Table of Contents
Mirrored from
/mnt/DATA/git/govoplan-core/docs/GOVERNANCE_MODEL.md. Origin:repository. Active tasks and changing state belong in Gitea issues; this wiki page is durable project context.
GovOPlaN Governance Model
Updated: 2026-07-09
Governance Rule
System policy is authoritative for tenants and all lower levels. Each lower level may only narrow what it inherits:
system
-> tenant
-> user or group owner
-> campaign
Lower levels do not widen privileges, allowed profiles, retention durations, or credential rights granted by a higher level.
Administration Structure
GovOPlaN separates system administration from scoped configuration:
ADMINISTRATION
- Modules
- Packages
- Maintenance
- Changes
GLOBAL
- Tenants
- Roles
- Groups and users
- File connectors
- Mail servers
- API keys
- Retention
TENANT
- Roles
- Groups and users
- File connectors
- Mail servers
- API keys
- Retention
GROUP
- File connectors
- Mail servers
- API keys
- Retention
USER
- File connectors
- Mail servers
- API keys
- Retention
System access scopes remain in the backend for assignment/read boundaries, but the UI should present the configuration hierarchy rather than a separate "system access" concept.
Tenant Governance
System settings define tenant defaults and whether tenants may narrow selected options. Tenant overrides can only restrict:
- custom groups;
- custom roles;
- tenant API keys.
The backend enforces that tenant governance cannot widen system-denied privileges.
Mail-Profile Governance
Mail server profiles may exist at these scopes:
system
tenant
user
group
campaign
Effective campaign profile availability follows campaign ownership. A campaign owned by a user resolves through system, tenant, that user, and campaign policy. A group-owned campaign resolves through system, tenant, that group, and campaign policy.
Policy semantics:
- higher levels define the maximum available profile set;
- lower levels can further restrict the set;
- forced profiles mean the lower level must choose from the forced set;
- a forced set with one profile effectively enforces that profile;
- campaign-level profile creation is allowed only if the effective policy permits it;
- SMTP/IMAP credentials use one inheritance decision per protocol: lower levels must inherit profile credentials, may inherit profile credentials, or must provide local credentials;
- the lower-level override switch for
smtp_credentials.inheritandimap_credentials.inheritcontrols whether descendants may change that inheritance decision; - deny patterns always win over allow patterns;
- empty or
*allowlist means allow all except denied; - non-empty allowlist means at least one allow rule must match and no deny rule may match.
Pattern targets:
SMTP hostname
IMAP hostname
envelope sender
From header
recipient domains
Ownership transfer is intentionally deferred as a two-step workflow: original owner initiates, new owner accepts and reselects/repairs the mail profile if their effective policy requires it.
File-Connector Governance
File connector profiles and credentials are separated. Profiles describe external endpoints; credentials bind authentication material and policy to a scope. Concrete linked folders appear as file spaces in the files module.
Governance follows the same inheritance shape as mail:
- system and tenant policy can permit, require, or forbid lower-level connections/credentials;
- user or group ownership controls which spaces appear to principals;
- spaces inherit endpoint and credential policy from their connector profile;
- connector health and credential tests must not reveal plaintext secrets.
Retention Governance
Retention policy is hierarchical:
system -> tenant -> user/group -> campaign
Managed fields:
- raw campaign JSON retention days;
- generated EML retention days;
- stored report detail retention days;
- mock mailbox retention days;
- audit detail retention days.
Rules:
- system may set concrete defaults or unlimited retention;
- system exposes allow-limiting toggles per field;
- tenants, users/groups, and campaigns may only shorten inherited retention where the parent allows limiting;
- blank lower-level values inherit;
- mock mailbox retention is currently system-level because mock mailbox records do not yet carry tenant/campaign ownership metadata;
- dry-run/apply retention actions report affected classes before destructive cleanup.
Role Definitions And Assignments
System Roles
System roles define instance-wide permissions. system:* is stored as one
wildcard and displayed as granting the full system catalogue. System owner is
protected.
Tenant Roles
Tenant roles can be system-governed templates or tenant-local definitions, subject to system tenant-governance settings and actor delegation ceilings. Wildcard counts are expanded against the canonical tenant catalogue.
Audit Access
Audit access remains scope-separated:
system audit -> system:audit:read
tenant audit -> active tenant + audit:read
Audit pages use server pagination, filtering, and bounded grids.
Tenant Switching
Tenant switching preserves the current URL when possible and falls back when a route/resource is not accessible in the new tenant context.
The tenant selector is hidden for ordinary single-tenant accounts and visible for multi-tenant or system tenant-management contexts.
Administration DataGrid Contract
Admin lists use bounded container grids:
- one flexible fill column;
- fixed total table width;
- compact action/status/count columns;
- resizable text/date columns;
- no intrinsic content growth;
- sticky headers where needed;
- server pagination for audit.
Deferred Work
- real SMTP/IMAP test-bed verification and operator runbook;
- recipient import with column mapping;
- session/device revocation UI;
- backup/restore, monitoring, and update procedures;
- DSAR workflows and evidence bundle verifier;
- campaign ownership transfer workflow;
- policy impact analysis before delete/disable/unshare/change;
- LDAP/OIDC/SAML provisioning;
- destructive tenant erasure orchestration.