;
- security evidence for recipient, attachment, and postbox isolation;
- operator runbooks for queue health, retry, reconciliation, and retirement;
- keyboard, focus, screen-reader, and responsive workflow evidence;
- privacy evidence for minimization, purpose, retention, redaction, and report
access; and
- version-pinned user and administrator documentation.
Optional Notifications, Portal, Reporting, and Workflow Engine integrations do
not change the package boundary when absent.
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
{
"package_id": "product.governed-communication",
"name": "Governed Communication",
"version": "0.1.0",
"package_class": "product",
"description": "Compose evidence-backed campaigns, mail and function-bound postboxes without merging their domain ownership.",
"publisher": "GovOPlaN",
"category": "communication",
"license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",
"required_modules": [
{"module_id": "access"},
{"module_id": "audit"},
{"module_id": "campaign"},
{"module_id": "files"},
{"module_id": "mail"},
{"module_id": "policy"},
{"module_id": "postbox"},
{"module_id": "templates"}
],
"optional_modules": [
{"module_id": "notifications"},
{"module_id": "portal"},
{"module_id": "reporting"},
{"module_id": "workflow_engine"}
],
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "documentation",
"reference": "packages/product/governed-communication/README.md",
"summary": "Defines the package boundary, journey, and reference-readiness gates."
}
],
"tags": ["campaign", "mail", "postbox", "public-sector"]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# Governed Data and Assurance Product Package
This package composes Datasources, Dataflow, Reporting, Search, Risk
Compliance, Policy, Audit, and Access. Connectors may acquire external data,
but Datasources owns the governed catalogue and immutable snapshots; Dataflow
owns transformation definitions and runs; Reporting owns measures and
presentation; Risk Compliance owns controls, findings, and effectiveness
review.
## Reference journey
1. Register a typed datasource with source authority, purpose, classification,
owner, freshness, and correction policy.
2. Acquire or upload an immutable source state.
3. execute a versioned flow and retain intermediate materializations and
provenance;
4. publish a report or decision input against exact source and flow revisions;
5. link obligation, governed object, risk, control, evidence, finding,
corrective measure, and effectiveness review; and
6. search current authorized objects while preserving ownership and access
rechecks.
## Reference-readiness gates
The artifact remains a `product` package. Promotion to `reference` requires:
- a target-tested monthly-data and sanctions-screening fixture with expected
outputs and complete provenance;
- database/object-storage backup and restore plus interrupted-run recovery;
- security evidence for datasource credentials, staged data, intermediate
states, search documents, and assurance references;
- operator runbooks for stale sources, failed runs, index rebuilds, and graph
reconciliation;
- accessibility evidence for the catalogue, graph editors, result inspection,
reports, and assurance graph;
- privacy evidence for minimization, purpose, retention, field visibility, and
aggregate disclosure; and
- version-pinned user and administrator documentation.
Optional Connectors, Files, Notifications, and Workflow Engine integrations
must remain capability-based and absence-safe.
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
{
"package_id": "product.governed-data-assurance",
"name": "Governed Data and Assurance",
"version": "0.1.0",
"package_class": "product",
"description": "Compose governed sources, transformations, reports, search, controls and assurance evidence through stable contracts.",
"publisher": "GovOPlaN",
"category": "data-governance",
"license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",
"required_modules": [
{"module_id": "access"},
{"module_id": "audit"},
{"module_id": "dataflow"},
{"module_id": "datasources"},
{"module_id": "policy"},
{"module_id": "reporting"},
{"module_id": "risk_compliance"},
{"module_id": "search"}
],
"optional_modules": [
{"module_id": "connectors"},
{"module_id": "files"},
{"module_id": "notifications"},
{"module_id": "workflow_engine"}
],
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "documentation",
"reference": "packages/product/governed-data-assurance/README.md",
"summary": "Defines the package boundary, provenance chain, and reference-readiness gates."
}
],
"tags": ["datasources", "dataflow", "reporting", "assurance"]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
# Governed Service To Decision
This product package composes independently owned institutional semantics into
one reconstructable administrative journey:
```text
Service discovery -> Case intake -> Party and representation -> Mandate
resolution -> approval/deliberation -> formal Decision -> observed delivery
effect -> record and review references
```
An installed Forms and Forms Runtime pair adds an alternative governed entry
path before case/workflow handoff:
```text
Service discovery -> exact Form revision -> validated draft/submission
-> receipt and handoff evidence -> Case or Workflow owner
```
Services, Cases, Parties, Mandates, Committee, and Decisions retain immutable
provider-owned revisions for the parts they own. Portal, Cases, and Committee
consume capabilities for cross-module semantics only. The package does not
grant cross-module table access and can omit optional presentation, work,
deliberation, delivery, or records modules while retaining explicit references
to externally performed steps.
## Security And Recovery
Every provider is tenant-bound. Missing or conflicting authority fails closed.
Protected Decision content has a separate permission. Writes are replay-safe
and OCC-guarded. Database restore is the semantic-state recovery unit; file and
communication effects remain governed by their owning providers and are linked
through requested/observed effect, evidence, and audit references.
The executable fixture in
`tests/test_institutional_governance_journey.py` proves SQL-backed Service,
Case, Party, Mandate, Committee meeting/agendum/vote/minute, and Decision state.
`tests/test_institutional_service_journey.py` separately proves exact Portal
Form launch, persisted submission provenance, and idempotent replay.
Target-environment accessibility, security, operator, privacy,
delivery-provider, and recovery evidence are still required before this product
package may claim `reference_ready` maturity.
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
{
"package_id": "product.service-to-decision",
"name": "Governed Service To Decision",
"version": "0.1.0",
"package_class": "product",
"description": "Carry one exact institutional context from service discovery and case intake through parties, authority, formal outcome, communication evidence, and review.",
"publisher": "GovOPlaN",
"category": "institutional-governance",
"license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",
"required_modules": [
{"module_id": "audit"},
{"module_id": "cases"},
{"module_id": "decisions"},
{"module_id": "mandates"},
{"module_id": "parties"},
{"module_id": "policy"},
{"module_id": "portal"},
{"module_id": "services"}
],
"required_capabilities": [
"cases.party_context",
"cases.service_intake",
"decisions.registry",
"mandates.resolver",
"parties.resolver",
"portal.service_directory",
"services.availability",
"services.definitions"
],
"optional_modules": [
{"module_id": "approvals"},
{"module_id": "committee"},
{"module_id": "files"},
{"module_id": "forms"},
{"module_id": "forms_runtime"},
{"module_id": "postbox"},
{"module_id": "records"},
{"module_id": "tasks"},
{"module_id": "workflow_engine"}
],
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "documentation",
"reference": "packages/product/service-to-decision/README.md",
"summary": "Defines the package boundary, authority path, recovery contract, and known operational limits."
},
{
"kind": "target_test",
"reference": "tests/test_institutional_governance_journey.py",
"summary": "Executes the SQL-backed provider composition from service discovery through persisted formal Decision reconstruction."
},
{
"kind": "target_test",
"reference": "tests/test_institutional_service_journey.py",
"summary": "Executes Portal delegation from an exact Service revision through an exact immutable Form revision to a replay-safe persisted submission."
}
],
"tags": ["service", "case", "mandate", "party", "decision", "public-sector"]
}
+79 -67
View File
@@ -1,73 +1,85 @@
{
"version": 1,
"organization": "add-ideas",
"organization": "GovOPlaN",
"default_parent": "/mnt/DATA/git",
"repositories": [
{"name": "govoplan", "category": "system", "subtype": "meta", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:add-ideas/govoplan.git", "path": "govoplan"},
{"name": "govoplan-core", "category": "system", "subtype": "kernel", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:add-ideas/govoplan-core.git", "path": "govoplan-core"},
{"name": "govoplan-access", "category": "module", "subtype": "platform", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:add-ideas/govoplan-access.git", "path": "govoplan-access"},
{"name": "govoplan-addresses", "category": "module", "subtype": "domain", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:add-ideas/govoplan-addresses.git", "path": "govoplan-addresses"},
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{"name": "govoplan-tasks", "category": "module", "subtype": "domain", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-tasks.git", "path": "govoplan-tasks"},
{"name": "govoplan-templates", "category": "module", "subtype": "domain", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-templates.git", "path": "govoplan-templates"},
{"name": "govoplan-tenancy", "category": "module", "subtype": "platform", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-tenancy.git", "path": "govoplan-tenancy"},
{"name": "govoplan-tickets", "category": "module", "subtype": "domain", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-tickets.git", "path": "govoplan-tickets"},
{"name": "govoplan-transparency", "category": "module", "subtype": "domain", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-transparency.git", "path": "govoplan-transparency"},
{"name": "govoplan-views", "category": "module", "subtype": "platform", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-views.git", "path": "govoplan-views"},
{"name": "govoplan-voting", "category": "module", "subtype": "domain", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-voting.git", "path": "govoplan-voting"},
{"name": "govoplan-wiki", "category": "module", "subtype": "domain", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-wiki.git", "path": "govoplan-wiki"},
{"name": "addideas-govoplan-website", "category": "website", "subtype": "public-site", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:add-ideas/addideas-govoplan-website.git", "path": "addideas-govoplan-website", "bootstrap_transport": "registered"},
{"name": "govoplan-workflow", "category": "module", "subtype": "platform", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow.git", "path": "govoplan-workflow"},
{"name": "govoplan-workflow-engine", "category": "module", "subtype": "platform", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-workflow-engine.git", "path": "govoplan-workflow-engine"},
{"name": "govoplan-xoev", "category": "connector", "subtype": "standard", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-xoev.git", "path": "govoplan-xoev"},
{"name": "govoplan-xrechnung", "category": "connector", "subtype": "standard", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-xrechnung.git", "path": "govoplan-xrechnung"},
{"name": "govoplan-xta-osci", "category": "connector", "subtype": "standard", "remote": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-xta-osci.git", "path": "govoplan-xta-osci"}
]
}
+25
View File
@@ -12,18 +12,41 @@
-e ../govoplan-admin
-e ../govoplan-policy
-e ../govoplan-audit
-e ../govoplan-approvals
-e ../govoplan-dashboard
-e ../govoplan-addresses
-e ../govoplan-dist-lists
-e ../govoplan-templates
-e ../govoplan-files
-e ../govoplan-forms
-e ../govoplan-forms-runtime
-e ../govoplan-mail
-e ../govoplan-campaign
-e ../govoplan-calendar
-e ../govoplan-committee
-e ../govoplan-cases
-e ../govoplan-portal
-e ../govoplan-services
-e ../govoplan-parties
-e ../govoplan-mandates
-e ../govoplan-decisions
-e ../govoplan-connectors
-e ../govoplan-datasources
-e ../govoplan-dataflow
-e ../govoplan-workflow-engine
-e ../govoplan-workflow
-e ../govoplan-views
-e ../govoplan-voting
-e ../govoplan-search
-e ../govoplan-risk-compliance
-e ../govoplan-postbox
-e ../govoplan-poll
-e ../govoplan-scheduling
-e ../govoplan-notifications
-e ../govoplan-evaluation
-e ../govoplan-docs
-e ../govoplan-encryption
-e ../govoplan-identity-trust
-e ../govoplan-ops
httpx==0.28.1
httpx2>=2.5,<3
@@ -32,5 +55,7 @@ idna>=3.15
jsonschema>=4,<5
pip>=26.1.2
pip-audit>=2.9,<3
pytest>=9.0.3,<10
pygments>=2.20,<3
python-multipart>=0.0.31
ruff>=0.14,<1
+5
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
# Test-harness dependencies used against immutable release source tags.
# Keep these separate from requirements-release.txt so they are not part of the
# deployable product dependency set.
pytest>=9.0.3,<10
pygments>=2.20,<3
+15 -15
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
# Whole-product release install from immutable, independently versioned module tags.
# Only add a module after its referenced tag has been published.
../govoplan-core[server]
govoplan-tenancy @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-tenancy.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-organizations @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-organizations.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-identity @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-identity.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-idm @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-idm.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-access @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-access.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-admin @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-admin.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-policy @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-policy.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-audit @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-audit.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-dashboard @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-dashboard.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-files @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-files.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-mail @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-mail.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-campaign @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign.git@v0.1.11
govoplan-calendar @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-calendar.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-docs @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-docs.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-ops @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-ops.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-tenancy @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-tenancy.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-organizations @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-organizations.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-identity @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-identity.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-idm @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-idm.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-access @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-admin @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-admin.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-policy @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-policy.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-audit @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-audit.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-dashboard @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-dashboard.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-files @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-files.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-mail @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-mail.git@v0.1.10
govoplan-campaign @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign.git@v0.1.11
govoplan-calendar @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-calendar.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-docs @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-docs.git@v0.1.8
govoplan-ops @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-ops.git@v0.1.8
+430
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@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from contextlib import redirect_stderr, redirect_stdout
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
import hashlib
import io
import json
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(META_ROOT / "tools" / "deployment"))
from govoplan_deploy.backup_evidence import verify_backup_evidence # noqa: E402
from govoplan_deploy.bundle import ( # noqa: E402
atomic_write,
bundle_paths,
canonical_json,
read_env,
)
from govoplan_deploy.cli import main as deploy_main # noqa: E402
from govoplan_deploy.distribution import ( # noqa: E402
DistributionError,
canonical_signed_payload,
canonical_json as canonical_distribution_json,
)
from govoplan_deploy.model import default_spec, parse_spec # noqa: E402
from govoplan_deploy.planning import ( # noqa: E402
release_change_requires_backup,
verify_stored_backup_evidence,
)
class BackupEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.now = datetime(2026, 8, 3, 12, tzinfo=UTC)
self.private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
public = (
self.private.public_key()
.public_bytes(
serialization.Encoding.PEM,
serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
)
.decode("ascii")
)
self.keyring = {
"schema_version": "1",
"purpose": "govoplan-backup-evidence",
"keys": [
{
"key_id": "backup-controller-1",
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"status": "active",
"public_key_pem": public,
"not_before": (self.now - timedelta(days=1)).isoformat(),
"expires_at": (self.now + timedelta(days=365)).isoformat(),
}
],
}
self.release = {
"channel": "stable",
"version": "1.2.3",
"manifest_sha256": "a" * 64,
"composition_sha256": "b" * 64,
"api_image": "registry.example/api@sha256:" + "c" * 64,
"web_image": "registry.example/web@sha256:" + "d" * 64,
}
def test_verifies_coordinated_restore_drill_and_release_binding(self) -> None:
summary = verify_backup_evidence(
self._evidence(),
self.keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=self.release,
now=self.now,
)
self.assertEqual("recovery-1", summary["recovery_point_id"])
self.assertEqual("restore-1", summary["restore_drill_id"])
self.assertEqual("backup-controller-1", summary["signature_key_id"])
def test_tampering_staleness_and_partial_restore_fail_closed(self) -> None:
tampered = self._evidence()
tampered["components"]["objects"]["object_count"] = 999
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "signature verification"):
verify_backup_evidence(
tampered,
self.keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=self.release,
now=self.now,
)
stale = self._evidence(captured=self.now - timedelta(days=2))
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "stale"):
verify_backup_evidence(
stale,
self.keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=self.release,
now=self.now,
)
partial = self._evidence()
partial["restore_drill"]["objects_verified"] = False
partial["signatures"] = [self._signature(partial)]
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "objects_verified"):
verify_backup_evidence(
partial,
self.keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=self.release,
now=self.now,
)
def test_wrong_release_key_purpose_and_component_skew_fail_closed(self) -> None:
wrong_release = dict(self.release)
wrong_release["version"] = "1.2.4"
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "release field"):
verify_backup_evidence(
self._evidence(),
self.keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=wrong_release,
now=self.now,
)
wrong_keyring = dict(self.keyring)
wrong_keyring["purpose"] = "govoplan-runtime-distribution"
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "wrong purpose"):
verify_backup_evidence(
self._evidence(),
wrong_keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=self.release,
now=self.now,
)
skewed = self._evidence()
skewed["components"]["database"]["captured_at"] = (
self.now - timedelta(hours=1)
).isoformat()
skewed["signatures"] = [self._signature(skewed)]
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "one recovery point"):
verify_backup_evidence(
skewed,
self.keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=self.release,
now=self.now,
)
false_rto = self._evidence()
false_rto["restore_drill"]["measured_rto_seconds"] = 1
false_rto["signatures"] = [self._signature(false_rto)]
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "RTO"):
verify_backup_evidence(
false_rto,
self.keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=self.release,
now=self.now,
)
def test_provider_signing_tool_emits_canonical_verified_evidence(self) -> None:
self.now = datetime.now(UTC)
self.keyring["keys"][0]["not_before"] = (
self.now - timedelta(days=1)
).isoformat()
self.keyring["keys"][0]["expires_at"] = (
self.now + timedelta(days=365)
).isoformat()
evidence = self._evidence()
evidence["signatures"] = []
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-backup-signer-") as value:
root = Path(value)
source = root / "unsigned.json"
output = root / "signed.json"
keyring = root / "keyring.json"
private_key = root / "private.pem"
atomic_write(source, canonical_json(evidence), mode=0o600)
atomic_write(keyring, canonical_json(self.keyring), mode=0o600)
atomic_write(
private_key,
self.private.private_bytes(
serialization.Encoding.PEM,
serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
serialization.NoEncryption(),
),
mode=0o600,
)
result = subprocess.run(
[
sys.executable,
str(META_ROOT / "tools/deployment/sign-backup-evidence.py"),
"--input",
str(source),
"--output",
str(output),
"--trusted-keyring",
str(keyring),
"--signing-key",
f"backup-controller-1={private_key}",
],
cwd=META_ROOT,
check=False,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode, result.stderr)
encoded = output.read_bytes()
signed = json.loads(encoded)
self.assertEqual(canonical_distribution_json(signed), encoded)
summary = verify_backup_evidence(
signed,
self.keyring,
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
release=self.release,
)
self.assertEqual("backup-controller-1", summary["signature_key_id"])
def test_cli_adoption_gates_the_next_release_against_previous_receipt(self) -> None:
self.now = datetime.now(UTC)
self.keyring["keys"][0]["not_before"] = (
self.now - timedelta(days=1)
).isoformat()
self.keyring["keys"][0]["expires_at"] = (
self.now + timedelta(days=365)
).isoformat()
evidence = self._evidence()
encoded_evidence = canonical_distribution_json(evidence)
encoded_keyring = canonical_distribution_json(self.keyring)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-backup-evidence-") as value:
paths = bundle_paths(Path(value))
paths.root.chmod(0o700)
raw = default_spec(
installation_id="govoplan-test",
profile="self-hosted",
public_url="https://govoplan.example.test",
ingress_mode="existing-proxy",
trusted_proxy_cidrs=("127.0.0.1/32",),
).to_dict()
raw["release"] = {
**raw["release"],
**self.release,
}
current = parse_spec(raw)
atomic_write(paths.spec, canonical_json(current.to_dict()), mode=0o600)
source_evidence = paths.root / "source-backup.json"
source_keyring = paths.root / "source-keyring.json"
atomic_write(source_evidence, encoded_evidence, mode=0o600)
atomic_write(source_keyring, encoded_keyring, mode=0o600)
output = io.StringIO()
with redirect_stdout(output), redirect_stderr(output):
result = deploy_main(
[
"verify-backup",
"--directory",
str(paths.root),
"--evidence",
str(source_evidence),
"--evidence-sha256",
hashlib.sha256(encoded_evidence).hexdigest(),
"--trusted-keyring",
str(source_keyring),
"--adopt",
]
)
self.assertEqual(0, result, output.getvalue())
runtime_environment = read_env(paths.env)
self.assertEqual(
"verified",
runtime_environment["GOVOPLAN_BACKUP_EVIDENCE_STATE"],
)
self.assertEqual(
"recovery-1",
runtime_environment["GOVOPLAN_BACKUP_RECOVERY_POINT_ID"],
)
self.assertNotIn("snapshot:postgres", str(runtime_environment))
self.assertNotIn("urn:kms", str(runtime_environment))
receipt = {
"installation_id": current.installation_id,
"profile": current.profile,
"release": dict(self.release),
}
atomic_write(paths.receipt, canonical_json(receipt), mode=0o600)
target_raw = current.to_dict()
target_raw["release"]["version"] = "1.2.4"
target_raw["release"]["manifest_sha256"] = "9" * 64
target = parse_spec(target_raw)
self.assertTrue(release_change_requires_backup(target, receipt))
summary = verify_stored_backup_evidence(
target,
paths,
receipt=receipt,
)
self.assertEqual("recovery-1", summary["recovery_point_id"])
def _evidence(self, *, captured: datetime | None = None) -> dict[str, object]:
captured = captured or self.now - timedelta(hours=2)
started = captured + timedelta(minutes=15)
completed = captured + timedelta(minutes=30)
issued = completed + timedelta(minutes=10)
artifact_time = captured.isoformat()
payload: dict[str, object] = {
"schema_version": "1",
"evidence_id": "backup-1",
"installation_id": "govoplan-test",
"deployment_subject": {
"profile": "self-hosted",
"topology": "compose",
"subject_ref": "urn:govoplan:installation:govoplan-test",
},
"release": dict(self.release),
"recovery_point": {
"id": "recovery-1",
"captured_at": captured.isoformat(),
"consistency": "application-quiesced",
"rpo_seconds": 300,
"write_fence": {
"mode": "application-quiesce",
"token_sha256": "e" * 64,
"established_at": captured.isoformat(),
},
},
"components": {
"database": {
"provider": "postgres",
"artifact_ref": "snapshot:postgres:backup-1",
"artifact_sha256": "1" * 64,
"snapshot_id": "pg-snapshot-1",
"lsn": "0/16B6C50",
"protected": True,
"encryption_key_ref": "urn:kms:key:database-backup",
"captured_at": artifact_time,
},
"objects": {
"provider": "s3",
"artifact_ref": "s3://backup/govoplan-test/recovery-1",
"manifest_sha256": "2" * 64,
"version_id": "object-snapshot-1",
"object_count": 4,
"total_bytes": 1024,
"protected": True,
"encryption_key_ref": "urn:kms:key:object-backup",
"captured_at": artifact_time,
},
"configuration": {
"artifact_ref": "backup:configuration:recovery-1",
"sha256": "3" * 64,
"protected": True,
"encryption_key_ref": "urn:kms:key:configuration-backup",
"captured_at": artifact_time,
},
"key_custody": {
"provider": "kms",
"keyset_ref": "urn:kms:keyset:govoplan-test",
"keyset_version": "version-4",
"recoverable": True,
"captured_at": artifact_time,
},
},
"restore_drill": {
"drill_id": "restore-1",
"recovery_point_id": "recovery-1",
"started_at": started.isoformat(),
"completed_at": completed.isoformat(),
"isolated_target_ref": "urn:govoplan:restore-target:restore-1",
"release_manifest_sha256": self.release["manifest_sha256"],
"migration_heads_sha256": "4" * 64,
"representative_object_manifest_sha256": "2" * 64,
"database_verified": True,
"objects_verified": True,
"configuration_verified": True,
"key_custody_verified": True,
"semantic_checks": [
{
"id": "institutional-journey",
"status": "passed",
"evidence_ref": "evidence:journey:institutional-1",
}
],
"measured_rpo_seconds": 120,
"measured_rto_seconds": 900,
"evidence_ref": "evidence:restore:restore-1",
},
"issued_at": issued.isoformat(),
"expires_at": (self.now + timedelta(days=7)).isoformat(),
"revoked": False,
"signatures": [],
}
payload["signatures"] = [self._signature(payload)]
return payload
def _signature(self, payload: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, str]:
return {
"key_id": "backup-controller-1",
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"value": base64.b64encode(
self.private.sign(canonical_signed_payload(payload))
).decode("ascii"),
}
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+198
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@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from datetime import UTC, datetime
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "assessments"
RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
if str(tools_root) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
from govoplan_assessment.boundary_evidence import ( # noqa: E402
issue_boundary_evidence,
)
from govoplan_assessment.evidence import ( # noqa: E402
InstalledEvidenceReview,
canonical_sha256,
review_boundary_evidence,
validate_payload,
)
class BoundaryEvidenceIssuerTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.assessment = {
"assessment_id": "assessment:test",
"release": {"ref": "stable-catalog-202608020001"},
"deployment_profile": {"id": "deployment:target"},
}
self.installed = {
"schema_version": "0.1.0",
"assessment_id": "assessment:test",
"artifacts": [],
}
self.private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
public_key = base64.b64encode(
self.private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
)
).decode("ascii")
self.authority = {
"$schema": "./capability-fit-proof-authority-keyring.schema.json",
"schema_version": "0.1.0",
"purpose": "govoplan.capability-fit-proof-authorities",
"keys": [
{
"key_id": "authority:target",
"status": "active",
"public_key": public_key,
"allowed_scopes": ["target_environment", "recovery"],
"not_before": "2026-08-01T00:00:00Z",
"not_after": "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
}
],
}
self.boundary_schema = json.loads(
(
META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit-boundary-evidence.schema.json"
).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
)
self.authority_schema = json.loads(
(
META_ROOT
/ "docs"
/ "capability-fit-proof-authority-keyring.schema.json"
).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
)
def test_issues_sanitized_hash_bound_proof_and_verifies_it(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
result_path = Path(temp_dir) / "recovery-result.json"
result_path.write_text(
'{"rto_seconds":42,"rpo_seconds":0,"reconstructed":true}\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
proof = self.issue(
claims=[
{
"scope": "target_environment",
"result": "passed",
"control_ids": ["topology:shared-state-v1"],
"artifacts": [
{"artifact_id": "target:run-1", "path": result_path}
],
},
{
"scope": "recovery",
"result": "passed",
"control_ids": ["recovery:restore-v1"],
"artifacts": [
{"artifact_id": "recovery:run-1", "path": result_path}
],
},
]
)
self.assertEqual(
(), validate_payload(payload=proof, schema=self.boundary_schema)
)
self.assertNotIn(str(result_path), json.dumps(proof))
self.assertEqual(
canonical_sha256(self.installed), proof["installed_evidence_sha256"]
)
installed_review = InstalledEvidenceReview(
findings=(),
changes=(),
changed_repositories=frozenset(),
affected_module_ids=frozenset(),
proof_scope={
"installed_artifacts": {"valid": True},
"installed_release_origin": {"valid": True},
},
evidence_sha256=canonical_sha256(self.installed),
)
review = review_boundary_evidence(
assessment=self.assessment,
installed_review=installed_review,
evidence=proof,
evidence_schema=self.boundary_schema,
authority_keyring=self.authority,
authority_keyring_schema=self.authority_schema,
verification_time=datetime(2026, 8, 2, 12, 30, tzinfo=UTC),
)
self.assertEqual((), review.findings)
self.assertTrue(review.proof_scope["target_environment"]["valid"])
self.assertTrue(review.proof_scope["recovery"]["valid"])
def test_refuses_missing_release_origin_or_scope_authority(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
artifact = Path(temp_dir) / "result.txt"
artifact.write_text("passed\n", encoding="utf-8")
claim = {
"scope": "security",
"result": "passed",
"control_ids": ["security:sast-v1"],
"artifacts": [{"artifact_id": "security:run-1", "path": artifact}],
}
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "release origin"):
self.issue(claims=[claim], release_origin_verified=False)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "authorized for scopes: security"):
self.issue(claims=[claim])
def test_refuses_authority_that_expires_before_the_proof(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
artifact = Path(temp_dir) / "result.txt"
artifact.write_text("passed\n", encoding="utf-8")
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "full proof interval"):
self.issue(
expires_at=datetime(2026, 10, 1, tzinfo=UTC),
claims=[
{
"scope": "recovery",
"result": "passed",
"control_ids": ["recovery:restore-v1"],
"artifacts": [
{
"artifact_id": "recovery:run-1",
"path": artifact,
}
],
}
],
)
def issue(
self,
*,
claims: list[dict[str, object]],
expires_at: datetime = datetime(2026, 8, 3, tzinfo=UTC),
release_origin_verified: bool = True,
) -> dict[str, object]:
return issue_boundary_evidence(
assessment=self.assessment,
installed_evidence=self.installed,
proof_id="proof:target:1",
claims=claims,
authority_keyring=self.authority,
signing_keys={"authority:target": self.private_key},
issued_at=datetime(2026, 8, 2, 12, tzinfo=UTC),
expires_at=expires_at,
release_origin_verified=release_origin_verified,
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+38
View File
@@ -1007,6 +1007,44 @@ class CapabilityFitEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
report["proof_scope"]["target_environment"]["observed_subject_id"],
)
def test_reference_readiness_scopes_require_release_bound_signed_proof(
self,
) -> None:
installed = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(
self.assessment,
release_artifacts=catalog_artifacts_for(installed),
)
readiness_scopes = (
"target_environment",
"accessibility",
"privacy",
"security",
"operations",
"recovery",
)
proof, authority = signed_boundary_evidence(
assessment=self.assessment,
installed=installed,
claims=[boundary_claim(scope, "passed") for scope in readiness_scopes],
allowed_scopes=list(readiness_scopes),
)
report = self.review(
catalog=catalog,
keyring=keyring,
installed_evidence=installed,
boundary_evidence=proof,
authority_keyring=authority,
)
self.assertEqual("current", report["status"])
for scope in readiness_scopes:
with self.subTest(scope=scope):
self.assertTrue(report["proof_scope"][scope]["checked"])
self.assertTrue(report["proof_scope"][scope]["valid"])
self.assertTrue(report["proof_scope"]["reference_readiness"]["valid"])
def test_external_provider_claim_requires_explicit_matching_subject(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
installed = matching_installed_evidence(self.assessment)
+30 -1
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
from govoplan_assessment.capability_fit import ( # noqa: E402
enforce_required_boundary_scopes,
local_tag_provenance,
render_review,
review_capability_fit,
@@ -74,6 +75,34 @@ class CapabilityFitReviewTests(unittest.TestCase):
json.dumps(report, sort_keys=True), json.dumps(repeated, sort_keys=True)
)
def test_required_boundary_scope_blocks_admission_until_positive(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(self.assessment)
report = review_capability_fit(
assessment=deepcopy(self.assessment),
schema=self.schema,
catalog=catalog,
published_keyring=keyring,
trusted_keyring=keyring,
)
enforce_required_boundary_scopes(
report, required_scopes=("security", "recovery")
)
self.assertEqual("blocked", report["status"])
self.assertFalse(report["proof_scope"]["admission"]["valid"])
self.assertEqual(
["recovery", "security"],
report["proof_scope"]["admission"]["failed_scopes"],
)
self.assertEqual(
2,
sum(
item["code"] == "required_boundary_scope_unsatisfied"
for item in report["findings"]
),
)
def test_release_drift_identifies_affected_conclusions(self) -> None:
catalog, keyring = signed_catalog(
self.assessment, versions={"campaigns": "0.1.11"}, sequence=202607230001
@@ -360,7 +389,7 @@ class CapabilityFitReviewTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("Capability fit rerun: current", rendered)
self.assertIn(
"No installed-composition, installed-release-origin, target-environment, external-provider, production-approval proof",
"No installed-composition, installed-release-origin, target-environment, external-providers, accessibility, privacy, security, operations, recovery, production-approval proof",
rendered,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
from pathlib import Path
import unittest
from govoplan_core.core.configuration_packages import (
ConfigurationPackageManifest,
ConfigurationPreflightContext,
configuration_package_claim_issues,
dry_run_configuration_package,
)
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
PACKAGE_ROOT = ROOT / "packages"
class ConfigurationPackageArtifactTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_product_package_manifests_are_portable_and_evidence_backed(self) -> None:
paths = tuple(sorted(PACKAGE_ROOT.glob("*/*/package.json")))
self.assertGreaterEqual(len(paths), 2)
package_ids: set[str] = set()
for path in paths:
manifest = ConfigurationPackageManifest.from_mapping(
json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
)
self.assertNotIn(manifest.package_id, package_ids)
package_ids.add(manifest.package_id)
self.assertEqual((), configuration_package_claim_issues(manifest))
for evidence in manifest.evidence:
evidence_path = ROOT / evidence.reference
self.assertTrue(
evidence_path.is_file(),
f"Missing evidence {evidence.reference} for {manifest.package_id}",
)
if evidence.checksum is not None:
self.assertEqual(
evidence.checksum,
"sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(evidence_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
f"Stale evidence checksum for {manifest.package_id}: {evidence.reference}",
)
for requirement in (
*manifest.required_modules,
*manifest.optional_modules,
):
repository = ROOT.parent / (
"govoplan-" + requirement.module_id.replace("_", "-")
)
self.assertTrue(
repository.is_dir(),
f"Missing repository for {requirement.module_id}",
)
result = dry_run_configuration_package(
manifest,
(),
ConfigurationPreflightContext(
installed_modules={
item.module_id: item.version or "workspace"
for item in manifest.required_modules
},
capabilities=frozenset(manifest.required_capabilities),
),
)
self.assertFalse(
any(item.severity == "blocker" for item in result.diagnostics),
tuple(item.to_dict() for item in result.diagnostics),
)
self.assertIn("product.governed-communication", package_ids)
self.assertIn("product.governed-data-assurance", package_ids)
self.assertIn("product.service-to-decision", package_ids)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+8
View File
@@ -88,9 +88,17 @@ class DependencyBoundaryDiscoveryTests(unittest.TestCase):
"govoplan-calendar",
"govoplan-poll",
"govoplan-scheduling",
"govoplan-workflow-engine",
):
self.assertIn(owner, boundary.REPOS)
def test_transitional_allowlist_entries_have_a_removal_target(self) -> None:
boundary = load_boundary_module()
for item in boundary.ALLOWLIST:
self.assertIn("remove", item.reason.casefold())
self.assertRegex(item.reason, r"#[0-9]+")
def test_webui_discovery_is_fail_closed(self) -> None:
boundary = load_boundary_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-boundary-webui-") as directory:
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+207
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
import hashlib
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(META_ROOT / "tools" / "deployment"))
from govoplan_deploy.bundle import bundle_paths # noqa: E402
from govoplan_deploy.cli import main # noqa: E402
from govoplan_deploy.distribution import ( # noqa: E402
canonical_json,
canonical_signed_payload,
)
from govoplan_deploy.model import load_spec # noqa: E402
from govoplan_deploy.planning import static_checks # noqa: E402
class DeploymentReleaseAdoptionTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_adopts_verified_manifest_and_makes_release_checks_pass(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-release-adopt-") as value:
root = Path(value)
self.assertEqual(
0,
main(
[
"init",
"--directory",
str(root),
"--non-interactive",
"--module-set",
"core",
]
),
)
manifest, keyring = self._signed_distribution()
manifest_path = root / "source-manifest.json"
keyring_path = root / "source-keyring.json"
encoded_manifest = canonical_json(manifest)
manifest_path.write_bytes(encoded_manifest)
keyring_path.write_bytes(canonical_json(keyring))
result = main(
[
"verify-release",
"--directory",
str(root),
"--manifest",
str(manifest_path),
"--manifest-sha256",
hashlib.sha256(encoded_manifest).hexdigest(),
"--trusted-keyring",
str(keyring_path),
"--adopt",
]
)
self.assertEqual(0, result)
paths = bundle_paths(root)
spec = load_spec(paths.spec)
self.assertEqual("1.2.3", spec.release.version)
self.assertEqual("release-1", spec.release.manifest_signature_key_id)
self.assertTrue(spec.release.api_image.endswith("a" * 64))
release_checks = {
item.id: item for item in static_checks(spec, paths)
if item.id.startswith("release.") or item.id == "modules.image_composition"
}
self.assertEqual("ok", release_checks["release.manifest"].level)
self.assertEqual(
"ok", release_checks["release.signature_verification"].level
)
self.assertEqual("ok", release_checks["modules.image_composition"].level)
def test_rejects_manifest_whose_independent_digest_does_not_match(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-release-adopt-") as value:
root = Path(value)
main(
[
"init",
"--directory",
str(root),
"--non-interactive",
"--module-set",
"core",
]
)
manifest, keyring = self._signed_distribution()
manifest_path = root / "source-manifest.json"
keyring_path = root / "source-keyring.json"
manifest_path.write_bytes(canonical_json(manifest))
keyring_path.write_bytes(canonical_json(keyring))
self.assertEqual(
1,
main(
[
"verify-release",
"--directory",
str(root),
"--manifest",
str(manifest_path),
"--manifest-sha256",
"0" * 64,
"--trusted-keyring",
str(keyring_path),
]
),
)
@staticmethod
def _signed_distribution() -> tuple[dict[str, object], dict[str, object]]:
now = datetime.now(UTC)
private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
public = private.public_key().public_bytes(
serialization.Encoding.PEM,
serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
).decode("ascii")
artifact = {
"url": "https://downloads.example.test/artifact.json",
"sha256": "f" * 64,
}
payload: dict[str, object] = {
"schema_version": "1",
"channel": "stable",
"sequence": 1,
"version": "1.2.3",
"issued_at": (now - timedelta(minutes=1)).isoformat(),
"expires_at": (now + timedelta(days=30)).isoformat(),
"revoked": False,
"deployer": {
"url": "https://downloads.example.test/govoplan-deploy.pyz",
"sha256": "e" * 64,
},
"images": {
"api": {
"index": "registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "a" * 64,
"platforms": {
"linux/amd64": "registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "1" * 64,
"linux/arm64": "registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "2" * 64,
},
"sbom": dict(artifact),
"provenance": dict(artifact),
},
"web": {
"index": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "b" * 64,
"platforms": {
"linux/amd64": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "3" * 64,
"linux/arm64": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "4" * 64,
},
"sbom": dict(artifact),
"provenance": dict(artifact),
},
},
"dependencies": {
"postgres": "docker.io/library/postgres@sha256:" + "5" * 64,
"redis": "docker.io/library/redis@sha256:" + "6" * 64,
"load_balancer": "docker.io/library/haproxy@sha256:" + "7" * 64,
},
"composition": {
"sha256": "c" * 64,
"module_ids": [],
"packages": [
{
"name": "govoplan-core",
"version": "1.2.3",
"wheel_sha256": "8" * 64,
}
],
},
}
payload["signatures"] = [
{
"key_id": "release-1",
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"value": base64.b64encode(
private.sign(canonical_signed_payload(payload))
).decode("ascii"),
}
]
keyring = {
"schema_version": "1",
"purpose": "govoplan-runtime-distribution",
"keys": [
{
"key_id": "release-1",
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"status": "active",
"public_key_pem": public,
"not_before": (now - timedelta(days=1)).isoformat(),
"expires_at": (now + timedelta(days=365)).isoformat(),
}
],
}
return payload, keyring
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+49
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import pathlib
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
SCRIPT = ROOT / "tools" / "gitea" / "gitea-sync-wiki.py"
TOOLS = SCRIPT.parent
if str(TOOLS) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(TOOLS))
SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("gitea_sync_wiki", SCRIPT)
assert SPEC and SPEC.loader
wiki_sync = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
sys.modules[SPEC.name] = wiki_sync
SPEC.loader.exec_module(wiki_sync)
class WikiSourceDiscoveryTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_generated_and_incidental_govoplan_files_are_not_docs(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary:
root = pathlib.Path(temporary)
paths = {
"readme": root / "README.md",
"architecture": root / "docs" / "DATASOURCE_ARCHITECTURE.md",
"plan": root / "workflow-plan.md",
"audit": root / "audit-reports" / "full" / "manifest.json",
"runtime": root / "runtime" / "release" / "manifest.json",
"incidental": root / "tools" / "semgrep" / "govoplan.yml",
"manifest": root / "manifest.json",
}
for path in paths.values():
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text("content\n", encoding="utf-8")
self.assertTrue(wiki_sync.is_repo_doc(root, paths["readme"]))
self.assertTrue(wiki_sync.is_repo_doc(root, paths["architecture"]))
self.assertTrue(wiki_sync.is_repo_doc(root, paths["plan"]))
self.assertFalse(wiki_sync.is_repo_doc(root, paths["audit"]))
self.assertFalse(wiki_sync.is_repo_doc(root, paths["runtime"]))
self.assertFalse(wiki_sync.is_repo_doc(root, paths["incidental"]))
self.assertFalse(wiki_sync.is_repo_doc(root, paths["manifest"]))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
import unittest
from sqlalchemy import create_engine
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from govoplan_core.core.institutional import (
ActorRepresentationReference,
DecisionEffectReference,
EvidenceReference,
InformationGovernanceReference,
InstitutionalReference,
LegalBasisReference,
MandateDefinition,
PartyRepresentation,
PartySubjectReference,
ProcedureParty,
ServiceBinding,
ServiceDefinition,
TemporalRevision,
service_launch_capability,
)
from govoplan_cases.backend.party_context import CasePartyContext
from govoplan_cases.backend.db.models import (
CaseAccessGrant,
CaseIdentity,
CaseRecordRevision,
CaseStatusDefinition,
CaseTimelineEntry,
CaseTypeDefinition,
)
from govoplan_cases.backend.service import (
create_case_from_intake,
get_case,
upsert_case_status,
upsert_case_type,
)
from govoplan_cases.backend.service_intake import CaseServiceIntake
from govoplan_committee.backend.db.models import (
CommitteeDecisionProjection,
CommitteeWorkspaceEvent,
CommitteeWorkspaceRevision,
)
from govoplan_committee.backend.decision_path import (
CommitteeDecisionPath,
CommitteeDecisionProposal,
)
from govoplan_committee.backend.workspace import (
CommitteeWorkspaceRecord,
SqlCommitteeWorkspace,
get_workspace_object,
record_workspace_object,
)
from govoplan_portal.backend.service_directory import PortalServiceDirectory
from govoplan_decisions.backend.db.models import FormalDecisionRevision
from govoplan_decisions.backend.service import SqlDecisionRegistry
from govoplan_mandates.backend.db.models import MandateRevision
from govoplan_mandates.backend.service import SqlMandateResolver, record_mandate
from govoplan_parties.backend.db.models import ProcedurePartyRevision
from govoplan_parties.backend.service import SqlPartyResolver, record_procedure_party
from govoplan_services.backend.db.models import ServiceDefinitionRevision
from govoplan_services.backend.service import SqlServiceDefinitionProvider, record_service_definition
NOW = datetime(2026, 8, 1, 10, 0, tzinfo=UTC)
def _reference(
kind: str,
object_id: str,
*,
owner: str,
version: str = "1",
) -> InstitutionalReference:
return InstitutionalReference(
kind=kind, # type: ignore[arg-type]
owner_module=owner,
object_id=object_id,
tenant_id="tenant-1",
version=version,
valid_at=NOW,
)
def _evidence(kind: str, evidence_id: str, owner: str) -> EvidenceReference:
return EvidenceReference(
kind=kind, # type: ignore[arg-type]
owner_module=owner,
evidence_id=evidence_id,
tenant_id="tenant-1",
version="1",
checksum=f"sha256:{evidence_id}",
captured_at=NOW,
)
@dataclass
class _Principal:
tenant_id: str = "tenant-1"
account_id: str = "account-1"
class _Registry:
def __init__(self, capabilities: dict[str, object]) -> None:
self.capabilities = capabilities
def has(self, module_id: str) -> bool:
return module_id in {
"portal",
"cases",
"committee",
"postbox",
"services",
"parties",
"mandates",
"decisions",
}
def has_capability(self, name: str) -> bool:
return name in self.capabilities
def capability(self, name: str) -> object:
return self.capabilities[name]
class InstitutionalGovernanceJourneyTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_service_to_formal_outcome_retains_governed_context(self) -> None:
engine = create_engine("sqlite+pysqlite:///:memory:")
for table in (
ServiceDefinitionRevision.__table__,
CaseStatusDefinition.__table__,
CaseTypeDefinition.__table__,
CaseIdentity.__table__,
CaseRecordRevision.__table__,
CaseAccessGrant.__table__,
CaseTimelineEntry.__table__,
ProcedurePartyRevision.__table__,
MandateRevision.__table__,
FormalDecisionRevision.__table__,
CommitteeWorkspaceRevision.__table__,
CommitteeWorkspaceEvent.__table__,
CommitteeDecisionProjection.__table__,
):
table.create(engine)
session = Session(engine)
principal = _Principal()
self.addCleanup(engine.dispose)
self.addCleanup(session.close)
organization = _reference(
"organization_unit",
"permit-office",
owner="organizations",
)
function = _reference("function", "permit-officer", owner="organizations")
jurisdiction = _reference(
"jurisdiction",
"city-1",
owner="organizations",
)
mandate_ref = _reference(
"mandate",
"permit-mandate",
owner="mandates",
version="4",
)
legal_basis = LegalBasisReference(
kind="law",
authority="Example legislature",
reference="permit-law:3",
version="2026-01",
effective_from=NOW - timedelta(days=100),
)
service = ServiceDefinition(
reference=_reference(
"service",
"permit-service",
owner="services",
version="5",
),
key="permit.apply",
temporal=TemporalRevision(
revision="5",
valid_from=NOW - timedelta(days=1),
valid_to=NOW + timedelta(days=30),
recorded_at=NOW - timedelta(days=2),
change_reason="Service published.",
),
title="Apply for a permit",
audience=("resident",),
legal_bases=(legal_basis,),
required_evidence_types=("application", "identity"),
channels=("portal", "postbox"),
responsible_organization_ref=organization,
responsible_function_ref=function,
mandate_ref=mandate_ref,
jurisdiction_refs=(jurisdiction,),
bindings=(
ServiceBinding("case", "permit-application"),
ServiceBinding("workflow", "workflow:permit-review"),
ServiceBinding("result", "decision:permit"),
),
remedy_refs=("review:administrative-court",),
publication_state="published",
)
record_service_definition(session, principal, definition=service)
service_registry = _Registry(
{
"services.definitions": SqlServiceDefinitionProvider(),
service_launch_capability("case"): object(),
}
)
entry = PortalServiceDirectory(service_registry).list_entries(
session,
principal,
tenant_id="tenant-1",
effective_at=NOW,
audiences=("resident",),
)[0]
self.assertTrue(entry.available)
intake = CaseServiceIntake().plan(
entry.definition,
case_id="case-1",
effective_at=NOW,
)
application_evidence = _evidence("document", "application-1", "files")
upsert_case_status(
session,
principal,
status_key="intake",
label="Intake",
)
upsert_case_status(
session,
principal,
status_key="decided",
label="Decided",
category="decided",
)
upsert_case_type(
session,
principal,
type_key="permit-application",
label="Permit application",
initial_status_key="intake",
allowed_status_keys=("intake", "decided"),
)
case_record = create_case_from_intake(
session,
principal,
plan=intake,
case_number="PERMIT-2026-0001",
title="Permit application",
status_key=None,
opened_at=NOW,
recorded_at=NOW,
change_reason="Portal application received.",
idempotency_key="journey-case-create",
evidence_refs=(application_evidence,),
deadline_at=NOW + timedelta(days=30),
)
applicant = _reference("party", "applicant", owner="parties")
representative = _reference("party", "representative", owner="parties")
address_evidence = _evidence(
"snapshot",
"address-snapshot-1",
"addresses",
)
representative_party = ProcedureParty(
reference=representative,
procedure_ref=case_record.reference,
role="representative",
subject=PartySubjectReference(
kind="identity",
provider="identity",
subject_id="identity-2",
tenant_id="tenant-1",
version="2",
),
temporal=TemporalRevision(
revision="1",
valid_from=NOW - timedelta(days=1),
recorded_at=NOW - timedelta(days=1),
change_reason="Representative added to the procedure.",
),
permitted_channels=("postbox",),
preferred_channels=("postbox",),
delivery_recipient=True,
representations=(
PartyRepresentation(
representative_party_ref=representative,
represented_party_ref=applicant,
power_ref="power-1",
permitted_actions=("submit", "receive"),
temporal=TemporalRevision(
revision="1",
valid_from=NOW - timedelta(days=1),
recorded_at=NOW - timedelta(days=1),
change_reason="Representation power recorded.",
),
evidence=(address_evidence,),
),
),
contact_snapshot_refs=("addresses:snapshot-1",),
evidence=(address_evidence,),
)
record_procedure_party(session, principal, party=representative_party)
party_context = CasePartyContext(
_Registry({"parties.resolver": SqlPartyResolver()})
)
parties = party_context.resolve(
session,
principal,
case_ref=case_record.reference,
effective_at=NOW,
)
delivery_target = party_context.delivery_targets(
parties,
channel="postbox",
)[0]
mandate = MandateDefinition(
reference=mandate_ref,
temporal=TemporalRevision(
revision="4",
valid_from=NOW - timedelta(days=30),
valid_to=NOW + timedelta(days=30),
recorded_at=NOW - timedelta(days=31),
change_reason="Permit authority delegated.",
),
task_types=("committee.formal_decision",),
authority_types=("permit",),
organization_unit_refs=(organization,),
function_refs=(function,),
jurisdiction_refs=(jurisdiction,),
legal_bases=(legal_basis,),
evidence=(_evidence("record", "mandate-record-4", "mandates"),),
authority_ceiling="permit:standard",
)
record_mandate(session, principal, definition=mandate)
workspace = SqlCommitteeWorkspace()
body = CommitteeWorkspaceRecord(
tenant_id="tenant-1",
object_kind="body",
object_id="permit-board",
revision=1,
state="active",
title="Permit board",
recorded_at=NOW,
change_reason="Permit board configured.",
attributes={
"organization_unit_ref": organization.to_dict(),
"function_refs": [function.to_dict()],
"quorum": {"minimum_count": 1},
},
)
meeting = CommitteeWorkspaceRecord(
tenant_id="tenant-1",
object_kind="meeting",
object_id="meeting-1",
revision=1,
state="open",
title="Permit board meeting",
parent_id=body.object_id,
recorded_at=NOW,
change_reason="Meeting opened.",
attributes={
"starts_at": NOW.isoformat(),
"ends_at": (NOW + timedelta(hours=1)).isoformat(),
},
context=case_record.context,
)
agenda = CommitteeWorkspaceRecord(
tenant_id="tenant-1",
object_kind="agenda_item",
object_id="item-1",
revision=1,
state="deliberating",
title="Permit application",
parent_id=meeting.object_id,
recorded_at=NOW,
change_reason="Agenda item entered deliberation.",
attributes={
"position": 1,
"subject_refs": [case_record.reference.to_dict()],
},
context=case_record.context,
evidence=(application_evidence,),
)
approval_ref = _reference("approval", "approval-1", owner="approvals")
vote = CommitteeWorkspaceRecord(
tenant_id="tenant-1",
object_kind="vote",
object_id="vote-1",
revision=1,
state="closed",
title="Vote on permit application",
parent_id=agenda.object_id,
recorded_at=NOW,
change_reason="Vote result accepted.",
attributes={
"method": "recorded",
"choices": ["yes", "no"],
"eligible_count": 3,
"cast_count": 3,
"counts": {"yes": 3, "no": 0},
"quorum_met": True,
"approval_ref": approval_ref.to_dict(),
},
context=case_record.context,
evidence=(_evidence("record", "vote-result-1", "committee"),),
)
for record, key in (
(body, "journey-body"),
(meeting, "journey-meeting"),
(agenda, "journey-agenda"),
(vote, "journey-vote"),
):
record_workspace_object(
session,
principal,
record=record,
idempotency_key=key,
)
decision_registry = SqlDecisionRegistry()
decision_result = CommitteeDecisionPath(
_Registry(
{
"mandates.resolver": SqlMandateResolver(),
"decisions.registry": decision_registry,
"committee.workspace": workspace,
}
)
).decide(
session,
principal,
proposal=CommitteeDecisionProposal(
tenant_id="tenant-1",
decision_id="decision-1",
revision="1",
effective_at=NOW,
meeting_ref="meeting-1",
agenda_item_ref="item-1",
decision_type="permit",
subject_refs=(case_record.reference,),
organization_unit_ref=organization,
function_ref=function,
actor=ActorRepresentationReference(
tenant_id="tenant-1",
account_id="account-1",
identity_id="identity-1",
represented_function_ref=function,
mandate_ref=mandate_ref,
),
approval_refs=(
approval_ref,
),
fact_evidence=(application_evidence, address_evidence),
legal_bases=(legal_basis,),
operative_result="Permit granted.",
reasoning="The application satisfies the effective rule.",
case_ref=case_record.reference,
jurisdiction_refs=(jurisdiction,),
party_refs=(applicant, representative),
record_refs=(
_reference("record", "record-1", owner="audit"),
),
remedy_refs=service.remedy_refs,
review_refs=("review:administrative-court",),
information_governance=InformationGovernanceReference(
classification="restricted",
purposes=("permit-decision", "party-delivery"),
legal_basis_refs=("permit-law:3@2026-01",),
retention_policy_ref="records:permit",
disclosure_state="partly_disclosable",
),
),
observed_effects=(
DecisionEffectReference(
effect_key="postbox.deliver_decision",
state="confirmed",
resource_refs=(
f"postbox:{delivery_target.party_ref.object_id}",
),
audit_event_refs=("audit:delivery-1",),
evidence_refs=(address_evidence.evidence_id,),
),
),
)
decided_agenda = replace(
agenda,
revision=2,
state="decided",
recorded_at=NOW + timedelta(minutes=1),
change_reason="Formal Decision recorded.",
attributes={
**dict(agenda.attributes),
"decision_ref": decision_result.decision.reference.to_dict(),
},
)
record_workspace_object(
session,
principal,
record=decided_agenda,
expected_revision=1,
idempotency_key="journey-agenda-decided",
)
closed_meeting = replace(
meeting,
revision=2,
state="closed",
recorded_at=NOW + timedelta(hours=1),
change_reason="All agenda items completed.",
)
record_workspace_object(
session,
principal,
record=closed_meeting,
expected_revision=1,
idempotency_key="journey-meeting-closed",
)
minute = CommitteeWorkspaceRecord(
tenant_id="tenant-1",
object_kind="minute",
object_id="minute-1",
revision=1,
state="accepted",
title="Accepted permit board minutes",
parent_id=meeting.object_id,
recorded_at=NOW + timedelta(hours=2),
change_reason="Minutes approved.",
attributes={
"content_ref": _reference(
"record",
"meeting-minutes-1",
owner="records",
).to_dict(),
"approval_ref": _reference(
"approval",
"minutes-approval-1",
owner="approvals",
).to_dict(),
},
context=case_record.context,
evidence=(_evidence("record", "minutes-proof-1", "records"),),
)
record_workspace_object(
session,
principal,
record=minute,
idempotency_key="journey-minute",
)
reconstruction = decision_result.reconstruction_payload()["decision"]
persisted = decision_registry.get_decision(
session,
principal,
reference=decision_result.decision.reference,
)
self.assertTrue(decision_result.persisted_by_decision_registry)
self.assertEqual(decision_result.decision, persisted)
self.assertEqual(
case_record,
get_case(session, principal, case_id="case-1"),
)
self.assertEqual(
"decided",
get_workspace_object(
session,
principal,
object_kind="agenda_item",
object_id="item-1",
).state,
)
self.assertEqual(service.reference, intake.context.service_ref)
self.assertEqual("applicant", delivery_target.represented_party_refs[0].object_id)
self.assertEqual("permit-mandate", reconstruction["authority_context"]["mandate_ref"]["object_id"])
self.assertEqual("city-1", reconstruction["authority_context"]["jurisdiction_refs"][0]["object_id"])
self.assertEqual("confirmed", reconstruction["observed_effects"][0]["state"])
self.assertEqual("audit:delivery-1", reconstruction["observed_effects"][0]["audit_event_refs"][0])
self.assertEqual("application-1", reconstruction["fact_evidence"][0]["evidence_id"])
self.assertEqual("The application satisfies the effective rule.", reconstruction["reasoning"])
self.assertEqual("review:administrative-court", reconstruction["review_refs"][0])
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
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from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
import unittest
from sqlalchemy import create_engine
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from govoplan_core.core.institutional import (
CAPABILITY_FORM_DEFINITIONS,
CAPABILITY_SERVICE_DEFINITIONS,
FormDefinition,
FormFieldDefinition,
InstitutionalReference,
ServiceBinding,
ServiceDefinition,
TemporalRevision,
service_launch_capability,
)
from govoplan_cases.backend.service_intake import (
CAPABILITY_CASES_SERVICE_INTAKE,
CaseServiceIntake,
)
from govoplan_forms.backend.db.models import FormDefinitionRevision
from govoplan_forms.backend.service import (
SqlFormDefinitionProvider,
record_form_definition,
)
from govoplan_forms_runtime.backend.db.models import (
FormInstanceEvent,
FormInstanceIdentity,
FormInstanceRevision,
)
from govoplan_forms_runtime.backend.service import (
FormRuntimeService,
FormsServiceLauncher,
)
from govoplan_portal.backend.service_directory import PortalServiceDirectory
NOW = datetime(2026, 8, 1, 10, 0, tzinfo=UTC)
def _service() -> ServiceDefinition:
return ServiceDefinition(
reference=InstitutionalReference(
kind="service",
owner_module="portal",
object_id="permit",
tenant_id="tenant-1",
version="5",
),
key="permit.apply",
temporal=TemporalRevision(
revision="5",
valid_from=NOW - timedelta(days=1),
valid_to=NOW + timedelta(days=1),
recorded_at=NOW - timedelta(days=2),
),
title="Apply for a permit",
audience=("resident",),
required_evidence_types=("application",),
bindings=(
ServiceBinding("capability", CAPABILITY_CASES_SERVICE_INTAKE),
ServiceBinding("case", "permit-application"),
ServiceBinding("workflow", "workflow:permit-review"),
),
publication_state="published",
)
class _Provider:
def __init__(self, definition: ServiceDefinition) -> None:
self.definition = definition
def get_service_definition(self, session, principal, *, reference, effective_at=None):
return self.definition
def list_service_definitions(self, session, principal, *, tenant_id, query="", limit=100):
return (self.definition,)
class _Registry:
def __init__(self, definition: ServiceDefinition) -> None:
self.capabilities = {
CAPABILITY_SERVICE_DEFINITIONS: _Provider(definition),
CAPABILITY_CASES_SERVICE_INTAKE: CaseServiceIntake(),
service_launch_capability("case"): object(),
}
def has(self, module_id: str) -> bool:
return module_id in {"portal", "cases"}
def has_capability(self, name: str) -> bool:
return name in self.capabilities
def capability(self, name: str) -> object:
return self.capabilities[name]
def require_capability(self, name: str) -> object:
return self.capabilities[name]
@dataclass
class _Principal:
tenant_id: str = "tenant-1"
account_id: str = "account-1"
class _FormRegistry(_Registry):
def __init__(self, definition: ServiceDefinition) -> None:
super().__init__(definition)
self.capabilities[CAPABILITY_FORM_DEFINITIONS] = (
SqlFormDefinitionProvider()
)
self.capabilities[service_launch_capability("form")] = (
FormsServiceLauncher(self)
)
def has(self, module_id: str) -> bool:
return module_id in {"portal", "forms", "forms_runtime"}
class InstitutionalServiceJourneyTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_one_service_version_drives_portal_and_case_intake(self) -> None:
definition = _service()
registry = _Registry(definition)
entries = PortalServiceDirectory(registry).list_entries(
None,
None,
tenant_id="tenant-1",
effective_at=NOW,
audiences=("resident",),
)
plan = registry.capability(CAPABILITY_CASES_SERVICE_INTAKE).plan(
entries[0].definition,
case_id="case-1",
effective_at=NOW,
)
self.assertTrue(entries[0].available)
self.assertIs(definition, entries[0].definition)
self.assertEqual(definition.reference, plan.service_ref)
self.assertEqual("5", plan.context.service_ref.version)
self.assertEqual("workflow:permit-review", plan.workflow_refs[0])
def test_portal_launches_exact_form_revision_and_persists_submission(self) -> None:
engine = create_engine("sqlite+pysqlite:///:memory:")
for table in (
FormDefinitionRevision.__table__,
FormInstanceIdentity.__table__,
FormInstanceRevision.__table__,
FormInstanceEvent.__table__,
):
table.create(engine)
session = Session(engine)
principal = _Principal()
try:
form = record_form_definition(
session,
principal,
definition=FormDefinition(
reference=InstitutionalReference(
kind="form",
owner_module="forms",
object_id="permit-application",
tenant_id="tenant-1",
version="3",
),
key="permit-application",
temporal=TemporalRevision(
revision="3",
valid_from=NOW - timedelta(days=1),
valid_to=NOW + timedelta(days=1),
recorded_at=NOW - timedelta(days=2),
change_reason="Publish the permit application.",
),
title="Permit application",
fields=(
FormFieldDefinition(
key="applicant_name",
label="Applicant name",
required=True,
constraints={"min_length": 2},
),
),
publication_state="published",
allow_drafts=True,
handoff_kinds=("case",),
),
)
binding = ServiceBinding(
"form",
f"{form.reference.object_id}/{form.reference.version}",
)
service = ServiceDefinition(
reference=InstitutionalReference(
kind="service",
owner_module="services",
object_id="permit",
tenant_id="tenant-1",
version="6",
),
key="permit.apply",
temporal=TemporalRevision(
revision="6",
valid_from=NOW - timedelta(days=1),
valid_to=NOW + timedelta(days=1),
recorded_at=NOW - timedelta(days=2),
),
title="Apply for a permit",
audience=("public",),
bindings=(binding,),
publication_state="published",
)
registry = _FormRegistry(service)
directory = PortalServiceDirectory(registry)
launched = directory.launch_service(
session,
principal,
reference=service.reference,
requested_at=NOW,
idempotency_key="portal-form-launch-1",
parameters={"applicant_name": "Ada Lovelace"},
)
replay = directory.launch_service(
session,
principal,
reference=service.reference,
requested_at=NOW,
idempotency_key="portal-form-launch-1",
parameters={"applicant_name": "Ada Lovelace"},
)
instance = FormRuntimeService(registry).get_instance(
session,
principal,
instance_id=str(launched.metadata["form_instance_id"]),
)
self.assertEqual("form_submission", launched.target_ref.kind)
self.assertEqual(service.reference, launched.service_ref)
self.assertEqual("3", launched.metadata["form_definition_revision"])
self.assertTrue(replay.replayed)
self.assertEqual(launched.target_ref, replay.target_ref)
self.assertEqual(
(
form.reference.owner_module,
form.reference.object_id,
form.reference.tenant_id,
form.reference.version,
),
(
instance.definition_ref.owner_module,
instance.definition_ref.object_id,
instance.definition_ref.tenant_id,
instance.definition_ref.version,
),
)
self.assertEqual(NOW, instance.definition_ref.valid_at)
self.assertEqual(service.reference, instance.service_ref)
self.assertEqual("Ada Lovelace", instance.values["applicant_name"])
finally:
session.close()
engine.dispose()
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
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from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
import json
import subprocess
import sys
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
def _load_module():
path = ROOT / "tools/checks/managed-ingress-drill.py"
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("managed_ingress_drill", path)
assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
sys.modules[spec.name] = module
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
INGRESS = _load_module()
class ManagedIngressDrillTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_config_is_streamed_into_a_daemon_visible_volume(self) -> None:
completed = subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0, "", "")
with patch.object(INGRESS, "_run", return_value=completed) as run:
INGRESS._write_volume_file(
image="registry.example/caddy@sha256:" + "1" * 64,
volume="config-volume",
filename="Caddyfile",
content=":8080 { respond /health 200 }\n",
)
argv = run.call_args.args[0]
self.assertIn("type=volume,src=config-volume,dst=/govoplan-config", argv)
self.assertIn("0:0", argv)
self.assertNotIn("type=bind", " ".join(argv))
self.assertEqual(
":8080 { respond /health 200 }\n",
run.call_args.kwargs["input_text"],
)
def test_config_filename_cannot_escape_the_volume(self) -> None:
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "invalid config filename"):
INGRESS._write_volume_file(
image="registry.example/caddy@sha256:" + "1" * 64,
volume="config-volume",
filename="../Caddyfile",
content="",
)
def test_drill_has_no_runner_local_bind_mounts(self) -> None:
source = (ROOT / "tools/checks/managed-ingress-drill.py").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
self.assertNotIn("type=bind", source)
self.assertIn('"--network-alias",\n "load-balancer"', source)
self.assertNotIn('"127.0.0.1::8080"', source)
self.assertIn("requested_http_port", source)
self.assertIn("requested_https_port", source)
self.assertIn('"--cap-add",\n "NET_BIND_SERVICE"', source)
def test_published_port_reads_the_docker_mapping(self) -> None:
completed = subprocess.CompletedProcess(
[],
0,
json.dumps(
{
"8443/tcp": [
{"HostIp": "127.0.0.1", "HostPort": "49152"}
]
}
),
"",
)
with patch.object(INGRESS, "_run", return_value=completed) as run:
port = INGRESS._published_port("ingress", 8443)
self.assertEqual(49152, port)
self.assertEqual(
[
"docker",
"inspect",
"--format",
"{{json .HostConfig.PortBindings}}",
"ingress",
],
run.call_args.args[0],
)
def test_published_port_rejects_non_loopback_binding(self) -> None:
completed = subprocess.CompletedProcess(
[],
0,
'{"8443/tcp":[{"HostIp":"0.0.0.0","HostPort":"49152"}]}',
"",
)
with patch.object(INGRESS, "_run", return_value=completed):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(RuntimeError, "loopback binding"):
INGRESS._published_port("ingress", 8443)
def test_probe_runs_as_a_network_sibling_from_a_digest_image(self) -> None:
completed = subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0, "", "")
image = "registry.example/runtime-api@sha256:" + "1" * 64
with patch.object(INGRESS, "_run", return_value=completed) as run:
INGRESS._probe_ingress(
image=image,
network="deployment-network",
container="ingress",
)
argv = run.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual("docker", argv[0])
self.assertIn("deployment-network", argv)
self.assertIn(image, argv)
self.assertIn('(\"ingress\", port)', argv[-1])
self.assertIn("server_hostname=\"localhost\"", argv[-1])
self.assertNotIn("localhost:49152", argv[-1])
def test_probe_diagnostics_include_container_stderr(self) -> None:
probe_failure = subprocess.CalledProcessError(1, ["docker", "run"])
state = subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0, '{"Running":false}', "")
logs = subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0, "", "caddy startup failed")
with patch.object(
INGRESS,
"_run",
side_effect=[probe_failure, state, logs],
), patch.object(INGRESS.sys, "stderr") as stderr:
with self.assertRaises(subprocess.CalledProcessError):
INGRESS._probe_ingress(
image="registry.example/runtime-api@sha256:" + "1" * 64,
network="deployment-network",
container="ingress",
)
rendered = "".join(call.args[0] for call in stderr.write.call_args_list)
self.assertIn('"Running":false', rendered)
self.assertIn("caddy startup failed", rendered)
def test_standalone_workflow_is_dispatch_only_and_digest_bounded(self) -> None:
workflow = (
ROOT / ".gitea/workflows/runtime-ingress-drill.yml"
).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn("workflow_dispatch:", workflow)
self.assertNotIn("\n push:", workflow)
self.assertIn("--probe-image \"$PROBE_IMAGE\"", workflow)
self.assertIn("GOVOPLAN_REGISTRY_TOKEN", workflow)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
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from __future__ import annotations
import ast
import importlib.util
import json
from pathlib import Path
import tempfile
import unittest
SCRIPT = (
Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
/ "tools"
/ "inventory"
/ "platform-interface-inventory.py"
)
SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("platform_interface_inventory", SCRIPT)
assert SPEC is not None and SPEC.loader is not None
inventory = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
SPEC.loader.exec_module(inventory)
class PlatformInterfaceInventoryTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_workspace_resolution_prefers_populated_checkout_siblings(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
sibling = root / "checkout"
meta = sibling / "govoplan"
configured = root / "configured"
(sibling / "govoplan-core" / "src").mkdir(parents=True)
(configured / "govoplan-core").mkdir(parents=True)
previous = inventory.META_ROOT
inventory.META_ROOT = meta
try:
resolved = inventory._resolve_workspace_root(
{
"default_parent": str(configured),
"repositories": [{"path": "govoplan-core"}],
}
)
finally:
inventory.META_ROOT = previous
self.assertEqual(sibling.resolve(), resolved)
def test_canonical_api_path_normalizes_versions_and_parameters(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
inventory.canonical_api_path(
"http://localhost/api/v1/campaigns/${campaignId}?limit=10"
),
"/campaigns/{}",
)
self.assertEqual(
inventory.canonical_api_path("/api/v2/campaigns/{campaign_id}"),
"/campaigns/{}",
)
self.assertEqual(
inventory.canonical_api_path("/api/v1/calendar/events/delta${querySuffix}"),
"/calendar/events/delta",
)
self.assertEqual(
inventory.canonical_api_path("/api/v1/calendar/events/${eventId}"),
"/calendar/events/{}",
)
def test_endpoint_declarations_are_exact_and_require_missing_ui_issue(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
path = Path(directory) / "endpoints.json"
path.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"schema_version": 1,
"endpoints": [
{
"repository": "govoplan-example",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/example/items/{}",
"category": "public_integration",
"rationale": "Published integration API.",
}
],
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
declarations = inventory._load_endpoint_declarations(path)
self.assertIn(
("govoplan-example", "GET", "/example/items/{}"),
declarations,
)
payload = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
payload["endpoints"][0]["category"] = "missing_ui"
path.write_text(json.dumps(payload), encoding="utf-8")
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "tracking_issue"):
inventory._load_endpoint_declarations(path)
def test_inventory_reports_unclassified_and_stale_endpoint_declarations(
self,
) -> None:
webui = {
"frontendApiReferences": [],
"translationUsages": [],
"translationCatalog": {"en": {}, "de": {}},
"fields": [],
"labels": [],
"visibleText": [],
"routes": [],
"navigation": [],
"uiCapabilities": [],
"dynamicTranslationUsages": [],
}
endpoint = {
"repository": "govoplan-example",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/example/items",
"file": "src/example.py",
"line": 1,
"handler": "items",
"router": "router",
}
stale = {
"repository": "govoplan-example",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/example/removed",
"category": "removable",
"rationale": "Removal is pending.",
}
result = inventory._assemble_inventory(
webui=webui,
backend_endpoints=[endpoint],
manifests=[],
endpoint_declarations={
("govoplan-example", "GET", "/example/removed"): stale,
},
)
self.assertEqual(1, result["summary"]["unclassified_backend_endpoints"])
self.assertEqual(1, result["summary"]["stale_endpoint_declarations"])
self.assertIsNone(result["api"]["backend_endpoints"][0]["surface"])
def test_fastapi_route_scanner_includes_router_prefix(self) -> None:
tree = ast.parse(
"""
from fastapi import APIRouter
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/items")
@router.get("/{item_id}")
def read_item(item_id: str):
return item_id
"""
)
prefixes = inventory._router_prefixes(tree)
function = next(
node for node in ast.walk(tree) if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef)
)
route = inventory._endpoint_from_decorator(
function.decorator_list[0],
prefixes=prefixes,
)
self.assertEqual(
route,
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/items/{item_id}",
"router": "router",
},
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+75
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import os
from pathlib import Path
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
SCRIPT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "checks" / "postgres-integration-check.py"
def _load_script():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
"postgres_integration_check",
SCRIPT,
)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
raise RuntimeError(f"Could not load {SCRIPT}")
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
class PostgresIntegrationCheckTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_staging_check_has_explicit_runtime_safety_settings(self) -> None:
module = _load_script()
with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
env = module._check_env(
database_url="postgresql+psycopg://user:password@postgres/db",
modules="tenancy,access,search",
app_env="staging",
)
self.assertEqual(
env["CORS_ORIGINS"],
"http://127.0.0.1:5173,http://localhost:5173",
)
self.assertEqual(
env["GOVOPLAN_TRUSTED_HOSTS"],
"127.0.0.1,localhost,testserver",
)
self.assertEqual(
env["GOVOPLAN_CONNECTOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKS"],
"false",
)
self.assertEqual(
env["GOVOPLAN_ALLOW_PROCESS_LOCAL_LOGIN_THROTTLE"],
"true",
)
def test_existing_runtime_safety_settings_are_preserved(self) -> None:
module = _load_script()
configured = {
"CORS_ORIGINS": "https://govoplan.example.test",
"GOVOPLAN_TRUSTED_HOSTS": "govoplan.example.test",
"GOVOPLAN_CONNECTOR_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKS": "true",
"GOVOPLAN_ALLOW_PROCESS_LOCAL_LOGIN_THROTTLE": "false",
}
with patch.dict(os.environ, configured, clear=True):
env = module._check_env(
database_url="postgresql+psycopg://user:password@postgres/db",
modules="tenancy,access,search",
app_env="staging",
)
for key, value in configured.items():
self.assertEqual(env[key], value)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+124
View File
@@ -77,6 +77,130 @@ class PythonEnvironmentSyncTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn(str(root / "govoplan-core"), command)
self.assertIn(str(root / "govoplan-access"), command)
def test_missing_editable_distribution_is_not_hidden_by_current_stamp(self) -> None:
sync = load_sync_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-python-sync-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
project_root = root / "govoplan-probe-missing"
project_root.mkdir()
(project_root / "pyproject.toml").write_text(
"\n".join(
(
"[project]",
'name = "govoplan-probe-definitely-not-installed"',
'version = "0.1.0"',
"",
'[project.entry-points."govoplan.modules"]',
'probe_missing = "govoplan_probe.backend.manifest:get_manifest"',
"",
)
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
requirements = root / "requirements-dev.txt"
requirements.write_text("-e ./govoplan-probe-missing\n", encoding="utf-8")
entries = sync.local_requirement_entries(requirements)
validation = sync.validate_local_installations(sys.executable, entries)
plan = sync.build_environment_repair_plan(
python=sys.executable,
stale_requirements=validation.stale_requirements,
)
self.assertFalse(validation.current)
self.assertEqual(validation.stale_requirements, entries)
self.assertIn("distribution is not installed", validation.issues[0])
self.assertEqual(plan.mode, "Selective Python environment repair")
self.assertEqual(plan.commands[0][-2:], ("-e", str(project_root)))
def test_metadata_sync_also_repairs_unrelated_missing_distribution(self) -> None:
sync = load_sync_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-python-sync-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
requirements = root / "requirements-dev.txt"
requirements.write_text("-e ./govoplan-changed\n-e ./govoplan-missing\n", encoding="utf-8")
for project in ("govoplan-changed", "govoplan-missing"):
project_root = root / project
project_root.mkdir()
(project_root / "pyproject.toml").write_text(
f'[project]\nname = "{project}"\nversion = "0.1.10"\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
entries = sync.local_requirement_entries(requirements)
fingerprint = sync.build_fingerprint(
requirements=requirements,
python="/test/venv/bin/python",
local_requirements=entries,
)
requirements_digest = hashlib.sha256(requirements.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
previous = {
"version": sync.STAMP_VERSION,
"python": "/test/venv/bin/python",
"inputs": [
{"path": str(requirements), "sha256": requirements_digest},
{"path": entries[0].pyproject, "sha256": "stale"},
{
"path": entries[1].pyproject,
"sha256": hashlib.sha256(Path(entries[1].pyproject).read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
},
],
"requirements_entries": [
entry.as_dict() for entry in sync.parse_requirement_entries(requirements)
],
}
plan = sync.build_install_plan(
previous=previous,
fingerprint=fingerprint,
requirements=requirements,
python="/test/venv/bin/python",
local_requirements=entries,
repair_requirements=(entries[1],),
force=False,
)
self.assertEqual(plan.mode, "Selective Python environment sync")
self.assertEqual(len(plan.commands), 1)
command = plan.commands[0]
self.assertEqual(command.count("-e"), 2)
self.assertIn(str(root / "govoplan-changed"), command)
self.assertIn(str(root / "govoplan-missing"), command)
def test_declared_module_entry_points_are_part_of_environment_validation(self) -> None:
sync = load_sync_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-python-sync-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
project_root = root / "govoplan-probe"
project_root.mkdir()
(project_root / "pyproject.toml").write_text(
"\n".join(
(
"[project]",
'name = "govoplan-probe"',
'version = "0.1.0"',
"",
'[project.entry-points."govoplan.modules"]',
'probe = "govoplan_probe.backend.manifest:get_manifest"',
"",
)
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
requirements = root / "requirements-dev.txt"
requirements.write_text("-e ./govoplan-probe\n", encoding="utf-8")
expectations = sync.local_installation_expectations(
sync.local_requirement_entries(requirements)
)
self.assertEqual(len(expectations), 1)
self.assertEqual(expectations[0].distribution, "govoplan-probe")
self.assertEqual(
expectations[0].entry_points,
(("govoplan.modules", "probe", "govoplan_probe.backend.manifest:get_manifest"),),
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import urlparse
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
INVENTORY = ROOT / "docs" / "recovery-operation-inventory.json"
MODES = {
"atomic",
"compensation",
"snapshot_restore",
"forward_recovery",
"irreversible",
}
ADOPTION_STATES = {"planned", "reference-implementation", "adopted"}
REQUIRED_PREFIXES = {
"campaign.",
"files.",
"mail.",
"connectors.",
"dataflow.",
"workflow-engine.",
"core.module-lifecycle.",
"core.module-runtime.",
}
ATOMIC_EXTERNAL_READS = {
"connectors.sync.read-snapshot",
"mail.mailbox.sync-cursor",
}
def test_recovery_operation_inventory_is_complete_and_actionable() -> None:
payload = json.loads(INVENTORY.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
assert payload["schema_version"] == 1
operations = payload["operations"]
ids = [item["id"] for item in operations]
assert len(ids) == len(set(ids))
assert all(any(item.startswith(prefix) for item in ids) for prefix in REQUIRED_PREFIXES)
for item in operations:
assert item["mode"] in MODES
assert item["adoption"] in ADOPTION_STATES
assert item["repository"].startswith("govoplan-")
assert item["resources"]
assert item["fenced"] is True
issue = urlparse(item["issue"])
assert issue.scheme == "https"
assert issue.netloc == "git.add-ideas.de"
assert issue.path.startswith(f"/GovOPlaN/{item['repository']}/issues/")
def test_non_atomic_operations_do_not_claim_plain_database_rollback() -> None:
operations = json.loads(INVENTORY.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))["operations"]
for item in operations:
if item["mode"] == "atomic":
assert (
item["resources"] == ["postgresql"]
or item["id"] in ATOMIC_EXTERNAL_READS
)
+87 -3
View File
@@ -4,17 +4,101 @@ import sys
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from govoplan_core.core.modules import ModuleManifest
from govoplan_core.core.provider_governance import (
ExternalProviderDeclaration,
ModuleArchitectureDeclaration,
ModuleMaturityEvidence,
ProviderBehaviorDeclaration,
ProviderObjectDeclaration,
)
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
RELEASE_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
if str(RELEASE_ROOT) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(RELEASE_ROOT))
from govoplan_release.catalog_entry_synthesis import validate_initial_entry_closure # noqa: E402
from govoplan_release.catalog_entry_synthesis import ( # noqa: E402
manifest_catalog_entry,
validate_initial_entry_closure,
)
from govoplan_release.selective_catalog import apply_repo_updates # noqa: E402
class ReleaseCatalogEntrySynthesisTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_catalog_entry_preserves_architecture_and_provider_declarations(
self,
) -> None:
provider = ExternalProviderDeclaration(
id="example.records",
module_id="example",
label="Example records",
maturity="read",
operations=("read",),
objects=(
ProviderObjectDeclaration(
object_type="record",
field_groups=("identity", "content"),
authority_modes=("external_mirror",),
default_authority_mode="external_mirror",
),
),
behavior=ProviderBehaviorDeclaration(
freshness="Reports the acquisition timestamp.",
health="Reports source and parser health.",
max_read_items=100,
classifications=("internal",),
purposes=("release contract test",),
retention="The owning package retention policy applies.",
),
)
architecture = ModuleArchitectureDeclaration(
layer="data_reporting_integration",
kind="integration",
maturity="vertical_slice",
evidence=(
ModuleMaturityEvidence(
kind="test",
reference="tests/test_release_catalog_entry_synthesis.py",
summary="Proves catalog metadata preservation.",
),
ModuleMaturityEvidence(
kind="documentation",
reference="docs/INSTITUTIONAL_GOVERNANCE_TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md",
summary="Defines the provider declaration contract.",
),
),
known_limits=("Test-only provider.",),
supported_authority_modes=("external_mirror",),
owned_concepts=("example transport",),
target_tested_providers=(provider.id,),
)
entry = manifest_catalog_entry(
manifest=ModuleManifest(
id="example",
name="Example",
version="1.2.3",
architecture=architecture,
external_providers=(provider,),
),
repo="govoplan-example",
package="govoplan-example",
version="1.2.3",
description=None,
root=META_ROOT,
repository_base="git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN",
)
self.assertEqual("vertical_slice", entry["architecture"]["maturity"])
self.assertEqual(
"external_mirror",
entry["external_providers"][0]["objects"][0][
"default_authority_mode"
],
)
def test_selective_update_synthesizes_initial_entries_from_package_manifests(self) -> None:
payload: dict[str, object] = {
"core_release": {},
@@ -24,7 +108,7 @@ class ReleaseCatalogEntrySynthesisTests(unittest.TestCase):
"module_id": "access",
"version": "0.1.11",
"python_package": "govoplan-access",
"python_ref": "govoplan-access @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/govoplan-access.git@v0.1.11",
"python_ref": "govoplan-access @ git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-access.git@v0.1.11",
}
],
}
@@ -37,7 +121,7 @@ class ReleaseCatalogEntrySynthesisTests(unittest.TestCase):
"govoplan-scheduling": "0.1.11",
},
repo_contracts={},
repository_base="git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas",
repository_base="git+ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN",
workspace=META_ROOT.parent,
)
+176 -13
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import tempfile
from types import SimpleNamespace
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
import zipfile
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ if str(RELEASE_ROOT) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(RELEASE_ROOT))
from govoplan_release.model import RepositorySpec # noqa: E402
from govoplan_release.artifact_identity import inspect_python_wheel # noqa: E402
from govoplan_release.git_state import sanitized_git_environment # noqa: E402
from govoplan_release.release_execution import ( # noqa: E402
ExecutorSpec,
@@ -30,6 +32,7 @@ from govoplan_release.release_execution import ( # noqa: E402
require_trusted_release_runtime,
verify_frozen_repository_tag_receipt,
verify_repository_preflight_binding,
verify_candidate_installation,
_clone_catalog_sources,
_checkout_frozen_source,
_flatpak_proxy_environment,
@@ -489,20 +492,180 @@ class ReleaseExecutionTests(unittest.TestCase):
expected_receipt={"kind": "repository_state"},
)
def test_commit_step_has_no_durable_executor(self) -> None:
self.assertIsNone(
executor_spec(
{
"id": "govoplan-files:commit",
"status": "planned",
"mutating": True,
"repo": "govoplan-files",
"source_binding": {
"kind": "repository_state",
},
}
)
def test_commit_step_has_narrow_confirmation(self) -> None:
spec = executor_spec(
{
"id": "govoplan-files:commit",
"status": "planned",
"mutating": True,
"repo": "govoplan-files",
"source_binding": {
"kind": "repository_state",
},
}
)
self.assertIsNotNone(spec)
self.assertEqual("commit", spec.kind)
self.assertEqual("COMMIT", spec.confirmation)
def test_version_and_commit_executors_bind_only_release_metadata(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
workspace = Path(temp_dir)
repository = workspace / "govoplan-files"
remote = workspace / "files.git"
_git(workspace, "init", "--bare", str(remote))
_git(workspace, "init", "-b", "main", str(repository))
_git(repository, "config", "user.name", "Release Test")
_git(repository, "config", "user.email", "release@example.test")
(repository / "pyproject.toml").write_text(
'[project]\nname = "govoplan-files"\nversion = "1.2.3"\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
_git(repository, "add", "pyproject.toml")
_git(repository, "commit", "-m", "Initial")
_git(repository, "remote", "add", "origin", str(remote))
_git(repository, "push", "-u", "origin", "main")
repository_spec = _repository_spec(remote)
plan_step = {
"id": "govoplan-files:version",
"repo": "govoplan-files",
"source_binding": {"kind": "repository_state"},
}
with (
patch(
"govoplan_release.release_execution.load_repository_specs",
return_value=(repository_spec,),
),
patch(
"govoplan_release.release_execution.require_trusted_release_runtime"
),
):
before = repository_state_receipt(
repo="govoplan-files",
target_tag="v1.2.4",
workspace_root=workspace,
)
_result, updated = execute_repository_step(
spec=ExecutorSpec(
"version",
"UPDATE",
"version_metadata_updated",
True,
),
plan_step=plan_step,
repo_versions={"govoplan-files": "1.2.4"},
workspace_root=workspace,
remote="origin",
expected_receipt=before,
)
self.assertFalse(updated["worktree_clean"])
self.assertNotEqual(
before["worktree_sha256"],
updated["worktree_sha256"],
)
plan_step["id"] = "govoplan-files:commit"
_result, committed = execute_repository_step(
spec=ExecutorSpec(
"commit",
"COMMIT",
"release_commit_created",
True,
),
plan_step=plan_step,
repo_versions={"govoplan-files": "1.2.4"},
workspace_root=workspace,
remote="origin",
expected_receipt=updated,
)
self.assertTrue(committed["worktree_clean"])
self.assertNotEqual(before["head"], committed["head"])
self.assertIn(
'version = "1.2.4"',
(repository / "pyproject.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
)
def test_candidate_installation_verifies_installed_metadata(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
workspace = Path(temp_dir)
repository = workspace / "govoplan-files"
repository.mkdir()
(repository / "pyproject.toml").write_text(
'[project]\nname = "govoplan-files"\nversion = "1.2.4"\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
artifacts = workspace / "candidate" / "artifacts"
artifacts.mkdir(parents=True)
wheel = artifacts / "govoplan_files-1.2.4-py3-none-any.whl"
members = {
"govoplan_files/__init__.py": '__version__ = "1.2.4"\n',
"govoplan_files-1.2.4.dist-info/METADATA": (
"Metadata-Version: 2.1\n"
"Name: govoplan-files\n"
"Version: 1.2.4\n"
),
"govoplan_files-1.2.4.dist-info/WHEEL": (
"Wheel-Version: 1.0\n"
"Generator: release-test\n"
"Root-Is-Purelib: true\n"
"Tag: py3-none-any\n"
),
}
record = "\n".join(f"{name},," for name in members)
record += "\ngovoplan_files-1.2.4.dist-info/RECORD,,\n"
with zipfile.ZipFile(wheel, "w") as archive:
for name, content in members.items():
archive.writestr(name, content)
archive.writestr(
"govoplan_files-1.2.4.dist-info/RECORD",
record,
)
identity = inspect_python_wheel(wheel)
channels = workspace / "candidate" / "channels"
channels.mkdir()
(channels / "stable.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"release": {
"selected_units": [
{
"repo": "govoplan-files",
"version": "1.2.4",
}
],
"artifacts": [
{
"package_name": "govoplan-files",
"archive_sha256": identity.archive_sha256,
}
],
},
"core_release": {},
"modules": [
{
"python_package": "govoplan-files",
"python_ref": (
"govoplan-files @ "
"git+ssh://git@example.test/GovOPlaN/"
"govoplan-files.git@v1.2.4"
),
}
],
}
)
+ "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
result = verify_candidate_installation(
candidate_path=workspace / "candidate",
repo_versions={"govoplan-files": "1.2.4"},
)
self.assertEqual("verified", result["status"])
self.assertEqual("govoplan-files", result["packages"][0]["repo"])
self.assertEqual("1.2.4", result["packages"][0]["version"])
def test_frozen_checkout_uses_receipt_commit_not_live_worktree(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
+67
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
import sys
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
if str(RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT))
from govoplan_release import git_state # noqa: E402
class ReleaseGitStateTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_manifest_version_does_not_confuse_interface_versions(self) -> None:
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory) / "govoplan-example"
manifest = root / "src" / "govoplan_example" / "backend" / "manifest.py"
manifest.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
manifest.write_text(
"\n".join(
(
'MODULE_VERSION = "1.2.3"',
"manifest = ModuleManifest(",
' id="example",',
" version=MODULE_VERSION,",
" provides_interfaces=(",
' ModuleInterfaceProvider(name="example.items", version="9.8.7"),',
" ),",
")",
"",
)
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
versions = git_state.read_manifest_versions(root)
self.assertEqual(("1.2.3",), versions)
def test_git_trusts_only_the_resolved_repository_for_each_command(self) -> None:
repository = Path("/workspace/../workspace/govoplan-core")
completed = subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0, "", "")
with patch.object(git_state.subprocess, "run", return_value=completed) as run:
result = git_state.git(repository, "status", "--porcelain")
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0)
command = run.call_args.args[0]
self.assertIn(f"safe.directory={repository.resolve()}", command)
self.assertNotIn("safe.directory=*", command)
self.assertEqual(run.call_args.kwargs["cwd"], repository)
self.assertEqual(
run.call_args.kwargs["env"]["GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL"],
"/dev/null",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+75 -4
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
from tools.checks.release_integration import (
SOURCE_COUPLED_CORE_TESTS,
@@ -10,6 +12,7 @@ from tools.checks.release_integration import (
artifact_contract_issues,
filter_test_suite,
release_package_names,
run_module_release_tests,
)
@@ -32,9 +35,9 @@ class ReleaseIntegrationTests(unittest.TestCase):
"\n".join(
(
"../govoplan-core[server]",
"govoplan-idm @ git+ssh://git@example.test/add-ideas/govoplan-idm.git@v0.1.8",
"govoplan-campaign @ git+ssh://git@example.test/add-ideas/govoplan-campaign.git@v0.1.8",
"govoplan-idm @ git+ssh://git@example.test/add-ideas/govoplan-idm.git@v0.1.8",
"govoplan-idm @ git+ssh://git@example.test/GovOPlaN/govoplan-idm.git@v0.1.8",
"govoplan-campaign @ git+ssh://git@example.test/GovOPlaN/govoplan-campaign.git@v0.1.8",
"govoplan-idm @ git+ssh://git@example.test/GovOPlaN/govoplan-idm.git@v0.1.8",
"other-package==1.0",
)
),
@@ -77,7 +80,7 @@ class ReleaseIntegrationTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(set(removed), set(SOURCE_COUPLED_CORE_TESTS))
self.assertEqual([test.id() for test in filtered], [retained_id])
self.assertEqual(len(SOURCE_COUPLED_CORE_TESTS), 4)
self.assertEqual(len(SOURCE_COUPLED_CORE_TESTS), 5)
def test_release_entrypoint_uses_artifact_checks_and_filtered_core_suite(self) -> None:
meta_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
@@ -89,8 +92,76 @@ class ReleaseIntegrationTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertLess(artifact_check, core_tests)
self.assertLess(core_tests, module_tests)
self.assertNotIn("unittest discover", script)
self.assertNotIn('"$PYTHON" -m unittest \\\n tests.test_module_system', script)
def test_tagged_module_runner_executes_pytest_functions_from_module_root(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-release-module-tests-") as temp_dir:
module_root = Path(temp_dir)
tests_root = module_root / "tests"
tests_root.mkdir()
marker = module_root / "pytest-function-ran"
(tests_root / "test_probe.py").write_text(
"""from pathlib import Path
import os
def test_pytest_style_function():
expected_root = Path(os.environ[\"GOVOPLAN_TEST_MODULE_ROOT\"])
assert Path.cwd() == expected_root
Path(os.environ[\"GOVOPLAN_TEST_MARKER\"]).write_text(\"ran\", encoding=\"utf-8\")
""",
encoding="utf-8",
)
with patch.dict(
os.environ,
{
"GOVOPLAN_TEST_MODULE_ROOT": str(module_root),
"GOVOPLAN_TEST_MARKER": str(marker),
},
):
status = run_module_release_tests(module_root)
self.assertEqual(status, 0)
self.assertEqual(marker.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), "ran")
def test_tagged_module_runner_skips_missing_test_tree(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-release-module-tests-") as temp_dir:
self.assertEqual(run_module_release_tests(Path(temp_dir)), 0)
def test_module_matrix_uses_artifact_aware_core_suite(self) -> None:
meta_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
script = (meta_root / "tools" / "checks" / "check-module-matrix.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
artifact_check = script.index('"$META_ROOT/tools/checks/release_integration.py" artifacts')
core_tests = script.index('"$META_ROOT/tools/checks/release_integration.py" core-tests')
self.assertLess(artifact_check, core_tests)
self.assertIn('--requirements "$META_ROOT/requirements-release.txt"', script)
self.assertIn('--core-root "$ROOT"', script)
self.assertNotIn('"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_module_system', script)
def test_module_matrix_installs_search_before_postgres_validation(self) -> None:
meta_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
workflow = (meta_root / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "module-matrix.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
install = workflow.index("pip install --no-deps ../govoplan-search")
validation = workflow.index("Validate Search against PostgreSQL")
self.assertLess(install, validation)
def test_release_workflow_installs_tagged_source_test_harness(self) -> None:
meta_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
workflow = (meta_root / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "release-integration.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
requirements = (meta_root / "requirements-release-tests.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
install = workflow.index("pip install -r requirements-release-tests.txt")
checks = workflow.index("bash tools/checks/check-release-integration.sh")
self.assertLess(install, checks)
self.assertIn("pytest>=9.0.3,<10", requirements)
self.assertNotIn("requirements-release-tests.txt", (meta_root / "requirements-release.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+32
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,38 @@ branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
self.assertEqual(migration.depends_on, ("core",))
self.assertEqual(migration.branch_labels, ())
def test_development_wrapper_uses_release_revision_metadata(self) -> None:
audit = load_audit_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="migration-audit-test-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
versions = root / "versions"
development = root / "dev_versions"
versions.mkdir()
development.mkdir()
release = versions / "1234_example.py"
release.write_text(
'revision = "1234"\n'
'down_revision = "base"\n'
'depends_on = "core"\n'
"branch_labels = None\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
wrapper = development / release.name
wrapper.write_text(
"revision = _migration.revision\n"
"down_revision = _migration.down_revision\n"
"depends_on = _migration.depends_on\n"
"branch_labels = _migration.branch_labels\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
migration = audit.parse_migration_file("govoplan-core", wrapper)
self.assertIsNotNone(migration)
self.assertEqual("1234", migration.revision)
self.assertEqual(("base",), migration.down_revisions)
self.assertEqual(("core",), migration.depends_on)
def test_release_baseline_matches_current_heads_in_strict_report(self) -> None:
audit = load_audit_module()
migrations = [
+128 -15
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ from govoplan_release.selective_planner import build_selective_release_plan # n
class ReleasePlanGuidanceTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_unprepared_target_has_structured_remediation_and_recommendation(
def test_unprepared_target_gets_bounded_version_and_commit_steps(
self,
) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
@@ -40,20 +40,25 @@ class ReleasePlanGuidanceTests(unittest.TestCase):
repo_versions={"govoplan-files": "1.2.4"},
)
self.assertEqual("blocked", plan.status)
self.assertFalse(plan.source_preflight_ready)
finding = next(
item
for item in plan.gate_findings
if item.code == "repository_version_alignment"
self.assertEqual("attention", plan.status)
self.assertTrue(plan.source_preflight_ready)
self.assertFalse(
any(
item.code == "repository_version_alignment"
for item in plan.gate_findings
)
)
self.assertEqual("govoplan-files", finding.repo)
self.assertEqual("pyproject.toml", finding.source)
self.assertEqual("1.2.4", finding.expected)
self.assertEqual("1.2.3", finding.actual)
self.assertIn("Regenerate lockfiles", finding.remediation)
self.assertEqual("resolve_release_gate", plan.recommended_action.id)
self.assertEqual("govoplan-files", plan.recommended_action.repo)
steps = {step.id: step for step in plan.dry_run_steps}
self.assertEqual("planned", steps["govoplan-files:version"].status)
self.assertEqual("planned", steps["govoplan-files:commit"].status)
self.assertIn("pyproject.toml", steps["govoplan-files:version"].detail)
self.assertTrue(
any(
"version metadata will be updated" in warning
for warning in plan.units[0].warnings
)
)
self.assertIn("python-package", plan.units[0].capabilities)
def test_aligned_target_recommends_non_mutating_tag_preview(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
@@ -74,6 +79,91 @@ class ReleasePlanGuidanceTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("preview_source_release", plan.recommended_action.id)
self.assertIn("Preview Tag + Publish", plan.recommended_action.remediation)
def test_mixed_plan_tags_modules_before_core_and_aligns_before_push(
self,
) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
workspace = Path(temp_dir)
for repo_name in ("govoplan-core", "govoplan-files"):
repo_path = workspace / repo_name
repo_path.mkdir()
(repo_path / "pyproject.toml").write_text(
f'[project]\nname = "{repo_name}"\nversion = "1.2.3"\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
repositories = tuple(
RepositorySnapshot(
spec=RepositorySpec(
name=repo_name,
category="core" if repo_name == "govoplan-core" else "module",
subtype="platform" if repo_name == "govoplan-core" else "infrastructure",
remote=f"git@example.test:GovOPlaN/{repo_name}.git",
path=repo_name,
),
absolute_path=str(workspace / repo_name),
exists=True,
is_git=True,
has_head=True,
branch="main",
versions=VersionSnapshot(pyproject="1.2.3"),
local_target_tag_exists=False,
)
for repo_name in ("govoplan-core", "govoplan-files")
)
base = dashboard(workspace=workspace, version="1.2.3")
mixed = ReleaseDashboard(
generated_at=base.generated_at,
meta_root=base.meta_root,
workspace_root=base.workspace_root,
target_version=None,
target_tag=None,
online=False,
include_migrations=False,
summary=DashboardSummary(
repository_count=2,
missing_count=0,
dirty_count=0,
ahead_count=0,
behind_count=0,
no_head_count=0,
error_count=0,
safe_directory_count=0,
local_target_tag_missing_count=0,
status="ready",
),
repositories=repositories,
catalog=base.catalog,
)
plan = build_selective_release_plan(
mixed,
selected_repos=("govoplan-core", "govoplan-files"),
repo_versions={
"govoplan-core": "1.2.3",
"govoplan-files": "1.2.3",
},
)
self.assertEqual(
["govoplan-files", "govoplan-core"],
[unit.repo for unit in plan.units],
)
step_ids = [step.id for step in plan.dry_run_steps]
self.assertLess(
step_ids.index("govoplan-files:tag"),
step_ids.index("govoplan-core:tag"),
)
self.assertLess(
step_ids.index("govoplan-core:tag"),
step_ids.index("release:alignment"),
)
self.assertLess(
step_ids.index("release:alignment"),
step_ids.index("govoplan-files:push"),
)
self.assertEqual("release:install-verify", step_ids[-1])
core = next(unit for unit in plan.units if unit.repo == "govoplan-core")
self.assertIn("core-release-bundle", core.capabilities)
def test_malformed_version_metadata_is_a_structured_blocker(self) -> None:
cases = (
("package.json", "{not-json\n", "JSONDecodeError"),
@@ -149,6 +239,29 @@ class ReleasePlanGuidanceTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn('pill("recommended next", recommendationKind)', webui)
self.assertIn("<strong>Remediation:</strong>", webui)
def test_webui_projects_release_state_into_a_guided_workflow(self) -> None:
webui = (RELEASE_ROOT / "webui" / "index.html").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for phase in (
"Inspect",
"Targets",
"Validate",
"Source",
"Package",
"Publish",
"Verify",
):
self.assertIn(f'label: "{phase}"', webui)
self.assertIn("releaseWorkflowPhases", webui)
self.assertIn("workflowPrimaryAction", webui)
self.assertIn("data-run-step-id", webui)
self.assertIn("invalidateReleaseDraft", webui)
self.assertIn("Installation Verification", webui)
self.assertIn("receipt-bound local gate", webui)
self.assertIn('step.id === "release:install-verify"', webui)
self.assertIn('const inspectionNotices = (summary.missing_count || 0)', webui)
self.assertIn('(summary.repository_count || 0) === 0', webui)
def dashboard(*, workspace: Path, version: str) -> ReleaseDashboard:
repo = RepositorySnapshot(
@@ -156,7 +269,7 @@ def dashboard(*, workspace: Path, version: str) -> ReleaseDashboard:
name="govoplan-files",
category="module",
subtype="infrastructure",
remote="git@example.test:add-ideas/govoplan-files.git",
remote="git@example.test:GovOPlaN/govoplan-files.git",
path="govoplan-files",
),
absolute_path=str(workspace / "govoplan-files"),
+30
View File
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ def add_scoped_workflow_manifest(repo: Path) -> None:
(backend / "__init__.py").write_text("", encoding="utf-8")
(backend / "manifest.py").write_text(
"""from govoplan_core.core.modules import DocumentationCondition, DocumentationTopic, ModuleManifest, PermissionDefinition
from govoplan_core.core.provider_governance import declared_module_architecture
def get_manifest():
@@ -368,6 +369,20 @@ def get_manifest():
conditions=(DocumentationCondition(required_scopes=("access:item:read",)),),
metadata={"kind": "workflow"},
),
DocumentationTopic(
id="access.admin.reference",
title="Administer access",
summary="Static administrator documentation for the release fixture.",
documentation_types=("admin",),
metadata={"kind": "reference"},
),
),
architecture=declared_module_architecture(
layer="institutional_foundation",
kind="foundation",
maturity="scaffold",
documentation_ref="pyproject.toml",
known_limits=("Release-test fixture only.",),
),
)
""",
@@ -387,6 +402,7 @@ def replace_with_unscoped_workflow_manifest(repo: Path) -> None:
manifest = repo / "src" / "govoplan_access" / "backend" / "manifest.py"
manifest.write_text(
"""from govoplan_core.core.modules import DocumentationTopic, ModuleManifest
from govoplan_core.core.provider_governance import declared_module_architecture
def get_manifest():
@@ -402,6 +418,20 @@ def get_manifest():
documentation_types=("user",),
metadata={"kind": "workflow"},
),
DocumentationTopic(
id="access.admin.reference",
title="Administer access",
summary="Static administrator documentation for the release fixture.",
documentation_types=("admin",),
metadata={"kind": "reference"},
),
),
architecture=declared_module_architecture(
layer="institutional_foundation",
kind="foundation",
maturity="scaffold",
documentation_ref="pyproject.toml",
known_limits=("Release-test fixture only.",),
),
)
""",
+105
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
RELEASE_ROOT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"
if str(RELEASE_ROOT) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(RELEASE_ROOT))
from govoplan_release.version_metadata import ( # noqa: E402
apply_version_metadata_mutations,
version_metadata_mutations,
)
class ReleaseVersionMetadataTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_updates_recognized_metadata_without_changing_interface_versions(
self,
) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
root = Path(temp_dir)
package = root / "src" / "govoplan_example"
backend = package / "backend"
webui = root / "webui"
backend.mkdir(parents=True)
webui.mkdir()
(root / "pyproject.toml").write_text(
'[project]\nname = "govoplan-example"\nversion = "1.2.3"\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
(root / "package.json").write_text(
'{"name":"root","version":"1.2.3"}\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
(webui / "package.json").write_text(
'{"name":"@govoplan/example-webui","version":"1.2.3"}\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
(webui / "package-lock.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"name": "@govoplan/example-webui",
"version": "1.2.3",
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "@govoplan/example-webui",
"version": "1.2.3",
}
},
}
)
+ "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
(backend / "manifest.py").write_text(
"def get_manifest():\n"
" return ModuleManifest(\n"
' id="example",\n'
' version="1.2.3",\n'
" provides_interfaces=(\n"
' ModuleInterfaceProvider(name="example.api", version="4.0"),\n'
" ),\n"
" )\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
(package / "__init__.py").write_text(
'__version__ = "1.2.3"\n',
encoding="utf-8",
)
preview = version_metadata_mutations(
root,
target_version="1.2.4",
)
changed = apply_version_metadata_mutations(
root,
target_version="1.2.4",
)
self.assertEqual(
{mutation.path for mutation in preview},
set(changed),
)
self.assertEqual(
"1.2.4",
json.loads((webui / "package-lock.json").read_text())[
"packages"
][""]["version"],
)
manifest = (backend / "manifest.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn('version="1.2.4"', manifest)
self.assertIn('version="4.0"', manifest)
self.assertEqual(
'__version__ = "1.2.4"\n',
(package / "__init__.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+443
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
SCRIPT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "repo" / "bootstrap-repositories.py"
def load_bootstrap_module():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("bootstrap_repositories", SCRIPT)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
raise RuntimeError(f"Could not load {SCRIPT}")
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
sys.modules[spec.name] = module
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
class RepositoryBootstrapTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_public_https_transport_rewrites_registered_gitea_remotes(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
self.assertEqual(
"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
bootstrap.clone_remote(
"git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
transport=bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
),
)
self.assertEqual(
"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
bootstrap.clone_remote(
"ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
transport=bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
),
)
self.assertEqual(
"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
bootstrap.clone_remote(
"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
transport=bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
),
)
def test_registered_transport_preserves_the_manifest_remote(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
remote = "git@example.test:private/repository.git"
self.assertEqual(
remote,
bootstrap.clone_remote(
remote,
transport=bootstrap.REGISTERED_TRANSPORT,
),
)
def test_public_https_transport_fails_closed_for_other_hosts(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
unsafe_remotes = (
"git@example.test:GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
"https://token@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
"https://git.add-ideas.de:443/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
"https://git.add-ideas.de/add-ideas/../govoplan-core.git",
"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git?ref=main",
"ssh://root@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
)
for remote in unsafe_remotes:
with self.subTest(remote=remote), self.assertRaises(ValueError):
bootstrap.clone_remote(
remote,
transport=bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
)
def test_main_clones_missing_repositories_over_public_https(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-bootstrap-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
parent = root / "checkouts"
parent.mkdir()
root.joinpath("repositories.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"default_parent": str(parent),
"repositories": [
{
"name": "govoplan-core",
"path": "govoplan-core",
"remote": (
"git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git"
),
}
],
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
with (
patch.object(bootstrap, "ROOT", root),
patch.object(bootstrap.subprocess, "run") as runner,
):
status = bootstrap.main(
[
"--parent",
str(parent),
"--transport",
bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
]
)
self.assertEqual(0, status)
runner.assert_called_once_with(
[
"git",
"-c",
"credential.helper=",
"clone",
"--",
"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
str(parent / "govoplan-core"),
],
check=True,
env=runner.call_args.kwargs["env"],
)
environment = runner.call_args.kwargs["env"]
self.assertEqual("/bin/false", environment["GIT_ASKPASS"])
self.assertEqual("0", environment["GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT"])
def test_checkout_auth_is_forwarded_without_entering_clone_arguments(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
environment = {
"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "1",
"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "url.https://example.test/.insteadOf",
"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": "ssh://example.test/",
}
auth_header = "AUTHORIZATION: basic c2hvcnQtbGl2ZWQtam9iLXRva2Vu"
with patch.object(
bootstrap.subprocess,
"run",
return_value=bootstrap.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
args=[],
returncode=0,
stdout=auth_header + "\n",
),
) as runner:
bootstrap._add_checkout_auth(environment, root=Path("/workspace/meta"))
runner.assert_called_once_with(
[
"git",
"-C",
"/workspace/meta",
"config",
"--local",
"--get",
bootstrap.GITEA_CHECKOUT_AUTH_KEY,
],
check=False,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
self.assertEqual("2", environment["GIT_CONFIG_COUNT"])
self.assertEqual(
bootstrap.GITEA_CHECKOUT_AUTH_KEY,
environment["GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1"],
)
self.assertEqual(auth_header, environment["GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1"])
def test_checkout_auth_fails_closed_when_checkout_did_not_persist_it(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
with (
patch.object(
bootstrap.subprocess,
"run",
return_value=bootstrap.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
args=[],
returncode=1,
stdout="",
),
),
self.assertRaisesRegex(
ValueError, "checkout authentication is unavailable"
),
):
bootstrap._add_checkout_auth({}, root=Path("/workspace/meta"))
def test_main_validates_every_remote_before_cloning(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-bootstrap-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
parent = root / "checkouts"
parent.mkdir()
root.joinpath("repositories.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"default_parent": str(parent),
"repositories": [
{
"name": "govoplan-core",
"path": "govoplan-core",
"remote": (
"git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git"
),
},
{
"name": "unsafe",
"path": "unsafe",
"remote": "git@example.test:private/unsafe.git",
},
],
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
with (
patch.object(bootstrap, "ROOT", root),
patch.object(bootstrap.subprocess, "run") as runner,
self.assertRaises(ValueError),
):
bootstrap.main(
[
"--parent",
str(parent),
"--transport",
bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
]
)
runner.assert_not_called()
def test_main_preserves_an_explicit_private_repository_transport(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-bootstrap-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
parent = root / "checkouts"
parent.mkdir()
root.joinpath("repositories.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"default_parent": str(parent),
"repositories": [
{
"name": "website",
"path": "website",
"remote": (
"git@git.add-ideas.de:"
"add-ideas/addideas-govoplan-website.git"
),
"bootstrap_transport": (bootstrap.REGISTERED_TRANSPORT),
}
],
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
with (
patch.object(bootstrap, "ROOT", root),
patch.object(bootstrap.subprocess, "run") as runner,
):
status = bootstrap.main(
[
"--parent",
str(parent),
"--transport",
bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
]
)
self.assertEqual(0, status)
command = runner.call_args.args[0]
self.assertEqual(
"git@git.add-ideas.de:add-ideas/addideas-govoplan-website.git",
command[-2],
)
def test_main_limits_bootstrap_to_selected_repositories(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-bootstrap-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
parent = root / "checkouts"
parent.mkdir()
root.joinpath("repositories.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"default_parent": str(parent),
"repositories": [
{
"name": name,
"path": name,
"remote": (f"git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/{name}.git"),
}
for name in ("govoplan-core", "govoplan-poll")
],
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
for repository_filter in (
["--repo", "govoplan-core"],
["--exclude-repo", "govoplan-poll"],
):
with (
self.subTest(repository_filter=repository_filter),
patch.object(bootstrap, "ROOT", root),
patch.object(bootstrap.subprocess, "run") as runner,
):
status = bootstrap.main(
[
"--parent",
str(parent),
"--transport",
bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
*repository_filter,
]
)
self.assertEqual(0, status)
runner.assert_called_once()
self.assertEqual(
"https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git",
runner.call_args.args[0][-2],
)
def test_main_rejects_unknown_or_conflicting_repository_filters(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-bootstrap-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
parent = root / "checkouts"
parent.mkdir()
root.joinpath("repositories.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"default_parent": str(parent),
"repositories": [
{
"name": "govoplan-core",
"path": "govoplan-core",
"remote": (
"git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git"
),
}
],
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
with (
patch.object(bootstrap, "ROOT", root),
patch.object(bootstrap.subprocess, "run") as runner,
):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "unknown registered"):
bootstrap.main(["--repo", "govoplan-missing"])
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "selected and excluded"):
bootstrap.main(
[
"--repo",
"govoplan-core",
"--exclude-repo",
"govoplan-core",
]
)
runner.assert_not_called()
def test_check_reports_missing_without_cloning(self) -> None:
bootstrap = load_bootstrap_module()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-bootstrap-") as directory:
root = Path(directory)
parent = root / "checkouts"
parent.mkdir()
root.joinpath("repositories.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"default_parent": str(parent),
"repositories": [
{
"name": "govoplan-core",
"path": "govoplan-core",
"remote": (
"git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan-core.git"
),
}
],
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
with (
patch.object(bootstrap, "ROOT", root),
patch.object(bootstrap.subprocess, "run") as runner,
):
status = bootstrap.main(
[
"--check",
"--parent",
str(parent),
"--transport",
bootstrap.PUBLIC_HTTPS_TRANSPORT,
]
)
self.assertEqual(1, status)
runner.assert_not_called()
def test_ci_bootstrap_reuses_checkout_auth_and_excludes_registered_transport_repositories(
self,
) -> None:
manifest = json.loads(
(META_ROOT / "repositories.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
)
registered_only = {
entry["name"]
for entry in manifest["repositories"]
if entry.get("bootstrap_transport") == "registered"
}
self.assertTrue(registered_only)
for workflow in sorted((META_ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows").glob("*.yml")):
contents = workflow.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
if (
"bootstrap-repositories.py" not in contents
or "--transport public-https" not in contents
):
continue
with self.subTest(workflow=workflow.name):
self.assertIn("--reuse-checkout-auth", contents)
for repository in registered_only:
self.assertIn(
f"--exclude-repo {repository}",
contents,
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
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from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
import hashlib
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(META_ROOT / "tools" / "deployment"))
sys.path.insert(0, str(META_ROOT / "tools" / "release"))
from govoplan_deploy.distribution import ( # noqa: E402
DistributionError,
canonical_signed_payload,
verify_manifest,
verify_manifest_binding,
verify_offline_image_index,
)
class RuntimeDistributionTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.now = datetime(2026, 8, 3, tzinfo=UTC)
self.private = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
public = self.private.public_key().public_bytes(
serialization.Encoding.PEM,
serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
).decode("ascii")
self.keyring = {
"schema_version": "1",
"purpose": "govoplan-runtime-distribution",
"keys": [
{
"key_id": "release-1",
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"status": "active",
"public_key_pem": public,
"not_before": (self.now - timedelta(days=1)).isoformat(),
"expires_at": (self.now + timedelta(days=365)).isoformat(),
}
],
}
def test_verifies_signature_and_exact_runtime_binding(self) -> None:
payload = self._manifest()
key_id = verify_manifest(
payload,
self.keyring,
expected_channel="stable",
now=self.now,
)
verify_manifest_binding(
payload,
channel="stable",
version="1.2.3",
api_image=payload["images"]["api"]["index"],
web_image=payload["images"]["web"]["index"],
enabled_modules=("access", "files"),
composition_sha256="c" * 64,
dependencies=payload["dependencies"],
)
self.assertEqual("release-1", key_id)
def test_tamper_expiry_revocation_and_unknown_key_fail_closed(self) -> None:
payload = self._manifest()
payload["composition"]["module_ids"].append("mail")
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "signature verification"):
verify_manifest(payload, self.keyring, now=self.now)
expired = self._manifest()
expired["expires_at"] = (self.now - timedelta(seconds=1)).isoformat()
expired["signatures"] = [self._signature(expired)]
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "expired"):
verify_manifest(expired, self.keyring, now=self.now)
revoked = self._manifest()
revoked["revoked"] = True
revoked["signatures"] = [self._signature(revoked)]
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "revoked"):
verify_manifest(revoked, self.keyring, now=self.now)
unknown = self._manifest()
unknown["signatures"][0]["key_id"] = "other-key"
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "active trusted key"):
verify_manifest(unknown, self.keyring, now=self.now)
def test_offline_image_index_is_complete_and_digest_bound(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-offline-images-") as value:
root = Path(value)
api = root / "api.oci.tar"
web = root / "web.oci.tar"
api.write_bytes(b"api archive")
web.write_bytes(b"web archive")
api_ref = "registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "a" * 64
web_ref = "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "b" * 64
index = {
"schema_version": "1",
"images": [
{
"reference": api_ref,
"archive": api.name,
"sha256": hashlib.sha256(api.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
},
{
"reference": web_ref,
"archive": web.name,
"sha256": hashlib.sha256(web.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
},
],
}
paths = verify_offline_image_index(
index,
root=root,
expected_references=(api_ref, web_ref),
)
self.assertEqual((api, web), paths)
index["images"][1]["sha256"] = "0" * 64
with self.assertRaisesRegex(DistributionError, "digest mismatch"):
verify_offline_image_index(
index,
root=root,
expected_references=(api_ref, web_ref),
)
def _manifest(self) -> dict[str, object]:
artifact = {"url": "https://downloads.example.test/artifact.json", "sha256": "d" * 64}
manifest: dict[str, object] = {
"schema_version": "1",
"channel": "stable",
"sequence": 1,
"version": "1.2.3",
"issued_at": (self.now - timedelta(minutes=1)).isoformat(),
"expires_at": (self.now + timedelta(days=30)).isoformat(),
"revoked": False,
"deployer": {
"url": "https://downloads.example.test/govoplan-deploy.pyz",
"sha256": "e" * 64,
},
"images": {
"api": {
"index": "registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "a" * 64,
"platforms": {
"linux/amd64": "registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "1" * 64,
"linux/arm64": "registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "2" * 64,
},
"sbom": dict(artifact),
"provenance": dict(artifact),
},
"web": {
"index": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "b" * 64,
"platforms": {
"linux/amd64": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "3" * 64,
"linux/arm64": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "4" * 64,
},
"sbom": dict(artifact),
"provenance": dict(artifact),
},
},
"dependencies": {
"postgres": "docker.io/library/postgres@sha256:" + "5" * 64,
"redis": "docker.io/library/redis@sha256:" + "6" * 64,
"load_balancer": "docker.io/library/haproxy@sha256:" + "7" * 64,
},
"composition": {
"sha256": "c" * 64,
"module_ids": ["access", "files"],
"packages": [
{
"name": "govoplan-core",
"version": "1.2.3",
"wheel_sha256": "8" * 64,
}
],
},
}
manifest["signatures"] = [self._signature(manifest)]
return manifest
def _signature(self, payload: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, str]:
return {
"key_id": "release-1",
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"value": base64.b64encode(
self.private.sign(canonical_signed_payload(payload))
).decode("ascii"),
}
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
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from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import importlib.util
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import shutil
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
from urllib.error import HTTPError
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
def _load(name: str, path: Path):
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, path)
assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
sys.modules[name] = module
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
OCI = _load("resolve_oci_platforms", ROOT / "tools/release/resolve-oci-platforms.py")
FINALIZE = _load(
"finalize_runtime_distribution",
ROOT / "tools/release/finalize-runtime-distribution.py",
)
DEPLOYER_BUILD = _load(
"build_deployer_zipapp",
ROOT / "tools/deployment/build-deployer-zipapp.py",
)
PUBLISH = _load(
"publish_runtime_release",
ROOT / "tools/release/publish-runtime-release.py",
)
class RuntimeDistributionBuildTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_deployment_zipapp_is_reproducible_across_source_mtimes(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-reproducible-zipapp-") as value:
root = Path(value)
source = root / "source"
shutil.copytree(ROOT / "tools/deployment", source)
first = root / "first.pyz"
second = root / "second.pyz"
original_root = DEPLOYER_BUILD.ROOT
try:
DEPLOYER_BUILD.ROOT = source
self.assertEqual(0, DEPLOYER_BUILD.main(["--output", str(first)]))
for path in source.rglob("*.py"):
os.utime(path, (2_000_000_000, 2_000_000_000))
self.assertEqual(0, DEPLOYER_BUILD.main(["--output", str(second)]))
finally:
DEPLOYER_BUILD.ROOT = original_root
self.assertEqual(first.read_bytes(), second.read_bytes())
def test_workflow_signs_with_the_release_environment(self) -> None:
workflow = (ROOT / ".gitea/workflows/runtime-distribution.yml").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
self.assertIn(
".runtime-build/bin/python tools/release/generate-runtime-distribution.py",
workflow,
)
self.assertNotIn(
"\n python tools/release/generate-runtime-distribution.py",
workflow,
)
def test_workflow_rejects_missing_or_mutable_image_inputs_before_build(self) -> None:
workflow = (ROOT / ".gitea/workflows/runtime-distribution.yml").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
validation = workflow.index("- name: Validate immutable release inputs")
bootstrap = workflow.index("- name: Bootstrap release sources")
self.assertLess(validation, bootstrap)
self.assertIn('image_pattern = re.compile(r"^[^@\\s]+@sha256:', workflow)
for input_name in (
"python_image",
"nginx_image",
"postgres_image",
"redis_image",
"load_balancer_image",
"managed_ingress_image",
"garage_image",
"test_mail_image",
"binfmt_image",
):
self.assertIn(f"inputs.{input_name}", workflow)
def test_api_runtime_points_core_at_packaged_migration_scripts(self) -> None:
dockerfile = (ROOT / "tools/release/runtime/Dockerfile.api").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
self.assertIn(
"GOVOPLAN_CORE_SOURCE_ROOT=/opt/govoplan/runtime/govoplan_core_runtime",
dockerfile,
)
def test_web_runtime_uses_only_writable_tmpfs_for_nginx_temp_files(self) -> None:
nginx = (ROOT / "tools/release/runtime/nginx.conf").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
for temporary_path in (
"client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;",
"fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;",
"proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;",
"scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;",
"uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;",
):
self.assertIn(temporary_path, nginx)
def test_workflow_verifies_portable_bootstrap_artifacts_before_execution(
self,
) -> None:
workflow = (ROOT / ".gitea/workflows/runtime-distribution.yml").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
self.assertIn(
"(cd runtime-output && sha256sum govoplan-deploy.pyz > "
"govoplan-deploy.pyz.sha256)",
workflow,
)
self.assertIn("openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin", workflow)
self.assertIn("govoplan-deploy.tampered.pyz", workflow)
self.assertLess(
workflow.index("openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin"),
workflow.index("python runtime-output/govoplan-deploy.pyz init"),
)
def test_workflow_retains_both_platform_runtime_smoke_receipts(self) -> None:
workflow = (ROOT / ".gitea/workflows/runtime-distribution.yml").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
self.assertIn('for ARCH in amd64 arm64; do', workflow)
self.assertIn("tools/checks/runtime-image-smoke.py", workflow)
self.assertIn("Resolve managed dependency platform images", workflow)
self.assertIn("--postgres-metadata", workflow)
self.assertIn("--redis-metadata", workflow)
self.assertIn("Register arm64 execution for runtime smoke", workflow)
self.assertIn(
'docker run --privileged --rm "$BINFMT_IMAGE" --install arm64',
workflow,
)
self.assertIn("runtime-smoke-amd64.json", workflow)
self.assertIn("runtime-smoke-arm64.json", workflow)
self.assertIn(
"jq -r '.platforms[\"linux/amd64\"]' runtime-output/api-metadata.json",
workflow,
)
self.assertNotIn(".platforms[\\\"linux/amd64\\\"]", workflow)
def test_workflow_binds_the_release_tag_to_the_workflow_commit(self) -> None:
workflow = (ROOT / ".gitea/workflows/runtime-distribution.yml").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
publisher = (ROOT / "tools/release/publish-runtime-release.py").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
self.assertIn("SOURCE_COMMIT: ${{ gitea.sha }}", workflow)
self.assertIn('--target-commit "$SOURCE_COMMIT"', workflow)
self.assertIn('"target_commitish": target_commit', publisher)
self.assertIn("self._resolve_commit(tag) != target_commit", publisher)
def test_runtime_publisher_rejects_a_tag_on_another_commit(self) -> None:
publisher = PUBLISH.GiteaReleasePublisher(
base_url="https://git.example.test",
owner="GovOPlaN",
repo="govoplan",
token="secret",
)
target = "1" * 40
with (
patch.object(
publisher,
"_resolve_commit",
side_effect=(target, "2" * 40),
),
self.assertRaisesRegex(PUBLISH.PublishError, "another commit"),
):
publisher.release(
tag="v1.2.3",
target_commit=target,
title="Release",
body="Body",
)
def test_runtime_publisher_creates_the_tag_at_the_exact_commit(self) -> None:
publisher = PUBLISH.GiteaReleasePublisher(
base_url="https://git.example.test",
owner="GovOPlaN",
repo="govoplan",
token="secret",
)
target = "1" * 40
requests: list[tuple[str, dict[str, object] | None]] = []
def request(method: str, _url: str, **kwargs):
payload = kwargs.get("payload")
requests.append((method, payload))
if method == "GET":
raise HTTPError(_url, 404, "not found", {}, None)
return {"id": 1}
with (
patch.object(
publisher,
"_resolve_commit",
side_effect=(target, None, target),
),
patch.object(publisher, "_json", side_effect=request),
):
release = publisher.release(
tag="v1.2.3",
target_commit=target,
title="Release",
body="Body",
)
self.assertEqual({"id": 1}, release)
self.assertEqual("POST", requests[-1][0])
assert requests[-1][1] is not None
self.assertEqual(target, requests[-1][1]["target_commitish"])
def test_resolves_platforms_and_builds_evidence_descriptor(self) -> None:
index = {
"schemaVersion": 2,
"manifests": [
{
"digest": "sha256:" + "1" * 64,
"platform": {"os": "linux", "architecture": "amd64"},
},
{
"digest": "sha256:" + "2" * 64,
"platform": {"os": "linux", "architecture": "arm64"},
},
],
}
metadata = OCI.resolve_platforms(
index,
repository="registry.example/govoplan/api",
index_digest="sha256:" + "a" * 64,
)
self.assertEqual(
"registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "1" * 64,
metadata["platforms"]["linux/amd64"],
)
dependency_metadata = OCI.resolve_platforms(
index,
repository="registry.example:5000/library/postgres:16-alpine",
index_digest="sha256:" + "a" * 64,
)
self.assertEqual(
"registry.example:5000/library/postgres@sha256:" + "2" * 64,
dependency_metadata["platforms"]["linux/arm64"],
)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-runtime-finalize-") as value:
root = Path(value)
composition = {
"schema_version": "1",
"python": {
"packages": [
{
"package": "govoplan-core",
"version": "1.2.3",
"sha256": "8" * 64,
}
],
"module_ids": ["access"],
"wheelhouse_sha256": "9" * 64,
"wheel_count": 1,
},
"web": {"sha256": "7" * 64, "file_count": 4},
}
(root / "composition.json").write_text(json.dumps(composition))
(root / "api.json").write_text(json.dumps(metadata))
web_metadata = {
"index": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "b" * 64,
"platforms": {
"linux/amd64": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "3" * 64,
"linux/arm64": "registry.example/govoplan/web@sha256:" + "4" * 64,
},
}
(root / "web.json").write_text(json.dumps(web_metadata))
deployer = root / "govoplan-deploy.pyz"
deployer.write_bytes(b"zipapp")
args = argparse.Namespace(
composition=root / "composition.json",
api_metadata=root / "api.json",
web_metadata=root / "web.json",
deployer=deployer,
deployer_url="https://downloads.example/govoplan-deploy.pyz",
artifact_base_url="https://downloads.example/runtime/v1.2.3",
source_commit="f" * 40,
version="1.2.3",
channel="stable",
sequence=1,
expires_days=30,
dependency=[
"postgres=docker.io/library/postgres@sha256:" + "5" * 64,
"redis=docker.io/library/redis@sha256:" + "6" * 64,
],
output_directory=root / "evidence",
descriptor=root / "descriptor.json",
)
descriptor = FINALIZE.finalize(args)
self.assertEqual(["access"], descriptor["composition"]["module_ids"])
self.assertEqual(
"registry.example/govoplan/api@sha256:" + "a" * 64,
descriptor["images"]["api"]["index"],
)
self.assertTrue((root / "evidence/api-sbom.cdx.json").is_file())
self.assertTrue((root / "evidence/web-provenance.json").is_file())
def test_rejects_incomplete_oci_index(self) -> None:
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "linux/amd64 and linux/arm64"):
OCI.resolve_platforms(
{
"manifests": [
{
"digest": "sha256:" + "1" * 64,
"platform": {"os": "linux", "architecture": "amd64"},
}
]
},
repository="registry.example/govoplan/api",
index_digest="sha256:" + "a" * 64,
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
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from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
import zipfile
SCRIPT = (
Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
/ "tools"
/ "release"
/ "prepare-runtime-context.py"
)
SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("prepare_runtime_context", SCRIPT)
assert SPEC is not None and SPEC.loader is not None
MODULE = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
sys.modules[SPEC.name] = MODULE
SPEC.loader.exec_module(MODULE)
class RuntimeImageContextTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_builds_deterministic_network_free_context(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-runtime-context-") as value:
root = Path(value)
wheelhouse = root / "input-wheels"
web = root / "web"
wheelhouse.mkdir()
web.mkdir()
self._wheel(
wheelhouse / "govoplan_core-1.2.3-py3-none-any.whl",
package="govoplan-core",
version="1.2.3",
module_ids=(),
)
self._wheel(
wheelhouse / "govoplan_files-1.2.3-py3-none-any.whl",
package="govoplan-files",
version="1.2.3",
module_ids=("files",),
)
self._wheel(
wheelhouse / "sqlalchemy-2.0.0-py3-none-any.whl",
package="SQLAlchemy",
version="2.0.0",
module_ids=(),
)
(web / "index.html").write_text("<main>GovOPlaN</main>\n", encoding="utf-8")
composition = MODULE.prepare_context(
wheelhouse=wheelhouse,
web_dist=web,
output=root / "context",
required_modules=("files",),
source_date_epoch=1_700_000_000,
)
self.assertEqual(["files"], composition["python"]["module_ids"])
self.assertEqual(2, composition["python"]["wheel_count"])
requirements = (root / "context" / "requirements-runtime.txt").read_text()
self.assertEqual(
"govoplan-core[server]==1.2.3\ngovoplan-files==1.2.3\n",
requirements,
)
published = json.loads(
(
root
/ "context"
/ "web-dist"
/ ".well-known"
/ "govoplan-composition.json"
).read_text()
)
self.assertEqual(composition, published)
def test_rejects_missing_required_module(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-runtime-context-") as value:
root = Path(value)
wheelhouse = root / "wheels"
web = root / "web"
wheelhouse.mkdir()
web.mkdir()
self._wheel(
wheelhouse / "govoplan_core-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl",
package="govoplan-core",
version="1.0.0",
module_ids=(),
)
(web / "index.html").write_text("ok", encoding="utf-8")
with self.assertRaisesRegex(MODULE.ContextError, "missing required"):
MODULE.prepare_context(
wheelhouse=wheelhouse,
web_dist=web,
output=root / "context",
required_modules=("mail",),
)
def test_rejects_symlinked_web_payload(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-runtime-context-") as value:
root = Path(value)
wheelhouse = root / "wheels"
web = root / "web"
wheelhouse.mkdir()
web.mkdir()
self._wheel(
wheelhouse / "govoplan_core-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl",
package="govoplan-core",
version="1.0.0",
module_ids=(),
)
outside = root / "outside"
outside.write_text("not part of dist", encoding="utf-8")
(web / "index.html").symlink_to(outside)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(MODULE.ContextError, "symlink"):
MODULE.prepare_context(
wheelhouse=wheelhouse,
web_dist=web,
output=root / "context",
)
@staticmethod
def _wheel(
path: Path,
*,
package: str,
version: str,
module_ids: tuple[str, ...],
) -> None:
dist_info = package.replace("-", "_") + f"-{version}.dist-info"
with zipfile.ZipFile(path, "w") as archive:
archive.writestr(
f"{dist_info}/METADATA",
f"Metadata-Version: 2.1\nName: {package}\nVersion: {version}\n",
)
if module_ids:
rows = "\n".join(
f"{module_id} = example.module:manifest"
for module_id in module_ids
)
archive.writestr(
f"{dist_info}/entry_points.txt",
f"[govoplan.modules]\n{rows}\n",
)
archive.writestr(f"{package.replace('-', '_')}/__init__.py", "")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+86
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import json
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
SCRIPT = ROOT / "tools/checks/runtime-image-smoke.py"
SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("runtime_image_smoke", SCRIPT)
assert SPEC is not None and SPEC.loader is not None
MODULE = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
sys.modules[SPEC.name] = MODULE
SPEC.loader.exec_module(MODULE)
class RuntimeImageSmokeTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_selects_the_exact_platform_digest(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-runtime-smoke-") as value:
path = Path(value) / "metadata.json"
path.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"index": "registry.example/api@sha256:" + "a" * 64,
"platforms": {
"linux/amd64": "registry.example/api@sha256:" + "1" * 64,
"linux/arm64": "registry.example/api@sha256:" + "2" * 64,
},
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
self.assertEqual(
"registry.example/api@sha256:" + "2" * 64,
MODULE.platform_image(path, "linux/arm64", "API"),
)
def test_rejects_mutable_or_missing_platform_images(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="govoplan-runtime-smoke-") as value:
path = Path(value) / "metadata.json"
path.write_text(
json.dumps({"platforms": {"linux/amd64": "registry.example/api:latest"}}),
encoding="utf-8",
)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(MODULE.SmokeError, "exact sha256"):
MODULE.platform_image(path, "linux/amd64", "API")
with self.assertRaisesRegex(MODULE.SmokeError, "exact sha256"):
MODULE.platform_image(path, "linux/arm64", "API")
def test_readiness_fails_immediately_when_container_exits(self) -> None:
exited = subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0, "false\n", "")
logs = subprocess.CompletedProcess(
[], 0, "fatal startup error db-secret\n", ""
)
with patch.object(MODULE, "_run", side_effect=(exited, logs)):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(
MODULE.SmokeError,
r"container exited before readiness: fatal startup error \[redacted\]",
):
MODULE._wait_for(
"WebUI",
lambda: self.fail("probe must not run for an exited container"),
timeout=60,
container="web",
redactions=("db-secret",),
)
def test_smoke_supplies_the_packaged_web_upstream_and_schema_contract(self) -> None:
source = SCRIPT.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn('"--network-alias",\n "load-balancer"', source)
self.assertIn("'core_system_settings'", source)
self.assertIn("'core_runtime_nodes'", source)
self.assertIn('if platform == "linux/arm64"', source)
self.assertIn('"ARM64-COW-BUG"', source)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+248
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import unittest
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
RESOLVER = (
META_ROOT / "tools" / "checks" / "security-audit" / "resolve_workspace_mount.py"
)
def load_resolver_module():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
"security_audit_mount_resolver",
RESOLVER,
)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
raise RuntimeError(f"Could not load {RESOLVER}")
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
sys.modules[spec.name] = module
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
class SecurityAuditMountResolverTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.resolver = load_resolver_module()
self.root = "/workspace/GovOPlaN/govoplan/govoplan"
self.workspace = "/workspace/GovOPlaN/govoplan"
def test_resolves_only_the_named_workspace_volume_for_both_scopes(self) -> None:
mounts = [
{
"Type": "bind",
"Source": "/var/run/docker.sock",
"Destination": "/var/run/docker.sock",
"RW": True,
},
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "actions-workspace",
"Source": "/var/lib/docker/volumes/actions-workspace/_data",
"Destination": self.workspace,
"RW": True,
},
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "actions-environment",
"Source": "/var/lib/docker/volumes/actions-environment/_data",
"Destination": "/var/run/act",
"RW": True,
},
]
for scope in ("current", "govoplan"):
with self.subTest(scope=scope):
self.assertEqual(
(f"type=volume,source=actions-workspace,target={self.workspace}"),
self.resolver.resolve_workspace_mount(
mounts,
root=self.root,
scope=scope,
reports_dir="audit-reports",
),
)
def test_resolves_a_workspace_bind_without_other_mounts(self) -> None:
mounts = [
{
"Type": "bind",
"Source": "/srv/gitea/actions/task-123",
"Destination": self.workspace,
"RW": True,
},
{
"Type": "bind",
"Source": "/var/run/docker.sock",
"Destination": "/var/run/docker.sock",
"RW": True,
},
]
self.assertEqual(
(f"type=bind,source=/srv/gitea/actions/task-123,target={self.workspace}"),
self.resolver.resolve_workspace_mount(
mounts,
root=self.root,
scope="govoplan",
reports_dir="audit-reports",
),
)
def test_nested_repository_mount_is_valid_only_for_current_scope(self) -> None:
mounts = [
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "all-repositories",
"Destination": self.workspace,
"RW": True,
},
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "current-repository",
"Destination": self.root,
"RW": True,
},
]
self.assertIn(
"source=current-repository",
self.resolver.resolve_workspace_mount(
mounts,
root=self.root,
scope="current",
reports_dir="audit-reports",
),
)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(
self.resolver.MountResolutionError,
"nested job-container mounts",
):
self.resolver.resolve_workspace_mount(
mounts,
root=self.root,
scope="govoplan",
reports_dir="audit-reports",
)
def test_rejects_unsafe_or_unusable_mount_layouts(self) -> None:
cases = {
"missing": [],
"path-boundary": [
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "wrong-workspace",
"Destination": "/workspace/GovOPlaN/govoplan-other",
"RW": True,
}
],
"read-only": [
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "actions-workspace",
"Destination": self.workspace,
"RW": False,
}
],
"ambiguous": [
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": name,
"Destination": self.workspace,
"RW": True,
}
for name in ("workspace-one", "workspace-two")
],
"scope-too-narrow": [
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "repository-only",
"Destination": self.root,
"RW": True,
}
],
}
for name, mounts in cases.items():
with (
self.subTest(name=name),
self.assertRaises(self.resolver.MountResolutionError),
):
self.resolver.resolve_workspace_mount(
mounts,
root=self.root,
scope="govoplan",
reports_dir="audit-reports",
)
def test_rejects_reports_outside_the_selected_workspace_mount(self) -> None:
mounts = [
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "actions-workspace",
"Destination": self.workspace,
"RW": True,
}
]
with self.assertRaisesRegex(
self.resolver.MountResolutionError,
"reports path .* outside",
):
self.resolver.resolve_workspace_mount(
mounts,
root=self.root,
scope="current",
reports_dir="/tmp/audit-reports",
)
def test_rejects_broad_or_sensitive_workspace_bind_sources(self) -> None:
for source in (
"/",
"/home",
"/var/run/docker.sock",
"/srv/../etc/shadow",
):
with (
self.subTest(source=source),
self.assertRaisesRegex(
self.resolver.MountResolutionError,
"too broad or sensitive",
),
):
self.resolver.resolve_workspace_mount(
[
{
"Type": "bind",
"Source": source,
"Destination": self.workspace,
"RW": True,
}
],
root=self.root,
scope="govoplan",
reports_dir="audit-reports",
)
with self.assertRaises(self.resolver.MountResolutionError):
self.resolver.resolve_workspace_mount(
[
{
"Type": "bind",
"Source": "//var/lib/workspace",
"Destination": self.workspace,
"RW": True,
}
],
root=self.root,
scope="govoplan",
reports_dir="audit-reports",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+308
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import unittest
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
AUDIT_SCRIPT = META_ROOT / "tools" / "checks" / "check-security-audit.sh"
CONTAINER_RUNNER = META_ROOT / "tools" / "checks" / "security-audit" / "run.sh"
class SecurityAuditWrapperTests(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -252,6 +253,12 @@ class SecurityAuditWrapperTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(0, manifest["overall_status"])
self.assertEqual(1, manifest["finding_status"])
self.assertEqual(0, manifest["execution_error_status"])
self.assertEqual("complete", manifest["coverage_status"])
scanner_results = {
result["id"]: result["status"]
for result in manifest["scanner_coverage"]["results"]
}
self.assertEqual("findings", scanner_results["semgrep"])
self.assertIn(
"Semgrep SAST\t1\tfindings", (reports / "step-status.tsv").read_text()
)
@@ -311,6 +318,86 @@ class SecurityAuditWrapperTests(unittest.TestCase):
)
self.assertEqual(1, self._manifest(invalid_reports)["execution_error_status"])
def test_missing_tool_is_machine_readable_and_strictly_enforced(self) -> None:
gitleaks_stub = self.stub_bin / "gitleaks"
disabled_stub = self.stub_bin / "gitleaks.disabled"
gitleaks_stub.rename(disabled_stub)
try:
result, reports = self._run(
"--report-only",
SECURITY_AUDIT_REQUIRE_TOOLS="0",
CI="false",
GITEA_ACTIONS="false",
)
self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode, result.stderr)
manifest = self._manifest(reports)
self.assertEqual("incomplete", manifest["coverage_status"])
self.assertEqual(["gitleaks"], manifest["scanner_coverage"]["incomplete"])
scanner_results = {
item["id"]: item for item in manifest["scanner_coverage"]["results"]
}
self.assertEqual("skipped", scanner_results["gitleaks"]["status"])
self.assertEqual(127, scanner_results["gitleaks"]["exit_code"])
self.assertIn(
"gitleaks\tmissing",
(reports / "tool-versions.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
)
strict_result, strict_reports = self._run(
"--strict",
SECURITY_AUDIT_REQUIRE_TOOLS="0",
CI="false",
GITEA_ACTIONS="false",
)
self.assertEqual(1, strict_result.returncode)
self.assertEqual(
"incomplete",
self._manifest(strict_reports)["coverage_status"],
)
ci_result, ci_reports = self._run(
"--report-only",
SECURITY_AUDIT_REQUIRE_TOOLS="0",
CI="true",
GITEA_ACTIONS="false",
)
self.assertEqual(1, ci_result.returncode)
self.assertEqual(
"incomplete",
self._manifest(ci_reports)["coverage_status"],
)
finally:
disabled_stub.rename(gitleaks_stub)
def test_full_mode_records_every_required_scanner(self) -> None:
self._install_full_mode_stubs()
result, reports = self._run("--report-only", mode="full")
self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode, result.stderr)
manifest = self._manifest(reports)
self.assertEqual("complete", manifest["coverage_status"])
required = manifest["scanner_coverage"]["required"]
results = manifest["scanner_coverage"]["results"]
self.assertEqual(
{
"semgrep",
"bandit",
"ruff-security",
"gitleaks",
"trivy",
"pip-audit",
"npm-audit",
"osv-scanner",
"jscpd",
"radon",
"xenon",
},
set(required),
)
self.assertEqual(set(required), {item["id"] for item in results})
self.assertTrue(all(item["status"] == "no-findings" for item in results))
def test_workspace_mutation_invalidates_the_audit(self) -> None:
result, reports = self._run(
"--report-only",
@@ -354,5 +441,226 @@ class SecurityAuditWrapperTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(set(manifest["reports"]), checksummed_paths)
class SecurityAuditContainerRunnerTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._temporary_directory = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(
prefix="govoplan-audit-runner-"
)
root = Path(self._temporary_directory.name)
self.stub_bin = root / "bin"
self.stub_bin.mkdir()
self.docker_log = root / "docker.jsonl"
docker_stub = self.stub_bin / "docker"
docker_stub.write_text(
textwrap.dedent(
"""\
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sys
arguments = sys.argv[1:]
with Path(os.environ["DOCKER_STUB_LOG"]).open(
"a", encoding="utf-8"
) as handle:
handle.write(json.dumps(arguments) + "\\n")
if arguments and arguments[0] == "version":
print("26.1.0")
if arguments[:2] == ["container", "inspect"]:
print(os.environ["DOCKER_STUB_MOUNTS"])
"""
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
docker_stub.chmod(0o755)
self.environment = os.environ.copy()
self.environment.update(
{
"DOCKER_STUB_LOG": str(self.docker_log),
"DOCKER_STUB_MOUNTS": "[]",
"PATH": f"{self.stub_bin}:{self.environment['PATH']}",
}
)
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._temporary_directory.cleanup()
def _run(
self,
*,
scope: str,
actions_mounts: object | None = None,
**environment_overrides: str,
) -> tuple[subprocess.CompletedProcess[str], list[list[str]]]:
self.docker_log.write_text("", encoding="utf-8")
environment = self.environment.copy()
environment.update(environment_overrides)
if actions_mounts is None:
environment.pop("GITEA_ACTIONS", None)
else:
environment["GITEA_ACTIONS"] = "true"
environment["DOCKER_STUB_MOUNTS"] = json.dumps(actions_mounts)
result = subprocess.run(
[
"bash",
str(CONTAINER_RUNNER),
"--mode",
"quick",
"--scope",
scope,
],
cwd=META_ROOT,
env=environment,
check=False,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
commands = [
json.loads(line)
for line in self.docker_log.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
]
return result, commands
def test_gitea_job_shares_only_its_workspace_mount(self) -> None:
mounts = [
{
"Type": "bind",
"Source": "/var/run/docker.sock",
"Destination": "/var/run/docker.sock",
"RW": True,
},
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "govoplan-actions-workspace",
"Destination": str(META_ROOT.parent),
"RW": True,
},
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "govoplan-actions-environment",
"Destination": "/var/run/act",
"RW": True,
},
]
container_id = subprocess.run(
["hostname"],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
).stdout.strip()
for scope in ("current", "govoplan"):
with self.subTest(scope=scope):
result, commands = self._run(scope=scope, actions_mounts=mounts)
self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode, result.stderr)
run_command = next(
command for command in commands if command[0] == "run"
)
inspect_command = next(
command
for command in commands
if command[:2] == ["container", "inspect"]
)
self.assertEqual(container_id, inspect_command[-1])
mount_index = run_command.index("--mount")
self.assertEqual(
(
"type=volume,source=govoplan-actions-workspace,"
f"target={META_ROOT.parent}"
),
run_command[mount_index + 1],
)
self.assertNotIn("--volumes-from", run_command)
self.assertNotIn("-v", run_command)
self.assertNotIn("/var/run/docker.sock", " ".join(run_command))
self.assertNotIn("/var/run/act", " ".join(run_command))
repository_roots = [
value
for value in run_command
if value.startswith("GOVOPLAN_REPOS_ROOT=")
]
expected_roots = (
[f"GOVOPLAN_REPOS_ROOT={META_ROOT.parent}"]
if scope == "govoplan"
else []
)
self.assertEqual(expected_roots, repository_roots)
self.assertIn("SECURITY_AUDIT_REQUIRE_TOOLS=1", run_command)
def test_gitea_job_passes_only_public_git_url_rewrites(self) -> None:
mounts = [
{
"Type": "volume",
"Name": "govoplan-actions-workspace",
"Destination": str(META_ROOT.parent),
"RW": True,
}
]
git_config = {
"GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "2",
"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": (
"url.https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan.insteadOf"
),
"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": "git@git.add-ideas.de:GovOPlaN/govoplan",
"GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1": (
"url.https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan.insteadOf"
),
"GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1": (
"ssh://git@git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan"
),
}
result, commands = self._run(
scope="govoplan",
actions_mounts=mounts,
**git_config,
)
self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode, result.stderr)
run_command = next(command for command in commands if command[0] == "run")
for key, value in git_config.items():
self.assertIn(f"{key}={value}", run_command)
def test_container_runner_rejects_non_url_git_configuration(self) -> None:
result, _commands = self._run(
scope="current",
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT="1",
GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0="credential.helper",
GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="!print-secret",
)
self.assertEqual(1, result.returncode)
self.assertIn(
"Only credential-free HTTPS Git insteadOf rewrites",
result.stderr,
)
def test_security_workflow_configures_nested_public_git_resolution(
self,
) -> None:
workflow = (
META_ROOT / ".gitea" / "workflows" / "security-audit.yml"
).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn('GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: "2"', workflow)
self.assertIn(
"url.https://git.add-ideas.de/GovOPlaN/govoplan.insteadOf",
workflow,
)
def test_non_actions_runner_keeps_the_scoped_bind_mount(self) -> None:
result, commands = self._run(scope="govoplan")
self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode, result.stderr)
run_command = next(command for command in commands if command[0] == "run")
bind_index = run_command.index("-v")
self.assertEqual(
f"{META_ROOT.parent}:/workspace",
run_command[bind_index + 1],
)
self.assertNotIn("--mount", run_command)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+64
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ from govoplan_release.version_alignment import ( # noqa: E402
repository_version_issues,
selected_repository_version_issues,
)
from govoplan_release.git_state import sanitized_git_environment # noqa: E402
from govoplan_release.model import ( # noqa: E402
CatalogSnapshot,
DashboardSummary,
@@ -398,6 +400,68 @@ class VersionAlignmentTests(unittest.TestCase):
)
self.assertTrue(all("must contain" in issue.message for issue in issues))
def test_annotated_release_tags_work_with_sanitized_git_configuration(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
workspace = Path(tmp)
meta = workspace / "govoplan"
core = workspace / "govoplan-core"
module = workspace / "govoplan-example"
meta.mkdir()
(core / "webui").mkdir(parents=True)
(module / "webui").mkdir(parents=True)
backend_ref = "git+ssh://git@example.test/acme/govoplan-example.git@v1.2.3"
webui_ref = "git+ssh://git@example.test/acme/govoplan-example.git#v1.2.3"
(meta / "requirements-release.txt").write_text(f"govoplan-example @ {backend_ref}\n")
(module / "pyproject.toml").write_text('[project]\nname="govoplan-example"\nversion="1.2.3"\n')
(module / "webui" / "package.json").write_text(
'{"name":"@govoplan/example-webui","version":"1.2.3"}\n'
)
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(module)], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(module), "config", "user.email", "test@example.test"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(module), "config", "user.name", "Test"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(module), "add", "pyproject.toml", "webui/package.json"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(module), "commit", "-qm", "release"], check=True)
subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", str(module), "tag", "-a", "v1.2.3", "-m", "Release v1.2.3"],
check=True,
)
tagged_commit = subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", str(module), "rev-parse", "refs/tags/v1.2.3^{commit}"],
check=True,
text=True,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
).stdout.strip()
dependencies = {"@govoplan/example-webui": webui_ref}
(core / "pyproject.toml").write_text('[project]\nname="govoplan-core"\nversion="2.0.0"\n')
(core / "webui" / "package.release.json").write_text(
json.dumps({"version": "2.0.0", "dependencies": dependencies})
)
(core / "webui" / "package-lock.release.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"packages": {
"": {"version": "2.0.0", "dependencies": dependencies},
"node_modules/@govoplan/example-webui": {
"version": "1.2.3",
"resolved": f"git+ssh://git@example.test/acme/govoplan-example.git#{tagged_commit}",
},
}
}
)
)
git_environment = sanitized_git_environment()
git_environment["GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER"] = "1"
with patch(
"govoplan_release.version_alignment.sanitized_git_environment",
return_value=git_environment,
):
composition_issues = release_composition_issues(meta, core_root=core)
core_issues = repository_version_issues(core)
self.assertEqual((), composition_issues)
self.assertEqual((), core_issues)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+42
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
import sys
import unittest
SCRIPT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "tools" / "checks" / "worker-runtime-drill.py"
SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("worker_runtime_drill", SCRIPT)
assert SPEC is not None and SPEC.loader is not None
MODULE = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
sys.modules[SPEC.name] = MODULE
SPEC.loader.exec_module(MODULE)
class WorkerRuntimeDrillTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_redacts_redis_credentials_and_query(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
"rediss://redis.example.test:6380/9",
MODULE._redacted_redis_url(
"rediss://worker:secret@redis.example.test:6380/9?ssl=true"
),
)
def test_worker_command_uses_solo_default_queue_for_deterministic_drill(self) -> None:
command = MODULE._worker_command("/usr/bin/python", "worker-a@%h")
self.assertEqual("/usr/bin/python", command[0])
self.assertIn("solo", command)
self.assertIn("default", command)
self.assertIn("worker-a@%h", command)
def test_rejects_implicit_or_non_redis_broker(self) -> None:
args = MODULE.build_parser().parse_args(["--redis-url", "memory://"])
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "explicit redis"):
MODULE.run_drill(args)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+363
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Issue and immediately verify a sanitized target-boundary proof."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
from copy import deepcopy
from datetime import UTC, datetime
import json
from pathlib import Path
import sys
META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
for tools_root in (
META_ROOT / "tools" / "assessments",
META_ROOT / "tools" / "release",
):
if str(tools_root) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(tools_root))
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization # noqa: E402
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import ( # noqa: E402
Ed25519PrivateKey,
)
from govoplan_assessment.atomic_io import ( # noqa: E402
AtomicJsonWriteError,
atomic_write_json,
)
from govoplan_assessment.boundary_evidence import ( # noqa: E402
issue_boundary_evidence,
)
from govoplan_assessment.capability_fit import review_capability_fit # noqa: E402
from govoplan_assessment.evidence import ( # noqa: E402
public_key_material_from_keyrings,
validate_payload,
)
MAX_INPUT_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--assessment", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument(
"--assessment-schema",
type=Path,
default=META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit.schema.json",
)
parser.add_argument("--catalog", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument("--keyring", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument("--trusted-keyring", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument("--installed-evidence", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument(
"--installed-evidence-schema",
type=Path,
default=META_ROOT / "docs" / "installed-composition-evidence.schema.json",
)
parser.add_argument("--installer-receipt", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument(
"--installer-receipt-schema",
type=Path,
default=META_ROOT / "docs" / "installer-receipt.schema.json",
)
parser.add_argument("--installer-authority-keyring", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument(
"--installer-authority-keyring-schema",
type=Path,
default=META_ROOT / "docs" / "installer-receipt-authority-keyring.schema.json",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--claims",
type=Path,
required=True,
help="Private target-run claim manifest; artifact paths are not published.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--claims-schema",
type=Path,
default=META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit-boundary-run.schema.json",
)
parser.add_argument("--authority-keyring", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument(
"--authority-keyring-schema",
type=Path,
default=META_ROOT
/ "docs"
/ "capability-fit-proof-authority-keyring.schema.json",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--signing-key",
action="append",
default=[],
required=True,
metavar="KEY_ID=/PATH/PRIVATE.pem",
help="Repeat for independent authorities needed to cover all claim scopes.",
)
parser.add_argument("--expected-external-provider-subject")
parser.add_argument("--output", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument("--review-output", type=Path, required=True)
parser.add_argument(
"--boundary-evidence-schema",
type=Path,
default=META_ROOT / "docs" / "capability-fit-boundary-evidence.schema.json",
)
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
if args.output.resolve() == args.review_output.resolve():
parser.error("proof and review output paths must differ")
assessment = read_object(args.assessment, label="assessment")
assessment_schema = read_object(args.assessment_schema, label="assessment schema")
catalog = read_object(args.catalog, label="catalog")
published_keyring = read_object(args.keyring, label="published keyring")
trusted_keyring = read_object(args.trusted_keyring, label="trusted keyring")
installed_evidence = read_object(
args.installed_evidence, label="installed evidence"
)
installed_schema = read_object(
args.installed_evidence_schema, label="installed evidence schema"
)
installer_receipt = read_object(args.installer_receipt, label="installer receipt")
installer_receipt_schema = read_object(
args.installer_receipt_schema, label="installer receipt schema"
)
installer_authorities = read_object(
args.installer_authority_keyring, label="installer authority keyring"
)
installer_authority_schema = read_object(
args.installer_authority_keyring_schema,
label="installer authority keyring schema",
)
claim_manifest = read_object(args.claims, label="target-run claim manifest")
claim_schema = read_object(args.claims_schema, label="target-run claim schema")
authority_keyring = read_object(
args.authority_keyring, label="proof-authority keyring"
)
authority_schema = read_object(
args.authority_keyring_schema, label="proof-authority keyring schema"
)
boundary_schema = read_object(
args.boundary_evidence_schema, label="boundary evidence schema"
)
_require_schema(claim_manifest, claim_schema, label="target-run claim manifest")
_require_schema(
authority_keyring, authority_schema, label="proof-authority keyring"
)
base_report = review_capability_fit(
assessment=assessment,
schema=assessment_schema,
catalog=catalog,
published_keyring=published_keyring,
trusted_keyring=trusted_keyring,
workspace_root=None,
installed_evidence=installed_evidence,
installed_evidence_schema=installed_schema,
installer_receipt=installer_receipt,
installer_receipt_schema=installer_receipt_schema,
installer_authority_keyring=installer_authorities,
installer_authority_keyring_schema=installer_authority_schema,
installed_evidence_mode="imported_unsigned",
)
_require_release_origin(base_report, parser=parser)
claims = resolve_claim_artifact_paths(
claim_manifest.get("claims"), base_dir=args.claims.resolve().parent
)
signing_keys = read_signing_keys(tuple(args.signing_key))
expires_at = parse_datetime(claim_manifest.get("expires_at"), label="expires_at")
forbidden_keys = public_key_material_from_keyrings(
published_keyring,
trusted_keyring,
installer_authorities,
)
try:
proof = issue_boundary_evidence(
assessment=assessment,
installed_evidence=installed_evidence,
proof_id=str(claim_manifest.get("proof_id") or ""),
claims=claims,
authority_keyring=authority_keyring,
signing_keys=signing_keys,
expires_at=expires_at,
expected_external_provider_subject=(
args.expected_external_provider_subject
),
forbidden_authority_public_keys=forbidden_keys,
release_origin_verified=True,
)
except ValueError as exc:
parser.error(str(exc))
_require_schema(proof, boundary_schema, label="issued boundary evidence")
review = review_capability_fit(
assessment=assessment,
schema=assessment_schema,
catalog=catalog,
published_keyring=published_keyring,
trusted_keyring=trusted_keyring,
workspace_root=None,
installed_evidence=installed_evidence,
installed_evidence_schema=installed_schema,
installer_receipt=installer_receipt,
installer_receipt_schema=installer_receipt_schema,
installer_authority_keyring=installer_authorities,
installer_authority_keyring_schema=installer_authority_schema,
boundary_evidence=proof,
boundary_evidence_schema=boundary_schema,
boundary_authority_keyring=authority_keyring,
boundary_authority_keyring_schema=authority_schema,
installed_evidence_mode="imported_unsigned",
expected_external_provider_subject=args.expected_external_provider_subject,
)
supplied_scopes = {str(claim.get("scope")) for claim in proof["claims"]}
unchecked = sorted(
scope
for scope in supplied_scopes
if review.get("proof_scope", {}).get(scope, {}).get("checked") is not True
)
if unchecked:
parser.error(
"issued proof did not pass immediate verification for scopes: "
+ ", ".join(unchecked)
)
write_object(args.output, proof, label="boundary evidence")
write_object(args.review_output, review, label="capability-fit review")
print(
json.dumps(
{
"proof_id": proof["proof_id"],
"scopes": sorted(supplied_scopes),
"reference_readiness": review.get("proof_scope", {}).get(
"reference_readiness"
),
"output": str(args.output),
"review_output": str(args.review_output),
},
sort_keys=True,
)
)
return 0
def read_object(path: Path, *, label: str) -> dict[str, object]:
try:
if path.stat().st_size > MAX_INPUT_BYTES:
raise ValueError("input exceeds size limit")
payload = json.loads(path.read_bytes().decode("utf-8"))
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise SystemExit(f"Could not read {label}") from exc
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise SystemExit(f"{label.capitalize()} must be a JSON object")
return payload
def read_signing_keys(values: tuple[str, ...]) -> dict[str, Ed25519PrivateKey]:
result: dict[str, Ed25519PrivateKey] = {}
for value in values:
key_id, separator, path_text = value.partition("=")
if not separator or not key_id or not path_text or key_id in result:
raise SystemExit(
"--signing-key must uniquely use KEY_ID=/path/to/private.pem"
)
try:
key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
Path(path_text).expanduser().read_bytes(), password=None
)
except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
raise SystemExit("Could not read boundary signing key") from exc
if not isinstance(key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
raise SystemExit("Boundary signing keys must be Ed25519")
result[key_id] = key
return result
def resolve_claim_artifact_paths(
claims: object, *, base_dir: Path
) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
if not isinstance(claims, list):
raise SystemExit("Target-run claim manifest has no claim list")
resolved = deepcopy(claims)
for claim in resolved:
if not isinstance(claim, dict):
continue
artifacts = claim.get("artifacts")
if not isinstance(artifacts, list):
continue
for artifact in artifacts:
if not isinstance(artifact, dict) or not isinstance(
artifact.get("path"), str
):
continue
path = Path(artifact["path"]).expanduser()
artifact["path"] = path if path.is_absolute() else base_dir / path
return resolved
def parse_datetime(value: object, *, label: str) -> datetime:
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise SystemExit(f"{label} must be an RFC 3339 date-time")
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
except ValueError as exc:
raise SystemExit(f"{label} must be an RFC 3339 date-time") from exc
if parsed.tzinfo is None:
raise SystemExit(f"{label} must include a timezone")
return parsed.astimezone(UTC)
def _require_schema(
payload: dict[str, object], schema: dict[str, object], *, label: str
) -> None:
errors = validate_payload(payload=payload, schema=schema)
if errors:
raise SystemExit(f"{label.capitalize()} failed schema validation: {errors[0]}")
def _require_release_origin(
report: dict[str, object], *, parser: argparse.ArgumentParser
) -> None:
proof_scope = report.get("proof_scope")
if not isinstance(proof_scope, dict):
parser.error("capability-fit review did not return proof scope")
required = (
"catalog_signature_and_keyring",
"catalog_signature_and_trusted_keyring",
"published_keyring_hash",
"release_metadata",
"installed_artifacts",
"installed_record_integrity",
"installed_release_origin",
)
failed = sorted(
scope
for scope in required
if not isinstance(proof_scope.get(scope), dict)
or proof_scope[scope].get("valid") is not True
)
observation = proof_scope.get("installed_evidence_observation")
if (
not isinstance(observation, dict)
or observation.get("receipt_authenticated") is not True
):
failed.append("installed_evidence_observation.receipt_authenticated")
if failed:
parser.error(
"trusted release and installer evidence must pass before target proof issuance: "
+ ", ".join(failed)
)
def write_object(path: Path, payload: dict[str, object], *, label: str) -> None:
try:
atomic_write_json(path, payload, max_bytes=MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES)
except AtomicJsonWriteError as exc:
raise SystemExit(f"Could not securely write {label}") from exc
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
+28
View File
@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@ for tools_root in (ASSESSMENT_TOOLS_ROOT, RELEASE_TOOLS_ROOT):
from govoplan_assessment import ( # noqa: E402
collect_installed_composition,
enforce_required_boundary_scopes,
render_review,
review_capability_fit,
)
from govoplan_assessment.evidence import REFERENCE_READINESS_SCOPES # noqa: E402
from govoplan_assessment.atomic_io import ( # noqa: E402
AtomicJsonWriteError,
atomic_write_json,
@@ -169,6 +171,21 @@ def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
"never supply a URL, credential, or endpoint identifier."
),
)
parser.add_argument(
"--require-reference-readiness",
action="store_true",
help="Fail unless every reference-readiness boundary scope is current and positive.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--require-external-provider-proof",
action="store_true",
help="Fail unless current positive external-provider evidence is present.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--require-production-approval",
action="store_true",
help="Fail unless a current explicit production approval is present.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--json", action="store_true", help="Print the machine-readable review report."
)
@@ -377,6 +394,17 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
),
expected_external_provider_subject=args.expected_external_provider_subject,
)
required_boundary_scopes: set[str] = set()
if args.require_reference_readiness:
required_boundary_scopes.update(REFERENCE_READINESS_SCOPES)
if args.require_external_provider_proof:
required_boundary_scopes.add("external_providers")
if args.require_production_approval:
required_boundary_scopes.add("production_approval")
if required_boundary_scopes:
enforce_required_boundary_scopes(
report, required_scopes=required_boundary_scopes
)
encoded = json.dumps(report, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
if args.output is not None:
write_object(
@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
"""Repeatable GovOPlaN product-assessment tooling."""
from .capability_fit import review_capability_fit, render_review
from .capability_fit import (
enforce_required_boundary_scopes,
render_review,
review_capability_fit,
)
from .evidence import collect_installed_composition
__all__ = (
"collect_installed_composition",
"enforce_required_boundary_scopes",
"render_review",
"review_capability_fit",
)
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
"""Issue sanitized, release-bound target evidence from retained result files."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
from .evidence import (
MAX_HASHED_FILE_BYTES,
NEGATIVE_RESULTS,
OPAQUE_ID_PATTERN,
POSITIVE_RESULTS,
PROOF_REQUIREMENTS,
_active_authority_keys,
_bounded_file_sha256,
canonical_bytes,
canonical_sha256,
)
MAX_BOUNDARY_ARTIFACT_BYTES = MAX_HASHED_FILE_BYTES
MAX_BOUNDARY_ARTIFACT_TOTAL_BYTES = 512 * 1024 * 1024
def issue_boundary_evidence(
*,
assessment: Mapping[str, Any],
installed_evidence: Mapping[str, Any],
proof_id: str,
claims: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
authority_keyring: dict[str, Any],
signing_keys: Mapping[str, Ed25519PrivateKey],
expires_at: datetime,
issued_at: datetime | None = None,
expected_external_provider_subject: str | None = None,
forbidden_authority_public_keys: frozenset[bytes] = frozenset(),
release_origin_verified: bool = False,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build and sign one bounded proof after its release origin was verified.
The public CLI is responsible for deriving ``release_origin_verified`` from
the signed catalog, installed observation and installer receipt. Artifact
paths are consumed here and never copied into the resulting receipt.
"""
if release_origin_verified is not True:
raise ValueError(
"boundary evidence requires independently verified installed release origin"
)
_require_opaque_id(proof_id, label="proof ID")
now = issued_at or datetime.now(tz=UTC)
now = _aware_utc(now, label="issuance time")
expiry = _aware_utc(expires_at, label="expiry time")
if now >= expiry:
raise ValueError("boundary evidence expiry must be after issuance")
assessment_id = assessment.get("assessment_id")
release = assessment.get("release")
assessment_release = release.get("ref") if isinstance(release, Mapping) else None
deployment = assessment.get("deployment_profile")
deployment_subject = (
deployment.get("id") if isinstance(deployment, Mapping) else None
)
_require_opaque_id(assessment_id, label="assessment ID")
_require_opaque_id(assessment_release, label="assessment release")
_require_opaque_id(deployment_subject, label="deployment subject")
if expected_external_provider_subject is not None:
_require_opaque_id(
expected_external_provider_subject,
label="external-provider subject",
)
normalized_claims = _normalize_claims(
claims=claims,
deployment_subject=str(deployment_subject),
expected_external_provider_subject=expected_external_provider_subject,
)
active_at_issue, issue_findings = _active_authority_keys(
authority_keyring=authority_keyring,
verification_time=now,
forbidden_public_keys=forbidden_authority_public_keys,
)
active_until_expiry, expiry_findings = _active_authority_keys(
authority_keyring=authority_keyring,
verification_time=expiry - timedelta(microseconds=1),
forbidden_public_keys=forbidden_authority_public_keys,
)
if issue_findings or expiry_findings:
raise ValueError(
"proof-authority keyring is malformed, reused, or not valid for the full proof interval"
)
if not signing_keys:
raise ValueError(
"at least one independently provisioned signing key is required"
)
covered_scopes: set[str] = set()
verified_signers: list[tuple[str, Ed25519PrivateKey]] = []
for key_id, private_key in sorted(signing_keys.items()):
_require_opaque_id(key_id, label="signing key ID")
if not isinstance(private_key, Ed25519PrivateKey):
raise ValueError("boundary signing keys must be Ed25519")
authority = active_at_issue.get(key_id)
authority_at_expiry = active_until_expiry.get(key_id)
public_bytes = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
)
if (
authority is None
or authority_at_expiry is None
or authority[0] != public_bytes
or authority_at_expiry[0] != public_bytes
):
raise ValueError(
f"signing key {key_id!r} is not independently authorized for the full proof interval"
)
covered_scopes.update(authority[1])
verified_signers.append((key_id, private_key))
claim_scopes = {str(claim["scope"]) for claim in normalized_claims}
uncovered_scopes = sorted(claim_scopes - covered_scopes)
if uncovered_scopes:
raise ValueError(
"no supplied signing key is authorized for scopes: "
+ ", ".join(uncovered_scopes)
)
proof: dict[str, Any] = {
"$schema": "./capability-fit-boundary-evidence.schema.json",
"schema_version": "0.1.0",
"evidence_kind": "govoplan.capability-fit-boundary-proof",
"proof_id": proof_id,
"assessment_id": assessment_id,
"assessment_release": assessment_release,
"installed_evidence_sha256": canonical_sha256(installed_evidence),
"issued_at": _iso_datetime(now),
"expires_at": _iso_datetime(expiry),
"claims": normalized_claims,
}
signature_payload = canonical_bytes(proof)
proof["signatures"] = [
{
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"key_id": key_id,
"value": base64.b64encode(private_key.sign(signature_payload)).decode(
"ascii"
),
}
for key_id, private_key in verified_signers
]
return proof
def _normalize_claims(
*,
claims: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
deployment_subject: str,
expected_external_provider_subject: str | None,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if not 1 <= len(claims) <= len(PROOF_REQUIREMENTS):
raise ValueError("boundary evidence requires between one and eight claims")
normalized: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
seen_scopes: set[str] = set()
total_bytes = 0
for claim in claims:
scope = str(claim.get("scope") or "")
if scope not in PROOF_REQUIREMENTS or scope in seen_scopes:
raise ValueError("boundary claim scopes must be known and unique")
seen_scopes.add(scope)
result = str(claim.get("result") or "")
if result not in {POSITIVE_RESULTS[scope], NEGATIVE_RESULTS[scope]}:
raise ValueError(f"boundary claim result is invalid for {scope!r}")
controls = _opaque_id_list(
claim.get("control_ids"),
label=f"{scope} control IDs",
maximum=256,
)
raw_artifacts = claim.get("artifacts")
if not isinstance(raw_artifacts, Sequence) or isinstance(
raw_artifacts, (str, bytes)
):
raise ValueError(f"{scope} artifacts must be a non-empty list")
if not 1 <= len(raw_artifacts) <= 256:
raise ValueError(f"{scope} must reference between one and 256 artifacts")
artifacts: list[dict[str, str]] = []
seen_artifacts: set[str] = set()
for artifact in raw_artifacts:
if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
raise ValueError(f"{scope} contains a malformed artifact")
artifact_id = artifact.get("artifact_id")
_require_opaque_id(artifact_id, label=f"{scope} artifact ID")
artifact_id = str(artifact_id)
if artifact_id in seen_artifacts:
raise ValueError(f"{scope} contains duplicate artifact IDs")
seen_artifacts.add(artifact_id)
raw_path = artifact.get("path")
if not isinstance(raw_path, (str, Path)) or not str(raw_path):
raise ValueError(f"{scope} artifact {artifact_id!r} has no file path")
try:
digest, size, changed = _bounded_file_sha256(
Path(raw_path), max_bytes=MAX_BOUNDARY_ARTIFACT_BYTES
)
except OSError as exc:
raise ValueError(
f"could not securely hash {scope} artifact {artifact_id!r}"
) from exc
if changed:
raise ValueError(
f"{scope} artifact {artifact_id!r} changed or exceeded the size limit while hashing"
)
total_bytes += size
if total_bytes > MAX_BOUNDARY_ARTIFACT_TOTAL_BYTES:
raise ValueError(
"boundary evidence artifacts exceed the total size limit"
)
artifacts.append({"artifact_id": artifact_id, "sha256": digest.hex()})
normalized.append(
{
"scope": scope,
"result": result,
"subject_id": (
expected_external_provider_subject
if scope == "external_providers"
else deployment_subject
),
"control_ids": controls,
"artifacts": artifacts,
}
)
if "external_providers" in seen_scopes and not expected_external_provider_subject:
raise ValueError(
"external-provider evidence requires its expected opaque subject ID"
)
return sorted(normalized, key=lambda item: str(item["scope"]))
def _opaque_id_list(value: object, *, label: str, maximum: int) -> list[str]:
if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
raise ValueError(f"{label} must be a non-empty list")
result = [str(item) for item in value]
if not 1 <= len(result) <= maximum or len(result) != len(set(result)):
raise ValueError(f"{label} must contain unique bounded IDs")
for item in result:
_require_opaque_id(item, label=label)
return result
def _require_opaque_id(value: object, *, label: str) -> None:
if (
not isinstance(value, str)
or len(value) > 160
or OPAQUE_ID_PATTERN.fullmatch(value) is None
):
raise ValueError(f"{label} must be a bounded opaque ID")
def _aware_utc(value: datetime, *, label: str) -> datetime:
if value.tzinfo is None:
raise ValueError(f"{label} must include a timezone")
return value.astimezone(UTC)
def _iso_datetime(value: datetime) -> str:
return value.astimezone(UTC).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ from govoplan_release.version_alignment import candidate_catalog_version_issues
from .evidence import (
BoundaryEvidenceReview,
InstalledEvidenceReview,
PROOF_REQUIREMENTS,
REFERENCE_READINESS_SCOPES,
public_key_material_from_keyrings,
review_boundary_evidence,
review_installed_composition,
@@ -928,11 +930,7 @@ def build_report(
boundary_scope = (
boundary_review.proof_scope
if boundary_review is not None
else {
"target_environment": {"checked": False, "valid": None},
"external_providers": {"checked": False, "valid": None},
"production_approval": {"checked": False, "valid": None},
}
else {scope: {"checked": False, "valid": None} for scope in PROOF_REQUIREMENTS}
)
proof_scope = {
"assessment_schema": {"checked": True, "valid": schema_valid},
@@ -961,6 +959,24 @@ def build_report(
**installed_scope,
**boundary_scope,
}
missing_readiness = tuple(
scope
for scope in REFERENCE_READINESS_SCOPES
if proof_scope.get(scope, {}).get("checked") is not True
)
failed_readiness = tuple(
scope
for scope in REFERENCE_READINESS_SCOPES
if proof_scope.get(scope, {}).get("checked") is True
and proof_scope.get(scope, {}).get("valid") is not True
)
proof_scope["reference_readiness"] = {
"checked": not missing_readiness,
"valid": not missing_readiness and not failed_readiness,
"required_scopes": list(REFERENCE_READINESS_SCOPES),
"missing_scopes": list(missing_readiness),
"failed_scopes": list(failed_readiness),
}
return {
"report_version": "0.5.0",
"status": status,
@@ -983,6 +999,63 @@ def build_report(
}
def enforce_required_boundary_scopes(
report: dict[str, Any], *, required_scopes: Iterable[str]
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Turn missing or negative external proof into an admission blocker."""
requested = tuple(dict.fromkeys(sorted(required_scopes)))
unknown = sorted(set(requested) - set(PROOF_REQUIREMENTS))
if unknown:
raise ValueError("unknown boundary scopes: " + ", ".join(unknown))
proof_scope = report.get("proof_scope")
if not isinstance(proof_scope, dict):
raise ValueError("capability-fit report has no proof scope")
failed = tuple(
scope
for scope in requested
if not isinstance(proof_scope.get(scope), dict)
or proof_scope[scope].get("checked") is not True
or proof_scope[scope].get("valid") is not True
)
proof_scope["admission"] = {
"checked": True,
"valid": not failed,
"required_scopes": list(requested),
"failed_scopes": list(failed),
}
if not failed:
return report
findings = report.setdefault("findings", [])
existing = {
(item.get("code"), item.get("message"))
for item in findings
if isinstance(item, dict)
}
for scope in failed:
message = (
f"Admission requires current positive boundary evidence for {scope!r}."
)
if ("required_boundary_scope_unsatisfied", message) not in existing:
findings.append(
{
"severity": "blocker",
"code": "required_boundary_scope_unsatisfied",
"message": message,
"assessment_ids": ["assessment.external_proof"],
}
)
findings.sort(
key=lambda item: (
_severity_rank(str(item.get("severity") or "")),
str(item.get("code") or ""),
str(item.get("message") or ""),
)
)
report["status"] = "blocked"
return report
def render_review(report: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
proof_scope = report.get("proof_scope", {})
installed_scope = proof_scope.get("installed_artifacts", {})
@@ -1043,9 +1116,7 @@ def render_review(report: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
unchecked_boundaries = [
label
for key, label in (
("target_environment", "target-environment"),
("external_providers", "external-provider"),
("production_approval", "production-approval"),
(scope, scope.replace("_", "-")) for scope in PROOF_REQUIREMENTS
)
if report.get("proof_scope", {}).get(key, {}).get("checked") is not True
]
@@ -1057,6 +1128,18 @@ def render_review(report: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
)
if unchecked_boundaries:
lines.append("No " + ", ".join(unchecked_boundaries) + " proof was performed.")
readiness = report.get("proof_scope", {}).get("reference_readiness", {})
if readiness.get("valid") is True:
lines.append("Reference-readiness evidence gate: passed.")
else:
unresolved = [
*readiness.get("missing_scopes", []),
*readiness.get("failed_scopes", []),
]
lines.append(
"Reference-readiness evidence gate: not established"
+ (f" ({', '.join(dict.fromkeys(unresolved))})." if unresolved else ".")
)
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
@@ -57,11 +57,21 @@ SHA256_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
POSITIVE_RESULTS = {
"target_environment": "passed",
"external_providers": "passed",
"accessibility": "passed",
"privacy": "passed",
"security": "passed",
"operations": "passed",
"recovery": "passed",
"production_approval": "approved",
}
NEGATIVE_RESULTS = {
"target_environment": "failed",
"external_providers": "failed",
"accessibility": "failed",
"privacy": "failed",
"security": "failed",
"operations": "failed",
"recovery": "failed",
"production_approval": "rejected",
}
PROOF_REQUIREMENTS = {
@@ -75,12 +85,45 @@ PROOF_REQUIREMENTS = {
"An independently trusted authority key permitted for external_providers proof.",
"Opaque control IDs and content hashes; credentials and endpoint identifiers stay outside the report.",
),
"accessibility": (
"Accessibility conformance results for the assessed journeys, viewports, keyboard paths, and assistive-technology profile.",
"An independently trusted authority key permitted for accessibility proof.",
"Opaque control IDs and content hashes for the sanitized conformance artifacts.",
),
"privacy": (
"Privacy and data-protection controls evaluated against the exact assessed composition and target profile.",
"An independently trusted authority key permitted for privacy proof.",
"Opaque control IDs and content hashes for the sanitized review artifacts.",
),
"security": (
"Security controls, scans, and bounded verification results for the exact release and target profile.",
"An independently trusted authority key permitted for security proof.",
"Opaque control IDs and content hashes for sanitized findings and attestations.",
),
"operations": (
"Operator procedures, health checks, monitoring, alerting, and failure-response exercises for the target profile.",
"An independently trusted authority key permitted for operations proof.",
"Opaque control IDs and content hashes for sanitized run evidence.",
),
"recovery": (
"A completed backup, restore, rollback, and reconciliation drill bound to the exact release and target profile.",
"An independently trusted authority key permitted for recovery proof.",
"Opaque control IDs and content hashes for drill outcomes and recovery-point/time observations.",
),
"production_approval": (
"An explicit approval bound to this assessment release and installed evidence whose release origin is independently anchored.",
"An independently provisioned authority key permitted for production_approval.",
"An unexpired signed proof bundle; an assessment or operator cannot approve itself.",
),
}
REFERENCE_READINESS_SCOPES = (
"target_environment",
"accessibility",
"privacy",
"security",
"operations",
"recovery",
)
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
@@ -1427,6 +1470,11 @@ def review_boundary_evidence(
expected_subjects = {
"target_environment": deployment_subject,
"external_providers": provider_subject,
"accessibility": deployment_subject,
"privacy": deployment_subject,
"security": deployment_subject,
"operations": deployment_subject,
"recovery": deployment_subject,
"production_approval": deployment_subject,
}
scopes = _unchecked_boundary_scope(expected_subjects=expected_subjects)
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Exercise connector -> datasource -> dataflow publication capabilities."""
from __future__ import annotations
from sqlalchemy import create_engine
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from govoplan_connectors.backend.db.models import ConnectorTabularSource
from govoplan_core.auth import ApiPrincipal
from govoplan_core.core.access import PrincipalRef
from govoplan_core.core.dataflows import (
DataflowPublicationTarget,
DataflowRunRequest,
dataflow_run_lifecycle,
)
from govoplan_core.core.automation import AutomationPrincipalResolution
from govoplan_core.core.access import (
CAPABILITY_AUTH_AUTOMATION_PRINCIPAL_PROVIDER,
)
from govoplan_core.core.datasources import (
DatasourceReadRequest,
datasource_catalogue,
datasource_lifecycle,
datasource_publication,
)
from govoplan_core.core.modules import ModuleContext
from govoplan_core.core.recovery import RecoveryCheckpoint, RecoveryOperation
from govoplan_core.core.runtime_coordination import (
DistributedLease,
RuntimeIdentity,
bind_process_runtime_identity,
)
from govoplan_core.core.tabular_sources import (
TabularSnapshotInput,
tabular_snapshot_writer,
)
from govoplan_core.db.base import Base
from govoplan_core.server.registry import build_platform_registry
from govoplan_dataflow.backend.schemas import (
GraphEdge,
GraphNode,
GraphPosition,
PipelineGraph,
PipelineCreateRequest,
PipelinePreviewRequest,
)
from govoplan_dataflow.backend.db.models import (
DataflowPipeline,
DataflowPipelineRevision,
DataflowRun,
)
from govoplan_dataflow.backend.service import create_pipeline, preview_pipeline
from govoplan_dataflow.backend.run_worker import SqlDataflowRunWorker
from govoplan_datasources.backend.db.models import (
DatasourceMaterializationRecord,
DatasourcePayloadRecord,
DatasourcePayloadRowRecord,
DatasourcePublicationRecord,
DatasourceRecord,
DatasourceStageRecord,
)
def main() -> int:
registry = build_platform_registry(
(
"connectors",
"datasources",
"dataflow",
"workflow_engine",
"workflow",
)
)
registry.configure_capability_context(
ModuleContext(registry=registry, settings=object())
)
engine = create_engine("sqlite:///:memory:")
Base.metadata.create_all(
engine,
tables=[
DistributedLease.__table__,
RecoveryOperation.__table__,
RecoveryCheckpoint.__table__,
ConnectorTabularSource.__table__,
DatasourceRecord.__table__,
DatasourcePayloadRecord.__table__,
DatasourcePayloadRowRecord.__table__,
DatasourceMaterializationRecord.__table__,
DatasourceStageRecord.__table__,
DatasourcePublicationRecord.__table__,
DataflowPipeline.__table__,
DataflowPipelineRevision.__table__,
DataflowRun.__table__,
],
)
session_factory = sessionmaker(bind=engine)
bind_process_runtime_identity(_runtime_identity())
try:
with session_factory() as session:
principal = _principal()
writer = tabular_snapshot_writer(registry)
lifecycle = datasource_lifecycle(registry)
catalogue = datasource_catalogue(registry)
publisher = datasource_publication(registry)
runner = dataflow_run_lifecycle(registry)
if (
writer is None
or lifecycle is None
or catalogue is None
or publisher is None
or runner is None
):
raise RuntimeError(
"Datasource composition capabilities are incomplete."
)
origin = writer.create_snapshot(
session,
principal,
snapshot=TabularSnapshotInput(
name="Monthly cases",
source_name="connector_monthly_cases",
rows=(
{"id": 1, "amount": 5},
{"id": 2, "amount": 15},
),
),
)
datasource = lifecycle.register_origin(
session,
principal,
origin_ref=origin.ref,
name="Monthly cases cache",
source_name="monthly_cases",
mode="cached",
)
result = preview_pipeline(
session,
tenant_id="tenant-1",
actor_id="account-1",
payload=PipelinePreviewRequest(
graph=_graph(
datasource_ref=datasource.ref,
fingerprint=datasource.fingerprint,
),
row_limit=100,
),
principal=principal,
registry=registry,
)
expected_rows = [
{"id": 1, "amount": 5},
{"id": 2, "amount": 15},
]
if result.status != "succeeded":
raise RuntimeError(
f"Dataflow preview failed: {result.diagnostics}"
)
if result.rows != expected_rows:
raise RuntimeError(f"Unexpected Dataflow rows: {result.rows!r}")
if result.source_fingerprints[0]["source_ref"] != datasource.ref:
raise RuntimeError(
"Dataflow lineage did not retain the datasource reference."
)
pipeline = create_pipeline(
session,
tenant_id="tenant-1",
actor_id="account-1",
payload=PipelineCreateRequest(
name="Monthly case output",
status="active",
graph=_graph(
datasource_ref=datasource.ref,
fingerprint=datasource.fingerprint,
),
editor_mode="graph",
),
)
run_request = DataflowRunRequest(
pipeline_ref=f"pipeline:{pipeline.id}",
revision=1,
idempotency_key="composition-run-1",
publication=DataflowPublicationTarget(
name="Monthly case result",
source_name="monthly_case_result",
freeze=True,
frozen_label="Composition evidence",
),
)
published = runner.start_run(
session,
principal,
request=run_request,
)
replayed = runner.start_run(
session,
principal,
request=run_request,
)
if published.status != "queued":
raise RuntimeError(
f"Dataflow run was not queued: {published.status}"
)
worker = SqlDataflowRunWorker(
registry=_AutomationRegistry(registry, principal)
)
worker_result = worker.dispatch_pending(
session,
worker_id="composition-worker",
)
if worker_result["succeeded"] != 1:
raise RuntimeError(f"Dataflow worker failed: {worker_result!r}")
completed = runner.get_run(
session,
principal,
run_ref=published.ref,
)
if completed is None:
raise RuntimeError("Dataflow run evidence disappeared.")
published = completed
if published.status != "succeeded":
raise RuntimeError(
f"Dataflow publication failed: {published.error}"
)
if replayed.ref != published.ref or not replayed.replayed:
raise RuntimeError(
"Dataflow run idempotency did not replay the prior run."
)
if (
not published.output_datasource_ref
or not published.output_materialization_ref
):
raise RuntimeError(
"Dataflow publication did not retain output references."
)
output = catalogue.read_datasource(
session,
principal,
request=DatasourceReadRequest(
datasource_ref=published.output_datasource_ref,
),
)
if list(output.rows) != expected_rows:
raise RuntimeError(
f"Unexpected published Dataflow rows: {list(output.rows)!r}"
)
if (
output.materialization is None
or output.materialization.ref
!= published.output_materialization_ref
or output.materialization.frozen_at is None
):
raise RuntimeError(
"Published Datasource materialization is not pinned and frozen."
)
finally:
bind_process_runtime_identity(None)
engine.dispose()
print(
"Connector -> Datasources -> pinned Dataflow publication composition passed."
)
return 0
class _AutomationProvider:
def __init__(self, principal: ApiPrincipal) -> None:
self.principal = principal
def resolve_automation_principal(self, _session, *, request):
return AutomationPrincipalResolution(
allowed=True,
principal=self.principal,
granted_scopes=request.grant_scopes,
provenance={"status": "composition_recheck"},
)
def _runtime_identity() -> RuntimeIdentity:
return RuntimeIdentity(
installation_id="datasource-composition-check",
node_id="composition-worker",
incarnation="composition-worker-incarnation",
role="worker",
software_version="test",
composition_hash="c" * 64,
)
class _AutomationRegistry:
def __init__(self, registry, principal: ApiPrincipal) -> None:
self.registry = registry
self.provider = _AutomationProvider(principal)
def has_capability(self, name: str) -> bool:
return (
name == CAPABILITY_AUTH_AUTOMATION_PRINCIPAL_PROVIDER
or self.registry.has_capability(name)
)
def capability(self, name: str):
if name == CAPABILITY_AUTH_AUTOMATION_PRINCIPAL_PROVIDER:
return self.provider
return self.registry.capability(name)
def _principal() -> ApiPrincipal:
return ApiPrincipal(
principal=PrincipalRef(
account_id="account-1",
membership_id="membership-1",
tenant_id="tenant-1",
scopes=frozenset(
{
"connectors:source:read",
"connectors:source:write",
"datasources:catalogue:read",
"datasources:source:write",
"datasources:stage:write",
"dataflow:pipeline:run",
}
),
),
account=object(),
user=object(),
)
def _graph(*, datasource_ref: str, fingerprint: str) -> PipelineGraph:
return PipelineGraph(
nodes=[
GraphNode(
id="source",
type="source.reference",
label="Cases",
position=GraphPosition(x=0, y=0),
config={
"source_ref": datasource_ref,
"source_name": "monthly_cases",
"expected_fingerprint": fingerprint,
"consistency": "current",
},
),
GraphNode(
id="output",
type="output",
label="Output",
position=GraphPosition(x=200, y=0),
config={},
),
],
edges=[
GraphEdge(
id="source-output",
source="source",
target="output",
)
],
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
+52 -1
View File
@@ -24,11 +24,28 @@ export NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG="$NPM_USERCONFIG"
export GOVOPLAN_NPM_USERCONFIG="$NPM_USERCONFIG"
unset npm_config_tmp NPM_CONFIG_TMP
# Validate the current sibling checkouts even when a newly added module has not
# yet been installed into an existing development virtualenv.
SOURCE_PYTHONPATH=""
for source_dir in "$META_ROOT"/../govoplan*/src; do
[ -d "$source_dir" ] || continue
SOURCE_PYTHONPATH="${SOURCE_PYTHONPATH:+$SOURCE_PYTHONPATH:}$source_dir"
done
export PYTHONPATH="${SOURCE_PYTHONPATH}${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}"
cd "$ROOT"
GOVOPLAN_CORE_ROOT="$ROOT" PYTHON="$PYTHON" CHECK_TESTCLIENT_DEPRECATIONS=1 bash "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-dependency-hygiene.sh"
"$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-contracts.py" --no-impact
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-manifest-shapes.py"
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 "$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-manifest-shapes.py" --require-architecture
cd "$META_ROOT"
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_deployment_installer
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_capability_fit_evidence
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_configuration_package_artifacts
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_institutional_governance_journey
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_institutional_service_journey
cd "$ROOT"
"$PYTHON" - <<'PY'
import ast
@@ -69,6 +86,25 @@ PY
"$PYTHON" -c 'import govoplan_core.db.bootstrap; import govoplan_access.backend.admin.service; import govoplan_addresses.backend.manifest; import govoplan_files.backend.router; import govoplan_mail.backend.sending.imap; print("targeted backend imports passed")'
"$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check_dependency_boundaries.py"
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_module_system
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-connectors/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-datasources/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-dataflow/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-workflow-engine/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-workflow/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-views/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-dashboard/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-postbox/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-portal/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-forms/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-forms-runtime/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-cases/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-committee/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-voting/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-approvals/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-identity-trust/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-encryption/tests
"$PYTHON" -m pytest -q /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-campaign/tests/test_approval_gate.py
"$PYTHON" "$META_ROOT/tools/checks/check-datasource-composition.py"
"$PYTHON" -m unittest discover -s /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-mail/tests
"$PYTHON" -m unittest tests.test_api_smoke.ApiSmokeTests.test_mailbox_message_listing_reports_total_count
@@ -77,6 +113,21 @@ cd "$ROOT/webui"
"$NPM" run test:module-capabilities
"$NPM" run test:module-permutations
cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-dataflow/webui
"$NPM" run test:structure
cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-datasources/webui
"$NPM" run typecheck
cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-workflow/webui
"$NPM" run typecheck
cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-dashboard/webui
"$NPM" run test:dashboard-layout
cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-postbox/webui
"$NPM" run test:ui-structure
cd /mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-mail/webui
"$NPM" run test:mail-ui
+92
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ META_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
MODULE_NAME_PATTERN = re.compile(
r"[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)*"
)
REQUIRED_DOCUMENTATION_TYPES = frozenset({"admin", "user"})
def main() -> int:
@@ -26,6 +27,14 @@ def main() -> int:
default=None,
help="Directory containing the GovOPlaN repositories. Defaults to repositories.json default_parent.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--require-architecture",
action="store_true",
help=(
"Reject every module that has not adopted the versioned architecture "
"declaration. GovOPlaN release and focused checks enable this gate."
),
)
args = parser.parse_args()
catalog = json.loads((META_ROOT / "repositories.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
@@ -90,6 +99,36 @@ def main() -> int:
)
continue
documented_types = {
documentation_type
for topic in manifest.documentation
for documentation_type in topic.documentation_types
}
missing_documentation_types = sorted(REQUIRED_DOCUMENTATION_TYPES - documented_types)
if missing_documentation_types:
errors.append(
f"{repository_name}: module {manifest.id!r} is missing static documentation for "
f"{', '.join(missing_documentation_types)}; add manifest DocumentationTopic entries "
"even when runtime documentation providers are registered"
)
continue
repository_root = manifest_path.parents[3]
if manifest.architecture is None:
if args.require_architecture:
errors.append(
f"{repository_name}: module {manifest.id!r} has no architecture declaration"
)
continue
else:
errors.extend(
_architecture_evidence_errors(
repository_name=repository_name,
repository_root=repository_root,
manifest=manifest,
)
)
manifests.append(manifest)
if errors:
@@ -109,6 +148,11 @@ def main() -> int:
f"Manifest registry check passed: {len(snapshot.manifests)} manifests "
f"from {len(manifest_sources)} source files."
)
declared = sum(manifest.architecture is not None for manifest in manifests)
print(
f"Architecture declaration coverage: {declared}/{len(manifests)} modules "
f"({(declared / len(manifests) * 100):.1f}%)."
)
return 0
@@ -120,5 +164,53 @@ def _module_entry_points(pyproject_path: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
return {str(name): str(target) for name, target in values.items()}
def _architecture_evidence_errors(
*,
repository_name: str,
repository_root: Path,
manifest: object,
) -> list[str]:
architecture = getattr(manifest, "architecture", None)
if architecture is None:
return []
errors: list[str] = []
references = [
(f"{item.kind} evidence", item.reference)
for item in architecture.evidence
]
for category in ("migration", "upgrade", "recovery", "security", "operations"):
references.extend(
(f"{category} documentation", reference)
for reference in getattr(architecture.documentation, category)
)
for label, reference in references:
if not _looks_like_repository_reference(reference):
continue
candidate = (repository_root / reference).resolve()
try:
candidate.relative_to(repository_root.resolve())
except ValueError:
errors.append(
f"{repository_name}: {label} escapes the repository: {reference!r}"
)
continue
if not candidate.exists():
errors.append(
f"{repository_name}: {label} does not exist: {reference!r}"
)
return errors
def _looks_like_repository_reference(reference: str) -> bool:
normalized = reference.strip()
if not normalized or "://" in normalized:
return False
return (
"/" in normalized
or normalized.startswith("README")
or normalized.endswith((".md", ".py", ".json", ".yaml", ".yml"))
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())

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