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feat: release authentication diagnostics 0.2.0

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zemion
2026-08-19 14:13:48 +02:00
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SECURITY.md
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All inputs are processed in the browser tab. There are no application `fetch`, WebSocket, beacon, analytics, service-worker, credential-storage or remote-metadata paths. OTP secrets, OCRA PIN input, imported files, WebAuthn responses and live test credential metadata are React/session memory and disappear on reload or **Clear session**.
Downloads and clipboard writes require a user action. Exports are not encrypted. The UI masks OTP secrets and provisioning URIs by default, but masking is not memory protection.
Downloads and clipboard writes require a user action. URI/CSV exports are not encrypted; the dedicated encrypted format uses an authenticated cipher and a user-supplied password. The UI masks OTP secrets and provisioning URIs by default, but masking is not memory protection.
## Trust boundaries
- The static release and its hosting origin are trusted code. A compromised host can alter JavaScript and steal subsequently entered material; verify the release SHA-256 when this matters.
- Imported URIs, CSV, XML, protobuf, JSON, Base64url and CBOR are untrusted. Size/depth/count limits are applied before or during decoding. Imported text is rendered by React, never as markup. The only generated markup insertion is the project-owned QR SVG serializer, which receives an already serialized provisioning URI and emits path coordinates only.
- WebAuthn client data is verified as exact strings/bytes. Origins and RP IDs are not suffix-matched. The expected challenge is caller-supplied ceremony state; the tool cannot prove that a server generated or consumed it once.
- Signature verification establishes consistency with the supplied COSE public key, not account ownership or attestation trust.
- Assertion signatures establish consistency with the supplied COSE public key. Attestation checks establish format-specific cryptographic bindings; certificate-chain trust and authenticator policy remain separate. Imported FIDO metadata has its JWS signer checked but does not silently install a trust root.
## Origin isolation
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## Cryptography
HMAC, digest, random generation, public-key import and signature verification use the browser Web Cryptography API. No custom cryptographic primitive is implemented. OTP dynamic truncation and OCRA data-input assembly are project code covered by RFC vectors.
HMAC, digest, random generation, PBKDF2 key derivation, AES-GCM authenticated encryption, public-key import and signature verification use the browser Web Cryptography API. No custom cryptographic primitive is implemented. OTP dynamic truncation, OCRA data-input assembly and bounded DER/TPM structure interpretation are project code covered by tests.
The encrypted backup format uses a 16-byte random salt, 600,000 PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 iterations, a 256-bit AES-GCM key, a 96-bit random IV, a 128-bit authentication tag and authenticated version/KDF/cipher metadata. Decryption failures do not expose partial plaintext. It is an export format, not persistent storage.
SHA-1 remains available only where HOTP/TOTP/OCRA interoperability standards require it; it is used inside HMAC or as an explicitly selected OCRA PIN digest, not as a collision-resistant document signature.
## Parser limits
- Provisioning URI: 16 KiB.
- Migration/CSV/PSKC input: 4 MiB.
- Migration/CSV/PSKC input: 4 MiB; vendor/encrypted backup input: 16 MiB.
- Google protobuf: bounded input, varints at most 10 bytes, supported wire types only.
- CBOR: 4 MiB, depth 32, 10,000 items, definite lengths only, duplicate map keys rejected.
- OTP secret: 1 KiB; random generation: 16–1,024 bytes.
- Verification windows: TOTP 100 steps maximum; HOTP 10,000 counters maximum.
- QR encoder: version 10 maximum.
- Verification windows: routine TOTP 100 steps maximum; explicit drift search 10,000 periods; HOTP 10,000 counters maximum.
- QR encoder: version 10 maximum. QR decoder: 16 MiB, 4096 px per side and 16 megapixels.
- FIDO Metadata BLOB: 32 MiB, 100,000 entries and 20 signer certificates maximum.
## Not a vault or identity provider
## Not persistent storage or an identity provider
Do not use this app as the only copy of a credential. It does not offer encrypted persistence, recovery codes, account recovery, server-side challenge state, rate limiting, audit logging, device attestation policy, FIDO certification, or phishing protection outside normal browser WebAuthn behavior.
Do not use this app as the only copy of a credential. It does not offer browser persistence, recovery codes, account recovery, server-side challenge state, rate limiting, audit logging, a preconfigured device-attestation trust policy, FIDO certification, or phishing protection outside normal browser WebAuthn behavior.
Report vulnerabilities through the repository issue tracker without including real secrets or production assertions.