179 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
179 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# Multi Seal Mail - Current System and Tenant Governance Model
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**Updated:** 2026-06-16
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**Current migration head:** `f5a6b7c8d9e0`
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## Governance Rule
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System policy is authoritative for tenants and all lower levels. Each lower level may only narrow what it inherits:
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```text
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system
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-> tenant
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-> user or group owner
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-> campaign
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```
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Lower levels do not widen privileges, allowed profiles, retention durations or credential rights granted by a higher level.
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## Administration Structure
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```text
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SYSTEM
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- Settings
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- Retention
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- Mail servers
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- Tenants
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- Users
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- Groups
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- System roles
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- Tenant roles
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- Audit
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TENANT
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- Settings boundary
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- Users
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- Groups
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- Roles
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- API keys
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- Mail servers
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- Retention
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- Audit
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USER
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- User mail
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- User retention
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GROUP
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- Group mail
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- Group retention
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```
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There is no separate System access page. Compatibility access scopes remain in the backend for assignment/read boundaries.
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## Tenant Governance
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System settings define tenant defaults and whether tenants may narrow selected options. Tenant overrides can only restrict:
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- custom groups;
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- custom roles;
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- tenant API keys.
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The backend enforces that tenant governance cannot widen system-denied privileges.
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## Mail-Profile Governance
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Mail server profiles may exist at these scopes:
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```text
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system
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tenant
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user
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group
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campaign
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```
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Effective campaign profile availability follows campaign ownership. A campaign owned by a user resolves through system, tenant, that user and campaign policy. A group-owned campaign resolves through system, tenant, that group and campaign policy.
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Policy semantics:
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- higher levels define the maximum available profile set;
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- lower levels can further restrict the set;
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- forced profiles mean the lower level must choose from the forced set;
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- a forced set with one profile effectively enforces that profile;
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- campaign-level profile creation is allowed only if the effective policy permits it;
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- credentials may be inherited from the authoritative profile or supplied by a lower level only when override is allowed;
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- deny patterns always win over allow patterns;
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- empty or `*` allowlist means allow all except denied;
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- non-empty allowlist means at least one allow rule must match and no deny rule may match.
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Pattern targets:
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```text
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SMTP hostname
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IMAP hostname
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envelope sender
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From header
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recipient domains
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```
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Ownership transfer is intentionally deferred as a two-step workflow: original owner initiates, new owner accepts and reselects/repairs the mail profile if their effective policy requires it.
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## Retention Governance
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Retention policy is hierarchical:
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```text
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system -> tenant -> user/group -> campaign
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```
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Managed fields:
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- raw campaign JSON retention days;
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- generated EML retention days;
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- stored report detail retention days;
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- mock mailbox retention days;
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- audit detail retention days.
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Rules:
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- system may set concrete defaults or unlimited retention;
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- system exposes allow-limiting toggles per field;
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- tenants, users/groups and campaigns may only shorten inherited retention where the parent allows limiting;
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- blank lower-level values inherit;
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- mock mailbox retention is currently system-level because mock mailbox records do not yet carry tenant/campaign ownership metadata;
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- dry-run/apply retention actions report affected classes before destructive cleanup.
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## Role Definitions and Assignments
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### System roles
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System roles define instance-wide permissions. `system:*` is stored as one wildcard and displayed as granting the full system catalogue. System owner is protected.
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### Tenant roles
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Tenant roles can be system-governed templates or tenant-local definitions, subject to system tenant-governance settings and actor delegation ceilings. Wildcard counts are expanded against the canonical tenant catalogue.
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## Audit Access
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Audit access remains scope-separated:
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```text
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system audit -> system:audit:read
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tenant audit -> active tenant + audit:read
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```
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Audit pages use server pagination, filtering and bounded grids.
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## Tenant Switching
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Tenant switching preserves the current URL when possible and falls back when a route/resource is not accessible in the new tenant context.
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The tenant selector is hidden for ordinary single-tenant accounts and visible for multi-tenant or system tenant-management contexts.
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## DataGrid Contract in Administration
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Admin lists use bounded container grids:
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- one flexible fill column;
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- fixed total table width;
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- compact action/status/count columns;
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- resizable text/date columns;
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- no intrinsic content growth;
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- sticky headers where needed;
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- server pagination for audit.
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## Still Deferred
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- real SMTP/IMAP test-bed verification and operator runbook;
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- recipient import with column mapping;
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- Seafile/external connector governance;
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- system/tenant/group/user file-space hierarchy and external storage hierarchy;
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- session/device revocation UI;
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- backup/restore, monitoring and update procedures;
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- DSAR workflows and evidence bundle verifier;
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- campaign ownership transfer workflow;
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- policy impact analysis before delete/disable/unshare/change;
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- LDAP/OIDC/SAML provisioning;
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- destructive tenant erasure orchestration.
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